Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 91, Section 227 — Accused seeking production of unrelied documents at the stage of framing of charges — Permissibility, limits, and procedure for inspection - While an accused is entitled to documents available with the prosecuting agency to shape their defence, the entitlement to demand production of unrelied documents at the pre-charge stage under Section 91 CrPC is not absolute - Internal records of the investigating agency (such as Daily Diary Registers, Dispatch Registers, and Source Information Reports) and case diaries are confidential/privileged and cannot be directed to be divulged or produced - Where the seized but unrelied documents are voluminous, the appropriate procedure is to allow the accused or their authorized representative to inspect the seized documents with the permission of the Court - Upon inspection, the accused may specify in writing the particular document(s) required, signed by both parties, which the prosecution shall keep ready and produce before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage of trial (when relevant prosecution or defence witnesses are examined) - Documents not in the possession or custody of the investigating agency cannot be directed to be produced - the accused remains at liberty to procure them independently (via RTI or defence evidence) to establish their defence. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568; Sarla Gupta and Anr. v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 7 SCC 626; Paras 6–14] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anil Dixit, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1001 : 2026 INSC 1064

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 222, 386(b), & 464 – Conversion of POCSO Conviction to Section 376 IPC in Absence of Formal Charge – Cognate Offences & Absence of Failure of Justice - The omission to frame a specific or alternative charge under Section 376 IPC does not bar the Appellate Court from convicting the accused under Section 376 IPC where the charge under Section 4 POCSO Act fails due to lack of proof of the victim's age, provided the actus reus of rape is conclusively proved - Section 375 IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act share identical ingredients and actus reus, with the victim's minority being the sole distinguishing feature - Where the accused was put to notice and given full opportunity to defend against penetrative sexual assault, no prejudice or failure of justice is occasioned under Section 464 CrPC - Under Section 222 and Section 386(b) CrPC, the Appellate Court is fully empowered to alter the finding and convict the accused for the cognate/minor offence under Section 376(1) IPC and modify the sentence accordingly. [Distinguished from Luis Caetano Viegas v. Estrelina Mariana R.M.A Da'Costa, (2002) 9 SCC 144; Relied on P. Yuvaprakash v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846; Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263; Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 474; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Swaroop @ Barkat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 442; Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 9 SCC 507; Paras 41–47, 50-58] Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 924 : 2026 INSC 984

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 227 & 228 — Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 468 & 471 — Framing of charge of forgery — Non-recovery or non-production of original forged document along with chargesheet does not entitle accused to discharge - The absence of the original document alleged to have been forged is not fatal to the prosecution at the threshold stage of framing charge and does not sound the death knell of the criminal proceedings - The prosecution is entitled to lead secondary or circumstantial evidence at trial to establish the commission of forgery beyond reasonable doubt - At the stage of framing charges under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, the Court cannot embark upon a roving inquiry or sift evidence as if conducting a mini-trial - it is sufficient if the material on record creates a grave suspicion against the accused. [Paras 6 - 20] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Distinction from Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC - Public Law Remedy of Compensation - Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(2) BNSS) operates on a distinct footing - In default bail cases, re-arrest is permissible upon filing of the chargesheet on cogent grounds, whereas breaches under Article 22(1) and 22(2) occur at the threshold of the arrest itself and violate fundamental rights, requiring strict judicial safeguards before custody can be sought again - For illegal detention in violation of Article 22(2), the constitutional court may direct payment of compensation under public law remedies as exemplary damages / palliative relief for infringement of civil liberties, without relegating the citizen solely to private law remedies, though reserving liberty to claim damages under private civil law. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; Paras 28-36] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 & Section 386 — Appeal against Acquittal — Scope of Appellate Interference — Principles governing reversal of trial court's acquittal - An appellate court considering an appeal against acquittal must bear in mind the cardinal principles - (1) presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is not weakened but reinforced by an acquittal; (2) if two reasonable views are possible on the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted; (3) the appellate court must give proper weight and consideration to the trial court's assessment regarding credibility and demeanour of witnesses, as the trial judge had the distinct advantage of seeing and hearing them; and (4) the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt - To reverse an acquittal, it is imperative for the appellate court to record a clear finding that the trial court's view is perverse, misread the evidence, or is an impossible conclusion unsupported by the material on record. [Relied on Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Samman Dass, 1972 INSC 11; Paras 7 - 13] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Maintainability of Corporate Prosecution without Arraigning or Identifying Natural Persons / Alter Ego - Criminal proceedings against a corporate entity cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC on the sole ground that no natural person/alter ego has been identified or arraigned alongside it in the chargesheet - The role and mental element of a company can be prima facie disclosed through its own conduct, decisions, and surrounding circumstances without naming specific individuals at the threshold stage - Establishing attribution conclusively is a matter of evidence to be determined during trial - While non-arraignment under provisions like Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is fatal to prosecuting individuals because liability is vicarious and derivative, no such condition precedent applies in reverse to corporations prosecuted for direct offences under the IPC or Prevention of Corruption Act. [Relied on Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, [1995] 2 A.C. 500; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530; Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74; Paras 175–187, 188–197] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 & Section 362 – Inherent Powers of the High Court – Bar under Section 362 – Scope of Recall vs. Substantive Review – Claim of Juvenility – Recall of earlier order dismissing appeal – Permissibility where order suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction or mistake by Court resulting in grave injustice - The High Court has inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to recall its previous order or judgment where an accused/convict was a juvenile on the date of occurrence and was deprived of statutory benefits due to a mistake committed by the Court - The bar enacted under Section 362 CrPC against altering or reviewing a judgment does not extinguish or curtail the inherent powers of the High Court to correct palpable mistakes, procedural irregularities, or orders passed under a misconception of law that result in a failure of justice - The principle actus curiae neminem gravabit (no person should suffer on account of a mistake of the Court) applies squarely - A petition seeking recall of an order on the ground of an inherent lack of jurisdiction (such as lack of trial jurisdiction over a juvenile) is in the nature of a procedural review, which is not barred by Section 362 CrPC. [Relied on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1988) 2 SCC 602; Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050; Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 703; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578; Paras 27–33] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 & 164 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 – Omissions in previous statements – Maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' – Held - Statements recorded under Section 161 and Section 164 CrPC are not substantive evidence; their legitimate use is strictly confined to contradicting the witness under Section 145 Evidence Act - An omission matures into a contradiction only if the omitted fact is irreconcilable with the court testimony or is one which the witness would ordinarily have been expected to state - Omission of background and contextual facts (such as antecedent ill-treatment or threats) by an illiterate witness does not destroy the credibility of her core account of sexual assault and strangulation - The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply in India - courts must separate the grain from the chaff and act on the reliable core. [Relied On Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505; Selvamani v. State of T.N., (2024) 19 SCC 112; Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 INSC 525; Paras 32, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 235(2) & 354(3) – Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 21 – Sentencing Principles – Same-Day Sentencing – Aggravating vs. Mitigating Circumstances – Intermediate Sentence of Natural Life Imprisonment without Remission – Held - (i) Imposing the death sentence on the same day as conviction violates Section 235(2) CrPC as expounded in Allaudin Mian - the sentencing court must provide an effective opportunity to place individualised mitigating circumstances on record; (ii) The High Court's formulation evaluating the "crime test at 100% and criminal test at 0%" is legally flawed - the criminal test can almost never be zero, and sentencing courts cannot ignore the circumstances of the offender; (iii) Although "instrumental silencing" (murdering a child victim to destroy evidence and suppress the rape) is an aggravating circumstance of the highest order, it relates to the crime and does not automatically establish that the criminal is beyond reformation - The State failed to discharge its burden of proving that the accused was incorrigible - The convict had no prior criminal antecedents, suffered severe childhood deprivation, maintained unblemished prison conduct over eight years, and showed no psychiatric disorder; (iv) Applying the Sriharan doctrine, life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission serves as an adequate and severe intermediate punishment to meet the ends of justice while keeping the possibility of reform intact - Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. [Relied On Allaudin Mian v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 16 SCC 584; Manoj v. State of M.P., (2023) 2 SCC 353; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546; Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460; Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 15 SCC 401; Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1043; Paras 148, 149, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 167, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 201, 202, 203] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 391 & 367 – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Legal aid counsel appointed on the very date when the star witness was examined and cross-examined in a capital case – Held - Appointing a legal aid counsel and recording the complete deposition of the key prosecution witness on the self-same day without providing adequate opportunity to prepare violates the standard of effective legal assistance and meaningful cross-examination guaranteed under Article 21 - this infirmity stood adequately cured when the Supreme Court invoked Section 391 read with Section 367 CrPC to direct a curative further cross-examination of the witness through counsel of the accused's choice with the complete record furnished in advance - Her testimony must be appreciated by reading together her original deposition and the further cross-examination. [Paras 4, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Constitution of India — Article 20(3), Article 22(5) — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 23 — Preventive detention based on extra-judicial confession made to police — Inadmissibility and invalidity - A confessional statement made before a police officer cannot, by itself and in the absence of independent material lending support thereto, constitute the basis for forming the subjective satisfaction necessary to sustain an order of preventive detention - Under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (analogous to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), confessions made before police officers are inherently suspect and excluded from evidence - If such a confession is too tainted to be received in evidence for proving guilt, it cannot legitimately constitute a valid ground for preventive detention, particularly when procured under alleged threat or torture in violation of Article 20(3) - Under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the inclusion of an irrelevant or legally impermissible ground strikes at the root of the detenu's right to make an effective representation and vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. [Relied on Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569; Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur, (2010) 9 SCC 618; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424; Distinguished from Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N., (2006) 5 SCC 676; E. Subbulakshmi v. State of T.N., (2017) 1 SCC 757; Paras 15, 30–36, 38–39] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Safety in Public Spaces & Institutional Accountability - The right to live with dignity, free from fear of violence, is an intrinsic facet of the fundamental guarantee of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution - Recurring sexual offences in public parks, roads, and transit facilities across Delhi-NCR expose a systemic failure of law enforcement and civic administrative bodies - Public spaces cannot be allowed to turn into high-risk zones due to poor lighting, lax patrolling, and deficient surveillance - Mere expressions of concern and solidarity by authorities, devoid of accountability, do not solve institutional security lapses - measurable responsibility must be fixed upon authorities entrusted with crime prevention and public order. [Paras 5-15] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996

