The Court held that there is no rule of law requiring the evidence of every complainant in a bribery case to be corroborated in all material particulars, and that whether corroboration is necessary and to what extent depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court upheld the conviction of a former bank manager for demanding and accepting a bribe, while reducing the sentence of imprisonment.

The Court was hearing an appeal directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Jammu, whereby the appellant was convicted for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Jammu & Kashmir Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 of the Ranbir Penal Code. The appellant, who was posted as Manager of a rural bank, was alleged to have demanded and accepted illegal gratification for releasing the second instalment of a loan sanctioned in favour of the complainant.

The appeal was heard by Justice Sanjay Dhar, who observed,

A person concerned in the commission of crime, a partner in crime and associate in guilt is an accomplice. He takes part in the crime and is privy to the criminal intent. In our opinion a witness forced to pay on promise of doing or forbearing to do any official act by a public servant, is not a partner in crime and associate in guilt and therefore cannot be said to be accomplice.”

Background

As per the prosecution case, the complainant had applied for and obtained sanction of a loan of Rs. 1.00 lakh from a rural bank and had received the first instalment of Rs. 35,000. For the release of the second instalment of Rs. 65,000, the appellant, who was posted as Manager of the bank, demanded Rs. 7,000 as illegal gratification.

After persuasion, the appellant agreed to release the loan instalment if an amount of Rs. 5,000 was paid to him. The complainant lodged a written complaint before the Vigilance Organization, on the basis of which an FIR was registered and a trap was laid.

The trap team, comprising officers of the Vigilance Organization and two independent witnesses, proceeded to the complainant's shop. The complainant produced Rs. 5,000, comprising six currency notes of Rs. 500 denomination and twenty currency notes of Rs. 100 denomination.

After the pre-trap demonstration, the complainant, along with the trap team, proceeded to the market. At about 1605 hours, the appellant reached the shop, and after taking a cold drink, demanded the bribe money from the complainant, who handed over the amount to the appellant. The shadow witness gave the pre-fixed signal, and the trap team gathered outside the shop.

The trap laying officer introduced himself to the appellant, who tried to throw away the accepted bribe money from the back pocket of his pant. However, he was caught hold of by the members of the trap team. A solution of sodium carbonate was prepared, and the appellant was made to wash his hands in the said solution, which turned pink.

Similarly, the right-side back pocket of the pant worn by the appellant was also washed with the solution, and its colour also turned pink. The bribe money was recovered from the back pocket of the pant worn by him.

The trial court, after analysing the evidence, concluded that the prosecution had successfully proved that the trap was genuinely laid on the basis of the written complaint, and that the appellant had demanded and accepted the bribe money. The trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant, which led to the filing of the appeal.

The appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the prosecution had not established the essential ingredients of demand, acceptance, and recovery of illegal gratification.

It was contended that the shadow witness had turned hostile, and therefore, no conviction could have been recorded on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. It was further contended that the complainant had not installed the machinery, which was a precondition for the release of the second instalment, and when the appellant refused to release the instalment, he lodged a false complaint against him.

Court's Observation

The Court extensively analysed the legal position regarding the evidentiary value of a bribe giver's testimony. The Court held that while an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused, and a conviction based on his uncorroborated testimony is not illegal, there is a rule of prudence requiring the court to look for corroboration. However, the Court distinguished between an accomplice and a bribe giver.

The Court held,

“Now coming to the witnesses in trap cases, as held in Basawan Singh case by a Bench of five Judges, if any of the witnesses are accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charge, their evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not accomplices in that sense but are only partisan or interested witnesses who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as other interested evidence is tested which may vary from case to case.”

The Court further held,

“Where a bribe has already been demanded from a man and if without giving the bribe he goes to the police or magistrate and brings them to witness the payment it will be a legitimate trap and in such cases at the most he can be treated as an interested witness and whether corroboration is necessary or not will be within the discretion of the court depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”

The Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2023), which laid down that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to establish the guilt of the accused, and that in the absence of direct evidence, the demand and acceptance can be proved by circumstantial evidence.

The Court observed that in the present case, the complainant had clearly stated that the appellant came to his shop, asked whether he had arranged the money, and demanded it. The complainant handed over the tainted amount to the appellant, who, after counting it, put it in the right-side back pocket of his pant.

The Court noted that even the hostile shadow witness corroborated the complainant's statement to the extent that the demand emanated from the appellant and the tainted money was handed over by the complainant to the appellant.

The Court held,

“Thus, it cannot be stated that the finding of the learned trial court, that there was a transaction involving tainted money in the form of demand and acceptance at the time of the trap proceedings, is based only on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant.”

The Court further held that the members of the trap team consistently stated that when the shadow witness conducted the search of the right-side back pocket of the appellant, the appellant pushed him, as a result of which the currency notes fell down on the ground, which were picked up and tallied with the serial numbers noted on the slip.

The Court noted that the hand wash and pant wash of the appellant turned pink immediately after the trap, which led to the presumption that the appellant had willingly received the currency notes.

The Court rejected the defence of the appellant that the complainant had thrust the money into his pocket, holding that the appellant visited the shop of the complainant at the time of the trap proceedings, which led to the inference that he had gone there to collect the bribe money. The Court further held that the defence witnesses had no knowledge of what had happened in the shop before they reached the spot, and therefore, their statements could not be relied upon.

The Court thus observed that the prosecution had proved the demand, acceptance, and recovery of the tainted money, and upheld the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court.

However, considering that the appellant had undergone trial for about six years and the appeal had remained pending for nine years, the Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment from two years to one year for each of the offences. The appellant was directed to surrender before the trial court within one month to serve the sentence.