In a significant reaffirmation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code's commitment to expedition and finality, a Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, speaking through Justice Dipankar Datta, held in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited (2026 INSC 629) that a litigant cannot circumvent the strict limitation regime under Section 62 of the IBC by filing a defective appeal and curing defects at a later stage. Delivered on 1 June 2026, the judgment goes beyond the immediate question of re-filing delay and substantially clarifies the legal status of defective appeals within the insolvency framework.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) has consistently been interpreted by the Supreme Court as a legislation built around speed, certainty and finality. Since its inception, the Court has repeatedly emphasised that insolvency proceedings cannot be permitted to languish in procedural delays and that statutory timelines form the backbone of the insolvency framework. The latest addition to this jurisprudential line is the Supreme Court's decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited.

At first glance, the decision appears to concern a narrow procedural question: whether delay in re-filing an appeal after curing defects can be condoned. However, a closer examination reveals that the judgment does far more. It fundamentally recharacterizes the legal significance of defective appeals under Section 62 of the IBC and reinforces the principle that procedural devices cannot be used to dilute statutory timelines. In effect, the Court transforms what was traditionally viewed as a procedural irregularity into a jurisdictional consequence.

The judgment therefore deserves attention not merely for its outcome but for its broader implications on appellate practice under the IBC.

The Facts

The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”). The appellant, who was the liquidator of a corporate debtor, filed an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC.

The appeal itself was filed seven days beyond the initial forty-five-day limitation period prescribed under Section 62(1), though still within the additional fifteen-day condonable period contemplated under Section 62(2). However, the appeal was marked defective by the Registry. The defects were not cured within the prescribed period and the matter came to be re-filed after a further delay of eighty-two days. The appellant accordingly sought condonation both of the delay in filing and of the delay in re-filing.

The principal issue before the Court was whether, once a defective appeal is lodged within the limitation period, delay in curing defects and re-filing can continue to be condoned even after the statutory timelines under the IBC have expired.

Re-Filing Delay: Traditionally A Procedural Matter

Historically, courts have maintained a distinction between delay in filing and delay in re-filing.

Delay in filing concerns the institution of proceedings itself and therefore attracts stricter scrutiny. Re-filing delay, on the other hand, generally arises after proceedings have already been lodged before the court but contain certain curable defects. Consequently, courts have often adopted a more liberal approach towards condoning delays in re-filing, particularly where the initial filing was made within limitation.

This distinction was recognised by the Supreme Court itself in earlier decisions. The Court has often observed that defects attributable to counsel or clerical lapses should not ordinarily defeat substantive rights and that applications seeking condonation of re-filing delay deserve a more liberal approach than applications seeking condonation of delay in filing.

Indeed, the appellant relied upon an earlier decision involving the very same parties where the Supreme Court had condoned delay in re-filing an appeal under Section 61 of the IBC before the NCLAT. That earlier order had emphasised that courts often view lawyer-related lapses more leniently and that substantial justice should ordinarily prevail over technical defects. However, the Court in the present case found that such principles could not be mechanically transplanted into the framework of Section 62 of the IBC.

A Defective Appeal Is Not A Complete Appeal

The most significant aspect of the judgment lies in the Court's treatment of defective appeals.

The Court held that an appeal under Section 62 can be regarded as having been properly instituted within limitation only when it is filed in a form capable of being acted upon by the Registry and placed before the Court. A filing riddled with defects does not enjoy the same legal status as a valid appeal.

This observation marks an important conceptual shift.

Traditionally, litigants often regarded initial filing as sufficient to preserve limitation, with defects being viewed as procedural matters capable of subsequent rectification. The Court rejected this understanding. According to the judgment, a defective appeal remains a defective appeal until the defects are cured. Mere presentation of papers before the Registry does not automatically preserve the statutory right of appeal.

By adopting this approach, the Court effectively rejected the notion that litigants may secure limitation through what could be described as a “protective filing” and thereafter cure defects at their convenience.

Rejecting The Protective Filing Strategy

The Court posed a pointed question:

Can a litigant circumvent the rigours of limitation by filing a defective appeal merely to save limitation and thereafter cure defects at leisure?