Constitution of India — Article 22(1), Article 22(2), and Article 21 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 50, Section 57, and Section 167 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India — Article 22(1), Article 22(2), and Article 21 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 50, Section 57, and Section 167 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India – Articles 21, 226, 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173(8), Section 482 – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Constitution of India – Articles 21, 226, 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173(8), Section 482 – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Constitution of India — Distinction from Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC - Public Law Remedy of Compensation - Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(2) BNSS) operates on a distinct footing - In default bail cases, re-arrest is permissible upon filing of the chargesheet on cogent grounds, whereas breaches under Article 22(1) and 22(2) occur at the threshold of the arrest itself and violate fundamental rights, requiring strict judicial safeguards before custody can be sought again - For illegal detention in violation of Article 22(2), the constitutional court may direct payment of compensation under public law remedies as exemplary damages / palliative relief for infringement of civil liberties, without relegating the citizen solely to private law remedies, though reserving liberty to claim damages under private civil law. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; Paras 28-36] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India — Procedure for Re-arrest / Fresh Custody Following Release for Breach of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) - An accused who has suffered a breach of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) does not enjoy a blanket permanent immunity from re-arrest - the investigating agency cannot automatically re-arrest the accused by executive fiat - Re-arrest requires prior judicial sanction/imprimatur; i. The investigating agency must file a formal application for custody before the concerned Magistrate setting forth the reasons and necessity for re-arrest and custodial interrogation, accompanied by an explanation for the initial default; ii. Such application can be moved only after furnishing the written grounds of arrest to the accused; iii. To eliminate foul play or collusion, the application must bear the prior endorsement of the immediate superior authority; iv. On the administrative side, the superior authority must transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate departmental/disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer(s); v. The Magistrate shall decide the application expeditiously, preferably within one week, adhering to principles of natural justice, and may grant custody only upon being satisfied with the bona fides of the explanation and the genuine necessity for re-arrest; vi. The same procedure applies mutatis mutandis to breaches under Article 22(2). [Paras 24 - 38] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India — Procedure for Re-arrest / Fresh Custody Following Release for Breach of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) - An accused who has suffered a breach of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) does not enjoy a blanket permanent immunity from re-arrest - the investigating agency cannot automatically re-arrest the accused by executive fiat - Re-arrest requires prior judicial sanction/imprimatur; i. The investigating agency must file a formal application for custody before the concerned Magistrate setting forth the reasons and necessity for re-arrest and custodial interrogation, accompanied by an explanation for the initial default; ii. Such application can be moved only after furnishing the written grounds of arrest to the accused; iii. To eliminate foul play or collusion, the application must bear the prior endorsement of the immediate superior authority; iv. On the administrative side, the superior authority must transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate departmental/disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer(s); v. The Magistrate shall decide the application expeditiously, preferably within one week, adhering to principles of natural justice, and may grant custody only upon being satisfied with the bona fides of the explanation and the genuine necessity for re-arrest; vi. The same procedure applies mutatis mutandis to breaches under Article 22(2). [Paras 24 - 38] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Corporate Criminal Liability — Possession of Mens Rea and the Three-Stage Sequential Framework of Attribution - The Supreme Court held that corporations can possess mens rea and be held criminally liable for offences requiring intent - Attributing the act and state of mind of an individual to a corporation fixes direct liability on the company, distinct from vicarious liability – The Supreme Court laid down a three-stage sequential/hierarchical framework to answer - "If X, a natural person, does an act while acting for a corporation, in what circumstances is X's act, and the state of mind accompanying it, to be treated as the corporation's own?" – I. Primary Stage: Examines whether the constitutional documents (Memorandum / Articles of Association) or rules implied by company law vest the person with the power to do the act; II. General Stage: Inquires whether the power to do the act was delegated (expressly or impliedly) to the person with sufficient discretion and independence in doing the act; III. Special Stage: Involves statutory construction to determine whether the purpose of the statute requires fashioning a special rule of attribution - Where the statutory purpose is narrow, it is tested in the abstract; where broad, it is examined in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Paras 23, 24, 137, 142–151, 171] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957

