Evidence Law - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest July - September 2026

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114A — Presumption as to Absence of Consent — Scope and Applicability - The statutory presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act does not apply mechanically merely because the prosecutrix denied consent - The denial of consent must be assessed in the overall matrix and context of her entire testimony - When surrounding facts, conduct, and lack of resistance demonstrate voluntary accompaniment and stay over multiple days, absence of consent cannot be accepted - mere presence of spermatozoa in vaginal swabs does not conclusively establish rape in the absence of internal or external injury and in the face of consensual conduct - A charge of rape must be proved beyond reasonable doubt on hard, credible evidence and not on surmises, conjectures, or personal value judgments of the trial judge - Even if the conduct of the accused is considered immoral or unethical, immorality sans credible evidence cannot justify a conviction under criminal law. [Paras 18-27] Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2026 INSC 1054

Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 8, 24 & 103 – Conduct of Accused; Extra-Judicial Confession; Defective Investigation; Absence of Male DNA – Held - (i) An extra-judicial confession made voluntarily before family members upon being confronted is admissible and provides corroboration; (ii) The appellant's subsequent conduct under Section 8 (inquiring whether the child had revealed anything, refusing hospitalisation, and attempting immediate burial) demonstrated consciousness of guilt; (iii) Under Section 293 CrPC, a DNA analysis report submitted by a Government Forensic Science Laboratory is admissible without calling the expert as a witness, especially when the accused did not seek to summon the expert under Section 293(2) - The absence of male DNA in a vaginal smear after the body had been washed prior to post-mortem does not displace the ocular account and genital tear; (iv) Lapses in investigation (such as lodging an FIR against an unknown person or delay in recording witnesses under Section 161) cannot ensure to the benefit of the accused when trustworthy ocular and medical evidence proves the case beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403; Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518; State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567; Paras 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 119] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act – Solitary Witness / Related Witness / Child Sexual Abuse - Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 134 & 106 – Appreciation of Evidence in Intra-Household Sexual Offence – Solitary Witness – Testimony of Mother against Husband – Held: Section 134 establishes that evidence is to be weighed and not counted; conviction can be founded on a single reliable witness - A related witness is distinct from an interested witness - The mother of a victim child testifying against her own husband renounces her home and security, making it inherently improbable that she would shield the real killer of her daughter to falsely frame her husband - offences committed within the secrecy of a household seldom occur before multiple witnesses; demanding independent corroboration of a standard impossible to attain would confer immunity upon perpetrators - As an inmate of the house possessing special knowledge under Section 106, the burden rested on the appellant to offer a plausible explanation of how the child suffered sexual violation and homicidal death. [Relied On Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (1957) 1 SCC 700; Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1953) 2 SCC 36; State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752; Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 28, 29, 30, 31, 38, 39] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872 - Witness Conduct – Abused and Coerced Woman – Absence of Immediate Reporting or Flight – Held - Courts must not assess the credibility of abused women or witnesses to trauma against preconceived, stereotyped notions of 'ideal' or 'expected' behaviour - Silence, prolonged cohabitation, and delayed reporting often arise from trauma, terror, economic dependency, learned helplessness, and coercive control in violent relationships - Perpetrators who secure silence through terror cannot subsequently exploit that very silence or lack of flight to attack the credibility of the victim or witness - Mere access to a mobile phone where the husband controlled the saved contacts does not denote liberty. [Relied On Rana Partap v. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327; XYZ v. State of M.P., (2021) 16 SCC 179; Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590.; Paras 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) & Section 6 – Child Victim's Disclosure – Admissibility as Dying Declaration and Res Gestae – Held - The verbal account given by a six-year-old child to her mother narrating the sexual assault immediately after the incident forms part of the "circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death" under Section 32(1) Evidence Act, as the sexual assault and the throttling were proximate, continuous, and connected stages of a single transaction aimed at silencing her - Expectation of death is not required under Section 32(1) - The disclosure is also admissible under Section 6 as res gestae, being spontaneous and proximate to the occurrence - The statement was strongly corroborated by the post-mortem finding of a fresh tear at the fourchette. [Relied On Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 4 SCC 161; Paras 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 8, 24 & 103 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 293 – Conduct of Accused; Extra-Judicial Confession; Defective Investigation; Absence of Male DNA – Held - (i) An extra-judicial confession made voluntarily before family members upon being confronted is admissible and provides corroboration; (ii) The appellant's subsequent conduct under Section 8 (inquiring whether the child had revealed anything, refusing hospitalisation, and attempting immediate burial) demonstrated consciousness of guilt; (iii) Under Section 293 CrPC, a DNA analysis report submitted by a Government Forensic Science Laboratory is admissible without calling the expert as a witness, especially when the accused did not seek to summon the expert under Section 293(2) - The absence of male DNA in a vaginal smear after the body had been washed prior to post-mortem does not displace the ocular account and genital tear; (iv) Lapses in investigation (such as lodging an FIR against an unknown person or delay in recording witnesses under Section 161) cannot ensure to the benefit of the accused when trustworthy ocular and medical evidence proves the case beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403; Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518; State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567; Paras 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 119] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 – Omissions in previous statements – Maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' – Held - Statements recorded under Section 161 and Section 164 CrPC are not substantive evidence; their legitimate use is strictly confined to contradicting the witness under Section 145 Evidence Act - An omission matures into a contradiction only if the omitted fact is irreconcilable with the court testimony or is one which the witness would ordinarily have been expected to state - Omission of background and contextual facts (such as antecedent ill-treatment or threats) by an illiterate witness does not destroy the credibility of her core account of sexual assault and strangulation - The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply in India - courts must separate the grain from the chaff and act on the reliable core. [Relied On Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505; Selvamani v. State of T.N., (2024) 19 SCC 112; Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 INSC 525; Paras 32, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Framing of charge of forgery — Non-recovery or non-production of original forged document along with chargesheet does not entitle accused to discharge - The absence of the original document alleged to have been forged is not fatal to the prosecution at the threshold stage of framing charge and does not sound the death knell of the criminal proceedings - The prosecution is entitled to lead secondary or circumstantial evidence at trial to establish the commission of forgery beyond reasonable doubt - At the stage of framing charges under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, the Court cannot embark upon a roving inquiry or sift evidence as if conducting a mini-trial - it is sufficient if the material on record creates a grave suspicion against the accused. [Paras 6 - 20] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032