Its answer was unequivocal.

Permitting such a practice, the Court held, would undermine the very objectives of the IBC. A litigant could indefinitely prolong proceedings by filing incomplete papers within limitation and subsequently seeking repeated indulgence for curing defects. Such an interpretation would render statutory timelines meaningless and frustrate the legislative objective of expedition.

The Court's concern was not merely procedural. It was institutional. The IBC was enacted to address delays that historically plagued insolvency and debt recovery proceedings. Allowing defective filings to indefinitely preserve appellate rights would reintroduce the very uncertainty that the Code sought to eliminate. The judgment therefore treats defective filings not as harmless procedural lapses but as potential instruments for defeating legislative intent.

The Emergence Of A Jurisdictional Bar

The Court's most consequential holding appears in its discussion of the relationship between Section 62 of the IBC and the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

Under the Rules, defects may ordinarily be cured within twenty-eight days and applications seeking condonation of delay in re-filing are generally maintainable. The appellant argued that since the Rules did not prescribe an absolute outer limit, the Court retained discretion to condone delays in re-filing upon sufficient cause being shown.

The Court rejected this submission.

According to the judgment, Section 62 constitutes a complete code governing appeals under the IBC. While procedural rules may regulate filing requirements, they cannot override or dilute the legislative mandate embodied in the statute itself.

The Court consequently held that once the statutory sixty-day window under Section 62 expires and defects are not cured within the twenty-eight-day period contemplated under the Supreme Court Rules, the right to appeal itself stands extinguished.

This is perhaps the most significant doctrinal contribution of the judgment.

The Court does not merely refuse to exercise discretion. Rather, it holds that jurisdiction itself ceases to exist. Once the statutory framework has run its course, there remains no appeal capable of being revived through procedural indulgence. In effect, re-filing delay under Section 62 is elevated from a matter of procedural discretion to a question of jurisdictional competence.

Reinforcing The “Complete Code” Doctrine

The judgment also fits neatly within the broader trend of insolvency jurisprudence.

Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly characterised the IBC as a self-contained and exhaustive legislative framework. Decisions such as Mobilox Innovations v. Kirusa Software, V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd., Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., and Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee have consistently underscored that strict adherence to timelines is indispensable to the success of the insolvency regime.

The present decision extends that logic further.

While earlier cases largely focused on delay in initiating proceedings or filing appeals, the present judgment addresses a more nuanced issue-whether procedural defects can indirectly achieve what direct condonation of delay cannot.

The Court's answer preserves the integrity of the statutory framework by ensuring that procedural mechanisms do not become vehicles for circumventing legislative timelines.

Implications For Insolvency Practice

The practical consequences of the judgment are substantial. First, litigants can no longer assume that filing a defective appeal within limitation will preserve their appellate rights indefinitely. Registry objections now acquire heightened significance.

Secondly, insolvency professionals, liquidators and resolution professionals must exercise greater diligence in appellate filings. The Court specifically declined to extend special treatment merely because the appellant was a liquidator acting for the benefit of stakeholders.

Thirdly, the decision provides greater certainty and finality to successful litigants. Parties prevailing before the NCLAT may now be less vulnerable to prolonged appellate uncertainty arising from defective filings that remain pending for months.

Finally, the judgment sends a strong signal to practitioners that compliance with procedural requirements is not a peripheral aspect of insolvency litigation. Under the IBC, procedural discipline forms an integral component of substantive rights.

The decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited is not merely another judgment reiterating the importance of limitation under the IBC. Its significance lies in recognising that defective appeals cannot be used as a mechanism to preserve appellate rights beyond the strict timelines prescribed by Parliament.

By holding that the right to appeal stands extinguished once both the statutory period and the permissible re-filing window expire, the Supreme Court has effectively transformed re-filing from a procedural concern into a jurisdictional issue. The judgment therefore represents a logical but significant extension of the Court's long-standing commitment to expedition and finality under the IBC.

In doing so, it reinforces a central message that has increasingly come to define insolvency jurisprudence in India: timelines under the IBC are not merely directory milestones but substantive boundaries that courts will not permit litigants to cross through procedural ingenuity.

Author is a Law student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Views are personal.