Criminal Jurisprudence — Defective Investigation — Shifting of Dead Body to Police Station vs. Hospital — Medical Impossibility of Instantaneous Death - Unexplained conduct and shoddy investigation creating reasonable doubt — Held: Medical expert evidence established that the gunshot wound sustained by the deceased could not cause instantaneous death and that a person of his physique would have survived for 3 to 6 hours - Conduct of relatives carrying the injured victim directly to the police station instead of taking him to a medical facility/hospital is highly unnatural and suspicious - the Investigating Officer's complete failure to prepare a site map of the scene of occurrence, non-recovery of firearms/empty cartridges from the spot, failure to seize blood-stained clothes, and failure to produce the gun license in court, fundamentally impair the prosecution version. [Paras 9-18] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Criminal Jurisprudence — Principle of Issue Estoppel — Relitigation of settled issues barred - Section 173(5) & 173(8) — Production of additional documents - Where a Division Bench of the High Court had previously declined to quash an FIR and chargesheet under Section 482 CrPC on the specific ground that the original plan was missing, a subsequent petition under Section 482 before a Single Judge raising the identical challenge against the order framing charges is barred by the doctrine of issue estoppel - A party cannot relitigate a proposition of fact or law distinctly raised and settled in earlier proceedings between the same parties - The requirement under Section 173(5) to submit all documents with the chargesheet is directory and not mandatory - The prosecution is not precluded from placing additional documents gathered during further investigation on record after the filing of the chargesheet. [Relied on Rama Shanker Lal & Ors. v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 905; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 INSC 522; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Paras 11 - 21] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032

Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — "Last Seen Together" Theory — Inferences from Cross-Examination Suggestions — Impermissibility - The theory of "last seen together" cannot be established when the witness testimonies lack consistency, contain material improvements over police statements, and fail to establish that the deceased accompanied the accused in close proximity to the time of death - The High Court committed a manifest error by holding that even if prosecution witnesses failed to depose in their examination-in-chief that the child accompanied the accused, a mere suggestion put by the defence counsel during cross-examination could be treated as an admission/inference establishing the "last seen together" theory to clinch the guilt of the accused - Circumstantial links cannot be substituted with erroneous inferences drawn from defence cross-examination suggestions. [Paras 23-42] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Evidentiary Value — Duty of Court - An extra-judicial confession is inherently a weak piece of evidence and, per se, cannot form the sole basis of conviction without independent and cogent corroboration - Wherever the court intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession upon due appreciation of the entire evidence, it must ensure that the confession inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence - If it suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities, the court is fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration - the prosecution alleged an extra-judicial confession was made to the village Sarpanch (PW-9) on 14.03.2007, whereas shopkeepers (PW-7 and PW-8) testified that the accused was already in police custody and brought to the shop on 12.03.2007 - This material contradiction, combined with the lack of intimate connection between the accused and the Sarpanch, completely belied the prosecution story. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403; Paras 31 – 43] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Criminal Law — Failure to Collect Corroborative Physical Clues / Telltale Evidence - Failure to recover any spent cartridges despite allegations of indiscriminate firing, non-recovery of the offending weapons, failure to seize the blood-stained clothes of the deceased or of the witnesses who allegedly carried him, omission to subject seized blood-stained earth to chemical examination, non-examination of independent eye-witnesses, and absence of injuries on accompanying witnesses despite indiscriminate firing, render the entire prosecution case doubtful and justify acquittal – Appeals allowed. [Paras 5-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Criminal Law — Forensic Evidence — Burden of Proof — Section 106, Evidence Act — Absence of DNA Profiling - Where human semen is detected on the underwear of the accused as well as on the rectal swab of the deceased, the prosecution is duty-bound to establish a positive link through DNA profiling or scientific matching - In the absence of a DNA match connecting the two samples, the mere presence of semen on the clothing of an unmarried accused cannot lead to a presumption of guilt - The burden cannot be shifted to the accused to prove that the semen did not belong to him or did not match the victim; the initial burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt remains squarely on the prosecution. [Paras 26 – 45] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Criminal Law — Hypothesis of Innocence — Benefit of Doubt - Applicability of the Principle of Hypothesis of Innocence — Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence — Held: Even where the prosecution case relies on purported direct eyewitness evidence, if the oral accounts suffer from irreconcilable contradictions and surrounding objective circumstances give rise to a plausible and reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the court is precluded from entering a conviction - The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Conviction and sentence set aside. [Paras 18–21] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 read with Section 34 — Arms Act, 1959 — Section 27 — Appreciation of Eyewitness Evidence — Related and Interested Witnesses - Reliability of Interested and Related Eyewitnesses — Significant contradictions, improvements, and lack of independent corroboration — Held: While related witnesses cannot be branded as interested witnesses solely by reason of relationship, where circumstances disclose a ring of falsity, closer scrutiny of their testimonies is warranted - Where the First Information Statement (FIS) omits material witnesses, substantial contradictions emerge with Section 161 CrPC statements, injury claims of alleged injured eyewitnesses are contradicted by medical evidence, and no independent local villagers are examined, unreserved reliance cannot be placed on such related witnesses to sustain a conviction. [Paras 12-20] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 307 read with Section 149, Section 148, Section 147 — Arms Act, 1959 — Section 27 — Defective/Collusive Investigation — Presumption of Guilt — Medical Evidence Contradicting Eye-witness Account — Inquest Prepared Prior to Registration of FIR/FIS - Investigation / Benefit of Defective Investigation - While a faulty investigation cannot ordinarily inure to the benefit of the accused, the Court cannot presume the guilt of the accused where there is a complete absence of reliable evidence simply because the Investigating Officer (I.O.) was recalcitrant or because allegations/complaints of collusive investigation were raised against the investigator - The High Court egregiously erred in relying upon a complaint against the I.O. that was not even brought on record during the trial to plug glaring evidentiary gaps and hold the prosecution case clinching. [Para 9 – 11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Criminal Law — Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony - Inquest Prior to First Information Statement (FIS) - Where ocular witnesses claimed that the party was walking in a single file led by the deceased and that the accused ambushed and shot the deceased in the back during indiscriminate firing from behind, but the expert medical evidence (ballistic/post-mortem) demonstrated that the deceased suffered an oval bullet entry wound with tattooing/blackening indicating a shot fired from close range (3–4 feet) while the victim was in a sitting position, the medical evidence directly discredited the eye-witness version - The High Court erred in brushing aside such expert medical evidence on mere conjectures of a "shaking hand" or moving target - The admission by the I.O. that the inquest was carried out before the First Information Statement was recorded renders the narration of events suspicious and premeditated. [Paras 7-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Criminal Trial — Evidence — Appreciation of Testimony — "Sterling Witness" — Non-Corroboration by Forensic and Medical Findings - Where the prosecution relies heavily on a prime witness whose account is riddled with contradictions, material improvements over Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements, and is directly refuted by expert medical and FSL examinations (showing an intact hymen, no vulval injury, and total absence of semen or male DNA), such a witness cannot be characterised as a "sterling witness" - When ocular testimony is entirely inconsistent with the scientific and medical evidence, and a plausible defence of false implication stemming from local disputes (water-sharing) is established, the accused is entitled to acquittal. [Relied on Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21; Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417; Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 SCC 684; Gangadhar alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) 9 SCC 202; Paras 5-10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008

