The Court observed that even if the period allegedly spent by the accused in custody before registration of the FIR was included while computing the statutory period, he was not entitled to default bail, as the prosecution had filed the charge-sheet before completion of 180 days from his first remand.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Justice Mohd Yousuf Wani held that “Since the charge-sheet was filed within the prescribed period, the indefeasible right of the applicant to default bail stood extinguished.”

The petitioner, Syed Ahmad Parimoo, approached the High Court seeking default bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, read with Article 21 of the Constitution.

He contended that the statutory maximum period of 180 days under Section 187 of the BNSS, read with Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, had expired and that his continued incarceration was therefore illegal.

The case arose out of FIR registered on April 17, 2026, after the petitioner and three others were apprehended by a naka party with live hand grenades.

The petitioner was produced before the Special Court on April 18, 2026, at about 3:30 pm and remanded to judicial custody.

The prosecution's chronology, placed before the High Court, showed that a report seeking extension of the investigation period under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA was submitted on July 6, 2026. The petitioner filed objections on July 13, and the Special Court, on July 15, extended the period of custody by 45 days against the 90 days sought by the prosecution.

A second report was submitted on August 19, 2026. The petitioner again filed objections, including a plea for default bail, before the Special Court. On August 24, the Special Court extended the investigation period to the statutory maximum of 180 days. The prosecution subsequently presented the charge-sheet before the Special Court on October 12, 2026.

The petitioner had filed the present application before the High Court on October 6, 2026, seeking release on default bail.

Court's Observation

The Division Bench considered the rival submissions and examined the sequence of remand orders, applications for extension of investigation and the date on which the charge-sheet was presented.

The respondents argued that the statutory period of 180 days had to be computed from April 18, 2026, when the petitioner was first remanded to judicial custody. On that calculation, the charge-sheet filed on October 12 was within the permissible period.

The Court also considered the judgments of the Division Bench in Syed Irfan Abdullah v. UT of J&K and Riyaz Ahmad Hajam v. UT of J&K. In Syed Irfan Abdullah, the Division Bench had held that an accused must be given an opportunity to oppose a prosecution request for extension of the investigation period, since such an extension affects the accused's right to default bail.

The judgment had also held that an application for default bail filed before expiry of the authorised custody period would be premature and not maintainable, particularly where the extension application was allowed and the charge-sheet was subsequently filed within the extended period.

The Court also relied upon Riyaz Ahmad Hajam, wherein the Division Bench had held that once a valid charge-sheet is filed within the prescribed or legally extended period, the right to default bail stands extinguished, irrespective of whether cognizance has been taken thereafter.

The Bench further referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Enforcement Directorate, Government of India v. Kapil Wadhawan & Anr., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 249.

Quoting the Supreme Court, the Bench noted,

“In cases where the charge-sheet/final report is filed on or after the 61st/91st day, the accused in our considered opinion would be entitled to default bail. In other words, the very moment the stipulated 60/90 day remand period expires, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the accused.”

Applying the principles laid down in the said judgment, the High Court held that the statutory period had to be computed with reference to the date of the first remand authorised by the Court.

The petitioner had also contended that he was already in custody for 17 days, from March 31, 2026, even before registration of the FIR and his formal arrest. His counsel argued that this period should also be taken into account while calculating the statutory period for default bail.

The Bench, however, found that the petitioner had failed to produce any document or material demonstrating that he had been kept in illegal custody from March 31 to April 17, 2026.

The Court noted that when counsel was asked whether this alleged illegal custody had been brought to the notice of the Special Court when the petitioner was produced for his first remand on April 18, 2026, he fairly conceded that no such record was available and that the issue had not been raised at that stage.

The Bench observed,

“This Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the list of dates, and also in view of the failure on the part of the petitioner to demonstrate from the record when he started agitating his illegal custody from 31.03.2026 to 17.04.2026, finds that there is not even an iota of evidence or any kind of record before the Court, or any application preferred before the Court, which would suggest that such an issue was brought before the Court.”

The Court held that the petitioner's assertion of prior illegal custody, unsupported by any contemporaneous material or proceedings before a court of law, could not be accepted for the purpose of computing the statutory period.

The Bench ultimately held that even if the period spent in remand was included while computing the 180 days under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, read with Section 167(2) of the CrPC and Section 187(3) of the BNSS, the petitioner was not entitled to statutory bail.

The prosecution had filed the charge-sheet on October 12, 2026, before completion of the 180-day period. The Court noted that the 180 days from the first remand were completed only on October 15, 2026.

The Bench accordingly held that the charge-sheet had been filed within the prescribed period and the petitioner's indefeasible right to default bail stood extinguished.

Finding that the case for default bail had not been made out, the Division Bench dismissed the application.