Circumstantial Evidence — Appreciation of Evidence — Night Identification — Rejection of Ocular Evidence - Unreliability of Identification in Pitch Dark Night: The testimony of related eye-witnesses alleging identification of assailants from a distance of 60 cubits during a pitch-dark night cannot be accepted - Where the source of light is a torch flashed by the assailants themselves towards the victim, it would partially blind the witnesses looking from a distance rather than enable clear identification of the assailants (Paragraph 20). Identification based merely on the sound of assault during a dark night is inherently weak, improbable, and liable to be discarded. [Paras 9, 18-29] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Standard of Proof in Circumstantial Evidence — "Panchsheel" Requirements - Where direct ocular evidence is rejected, conviction can only be sustained if circumstantial evidence satisfies the Panchsheel test enunciated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Paragraphs 22, 23) - The circumstances must be conclusively established ("must or should be proved", not merely "may be proved"), forming an unbroken chain that points solely to the guilt of the accused and excludes every hypothesis of innocence. [Paras 24 - 32] Kartika @ Kirtan @ Kirtan Charan Jena v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2026 INSC 1015

Evidence — Appreciation of Testimony — "Sterling Witness" — Non-Corroboration by Forensic and Medical Findings - Where the prosecution relies heavily on a prime witness whose account is riddled with contradictions, material improvements over Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements, and is directly refuted by expert medical and FSL examinations (showing an intact hymen, no vulval injury, and total absence of semen or male DNA), such a witness cannot be characterised as a "sterling witness" - When ocular testimony is entirely inconsistent with the scientific and medical evidence, and a plausible defence of false implication stemming from local disputes (water-sharing) is established, the accused is entitled to acquittal. [Relied on Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21; Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417; Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 15 SCC 684; Gangadhar alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) 9 SCC 202; Paras 5-10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008

Medical & Forensic Evidence Contradicting Oral Testimony - The statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 and culpable mental state under Section 30 of the POCSO Act are rebuttable and do not dispense with the fundamental obligation of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt - The statutory presumption does not convert the prosecution's ipse dixit into gospel truth, nor does it absolve the trial court from critically scrutinising the evidence - The presumption only shifts the evidential burden once foundational facts are established - the accused can successfully rebut it on the standard of preponderance of probability, inter alia, by pointing out contradictions, demolishing witness credibility, demonstrating a mismatch between ocular and forensic evidence, or establishing a plausible defence such as prior enmity. [Paras 7 - 10] Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2026 INSC 1008