Evidence Act – Solitary Witness / Related Witness / Child Sexual Abuse - Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 134 & 106 – Appreciation of Evidence in Intra-Household Sexual Offence – Solitary Witness – Testimony of Mother against Husband – Held: Section 134 establishes that evidence is to be weighed and not counted; conviction can be founded on a single reliable witness - A related witness is distinct from an interested witness - The mother of a victim child testifying against her own husband renounces her home and security, making it inherently improbable that she would shield the real killer of her daughter to falsely frame her husband - offences committed within the secrecy of a household seldom occur before multiple witnesses; demanding independent corroboration of a standard impossible to attain would confer immunity upon perpetrators - As an inmate of the house possessing special knowledge under Section 106, the burden rested on the appellant to offer a plausible explanation of how the child suffered sexual violation and homicidal death. [Relied On Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (1957) 1 SCC 700; Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1953) 2 SCC 36; State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752; Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 28, 29, 30, 31, 38, 39] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114A — Presumption as to Absence of Consent — Scope and Applicability - The statutory presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act does not apply mechanically merely because the prosecutrix denied consent - The denial of consent must be assessed in the overall matrix and context of her entire testimony - When surrounding facts, conduct, and lack of resistance demonstrate voluntary accompaniment and stay over multiple days, absence of consent cannot be accepted - mere presence of spermatozoa in vaginal swabs does not conclusively establish rape in the absence of internal or external injury and in the face of consensual conduct - A charge of rape must be proved beyond reasonable doubt on hard, credible evidence and not on surmises, conjectures, or personal value judgments of the trial judge - Even if the conduct of the accused is considered immoral or unethical, immorality sans credible evidence cannot justify a conviction under criminal law. [Paras 18-27] Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2026 INSC 1054

