Delhi High Court Rejects 'Unbelievable' Settlement To Quash POCSO Conviction, Says It Would Harm Interests Of Minors
Nupur Thapliyal
16 Oct 2026 12:10 PM IST

The Delhi High Court has refused to quash a man's conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act on the basis of a settlement with the victim, describing the memorandum of understanding between them as “incredulous and unbelievable”.
Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora observed that the case did not fall within the category of cases colloquially known as “Romeo-Juliet” cases, noting that the victim was 16 years old while the accused was 27 at the time of the incident.
The Court observed that the accused had persisted with unwanted attention towards the victim despite her express rejection of his advances.
It further noted that the victim had never harboured affection for him and had stood by her statement before the Trial Court, leading to his conviction.
“The reason recorded in the MoU i.e., 'parties are neighbours' fails to satisfy the conscience of the Court so as to justify exercise of its extraordinary equitable jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS,” the Court said.
The Court was hearing a plea filed by one Sushil Kumar seeking quashing of an FIR registered in 2019 at Tigri Police Station, as well as the consequent conviction.
The quashing was sought on the ground that he had entered into a memorandum of understanding with the complainant.
The complainant had stated in the MoU, dated January 07, 2025, that she did not wish to pursue the FIR as the parties were neighbours.
The accused relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh to contend that the proceedings could be quashed on the basis of the settlement.
Opposing the plea, the Delhi Police submitted that the complainant was a minor at the time of the incident and that the accused had been convicted under the POCSO Act.
Rejecting the plea, the Court observed that the POCSO Act is intended to protect minors and children, who constitute a vulnerable section of society, from sexual harassment and predatory behaviour.
It further noted that the Act does not recognise a minor victim's consent as a valid defence to an offence committed under the statute.
“The safety of minors, children and adult women is a persisting monumental concern in our civil society,” the Court observed.
It added that accepting the MoU after the accused's conviction under the POCSO Act, for the purpose of quashing the FIR and conviction, would be against the interests of the State and the public, particularly minors, and would amount to a mockery of justice and an abuse of the Court's extraordinary equitable jurisdiction.
“In the considered opinion of this Court, a conviction under POCSO Act cannot be quashed on the bare plea that the accused and complainant have now reached a compromise agreeing to quash the FIR and the consequent conviction. The MoU in this case is incredulous and unbelievable,” the Court said.
Observing that safety of minors, children and adult women is a persisting monumental concern in civil society, the Court said such category of individuals continue to remain vulnerable despite efforts from the State, due to the unchanging mindset of the predators and accused.
“In this Court's considered opinion, accepting the subject MoU after the accused stands convicted under POCSO Act, for quashing the FIR and conviction, would be against the interest of the State, the public more specifically the minors. It would be a mockery of justice and would be an abuse of the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court. Given the widespread prevalence of such offences within society, any infraction, regardless of magnitude, perpetrated against a minor demands immediate punitive action and should not go unpunished,” the Court said.
Justice Pushkarna distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Ramgopal, noting that the case before it concerned a physical altercation arising out of monetary disputes that resulted in assault and injury.
The facts of the present case, it held, did not warrant the exercise of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petition.