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 read with Section 114, Illustration (b) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 306 — Approver/Accomplice Testimony — Rule of Prudence — Requirement of independent material corroboration connecting the accused with the crime - An accomplice who secures pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. possesses a powerful incentive to minimize his own culpability and shift blame onto others - Although an accomplice is a competent witness under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, the rule of prudence under Section 114, Illustration (b) mandates independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the commission of the offence, and not merely connecting the transaction with the offence - Testimony of one participant in a bribe transaction (the bribe-giver) corroborating another participant (the approver intermediary) does not satisfy the requirement of independent corroboration in the sense required by law. [Relied on Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 52–55, 70-82] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 read with Section 114, Illustration (b) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 306 — Approver/Accomplice Testimony — Rule of Prudence — Requirement of independent material corroboration connecting the accused with the crime - An accomplice who secures pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. possesses a powerful incentive to minimize his own culpability and shift blame onto others - Although an accomplice is a competent witness under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, the rule of prudence under Section 114, Illustration (b) mandates independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the commission of the offence, and not merely connecting the transaction with the offence - Testimony of one participant in a bribe transaction (the bribe-giver) corroborating another participant (the approver intermediary) does not satisfy the requirement of independent corroboration in the sense required by law. [Relied on Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 52–55, 70-82] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Appreciation of Eyewitness Evidence — Related and Interested Witnesses - Reliability of Interested and Related Eyewitnesses — Significant contradictions, improvements, and lack of independent corroboration — Held: While related witnesses cannot be branded as interested witnesses solely by reason of relationship, where circumstances disclose a ring of falsity, closer scrutiny of their testimonies is warranted - Where the First Information Statement (FIS) omits material witnesses, substantial contradictions emerge with Section 161 CrPC statements, injury claims of alleged injured eyewitnesses are contradicted by medical evidence, and no independent local villagers are examined, unreserved reliance cannot be placed on such related witnesses to sustain a conviction. [Paras 12-20] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Criminal Law — Hypothesis of Innocence — Benefit of Doubt - Applicability of the Principle of Hypothesis of Innocence — Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence — Held: Even where the prosecution case relies on purported direct eyewitness evidence, if the oral accounts suffer from irreconcilable contradictions and surrounding objective circumstances give rise to a plausible and reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the court is precluded from entering a conviction - The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Conviction and sentence set aside. [Paras 18–21] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 165 (BSA, 2023, Section 168) r/w CrPC — Section 311 (BNSS, 2023, Section 348) — Role and Duty of Trial Court - A criminal trial is not an adversarial game where the Presiding Officer acts as a mere recording machine - Under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 of the CrPC, the Court possesses wide powers and is required to take an active, participatory role to elicit truth and ensure material evidence necessary for just adjudication is brought on record - When the accused was present in the courtroom from judicial custody, the failure of the Public Prosecutor and the Trial Judge to have the victim identify the accused from the dock was a gross omission. [Paras 45–48, 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Evidence Act, 1872 — Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification — Evidentiary Value - Substantive evidence of identification is the identification of the accused by the witness while testifying in Court (dock identification); Test Identification Parade (TIP) conducted during police investigation is merely corroborative and not substantive evidence - Where the accused was not named in the FIR, his name was disclosed to the victim by the police, the sketch prepared with the victim's assistance was withheld from the Court, and the child victim explicitly stated that she could identify the accused if produced, but no dock identification was elicited during her sworn testimony, relying solely on the TIP to convict the accused was fatal to the prosecution. [Paras 40–44, 53- 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 165 (BSA, 2023, Section 168) r/w CrPC — Section 311 (BNSS, 2023, Section 348) — Role and Duty of Trial Court - A criminal trial is not an adversarial game where the Presiding Officer acts as a mere recording machine - Under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 of the CrPC, the Court possesses wide powers and is required to take an active, participatory role to elicit truth and ensure material evidence necessary for just adjudication is brought on record - When the accused was present in the courtroom from judicial custody, the failure of the Public Prosecutor and the Trial Judge to have the victim identify the accused from the dock was a gross omission. [Paras 45–48, 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Medical Evidence — Discrepancy Regarding Time of Incident and Absence of DNA Profiling - Where the medical officer opined that the victim's genital injuries were 5 to 7 days old with foul pus and maggots, the prosecution's narrative that the crime was committed only 2 days prior stood contradicted and unreconciled - in the absence of any DNA profiling or serological matching connecting the biological fluids (sperm) found on the victim to the accused, the prosecution failed to establish a conclusive nexus, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. [Relied on Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K, (1971) 2 SCC 715; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Paras 33–36, 51–59] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Causing disappearance of evidence of offence – Essential Ingredients – Acquittal of main offence – Legality of conviction - A conviction under Section 201 Part II IPC cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the main crime was committed, that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed, and that the accused caused evidence thereof to disappear with the specific intention of screening the offender from legal punishment - Where the prosecution fails to establish the offences of dowry death and murder under Sections 302 and 304B IPC, resulting in an unassailed acquittal of the accused for those substantive offences, an isolated conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot be maintained and must be set aside. [Relied on Suleman Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1967) SCC OnLine SC 337; Kedar Nath & Ors. v. State of M.P., (1993) Supp (1) SCC 7; Para 32] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Evidentiary Value — Duty of Court - An extra-judicial confession is inherently a weak piece of evidence and, per se, cannot form the sole basis of conviction without independent and cogent corroboration - Wherever the court intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession upon due appreciation of the entire evidence, it must ensure that the confession inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence - If it suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities, the court is fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration - the prosecution alleged an extra-judicial confession was made to the village Sarpanch (PW-9) on 14.03.2007, whereas shopkeepers (PW-7 and PW-8) testified that the accused was already in police custody and brought to the shop on 12.03.2007 - This material contradiction, combined with the lack of intimate connection between the accused and the Sarpanch, completely belied the prosecution story. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403; Paras 31 – 43] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Circumstantial Evidence — "Last Seen Together" Theory — Inferences from Cross-Examination Suggestions — Impermissibility - The theory of "last seen together" cannot be established when the witness testimonies lack consistency, contain material improvements over police statements, and fail to establish that the deceased accompanied the accused in close proximity to the time of death - The High Court committed a manifest error by holding that even if prosecution witnesses failed to depose in their examination-in-chief that the child accompanied the accused, a mere suggestion put by the defence counsel during cross-examination could be treated as an admission/inference establishing the "last seen together" theory to clinch the guilt of the accused - Circumstantial links cannot be substituted with erroneous inferences drawn from defence cross-examination suggestions. [Paras 23-42] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Circumstantial Evidence — Missing Links in Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - Where conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish an unbroken and complete chain of events leading solely to the hypothesis of the accused's guilt - Where there are significant gaps including unexplained seizure of ordinary consumer articles (generic packet of namkeen) before any disclosure, ante-timed/contradictory custody prior to the alleged extra-judicial confession, invalid reliance on Section 27 recoveries, uncorroborated "last seen" theory, and lack of forensic DNA matching the chain remains broken - Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant extended the benefit of doubt and ordered to be released forthwith after serving over 16 years of incarceration – Appeal allowed. [Paras 27–36, 46–50] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 [Now Proviso to Section 23(2), Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] — Disclosure Statement & Information Leading to Discovery — Inadmissibility when no new fact is discovered - A confession made to a police officer is inadmissible except to the extent permitted under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from the accused - Where no new fact is discovered and the disclosure statement merely relates to the demarcation or identification of places/spots already within the prior knowledge of the police and recorded in the site plan, Section 27 cannot be invoked, and the disclosure statement cannot be taken into consideration - The High Court fundamentally erred in holding that the disclosure statement dated 14.03.2007 led to the recovery of the deceased's body from the well, when the body had already been recovered by the police two days earlier on 12.03.2007. [Paras 38–44] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Forensic Evidence — Burden of Proof — Section 106, Evidence Act — Absence of DNA Profiling - Where human semen is detected on the underwear of the accused as well as on the rectal swab of the deceased, the prosecution is duty-bound to establish a positive link through DNA profiling or scientific matching - In the absence of a DNA match connecting the two samples, the mere presence of semen on the clothing of an unmarried accused cannot lead to a presumption of guilt - The burden cannot be shifted to the accused to prove that the semen did not belong to him or did not match the victim; the initial burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt remains squarely on the prosecution. [Paras 26 – 45] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Failure to Collect Corroborative Physical Clues / Telltale Evidence - Failure to recover any spent cartridges despite allegations of indiscriminate firing, non-recovery of the offending weapons, failure to seize the blood-stained clothes of the deceased or of the witnesses who allegedly carried him, omission to subject seized blood-stained earth to chemical examination, non-examination of independent eye-witnesses, and absence of injuries on accompanying witnesses despite indiscriminate firing, render the entire prosecution case doubtful and justify acquittal – Appeals allowed. [Paras 5-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Medical Evidence Contradicting Eye-witness Account — Inquest Prepared Prior to Registration of FIR/FIS - Investigation / Benefit of Defective Investigation - While a faulty investigation cannot ordinarily inure to the benefit of the accused, the Court cannot presume the guilt of the accused where there is a complete absence of reliable evidence simply because the Investigating Officer (I.O.) was recalcitrant or because allegations/complaints of collusive investigation were raised against the investigator - The High Court egregiously erred in relying upon a complaint against the I.O. that was not even brought on record during the trial to plug glaring evidentiary gaps and hold the prosecution case clinching. [Para 9 – 11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony - Inquest Prior to First Information Statement (FIS) - Where ocular witnesses claimed that the party was walking in a single file led by the deceased and that the accused ambushed and shot the deceased in the back during indiscriminate firing from behind, but the expert medical evidence (ballistic/post-mortem) demonstrated that the deceased suffered an oval bullet entry wound with tattooing/blackening indicating a shot fired from close range (3–4 feet) while the victim was in a sitting position, the medical evidence directly discredited the eye-witness version - The High Court erred in brushing aside such expert medical evidence on mere conjectures of a "shaking hand" or moving target - The admission by the I.O. that the inquest was carried out before the First Information Statement was recorded renders the narration of events suspicious and premeditated. [Paras 7-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Circumstantial Evidence — Grant of Bail Affirmed - Where the co-accused (father of the prime accused) was admittedly not present at the spot when the fatal attack occurred and was implicated solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence of conspiracy and providing petrol under Section 109 IPC, his case stands on a materially different footing - Order of the High Court granting him regular bail affirmed. [Relied on Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 598; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana & Anr., (2021) 6 SCC 230; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 172; Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129; Paras 26-40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917