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 read with Section 114, Illustration (b) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 306 — Approver/Accomplice Testimony — Rule of Prudence — Requirement of independent material corroboration connecting the accused with the crime - An accomplice who secures pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. possesses a powerful incentive to minimize his own culpability and shift blame onto others - Although an accomplice is a competent witness under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, the rule of prudence under Section 114, Illustration (b) mandates independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the commission of the offence, and not merely connecting the transaction with the offence - Testimony of one participant in a bribe transaction (the bribe-giver) corroborating another participant (the approver intermediary) does not satisfy the requirement of independent corroboration in the sense required by law. [Relied on Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 52–55, 70-82] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 165 (BSA, 2023, Section 168) r/w CrPC — Section 311 (BNSS, 2023, Section 348) — Role and Duty of Trial Court - A criminal trial is not an adversarial game where the Presiding Officer acts as a mere recording machine - Under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 of the CrPC, the Court possesses wide powers and is required to take an active, participatory role to elicit truth and ensure material evidence necessary for just adjudication is brought on record - When the accused was present in the courtroom from judicial custody, the failure of the Public Prosecutor and the Trial Judge to have the victim identify the accused from the dock was a gross omission. [Paras 45–48, 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 [Now Proviso to Section 23(2), Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] — Disclosure Statement & Information Leading to Discovery — Inadmissibility when no new fact is discovered - A confession made to a police officer is inadmissible except to the extent permitted under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from the accused - Where no new fact is discovered and the disclosure statement merely relates to the demarcation or identification of places/spots already within the prior knowledge of the police and recorded in the site plan, Section 27 cannot be invoked, and the disclosure statement cannot be taken into consideration - The High Court fundamentally erred in holding that the disclosure statement dated 14.03.2007 led to the recovery of the deceased's body from the well, when the body had already been recovered by the police two days earlier on 12.03.2007. [Paras 38–44] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Evidence Act, 1872 — Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification — Evidentiary Value - Substantive evidence of identification is the identification of the accused by the witness while testifying in Court (dock identification); Test Identification Parade (TIP) conducted during police investigation is merely corroborative and not substantive evidence - Where the accused was not named in the FIR, his name was disclosed to the victim by the police, the sketch prepared with the victim's assistance was withheld from the Court, and the child victim explicitly stated that she could identify the accused if produced, but no dock identification was elicited during her sworn testimony, relying solely on the TIP to convict the accused was fatal to the prosecution. [Paras 40–44, 53- 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Evidence Act, 1872 - Witness Conduct – Abused and Coerced Woman – Absence of Immediate Reporting or Flight – Held - Courts must not assess the credibility of abused women or witnesses to trauma against preconceived, stereotyped notions of 'ideal' or 'expected' behaviour - Silence, prolonged cohabitation, and delayed reporting often arise from trauma, terror, economic dependency, learned helplessness, and coercive control in violent relationships - Perpetrators who secure silence through terror cannot subsequently exploit that very silence or lack of flight to attack the credibility of the victim or witness - Mere access to a mobile phone where the husband controlled the saved contacts does not denote liberty. [Relied On Rana Partap v. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327; XYZ v. State of M.P., (2021) 16 SCC 179; Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590.; Paras 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) & Section 6 – Child Victim's Disclosure – Admissibility as Dying Declaration and Res Gestae – Held - The verbal account given by a six-year-old child to her mother narrating the sexual assault immediately after the incident forms part of the "circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death" under Section 32(1) Evidence Act, as the sexual assault and the throttling were proximate, continuous, and connected stages of a single transaction aimed at silencing her - Expectation of death is not required under Section 32(1) - The disclosure is also admissible under Section 6 as res gestae, being spontaneous and proximate to the occurrence - The statement was strongly corroborated by the post-mortem finding of a fresh tear at the fourchette. [Relied On Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 4 SCC 161; Paras 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 8, 24 & 103 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 293 – Conduct of Accused; Extra-Judicial Confession; Defective Investigation; Absence of Male DNA – Held - (i) An extra-judicial confession made voluntarily before family members upon being confronted is admissible and provides corroboration; (ii) The appellant's subsequent conduct under Section 8 (inquiring whether the child had revealed anything, refusing hospitalisation, and attempting immediate burial) demonstrated consciousness of guilt; (iii) Under Section 293 CrPC, a DNA analysis report submitted by a Government Forensic Science Laboratory is admissible without calling the expert as a witness, especially when the accused did not seek to summon the expert under Section 293(2) - The absence of male DNA in a vaginal smear after the body had been washed prior to post-mortem does not displace the ocular account and genital tear; (iv) Lapses in investigation (such as lodging an FIR against an unknown person or delay in recording witnesses under Section 161) cannot ensure to the benefit of the accused when trustworthy ocular and medical evidence proves the case beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403; Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518; State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567; Paras 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 119] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Section 7A & Proviso – Plea of Juvenility – Stage at which it can be raised – Effect of earlier dismissal of Special Leave Petition as withdrawn - The plea of juvenility goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the trial Court and constitutes a jurisdictional fact - Under the Proviso to Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, a claim of juvenility can be raised before any Court at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case - The dismissal of a Special Leave Petition as "withdrawn" does not constitute an adjudication on merits and does not operate as an irrevocable bar of finality preventing the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 CrPC to give effect to an inquiry report of the Juvenile Justice Board declaring the convict to have been a juvenile on the date of the offence - The beneficial and remedial provisions of the Juvenile Justice legislations must receive a purposive and wide interpretation. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2005) 3 SCC 551; Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 193; Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 9 SCC 750; Paras 19–33] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Relocation of Children to Foreign Jurisdiction — Cultural Ethos vs. Best Interests - Rejecting the father's contention that relocation to the UK would lead to the loss of Bengali cultural ethos, held that there is no presumption that relocating abroad deprives children of their cultural roots, particularly when the mother herself belongs to the community and can nurture them accordingly - The mother was permitted to take both children to the United Kingdom, secure their admission in school, and file an undertaking to produce them as and when directed by Indian Courts. [Paras 51, 60–62] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 3(iii), (iv), (vi), and (ix) — Child's Voice and Best Interest - The statutory principles of participation, best interest, safety, and non-waiver of rights under Section 3 of the JJ Act make it imperative that the disclosure, emotional comfort, and safety of the child cannot be compromised - The son's morbid fear and reluctance towards the father, established during Chamber interactions and multiple independent counselling reports, cannot be overridden - Entrusting custody to the accused parent would also jeopardize a free and fair trial. [Paras 55, 56] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Media Guidelines & Responsible Journalism — Section 72, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 & Section 23, POCSO Act - Media outlets, journalists, and digital platforms bear a constitutional and ethical duty of restrained, empathetic journalism - Sensationalized headlines, graphic/lurid descriptions, and insensitive phraseology cause secondary trauma and are strictly deprecated - Direct or indirect disclosure of the identity of sexual assault victims or minors is statutorily prohibited under Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 23 of the POCSO Act - Media houses urged to provide dedicated columns/airtime pro bono displaying emergency helplines and protective systems. [Relied on Avishek Goenka v. Union of India & Anr., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 265 of 2011; Paras 17-19] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 52-A — Non-compliance with statutory sampling procedure — Total failure to draw samples before a Magistrate - While minor procedural delay or lapses under Section 52-A may not automatically vitiate the trial in the absence of prejudice, total non-compliance with the statutory mandate to draw representative samples in the presence of an Executive/Judicial Magistrate and certify the inventory strikes at the root of the prosecution case, rendering the integrity of the seizure and sampling process wholly doubtful. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 8 SCC 452; Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1779; Paras 31–34] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 42 and 50 — Applicability — Search of bags carried in open public place - Provisions of Section 42 and Section 50 of the NDPS Act do not apply where the recovery of contraband is effected from bags being carried by suspects apprehended from an open public place rather than through personal search of their bodies or search of an enclosed building/conveyance. [Para 16] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8, 20(b)(ii)(B), 20(b)(ii)(C), and Section 52-A — Search, Seizure & Sampling — Link Evidence & Chain of Custody — Unexplained delay and custody gap fatal to prosecution - To admit and rely upon a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report in NDPS prosecutions, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of custody and proper link evidence demonstrating that the samples were safely kept, properly sealed, and remained untampered with from the point of seizure until receipt at the laboratory - Where sample packets do not bear identifying marks or signatures of the accused/panch witnesses, maalkhana registers lack corresponding exit entries, carrier witnesses are not examined, and an unexplained gap of five days exists between dispatch from the SP Office and receipt at the FSL, the link evidence totally collapses - Once the FSL report is rendered unreliable and discarded, no admissible evidence survives to prove the nature of the seized substance. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Tara Singh, (2011) 11 SCC 559; Paras 20–29, 30-35] Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2026 INSC 1001

National Security Act, 1980 — Section 3(2) — Mere filing of charge-sheet and pendency of criminal cases — Invocation of preventive detention to defeat bail — Subversion of criminal process - The mere filing of a charge-sheet amounts only to an opinion of the investigating agency and does not constitute conclusive proof of guilt or disturbance of public order - While the pendency of a criminal prosecution is not an absolute bar to preventive detention (Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal affirmed), invoking preventive detention on the very same allegations when an accused has obtained or is likely to obtain bail demonstrates that the power was used punitively rather than preventively, seeking to subvert judicial orders of bail - The mere existence of multiple cases is not per se a ground for detention absent cogent, proximate material showing an imperative need to prevent future prejudicial activity - Impugned detention order and confirmation set aside with costs of Rs. 10 Lakh imposed on the State. [Relied on Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244; Paras 49–59, 63–69] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067

National Security Act, 1980 — Section 3(2), Section 8 — Scope of Judicial Review — Non-disclosure and non-supply of foundational material - Where the grounds of detention asserted that the detenu was identified as the mastermind via CCTV footages and call records with a "Boss," but neither the CCTV recordings nor the call records/mobile data formed part of the 22 documents relied upon or supplied to the detenu or produced before the Court, reliance on such undisclosed material is fatal to the detention order - A detention order cannot be founded on material that was never furnished to the detenu. [Relied on Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur, (2010) 9 SCC 618; Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587; State of Rajasthan v. Talib Khan, (1996) 11 SCC 393; Paras 44–48] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 201 Part II – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence – Essential Ingredients – Acquittal of main offence – Legality of conviction - A conviction under Section 201 Part II IPC cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the main crime was committed, that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed, and that the accused caused evidence thereof to disappear with the specific intention of screening the offender from legal punishment - Where the prosecution fails to establish the offences of dowry death and murder under Sections 302 and 304B IPC, resulting in an unassailed acquittal of the accused for those substantive offences, an isolated conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot be maintained and must be set aside. [Relied on Suleman Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1967) SCC OnLine SC 337; Kedar Nath & Ors. v. State of M.P., (1993) Supp (1) SCC 7; Para 32] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Medical Evidence — Discrepancy Regarding Time of Incident and Absence of DNA Profiling - Where the medical officer opined that the victim's genital injuries were 5 to 7 days old with foul pus and maggots, the prosecution's narrative that the crime was committed only 2 days prior stood contradicted and unreconciled - in the absence of any DNA profiling or serological matching connecting the biological fluids (sperm) found on the victim to the accused, the prosecution failed to establish a conclusive nexus, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. [Relied on Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K, (1971) 2 SCC 715; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Paras 33–36, 51–59] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 (prior to 2013 amendment) read with Section 366 — Appreciation of Prosecutrix's Sole Testimony — Rule against Selective Acceptance and Partial Rejection of Evidence - While conviction for rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, her testimony must be of unimpeachable character and inspire the confidence of the Court - There cannot be partial rejection of the evidence of the prosecutrix to record acquittal under Section 366 IPC (holding she was a consenting major who travelled willingly) and simultaneous partial acceptance of the very same testimony to convict the accused under Section 376 IPC - Where the prosecutrix was determined to be a major (approx. 19 years old) who accompanied the accused voluntarily for 5–6 days across busy markets, intersections, and public transport without raising any hue, cry, or alarm, her testimony was a "bundle of contradictions" and not credible. [Paras 20, 20.3, 22, 22.1, 24, 25, 28, 29] Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2026 INSC 1054

