The Supreme Court has questioned whether its 2017 ruling in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana, which restricted intra-court appeals in certain writ proceedings connected with criminal-law matters, places an unnecessary burden on litigants by limiting their ability to challenge a Single Judge's decision passed in a contempt jurisdiction before a High Court Division Bench.

A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu observed that approaching the Supreme Court can involve substantial expenses, including the cost of travel, boarding, lodging, preparing and presenting a case, and securing reasonable legal representation.

“Long distance is not the only disabling factor; heavy expenses for boarding/lodging and for the proper presentation of a case and reasonable representation before this Court are also involved, notwithstanding what science and technology have helped the system to achieve,” the Court observed, while hearing a case where it examined the maintainability of a Special Appeal (intra court appeal) against a Single Judge's order before the Division Bench of the High Court passed in contempt proceedings arising from a writ petition.

The judgment authored by Justice Datta questioned the approach in Ram Kishan Fauji, which treated certain writ proceedings arising from criminal-law matters as involving the exercise of criminal jurisdiction for determining the availability of an intra-court appeal.

The Court explained that criminal jurisdiction refers to the authority of a court to entertain, try and decide criminal proceedings. Such jurisdiction is conferred by legislation, including the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita or a special law, in accordance with the applicable territorial, subject-matter and hierarchical limits. Therefore, the mere fact that a right asserted by a litigant originates in a statute containing criminal-law elements does not transform the High Court's constitutionally conferred writ jurisdiction into ordinary criminal jurisdiction so as to defeat an intra-court appeal under the Letters Patent.

“Writ remedy under Article 226, being a public law remedy, its invocation presupposes a public law element, i.e., infringement of a legally protected right and failure of public duty. Existence of the jurisdiction does not depend on whether the factual matrix originates in civil or criminal law. What is relevant is the nature of the grievance: whether a legally protected right has been infringed and also as to whether the right claimed is capable of being judicially enforced through a writ. The subject matter of a writ petition – whether having its roots in contract, service, taxation or criminal complaint – is not decisive of the nature of jurisdiction; what is decisive is the character of the lis and the nature of relief sought. Merely because the right asserted has its origin in a statute containing criminal elements cannot convert the special and exclusive constitutionally conferred 'writ jurisdiction' on the high courts into ordinary 'criminal jurisdiction' to defeat an intra-court appeal under the Letters Patent.”, the Court observed.

In a nutshell, the Court said that when a contempt proceeding results in a fine or a punishment, it cannot be automatically treated as a criminal contempt to oust the option of an intra-court appeal against the Single Bench order passed in a contempt proceeding arising out of a writ jurisdiction.

When can an intra-court appeal be filed against the Single Judge's order?

The Court also held that, where permitted by the applicable Letters Patent or High Court rules, an intra-court appeal may lie against a Single Judge's order in contempt proceedings if the order satisfies the tests of a “judgment” laid down in Midnapore Peoples' Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006).

“we think that an intra court appeal would lie…in cases/situations such as:

(i) an order issuing direction to a party who was either not bound by the original/parent order, or, who was originally not a party to the writ proceedings, except where such party steps into the shoes of the original respondent and the obligation to secure compliance rests on him;

(ii) an order requiring compliance with the original/parent order once again, upon examining the correctness of the purported order of compliance and rejecting such order;

(iii) an order which travels beyond the original/parent order, of which contempt is alleged, and issues directions not present in the original/parent order; and

(iv) an order deciding disputed questions of fact/law having the effect of finally determining rights of parties.”, the Court said.

Ram Kishan Fauji has been sent for reconsideration

Since Ram Kishan Fauji was decided by a three-judge Bench, the present two-judge Bench referred the issue to an appropriate Bench. The questions include whether the Letters Patent provisions governing intra-court appeals were correctly interpreted in that decision, whether its reasoning is consistent with access to justice, and whether the ruling warrants reconsideration.

The Court has not overruled Ram Kishan Fauji; the questions have been referred for further consideration by an appropriate bench, subject to such order as the Chief Justice of India may issue on the administrative side

The terms of reference framed were as follows:

“Does the decision in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana, (2017) 5 SCC 533 correctly interpret the Letters Patent governing the various high courts on maintainability of intra-court appeals in the light of the nature of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution, adverted to above? Does the ratio not, effectively, negate proper access to justice at the intra-court appellate level, apart from creating a division in Article 226 not contemplated by the framers of the Letters Patent or the Constitution? Should the decision in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) be revisited in view of the discussions in paragraphs 49 to 51 of this opinion?”

Background

The case arose from contempt proceedings before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, concerning the appointment of Assistant Prosecution Officers.

After an earlier writ order dated March 17, 2026, concerning the respondents' candidature, the authorities rejected their candidature on September 2, 2026, and filed a compliance affidavit.

The Single Judge rejected the affidavit, observed that the State was obligated to appoint the candidates, and warned the Additional Chief Secretary of personal appearance and the possibility of charges being framed.

Against the Single Judge order, the appellant moved to the Supreme Court contending that the contempt court had travelled beyond the original writ judgment by examining the authorities' decision on candidature and effectively granting relief that had not been directed in the original proceedings.

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Appellant could have filed an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court against the Single Judge order.

In light of the above observations and the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court permitted the appellant to file a Special Appeal before the Allahabad High Court within two weeks. However, it left open the question of whether Ram Kishan Fauji was correct in treating contempt proceedings involving a criminal element as criminal proceedings, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the Division Bench under the Letters Patent.

It also stayed the contempt proceedings before the Single Judge for two months.

For Petitioner(s) :Mr. K.M. Nataraj, A.S.G. Mr. Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, Sr. A.A.G. Ms. Ruchira Goel- 2477, AOR Ms. Indira Bhakar, Adv. Mr. Sharanya, Adv. Mr. Anuj Udupa, Adv. Ms. Rishika Rishabh, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Dr. Amrendra Nath Tripathi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Gunjan Kumar- 2907, AOR Mr. Ankit Kumar, Adv. Mr. Kamal Singh Bisht, Adv.