Evidence and Expert Reports — Evidentiary value of solitary satellite imagery vs. contemporaneous material - Held, expert committee reports and visual inspections cannot be accepted uncritically when they suffer from patent contradictions and somersaults - A solitary satellite image obtained from Google Earth cannot override independent, contemporaneous evidence and previous official inspection reports demonstrating that the river floodplains were already in a dilapidated and degraded state with accumulated construction debris prior to allotment - Judicial bodies must critically evaluate expert reports against surrounding contemporaneous record rather than according them mechanical acceptance. [Paras 30–50] Vyakti Vikas Kendra India v. Manoj Misra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2026 INSC 910

Circumstantial Evidence — Panchsheel Principles — Incomplete Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - In a case solely dependent on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence, which taken together must form a complete chain of events pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused and leaving no reasonable ground for any hypothesis consistent with innocence - Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for legal proof - An adverse inference or mere suspicion drawn from an accused's explanation regarding his absence or absconding cannot substitute for cogent evidence completing the chain of circumstances - The presence of missing links in the chain of circumstances entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt and acquittal. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172; Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45; Paras 27- 30] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 118 — Child Witness — Evaluation and Corroboration — Rule of Prudence — Tutoring - While there is no inflexible statutory bar preventing conviction based on the testimony of a competent child witness, seeking independent corroboration is a well-established rule of prudence - A child witness of tender age, lacking maturity of understanding, is an easy prey to tutoring; thus, the evidence must be evaluated with great care and circumspection - Where the child witness (aged 4.5 years at the time of the incident and examined 4 years later) was residing with a police constable and expressly admitted in his cross-examination to having been tutored by the Station House Officer prior to deposing, his testimony cannot form the sole basis of conviction - where the child's account of being strangulated with a rope and burnt with acid is falsified by medical evidence and humanly unnatural conduct is attributed, insisting on corroboration is imperative and the trial court's rejection of such evidence cannot be considered unreasonable. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 21; Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177; Paras 24, 25, 26] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery Evidence — Hostile Panch Witnesses and Inordinate Delay - Recovery of incriminating articles (clothes and an empty acid bottle) made six months after the incident from an open/accessible dump site at the instance of the accused loses its evidentiary value when independent seizure witnesses turn hostile and testify that they merely signed blank papers without knowing the contents - The evidentiary integrity of the recovery is further compromised when articles allegedly buried 6 feet deep under rocks for months show no traces of mud, earth, or water residue, raising a serious possibility of planting and creating a fatal breach in the prosecution case. [Paras 30, 31, 32] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(e) & Section 114 Illustration (g) – Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts – Non-examination of Material Witness - The statutory presumption of regularity under Section 114(e) extends solely to the regularity of official procedure and does not extend to conclusively proving the bona fides or legality of the underlying private transaction on which the official order is based - an adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) does not follow automatically from the non-examination of an available party/witness (such as the widow) where the acquisition of knowledge of hostile action is independently established through contemporary documentary evidence. [Para 28-30] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 68 & 69 — Invocation of Section 69 — Proof where no attesting witness can be found — Conditions Precedent — Evidentiary Burden - Section 69 is not an alternative which the propounder may freely choose, but an exceptional mode of proof available only when proof through an attesting witness has become impossible - The opening condition "if no such attesting witness can be found" requires strict proof that the witnesses are dead, beyond the jurisdiction, untraceable despite diligent search, or incapable of giving evidence - A bare, unparticularised statement by an interested propounder regarding the death of a witness, unsupported by credible oral or documentary evidence or enquiry, is insufficient to invoke Section 69 - The mere absence of a contrary suggestion in cross-examination cannot reverse the statutory burden or establish the foundational fact required to bypass Section 68 - Even if Section 69 is applicable, proving the handwriting of one attestor and the mark of the testatrix only satisfies the formal limb and does not create a presumption of capacity, free will, or elimination of suspicious circumstances. [Relied on Babu Singh v. Ram Sahai alias Ram Singh, (2008) 14 SCC 754; Paras 72–76, 78–85, 96–98] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 — Proof of execution and attestation of Will — Dual statutory requirement — Distinction between Scribe and Attesting Witness — Animus Attestandi - Sections 63 of the Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act perform related but distinct functions - Section 63 prescribes what must have occurred when the Will was executed, whereas Section 68 prescribes the ordinary manner in which the occurrence of those acts must be proved - Proof of the testatrix's signature or thumb impression alone does not establish due execution unless the statutory attestation by at least two witnesses is proved - The concession in Section 68 permitting examination of only one attesting witness does not dilute the requirement that the witness examined must be capable of proving the complete statutory execution of the Will, including attestation by both witnesses - A scribe who signs the document merely to authenticate authorship and not animo attestandi cannot be treated as an attesting witness, nor can his testimony cure the lack of proof of attestation under Section 68. [Relied on N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy, (2001) 7 SCC 503; Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, (2003) 2 SCC 91; Paras 50–59, 60–68, 70–71] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 — Testamentary Capacity, Sound Disposing Mind, and Cumulative Suspicious Circumstances - Proof of physical execution or thumb impression of an illiterate testatrix does not dispense with the necessity of proving testamentary capacity, sound disposing mind, and conscious approval of the dispositions - Where a registered Will exhibits multiple suspicious circumstances incorrect recital describing ancestral property inherited from the husband as "self-acquired", describing a step-daughter as own daughter without disclosure of true relation, unexplained exclusion of other legal heir branches, attestation by a close relative of a beneficiary, witnesses brought from another village, beneficiary branch in proximate control/possession, unexplained custody, and non-examination of the key surviving person (the step-daughter) best placed to explain the family arrangement—the court must evaluate the cumulative effect - Registration and subsequent survival of the testatrix for years do not by themselves remove legitimate suspicions where independent evidence of informed, free agency is lacking. [Relied on Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687; Paras 99–104, 110–121, 122–134] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860