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Benefit of Doubt Where Links in Chain are Missing - Mere prior threats, generalized presence of villagers, or recovery of unlinked weapons/articles from the crime spot do not establish authorship of the crime - Where the prosecution alleges death was caused by a 53 kg laterite stone but fails to produce evidence as to who brought it, fails to recover the weapon, and omits to submit it for medical opinion, substantial gaps remain in the prosecution case - Where two views are reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail, entitling the appellants to an acquittal. [Relied on Tamilselvan v. State, (2008) 7 SCC 755; Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 93; Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 111; Paras 33–35] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Circumstantial Evidence — Appreciation of Evidence — Night Identification — Rejection of Ocular Evidence - Unreliability of Identification in Pitch Dark Night: The testimony of related eye-witnesses alleging identification of assailants from a distance of 60 cubits during a pitch-dark night cannot be accepted - Where the source of light is a torch flashed by the assailants themselves towards the victim, it would partially blind the witnesses looking from a distance rather than enable clear identification of the assailants (Paragraph 20). Identification based merely on the sound of assault during a dark night is inherently weak, improbable, and liable to be discarded. [Paras 9, 18-29] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 148, 149, 506 — Murder — Standard of Proof in Circumstantial Evidence — "Panchsheel" Requirements - Where direct ocular evidence is rejected, conviction can only be sustained if circumstantial evidence satisfies the Panchsheel test enunciated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Paragraphs 22, 23) - The circumstances must be conclusively established ("must or should be proved", not merely "may be proved"), forming an unbroken chain that points solely to the guilt of the accused and excludes every hypothesis of innocence. [Paras 24 - 32] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 201, and 377 — Murder, Causing Disappearance of Evidence, and Unnatural Offences — Circumstantial Evidence — Missing Links in Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - Where conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish an unbroken and complete chain of events leading solely to the hypothesis of the accused's guilt - Where there are significant gaps including unexplained seizure of ordinary consumer articles (generic packet of namkeen) before any disclosure, ante-timed/contradictory custody prior to the alleged extra-judicial confession, invalid reliance on Section 27 recoveries, uncorroborated "last seen" theory, and lack of forensic DNA matching the chain remains broken - Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant extended the benefit of doubt and ordered to be released forthwith after serving over 16 years of incarceration – Appeal allowed. [Paras 27–36, 46–50] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 read with Section 107 — Abetment of Suicide — Matrimonial Discord — Necessary Ingredients — Mens Rea and Actus Reus - To sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC, specific abetment as contemplated under Section 107 IPC is an indispensable requirement - There must be clear evidence of active instigation, intentional aiding, or positive acts by the accused intended to drive the deceased to commit suicide - Mere marital disputes, ordinary domestic discord, or general allegations of harassment do not, ipso facto, satisfy the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC in the absence of any instigation or mens rea - Where the husband, upon learning that his wife ingested poison, immediately summoned medical assistance and rushed her to the hospital, such bona fide conduct militates against an intention to abet suicide. [Relied on Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, 2010 INSC 521; Paras 14, 15] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498-A & Section 306 — Cruelty and Abetment of Suicide — Vague and General Allegations — Failure of Prosecution to Prove Charges - Where the prosecution witnesses (relatives of the victim) depose in general and vague terms without citing specific incidents of dowry demand, cruelty, or torture, and their statements suffer from material omissions and improvements not disclosed during the police investigation, the charges under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC cannot be held to be proved beyond reasonable doubt - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court without coming to close quarters with the reasons assigned by the trial court and by resting its conviction on findings unsupported by the record. Acquittal restored. [Paras 8-17] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948

Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 read with Section 34 – Sentencing Discretion of the Supreme Court – Modification of Sentence – Factors to be Considered – Held - In determining an appropriate special category sentence, Constitutional Courts must apply the principle of proportionality, balancing the aggravating factors of the crime with the mitigating factors of the convict - While the premeditated murder of a mother and two minor children by slitting their throats was grave, the appellants had already served over 11 and 12 years of actual custody and demonstrated satisfactory prison discipline - ordinary life imprisonment with early remission would be inadequate, but life imprisonment for the rest of their natural lives would be disproportionate - The Supreme Court, exercising its powers as a Constitutional Court, substituted the Sessions Court's illegal direction and sentenced the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a fixed term of 25 years without the benefit of statutory remission. [Relied On Navas alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, (2024) 14 SCC 82; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Paras 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048

Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 vs Sections 376AB, 376DA, 376DB – Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 – Statutory Interpretation of "Imprisonment for Life" – Held - Where the Parliament intended imprisonment for life to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life excluding ordinary remissions, it enacted express statutory provisions to that effect, as seen in Sections 376AB, 376DA, and 376DB inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 - The Parliament chose to retain Section 302 IPC in its existing form without such express stipulations - It is impermissible for a Sessions Court to read into Section 302 IPC an enhanced punishment that the legislature chose not to insert, thereby supplementing the statutory penal code - Prescribing punishments is an exclusively legislative function. [Relied On Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Paras 14, 22, 23, 24] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048

Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 376AB, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 201 – POCSO Act; Sections 5, 6, 29 – Plea of Alibi – Held - A plea of alibi must be established with certainty to demonstrate that presence at the scene was impossible - Since the appellant's own testimony placed him back at the house prior to the throttling, the alibi collapsed - The foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault having been established through direct ocular, dying declaration, and medical evidence, Section 29 POCSO statutory presumption operates, and the false counter-plea of the appellant provides an additional link under Section 106 Evidence Act. [Relied On Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 166; Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283; Paras 110, 111, 113, 114, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 53 & 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 432 to 435 – Incompetence of Sessions Court to Impose Special Category Sentence Curtailing Statutory Remission – Held - (i) While imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC means imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of the convict, such sentence is inherently subject to the statutory powers of remission and commutation vested in the appropriate Government under Sections 432 to 435 CrPC; (ii) A Court of Session, while sentencing an accused to life imprisonment for murder under Section 302 IPC, is not competent to issue a direction that the convict shall "remain in prison till the rest of their life" so as to exclude or curtail the Government's statutory remission powers; (iii) The power to evolve and award a special category of sentence specifying a term of imprisonment beyond 14 years or for the remainder of natural life without the benefit of statutory remission as an alternative to the death penalty belongs exclusively to the Constitutional Courts (the Supreme Court and the High Courts) and cannot be exercised by the Sessions Court or any other inferior court. [Relied On Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Kiran v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2863; Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 2 SCC 323; Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25-34] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Appreciation of Evidence — Discrepancies between Complainant and Trap/Shadow Witnesses - Where the shadow witness and official independent witness admitted during cross-examination that the alleged handing over or recovery of the tainted bribe money did not occur in their presence, and there were unresolved material contradictions regarding the exact location of recovery (shirt pocket versus trouser pocket), the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts of demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction set aside. [Relied on P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; Aman Bhatia v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013; Paras 17-22] Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2026 INSC 1031

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) — Bribery — Proof of demand and acceptance is sine qua non for establishing guilt under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) — Mere recovery of tainted money insufficient - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes or phenolphthalein powder reaction, in the absence of cogent evidence establishing a prior demand and subsequent acceptance of illegal gratification, is fatal to the prosecution's case and cannot form the basis of conviction under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act - Proof of demand is the gravamen of the offence - In the absence of primary direct oral or documentary evidence or reliable circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the public servant voluntarily demanded and accepted gratification knowing it to be a bribe, an inferential deduction of guilt cannot be drawn. [Paras 13-21] Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2026 INSC 1031

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 — Illegal gratification — Intermediary/Conduit — Trap operation — Failure to establish complete chain of demand, acceptance, and recovery qua the accused — Non-applicability of statutory presumption - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes from an intermediary/conduit who invokes the name of the accused public servant cannot automatically result in criminal liability being fastened on the public servant - Where the investigating agency prematurely aborts the trap operation at the stage of recovery from the intermediary instead of allowing the chain to run its course to verify if the money was actually intended to reach or did reach the public servant, the link remains incomplete - Proof of demand is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d), and statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts of voluntary acceptance/obtainment are established - Held, conviction cannot be sustained where residual gaps in receipt are bridged by mere speculation. [Relied on C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779; P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; State by Lokayuktha Police v. K. Rangayya, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 963; Paras 44–51, 66–74] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Prohibition Act, 1949 (Gujarat) — Section 98(2) read with Section 132 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 451, Section 457 [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 497, Section 503] — Seizure of Vehicle carrying Prohibited Liquor — Interim Custody / Release of Vehicle pending Trial — Scope of Statutory Embargo - Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 does not operate as an absolute embargo against the release of a seized vehicle on interim custody pending trial - The second part of Section 98(2) and Section 451 CrPC [Section 497 BNSS] operate in distinct fields - Section 98 deals with confiscation of articles when an offence has been committed, and the second part of sub-section (2) comes into play when the seized article liable to be confiscated (and not required as evidence) is forwarded to the Collector under Section 132(b) - when the seized property/vehicle is produced before the jurisdictional Criminal Court under Section 132(a) during inquiry or investigation, the Court is competent to exercise powers under Section 451 CrPC to pass appropriate orders for its proper custody - Keeping seized conveyances parked indefinitely at police stations or court premises exposes them to decay, cannibalisation, loss of roadworthiness, and causes undue economic hardship to owners without serving any fruitful purpose - Courts must dispose of interim custody applications expeditiously and judiciously by adopting safeguards such as Panchama's, photographs, videography, and imposing appropriate surety/bonds rather than leaving vehicles in a state of suspended animation - The High Court and the Courts below erred in declining interim release solely relying on Section 98(2) of the Prohibition Act - Vehicle directed to be released on interim custody subject to conditions. [Relied on Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 285; Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283; Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil (Smt.) v. State of Mysore and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 358; General Insurance Council and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2010 INSC 225; Distinguished from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Uday Singh, (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 473; Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2013 INSC 69; Paras 10-17] ABC Express v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 885 : 2026 INSC 940

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 10 read with Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 75 & IPC, Sections 323, 504, 506 — False Implication in Matrimonial Discord — Quashing of FIR - Following extensive matrimonial and custody litigation where the father had attained final custody orders up to the Supreme Court, the mother lodged an FIR alleging aggravated sexual assault of the minor child by the father - A comprehensive multi-disciplinary investigation conducted by a Special Committee of the CBI, assisted by child and adolescent psychiatrists and clinical psychologists from NIMHANS, established that the child displayed no behavioural indicators or signs of sexual trauma, the CCTV and witness statements contradicted the allegations, and the narrative was shaped by prolonged exposure to family conflict and loyalty dilemmas - Held, the prosecution was a gross abuse of process engineered solely to create a ruse to regain custody - FIR and consequential proceedings quashed. [Paras 18, 24–34, 78, 79] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Section 34 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 94 – Determination of Age of Child/Victim – Inadmissibility of Baptismal Certificate Alone - The procedure for determining the age of a victim under the POCSO Act is strictly governed by the hierarchy of documents prescribed under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 - Age must be proved firstly by the date of birth certificate from the school / matriculation certificate; in its absence, by a birth certificate issued by a corporation, municipal authority, or panchayat; and only in the absence of both, by an ossification test or latest medical age determination test - A Baptismal Certificate issued by a church authority, even if supported by oral testimony of parents, does not fall within the statutory classes of documents enumerated in Section 94 of the JJ Act - In the absence of statutory certificates or an ossification test, the prosecution fails to establish minority, rendering conviction and enhanced punishment under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act unsustainable. [Paras 35- 38] Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 924 : 2026 INSC 984

