Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 — Illegal gratification — Intermediary/Conduit — Trap operation — Failure to establish complete chain of demand, acceptance, and recovery qua the accused — Non-applicability of statutory presumption - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes from an intermediary/conduit who invokes the name of the accused public servant cannot automatically result in criminal liability being fastened on the public servant - Where the investigating agency prematurely aborts the trap operation at the stage of recovery from the intermediary instead of allowing the chain to run its course to verify if the money was actually intended to reach or did reach the public servant, the link remains incomplete - Proof of demand is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d), and statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts of voluntary acceptance/obtainment are established - Held, conviction cannot be sustained where residual gaps in receipt are bridged by mere speculation. [Relied on C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779; P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; State by Lokayuktha Police v. K. Rangayya, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 963; Paras 44–51, 66–74] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Maintainability of Corporate Prosecution without Arraigning or Identifying Natural Persons / Alter Ego - Criminal proceedings against a corporate entity cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC on the sole ground that no natural person/alter ego has been identified or arraigned alongside it in the chargesheet - The role and mental element of a company can be prima facie disclosed through its own conduct, decisions, and surrounding circumstances without naming specific individuals at the threshold stage - Establishing attribution conclusively is a matter of evidence to be determined during trial - While non-arraignment under provisions like Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is fatal to prosecuting individuals because liability is vicarious and derivative, no such condition precedent applies in reverse to corporations prosecuted for direct offences under the IPC or Prevention of Corruption Act. [Relied on Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, [1995] 2 A.C. 500; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530; Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74; Paras 175–187, 188–197] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Appellate Jurisdiction / Criminal Trial — Standard of Proof — Material Contradictions - Variance between the complainant's statements in the corruption trial and earlier depositions in collateral proceedings regarding the demanded amount, coupled with disobedience of the trap-laying instructions given by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, creates serious doubt regarding the foundational fact of demand - the conviction cannot be sustained. [Paras 10–19] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 19(1)(c) — Validity of Sanction — Authority Competent to Remove - Cognizance under Sections 7 and 13 cannot be validly taken without previous sanction from the authority competent to remove the public servant from office - For a substantively appointed Talati-cum-Mantri under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, the competent authority to remove is the District Development Officer (DDO) - Sanction granted by the Deputy District Development Officer (Dy. DDO) is defective and invalid, notwithstanding that the initial ad-hoc appointment was made by the Dy. DDO. [Para 17] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) — Timing of Payment — Work Already Executed - Payment made after the delivery/issuance of the requested document casts serious doubt on the allegation of bribe demand - Where an income certificate was already prepared and handed over to the complainant before any money was allegedly passed to the peon, it cannot be assumed ipso facto that such payment was made pursuant to an illegal demand - The defence that the amount was handed over on the eve of a festival (Eid) was held to be probable. [Relied On State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 INSC 736; Paras 16 - 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 20 — Proof of Demand and Acceptance — Statutory Presumption - The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act comes into play only after the prosecution proves the foundational fact of demand beyond reasonable doubt - Mere recovery of tainted money from an accused, in the absence of proof of demand, cannot sustain a conviction - Where the initial demand by Accused No. 1 (Talati-cum-Mantri) was doubtful due to material contradictions, Accused No. 2 (Peon) made no demand, and both stood acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC, mere recovery of ₹20/- from Accused No. 2 cannot resurrect the prosecution's case or attract the presumption under Section 20. [Relied On N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 3 SCC 687; Paras 10 – 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197 – Role of Sanctioning Authority - The sanctioning authority must independently apply its mind to the materials placed before it without acting under external force, coercion, or political dictate - Granting sanction upon reconsideration on identical material especially under political pressure—vitiates the sanction order and amounts to an abuse of process. [Relied on Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of H.P. v. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527; Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 53; State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92; Paras 8-13] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Grant or Refusal of Sanction – Reconsideration / Review of Order Refusing Sanction – Power of Review – Scope and Standard of Evaluation - No Express Power of Review - Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not contain any express provision regarding review or reconsideration of the matter by the sanctioning authority once the power to grant or refuse sanction has already been exercised – i. Review on Same Material Impermissible - A mere change of opinion per se on the exact same material is completely impermissible and cannot form the ground for reviewing an earlier order that refused to grant sanction – ii. When Review is Permissible - A review of an order refusing sanction is permissible only when fresh materials are collected by the investigating agency, which were not available at the earlier instance, provided there is a proper application of mind to such new materials – iii. External Pressure and Extraneous Dictates Vitiates Sanction - Sanction for prosecution is a statutory safeguard designed to protect innocent public servants from frivolous, vexatious, and unsubstantiated allegations - The decision-making process under Section 19 cannot be influenced by political dictates, extraneous considerations, or pressure exerted by higher authorities (such as the Chief Minister's office); iv. Standard of Evaluation by Sanctioning Authority - If the administrative/sanctioning authority itself expresses reasonable doubts and suspicions regarding the demand of bribe, the trap laid, or the recovery of money, sanction ought to be declined - Where two views are reasonably possible on the materials produced, the view exonerating the officer should be taken. [Paras 7 - 12] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752

When a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed statutory period, the mere non-supply of its copy to the accused does not entitle the accused to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS. Held, Section 187(3) BNSS provides for default bail only where the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet within the stipulated time. Non-supply or non-delivery of a copy of the charge sheet to the accused after it has been filed within time does not constitute a ground for granting default bail. The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court rejecting the accused's plea for default bail in a CBI case involving large-scale cyber fraud (approx. ₹3.81 crores) registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Information Technology Act, 2000. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 649 : 2026 INSC 666