Circumstantial Evidence — Accidental Death vs. Homicidal Death — Chain of Circumstances - Conviction of the appellants-accused by the Trial Court and the High Court under Sections 302, 120B, and 201 read with Section 34 IPC set aside - The Supreme Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the foundational fact of a homicidal death - Medical evidence established the cause of death as 'Cardio-Respiratory arrest due to Asphyxia due to drowning' - Non-grievous injuries found on the body could have been sustained due to friction with hard or sharp objects in the river flow, corroborating the defence version of accidental drowning rather than a premeditated attack - Alleged use of a broken soda bottle as a weapon was unsupported due to non-confrontation of the object to the medical expert, absence of seizure, and lack of forensic matching. [Paras 10 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Circumstantial Evidence — Delayed FIR & Motive as an Afterthought - Gross, unexplained delay of about four months in lodging the First Information Statement (FIS)/FIR alleging motive for murder renders the story of motive a deliberated afterthought - Conduct of the deceased's family members in allowing the deceased to travel with the accused on friendly terms dispels the alleged pre-existing enmity. [Paras 13 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Evidentiary Value of Admissions - Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 8 — Subsequent Conduct of Accused — Abnormal Conduct not Inculpatory Evidence - Presumptions and alleged admissions raised in bail applications cannot form the basis of sustaining a conviction for murder in a case based on circumstantial evidence - Fleeing from the scene in panic upon witnessing a friend accidentally drown, omitting to call for rescue, lying initially to family members, and subsequently going to watch a movie or returning empty soda bottles though morally reprehensible, foolish, or strange cannot be elevated to an incriminating circumstance establishing premeditated murder - The human mind is fickle, manipulative, and unpredictable in the face of sudden adversity - Where the hypothesis of accidental drowning is far more probable and plausible, the chain of circumstances cannot be held to be complete to exclude the hypothesis of innocence - Dock identification of unknown accused persons by witnesses for the first time in court without a prior Test Identification Parade (TIP) carries no evidentiary value, especially when the allegations are levelled months after the occurrence. [Paras 17 - 23] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Evidence Act, 1872, Section 60 – Admissibility and Redaction of Evidence Affidavit in Lieu of Examination-in-Chief – Oral Evidence qua Inadmissible/Irrelevant Internal Documents – Permissibility – Principles on Res Judicata at Interlocutory Stages - Where internal documents, internal emails, and inter-se correspondence unilaterally prepared by a party have been consistently held irrelevant and inadmissible by the court, and such orders have attained finality, a party cannot be permitted to adduce oral evidence as to the contents of those very documents or what transpired in internal meetings by an indirect method - The earlier orders operate as res judicata and are binding during the trial - An interlocutory order ruling on the relevance and non-production of such documents cannot be circumvented by invoking Section 60 of the Evidence Act under the guise of oral testimony of a witness who was party to internal discussions – Held that the High Court was fully justified in meticulously scrutinizing and redacting the yellow-marked portions of the evidence affidavits of the defendant's witness (DW-1) that sought to introduce the contents of excluded internal communications and meetings, while retaining portions that pertained strictly to the witness's personal perception/state of mind or inter-party correspondence. [Paras 13–20] Reliance Industries v. NTPC Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2026 INSC 862

Circumstantial Evidence — Last-Seen Theory & Unexplained Possession of Stolen Property — Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 and Section 106 - Conviction based on circumstantial evidence upheld where foundational circumstances were firmly established in an unbroken chain - (i) deceased was last seen leaving with the accused persons in his taxi; (ii) deceased went missing and his decomposed body was subsequently found along the route; (iii) accused persons were intercepted within five days in joint, unexplained possession of the deceased's taxi and its original papers while attempting to dispose of it; and (iv) personal belongings (driving licence and tiffin carrier) of the deceased were recovered from a sugarcane field pursuant to disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act - Held, failure of the accused to offer any plausible explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. regarding recent possession of the taxi supplied an additional link under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - Inability of medical evidence to ascertain the precise cause of death due to advanced decomposition does not override an otherwise complete and consistent chain of circumstantial evidence. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344; Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193; Paras 14–23] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2026 INSC 842

Evidence Law - Appreciation of Evidence – Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus not applicable – Sifting Chaff from Grain - The doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no strict application in Indian criminal jurisprudence - When evidence is separable, the court must sift the chaff from the grain and act on acceptable evidence - Discrepancies on collateral particulars that do not shake the core of the prosecution case or touch the documentary/forensic chain of custody do not warrant acquittal. [Relied on Arvind Kumar alias Nemichand v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099; Ramabora alias Ramaboraiah v. State of Karnataka, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 996; Paras 43–46] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Appreciation of Evidence — Related Witness vs. Interested Witness - A witness can be regarded as an “interested witness” only when it is demonstrated that the witness has a direct motive, personal animosity, or reasons to falsely implicate the accused - A close relative who is a natural witness cannot be equated with an interested witness merely on account of the relationship - Relationship far from being a foundation to discard testimony is often a sure guarantee of truth, as a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit to falsely implicate an innocent person. [Relied on Shio Shankar Dubey and Others v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 501; Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614; Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158; Paras 24-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Conviction based on Sole Eyewitness Testimony — Upheld - Direct ocular evidence, if found natural, cogent, and trustworthy, constitutes the best form of evidence and ordinarily prevails over all other forms - The testimony of a single reliable eyewitness (PW-3, daughter of the deceased) who witnessed the brutal lathi assault on her mother after being dragged from her house on the accusation of practicing witchcraft, was consistent, unshaken, and duly corroborated by medical evidence. [Paras 17 - 22] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence — Sole Eyewitness - The legal system lays emphasis on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses - The time-honoured principle is that “evidence has to be weighed and not counted” - There exists no legal impediment to convicting an accused solely on the testimony of a single witness, provided such testimony is wholly reliable and inspires confidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367; Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91; Paras 20-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Medical Evidence and Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report conflicting with ocular testimony — Rape of a 4.5-year-old child alleged - The High Court overturned the trial Court's acquittal without considering the medical report and the FSL report - The informant (PW-2) and the child victim (PW-3) consistently claimed that the victim sustained injuries and that her clothes had bloodstains - the medical examination conducted within 12 hours of the incident revealed no injuries, inflammation, redness, or bruising on the body or private parts of the victim, with the hymen found intact - the State Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report confirmed that even after performing the Benzidine test (a reliable screening test capable of detecting blood up to multiple washings) as well as the Acid Phosphatase test, neither blood nor semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the seized mat/bedding from the alleged place of occurrence - There were also irreconcilable contradictions regarding the place of occurrence (cot vs. kitchen where no cot existed) - Held, the entire prosecution evidence must be considered in totality - Where oral testimonies alleging bleeding/injury are directly belied by prompt medical examination and negative forensic reports, a grave doubt is cast on the prosecution's case - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by ignoring the medical and FSL reports. Conviction set aside; trial court's acquittal restored. [Paras 9–16]. Ram Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2026 INSC 830