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 35 (erstwhile Sections 41, 41-A CrPC) — Dual Threshold Test & Safeguards against Unwarranted Arrests - Taking judicial notice of the alarming rise in false POCSO complaints by warring spouses as an "arm-twisting tactic" to settle scores or defeat custody claims, the Supreme Court laid down mandatory safeguards where two threshold conditions exist - (i) an offence under POCSO is alleged against a parent or family member residing under the same roof, and (ii) an existing matrimonial dispute of any form exists between the parents – i. Safeguard 1 (Police Investigation) - The Investigating Officer (IO) or Special Juvenile Police Unit (SJPU) shall not act in haste to make mechanical arrests - Discretion under Section 35 BNSS requires an objective "reason to believe" - The IO/SJPU shall mandatorily engage the services of an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry/clinical psychology (drawn from the DCPU register under Rule 5 of POCSO Rules, 2020) to conduct an independent evaluation of the child before taking coercive steps - In exceptional cases where material is palpable, this may be dispensed with for reasons recorded in writing - The report is an aid to exercise discretion and not the sole basis for a chargesheet or closure; ii. Safeguard 2 (Private Complaints under Section 33 POCSO Act) - Where a private complaint alleging POCSO offences is directly filed before the Special Court amid matrimonial strife, the Court must not take cognizance or issue summons mechanically - The Special Court shall order an evaluation by a child psychiatrist/clinical psychologist before forming an opinion on issuing process, unless exceptional circumstances warrant dispensing with it by written order; iii. Safeguard 3 (Guardianship & Custody Courts) - The mere registration of a POCSO FIR against a parent shall not ipso facto disqualify the parent or defeat their claim for custody; the Family Court must independently examine the prima facie veracity of the allegations on a case-to-case basis. [Relied on Geddam Jhansi and Anr. v. State of Telangana and Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263; Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana & Anr., (2025) 3 SCC 756; Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1004; Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 260; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 48-63, 64-70, 73-77] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) — Pending Chargesheet against Father — Disqualification from Custody — Pre-mature High Court Comments on Quashing/Merits - Where the minor son made disclosures before psychiatrists at NIMHANS resulting in the lodging of an FIR and filing of a chargesheet under the POCSO Act against the father, granting custody of the child to the father while he is facing criminal prosecution is unwarranted, unjustified, and contrary to the paramount welfare of the child - the High Court erred in making observations in a guardianship appeal labelling the POCSO allegations as a "motivated counterblast," especially when quashing proceedings were pending before the High Court of Calcutta; such adverse observations were premature and expunged - Even if the father were to succeed in quashing the FIR, the child's spontaneous apprehensions and safety cannot be subordinated to the father's claim for custody. [Paras 46(ii), 52 – 57] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) — Sections 29, 30, and 6 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 363 — Statutory Presumption of Guilt — Reverse Burden of Proof — Standard of Proof on Prosecution vs. Accused — Rebuttal of Presumption — Medical & Forensic Evidence Contradicting Oral Testimony - The statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 and culpable mental state under Section 30 of the POCSO Act are rebuttable and do not dispense with the fundamental obligation of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt - The statutory presumption does not convert the prosecution's ipse dixit into gospel truth, nor does it absolve the trial court from critically scrutinising the evidence - The presumption only shifts the evidential burden once foundational facts are established - the accused can successfully rebut it on the standard of preponderance of probability, inter alia, by pointing out contradictions, demolishing witness credibility, demonstrating a mismatch between ocular and forensic evidence, or establishing a plausible defence such as prior enmity. [Paras 7 - 10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Interplay Between Stage of Investigation and Stage of Sanction under Section 45 UAPA - Extinction of Right to Default Bail - While sanction for prosecution under Section 45 UAPA and Section 196 CrPC is an embargo on the Court taking cognizance (and not a bar to merely filing a charge sheet), the sanctioning authority requires an independent review of all collected investigative material under Section 45(2) to apply its mind - Where the prosecution requires additional time to collate retrieved scientific data to present a complete report before the sanctioning authority, such grounds cannot be discarded as invalid or flimsy - The High Court erred in holding that awaiting sanction was the sole reason accepted and thereby invalidating the extension order - Since the order dated 18.01.2023 granting a valid 15-day extension was lawful and within the statutory framework of Section 43D(2)(b), the accused acquired no indefeasible right to default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC upon the expiry of earlier periods - the charge sheet having been filed within the extended timeframe. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, (2024) 2 SCC 632; State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178; Judgebir Singh @ Jasbir Singh Samra v. National Investigation Agency, (2023) 17 SCC 48; Paras 26 – 35] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Interplay Between Stage of Investigation and Stage of Sanction under Section 45 UAPA - Extinction of Right to Default Bail - While sanction for prosecution under Section 45 UAPA and Section 196 CrPC is an embargo on the Court taking cognizance (and not a bar to merely filing a charge sheet), the sanctioning authority requires an independent review of all collected investigative material under Section 45(2) to apply its mind - Where the prosecution requires additional time to collate retrieved scientific data to present a complete report before the sanctioning authority, such grounds cannot be discarded as invalid or flimsy - The High Court erred in holding that awaiting sanction was the sole reason accepted and thereby invalidating the extension order - Since the order dated 18.01.2023 granting a valid 15-day extension was lawful and within the statutory framework of Section 43D(2)(b), the accused acquired no indefeasible right to default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC upon the expiry of earlier periods - the charge sheet having been filed within the extended timeframe. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, (2024) 2 SCC 632; State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178; Judgebir Singh @ Jasbir Singh Samra v. National Investigation Agency, (2023) 17 SCC 48; Paras 26 – 35] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Section 43D(2)(b) and Section 45 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 167(2), Section 173(2), and Section 196 — Investigation — Extension of Time for Completing Investigation — Default Bail — High Court Cannot Pre-emptively Declare Investigation Complete or Sever Intertwined Reasons – i. Extension of Time under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA — Pendency of Data Analysis & Retrieval of Forensic Evidence - An extension of time beyond 90 days up to 180 days under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA is statutorily permissible upon the Public Prosecutor's report demonstrating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention - The analysis of scientific data, digital evidence retrieved from forensic science laboratories (mobile devices, hard drives, audio recordings), and financial verification of foreign funds form an integral part of ongoing investigation that must be concluded prior to filing a complete charge sheet; ii. Holistic Interpretation of Prosecutor's Report vs. Premature Declaration of Completion of Investigation - Statements in an extension application indicating that "there is enough evidence to file a charge sheet" cannot be read in isolation or ripped out of context to mean that the investigation is complete in all respects - Investigation of cognizable offences falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and Courts cannot artificially truncate or curtail statutory investigative powers or declare the investigation complete when specialized analysis of digital and financial material remains ongoing. [Paras 14 - 33] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Section 43D(2)(b) and Section 45 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 167(2), Section 173(2), and Section 196 — Investigation — Extension of Time for Completing Investigation — Default Bail — High Court Cannot Pre-emptively Declare Investigation Complete or Sever Intertwined Reasons – i. Extension of Time under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA — Pendency of Data Analysis & Retrieval of Forensic Evidence - An extension of time beyond 90 days up to 180 days under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA is statutorily permissible upon the Public Prosecutor's report demonstrating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention - The analysis of scientific data, digital evidence retrieved from forensic science laboratories (mobile devices, hard drives, audio recordings), and financial verification of foreign funds form an integral part of ongoing investigation that must be concluded prior to filing a complete charge sheet; ii. Holistic Interpretation of Prosecutor's Report vs. Premature Declaration of Completion of Investigation - Statements in an extension application indicating that "there is enough evidence to file a charge sheet" cannot be read in isolation or ripped out of context to mean that the investigation is complete in all respects - Investigation of cognizable offences falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and Courts cannot artificially truncate or curtail statutory investigative powers or declare the investigation complete when specialized analysis of digital and financial material remains ongoing. [Paras 14 - 33] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021