Evidence — Injured Witness vs. Stereotyped/Identical Testimony — Group Assault & Constructive Liability under Section 149 IPC - Reliability of Injured Witness versus Detailed Attribution in Unlawful Assembly - The presence of an injured witness at the crime scene carries an inherent guarantee of presence and reliability regarding the assault upon himself; however, it does not automatically render their testimony a reliable inventory of the specific, minute roles and weapons attributed to each of the multiple members of a large assembly - Parrot-like / Tutored Narration - Where multiple witnesses (both injured and eye-witnesses) present a verbatim, identical, and stereotyped account—assigning distinct overt acts, weapons, and body parts assaulted across 23 accused persons without individual variation—it raises serious doubts of tutoring rather than truthful recollection - In cases involving group rivalries and constructive liability under Section 149 IPC, safe identification is foundational, and convictions cannot safely rest solely on interested and stereotyped testimony. [Paras 27- 35] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 65B (Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) — Electronic Records — Admissibility & Regulation of Private Investigators - Electronic Evidence & Private Investigators — Admissibility subject to Section 65B mandatory certification — Lack of legislative regulatory framework for Private Detective Agencies highlighted - Photographs, audio, or video evidence (including those procured via private investigators) are electronic records - Under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872, mandatory certification is a condition precedent to admissibility - Oral evidence cannot substitute this statutory requirement -Admissibility requires relevance to the matter in issue, identification of voice/source, and proof of accuracy by ruling out tampering or morphing - The Code of Criminal Procedure does not recognize private investigating agencies. Concerns regarding individual privacy, data protection, authenticity/morphing of evidence, and lack of regulation/grievance redressal mechanisms for private detectives were raised - The Supreme Court directed copies of the judgment to be forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, and the Chairman, Law Commission of India, to consider framing appropriate rules/regulations. [Relied on Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Meghalaya, (2000) 8 SCC 323; R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 21-24] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 61, 64 & 65 — Proof of Official Documents — Primary vs. Secondary Evidence - Unless conditions enumerated under Section 65 of the Evidence Act are pleaded, present, and proved, an official document must be proved by primary evidence - Secondary evidence cannot be admitted without sufficient and satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the original primary source - Mere oral evidence or uncorroborated letters claiming technical error/data loss cannot override contradictory documentary record entries produced from official custody - The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH), Government of India, and state transport departments are suggested to undertake awareness campaigns through various mediums regarding the necessity of holding valid driving licences, streamline issuance and renewal procedures, regulate driving schools, and make licensing tests accessible in regional languages. [Relied on Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar, (2022) 15 SCC 572; Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 781; Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 169; Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board v. Penjarla Vijay Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2915; Paras 11 - 20]. Reliance General Insurance v. Om Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2026 INSC 767

Secondary evidence cannot replace primary documentary evidence unless foundational circumstances under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are pleaded and established - The owner owes a duty to verify that the driver holds an effective driving licence and takes reasonable care to get it renewed upon expiry - Failure of the owner to produce evidence of checking the licence or taking steps for its timely renewal amounts to a breach of policy terms, exonerating the insurer from ultimate liability - applying the doctrine of 'pay and recover', the Supreme Court directed the insurer to satisfy the compensation award first and recover the same from the driver and owner. [Paras 10–12, 14–18]. Reliance General Insurance v. Om Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2026 INSC 767

Admissibility and Evidentiary Value of Retracted Confession - Mandatory Compliance with Statutory Safeguards - Resiling Approver / Co-accused Confession - A retracted confession whose voluntariness is seriously disputed and whose authenticity is compromised by repeated recording/repudiation cannot form the primary foundation of a conviction - For a retracted confession to sustain a finding of guilt, it must receive strong, independent, and substantive corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime - Compliance with statutory warnings under Section 164(2) CrPC is an indispensable prerequisite to ensure the voluntary character of a confession. Any subsequent insertion or procedural variation indicating that warnings were not administered prior to recording diminishes the degree of assurance and invalidates its reliability - Once an approver resiles from a confession made under a grant of pardon and fails to fulfill the conditions under Section 306 CrPC, their statement can at best be treated as a confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act - Such a confession is not substantive evidence and can only be used to lend assurance to a conclusion otherwise arrived at via independent, legally admissible evidence - Held, the conviction of Accused No. 12 (Pappu @ Salim) rested solely on successive, repeated confessional statements which he subsequently disowned in open court, denouncing his approver status. In the complete absence of independent physical, forensic, or circumstantial evidence, the conviction is unsustainable - Evidentiary superstructure cannot stand once the foundation of the confession is discredited - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275; Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337; Paras 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 69] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Circumstantial Evidence – The Panchsheel Principles - To sustain a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete, coherent, and unbroken chain of clinching circumstances that unequivocally points exclusively toward the hypothesis of guilt and excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused - Section 386(a) CrPC – Interference with Orders of Acquittal - An appellate court possesses full powers to review and reconsider the entire evidence underlying an acquittal - it must respect the double presumption of innocence operating in favour of an acquitted accused ordinary presumption under criminal law reinforced by the judicial finding of acquittal - An acquittal cannot be disturbed unless the findings of the court below are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, perverse, or demonstrably unsustainable - If two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail - Held, the High Court's view in acquitting Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 10 was a highly plausible and reasonable view, as the prosecution failed to produce any direct or corroborative evidence linking them specifically to the execution or planning of the Samleti bus blast, apart from generic references in an uncognate confession - Orders of acquittal affirmed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225; Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42; Paras 54-60, 71-74] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Scope and Ambit of Disclosure Statements: The statutory exception carved out under Section 27 IEA is attracted only when the information furnished by an accused distinctly relates to a relevant fact discovered which was previously unknown to the investigating agency - A mere statement expressing a willingness to identify a place or location already within the knowledge of the police, or pointing out a spot without resulting in the recovery of an incriminating fact/article having a direct nexus with the crime, does not constitute a "discovery" - Panchnama / Memorandum Not Substantive Evidence - Recitals in a panchnama or site verification memorandum do not constitute substantive evidence - The substantive evidence is the live testimony of the witness in the witness box proving the precise information furnished and the corresponding discovery - Held, the prosecution's reliance on site verification proceedings and the pointing out of Masjids/premises by Accused Nos. 1 and 10 failed to meet the threshold of Section 27, as no incriminating fact, weapon, or explosive substance linked to the Samleti blast was discovered - Generic references or travel companionship in a co-accused's confession do not substitute proof of a specific conspiracy. [Relied on Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47; Murli & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 41; Paras 63, 64, 65, 66] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 & Section 27 — Appreciation of Technical Evidence — Call Detail Records (CDRs) & Adverse Inference - Where the prosecution successfully establishes a strong incriminating nexus through Call Detail Records (CDRs) and location data proving that the accused persons were in constant communication and present around the crime scene, the burden shifts to the accused to explain these facts - The failure or refusal of the accused to offer a plausible explanation for circumstances uniquely within their exclusive personal knowledge leads to a direct adverse inference against them. Furthermore, utilizing fake SIM cards registered under third-party names to evade surveillance constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance if left unrebutted. [Paras 17- 20, 22-28] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Circumstantial Evidence — Role and Absence of Motive - The role of motive in a criminal trial based entirely on circumstantial evidence is limited - The absence of a motive does not ipso facto break the chain of evidence or automatically lead to the acquittal of the accused if the remaining evidence on record is sufficient to prove guilt - A complete absence of motive is merely a factor that may be weighed in favour of the accused during the judicial sifting and balancing of favourable and unfavourable circumstances. [Relied On Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 800; Paras 24, 25] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Evidence Act, 1872 – Prevention of abuse of process - The clear intent behind Section 299(1) of the CrPC is to ensure that evidence against an accused is preserved when they have deliberately absconded from the trial - The provision cannot be given a restrictive interpretation that would defeat its very purpose or incentivize accused persons to willfully abscond for long periods to await the natural death or unavailability of material witnesses - The prosecuting agency is not required to move an application under this Section in the first trial as a matter of rule anticipating the future unavailability of a witness. [Relied on: Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 41; CBI v. Abu Salem Ansari, (2011) 4 SCC 426; Paras 14-21] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Record of evidence in absence of accused – Deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial – Admissibility in subsequent trial against an absconding accused – Absence of a formal judicial order recording satisfaction of abscondence before recording deposition does not invalidate its admissibility - There is no statutory requirement under Section 299(1) of the CrPC mandating the formal passing of an order by the Magistrate concerned, recording that the accused is absconding and that there is no immediate prospect of arrest, before the witness deposes - What is essential is whether these two foundational facts stood established on the actual date of the deposition of the witness. [Para 14] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Conviction on circumstantial evidence and testimony of a material witness upheld despite non-recovery of the dead body - Corpus Delicti in Murder Cases - Corpus delicti means that the offence has been committed and not that the dead body of the murdered person has been recovered - A person can be convicted of murdering another even if the later's body has not been recovered - If recovery of the dead body is treated as an absolute necessity to convict an accused, it would afford complete immunity to the guilty from being punished in cases where the body is destroyed or thrown into a flowing river - What is legally required to base a conviction for murder is reliable and acceptable direct or circumstantial evidence proving the factum of death. [Para 15] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687

Evidentiary Value of Coerced Witness - The testimony of a witness (PW-4) who was threatened at the point of a dagger by the accused to assist in transporting the wrapped body on a bicycle for disposal cannot be discarded as an interested witness or an accomplice - The witness stood firm in cross-examination, and his natural, limited narrative (accompanying the accused only for some distance out of fear) establishes his reliability and credibility - Where a 10-year-old minor child was left in the exclusive custody of the accused by his mother, and the child went missing for 22 days, it was naturally expected of the accused to either report the matter to the police or inform the relatives - The absolute failure of the accused to offer any justifiable or plausible explanation during his Section 313 CrPC examination constitutes a vital additional link in the chain of circumstances to establish his guilt. [Relied on Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471; Prithi v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536; Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Paras 14-17] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 45, 47, 67 & 68 — Proof of Genuineness of Will — Duties of Appellate Court - Adjudication on the validity and genuineness of a Will requires specific statutory compliances, including proving the signature of the testator, evaluating the testimony of at least one attesting witness, and establishing that the testator was of sound mind, understood the nature/effect of the dispositions, and signed out of free volition - An Appellate Court tasked with determining the validity of a Will cannot overturn the Trial Court's findings without discussing these statutory aspects on the touchstone of evidence led by the parties. [Para 11] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709

Evidence Act, 1872 / Civil Law – Burden of Proof – Declaration of Title – A plaintiff seeking a declaration of title must succeed strictly on the strength of their own case and not on the perceived weakness of the defense - Title over an immovable property cannot rest on surmises, probabilities, or conjectural comparisons of boundaries by courts in the absence of solid revenue records, village maps, or expert evidence. [Paras 23-42] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 Proviso — Applicability to Registered Sale Deeds — Interpretation of Proviso — Scope of "Specific Denial" — A registered sale deed does not require compulsory attestation under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 68 of the Evidence Act applies exclusively to documents that are mandatorily required by law to be attested - neither the main section nor its proviso applies to a registered sale deed - There is no requirement in law to examine an attesting witness to prove a sale deed, even if it contains signatures of marginal witnesses - The High Court erred in expanding the proviso to include a registered sale deed and in holding that an executant must specifically deny the document by way of a separate suit or counter-claim rather than a written statement - The proviso to Section 68 cannot create an independent rule or travel beyond the main provision to cover documents not requiring compulsory attestation by law. [Relied on Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, (2020) 19 SCC 57; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 INSC 693 / (2001) 3 SCC 179; Bayanabai Kaware v. Rajendra s/o Baburao Dhote, (2018) 1 SCC 585; Rohitash Kumar & Ors. vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 451; Paras 31- 46] R. Veronica v. Rudrayani Devaki, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2026 INSC 703

Appreciation of Defence Evidence – Hypothesis of Innocence - Trial courts must bestow equal attention and weight to defence evidence as they do to prosecution evidence - There is no legal baseline to approach evidence led by the accused with inherent distrust or scepticism - If the defence introduces a deeply probable hypothesis of innocence that establishes reasonable doubt, the absolute benefit must inure to the accused - To travel from the realm of "may be true" to "must be true," the prosecution's journey must be strictly paved with legal, reliable, and unimpeachable evidence. [Relied on Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107; H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1954) 2 SCC 934; Banwari v. State of U.P., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 98; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1957) 1 SCR 953; Para 34-39] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Evaluation of Exculpatory Dying Declaration and Defence Evidence - Conviction of the husband reversed - The prosecution failed to present independent witnesses from the neighborhood to substantiate the generalized and bland allegations of a continuous ₹50,000 dowry demand - the defence effectively dismantled the prosecution's narrative by producing substantial documentary proof of significant joint financial investments, medical receipts showing immediate specialized treatment provided by the husband, and call records demonstrating prompt notification to the bride's family - The exculpatory dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, combined with the absolute lack of a post-mortem or medical forensic analysis of the burn patterns, created a compelling probability of an accidental fire rather than homicide or suicide. [Paras 27-35] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Circumstantial Evidence – Golden principles governing circumstantial evidence – Broken chain of events – The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the wife (Accused No. 1) along with her lover (Accused No. 2) and others conspired to murder the deceased - Held, the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - There was no positive legal evidence proving a reciprocal love affair/motive, the "last seen" theory was found weak and unreliable, and the call detail records directly contradicted the prosecution's narrative - Suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof - The acquittal of the accused persons for the charges of murder and criminal conspiracy upheld. [Paras 19-39] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Recovery of weapon and incriminating articles – Failure to affix lac seals at the spot – Total absence of blood at the alleged site of crime – Fatal to prosecution case – The prosecution relied on the recovery of a blood-stained grinding stone (alleged murder weapon) and clothes at the behest of Accused No. 1 - Held, the alleged articles were recovered from a public area accessible to anyone and, crucially, were not sealed at the spot - In the absence of link evidence to prove articles were kept in a sealed condition until they reached the Chemical Analyzer, the reports hold no evidentiary value as the possibility of tampering/planting cannot be ruled out - the complete absence of blood on the mattresses or pillows in the house completely contradicts the narrative that the deceased was bludgeoned to death in his bed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Tulshiram Bhanudas Kambale v. State of Maharashtra, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 227; Salim Akhtar alias Mota v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2003) 5 SCC 499; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Maghavendra Pratap Singh Alias Pankaj Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 12 SCC 401; Paras 27, 28, 29] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Customary Law (Oraon Tribe) – Succession and Inheritance – Right of Daughter and Son-in-law (Ghardamad) – Scope of Article 136 of the Constitution of India and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Facts: The dispute pertained to ownership claims over the landed property of one Sukhu Oraon (grandfather), who had three sons: Dhungru, Ledura, and Bhoula - The Plaintiff (Sukhu, second son of Dhungru) claimed ownership over the entire ancestral land - The claim was resisted by Defendant No. 1 (Budhain, daughter of Bhoula) and Defendant No. 2 (Punai, husband of Budhain) on the ground that Ledura (who died issueless) had adopted Punai as his ghardamad (resident son-in-law) and that the properties were partitioned via a deed dated February 27, 1975 - The Munsif Court, First Appellate Court, and the High Court of Jharkhand concurrently dismissed the plaintiff's suit, accepting the ghardamad relationship - Held, concurrent findings of fact are not generally interfered with unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as the finding being perverse, based on no evidence, built on inadmissible evidence, ignoring material circumstances, or resulting in a miscarriage of justice - Held, the party alleging a custom must strictly prove its existence, long usage, certainty, and reasonableness - General observations cannot replace strict proof required under Section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1872 - Held, under the prevalent customary law of the Oraon community, daughters do not have a right of inheritance and are only entitled to maintenance if there is no son - While the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in the property of his father-in-law is established, it must be duly adopted by the last male owner or his widow - In the present case, Punai was the husband of Bhoula's daughter (Budhain) but was allegedly adopted as a ghardamad by the uncle-in-law (Ledura) - Customary law does not recognize or permit an uncle-in-law to adopt his niece's husband as a ghardamad - Held, relying upon authoritative scholarly works (The Oraons of Chotanagpur by S.C. Roy), in the absence of a son, an appropriately adopted ghardamad, or other direct male descendants, the property of an issueless Oraon male devolves upon the nearest male agnate - the plaintiff (nephew) is entitled to succeed to the property - The partition/lease deed executed between the niece and the uncle-in-law is non-est and irrelevant to the title - The High Court erred in failing to answer the formulated substantial question of law regarding the uncle-in-law's capacity to adopt a ghardamad merely on the count of concurrent findings below - Merely observing that there is no established bar against such adoption does not satisfy the requirements of Section 100 CPC - The onus was on the defendants to prove such a custom existed. [Relied on Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217; Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; Ramachandran v. Vijayan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3384; Paras 6-13] Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2026 INSC 672

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 58 – Doctrine of Non-Traverse – Non-examination of Plaintiff - Where the plaintiff sues on the basis of intestate succession, and the primary facts regarding her status as the legally wedded wife and sole surviving Class I heir are not traversed or specifically denied by the defendants in the written statement, they stand admitted - Facts admitted need not be proved, and the non-examination of the plaintiff or any witness of fact on her behalf cannot be a ground to dismiss the suit. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669

Requirement of Pre-Charge Evidence in Complaints Involving Offences Exclusively Triable by the Court of Session – Constricted Role of the Magistrate – Held - The High Court erred in holding that a Magistrate must record pre-charge prosecution evidence under Section 244 of the CrPC even when the offence is strictly and exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - The scheme of the modern CrPC has consciously done away with the lengthy pre-committal inquiry and evidence gathering that existed under the old 1898 Code - The primary mandate of the Magistrate under Section 209 is merely to inspect and see whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - In performing this administrative act, no evidence needs to be taken, and the Magistrate is forbidden from applying their mind to the merits of the case to determine whether an accused needs to be added or subtracted. [Paras 8 - 13] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660