Administrative Law — Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate — Consistency of conduct - A bidder who has acquiesced in being declared technically non-responsive on an identical experience clause by other statutory authorities under the same parent board cannot approbate and reprobate by advancing a contradictory interpretation to claim eligibility before another authority. [Paras 31-33] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025

Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 — Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) — Sister-Ship Arrest — Twin Jurisdictional Requirements - For a valid sister-ship arrest in rem under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(b), the claimant must establish that - (i) the demise charterer of the vessel at the time the maritime claim arose is liable for the claim; and (ii) such person continues to be the demise charterer (or owner) of the arrested vessel at the time the arrest is effected - If the bareboat charterparty stood validly terminated prior to the date of arrest, the entity ceases to be the demise charterer, displacing the statutory foundation for an arrest in rem under Section 5(1)(b). [Paras 30 - 44] Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2026 INSC 1055

Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 — Bareboat Charterparty (BIMCO BARECON 2017) — Clauses 31 & 32 — Termination vs. Repossession — Status as Gratuitous Bailee - A validly issued notice of contractual termination (under Clause 31 for non-payment of hire following anti-technicality grace periods) operates of its own force to bring the demise charter to an end - Physical repossession is not a condition precedent to termination; it is merely the consequential practical mechanism by which the owner recovers physical control - Under Clause 32 of BIMCO BARECON 2017, pending physical repossession, the charterer holds the vessel strictly as a "gratuitous bailee only to the Owners" - An entity cannot simultaneously be a 'demise charterer' (exercising full commercial dominion and control) and a 'gratuitous bailee' (holding property without user rights) - Because the demise charter had terminated and the charterer was holding the vessel merely as a gratuitous bailee prior to the date of the arrest order, the vessel was not liable to arrest under Section 5(1)(b). [Paras 20 - 45] Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2026 INSC 1055

Arbitration — Interpretation of Negative Interest Clause — Clause 54 of NEEPCO GCC — State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra distinguished - Clause 54 of the GCC provided: "No claims for interest or damages will be entertained by the Corporation with respect to any money or balance which may be lying with the Corporation owing to any dispute, OR with respect to any delay on the part of the Engineer-in-Charge making periodical or final payments or in any other respect whatsoever - The clause construed in State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co., (1999) 1 SCC 63, operated only where money was withheld owing to a dispute in making payments, and did not bar interest where money was simply delayed without any dispute - Clause 54 creates two distinct, disjunctive categories joined by "or" - (i) money withheld due to a dispute, and (ii) any delay in making payments standing independently on its own - Because delay in payment is expressly made an independent ground, Clause 54 operates as a complete contractual prohibition against the grant of pre-reference interest, aligning squarely with Sayeed Ahmed & Co. v. State of U.P. and THDC-II - The arbitral award granting pre-reference interest was contrary to Section 31(7)(a) and exceeded jurisdiction - the High Court's order restoring pre-reference interest set aside. [Relied on Sayeed Ahmed & Co. v. State of U.P., (2009) 12 SCC 26; Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corpn. (India) Ltd. (THDC-II), (2019) 17 SCC 786; Pam Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (2024) 10 SCC 715; Distinguished from State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra and Co., (1999) 1 SCC 63; Paras 16 - 23] North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO) v. Astra Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2026 INSC 1036

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11(6) read with Section 42 — Reference by High Court does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the District or Commercial Court where the High Court is physically situated - The High Court exercises territorial jurisdiction over the entire State - Merely because an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) whose principal seat is at Cuttack, it does not confer exclusive supervisory jurisdiction under Section 42 on the District Court or Commercial Court at Cuttack to entertain a petition under Section 34 - In the absence of a designated seat or an established Commercial Court (where the cause of action substantially arose and the contract was executed), the Section 34 petition was maintainable before the District Judge under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (BALCO), (2012) 9 SCC 552; Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678; BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234; Paras 22-32] Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2026 INSC 1038

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 31(7)(a) — Pre-reference and Pendente Lite Interest — Contractual Bar — Regime shift from the 1940 Act to the 1996 Act - Under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act, the power of an arbitral tribunal to award interest for the pre-reference and pendente lite period is expressly subject to party autonomy ("Unless otherwise agreed by the parties") - Unlike the strict-construction approach under the 1940 Act, under the 1996 Act, an express contractual bar in the agreement excludes the jurisdiction of the tribunal to award pre-reference and pendente lite interest, even if the clause is not specifically directed against the arbitrator - While pendente lite interest is procedural, pre-reference interest is substantive and cannot be awarded when explicitly prohibited by the contract. [Paras 13-23] North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO) v. Astra Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2026 INSC 1036

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 read with Sections 2(1)(e) and 42 — Territorial Jurisdiction — Distinction between "Seat" and "Venue" — Sittings of the tribunal held at Cuttack merely for convenience — High Court seat physically located at Cuttack does not make Cuttack the juridical seat of arbitration - There is an established distinction between the "Seat" and the "Venue" of arbitration - While the "seat" determines the court exercising supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings, the "venue" merely denotes the physical location where sittings are held for administrative convenience - Where the order under Section 11(6) did not designate Cuttack as the seat, and there was no agreement between the parties conferring exclusive supervisory jurisdiction on the courts at Cuttack, the mere conduct of arbitral proceedings at Cuttack for the convenience of the arbitrator does not constitute Cuttack as the juridical seat. [Paras 26-29] Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2026 INSC 1038

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34(3) — Limitation - Where the arbitral award was passed on 25.10.2021 and the objection petition under Section 34 was presented before the court on 08.12.2021, the petition was filed well within the statutory period of three months prescribed under Section 34(3) - the finding of the High Court that it was time-barred was factually and legally erroneous. [Paras 17-21] Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2026 INSC 1038

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXIII Rule 3A — Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended by Act 39 of 2005) — Section 6 — Partition suit — Daughter entitled to undivided 1/4th share omitted from suit and subsequent appeal — Validity of compromise decree recorded behind back of omitted coparcener's heirs — Recall application maintainable - By virtue of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005), a daughter is a coparcener and entitled to an undivided share in ancestral coparcenary properties, making her and her legal heirs necessary parties to a suit for partition - A compromise decree entered into among other coparceners/brothers in appeal, deliberately omitting the sister/daughter or her legal heirs, is a complete nullity in the eyes of law - Such legal heirs cannot be treated as strangers to the lis - The bar contained under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC does not disentitle them from filing an interlocutory application before the very court that recorded the compromise to seek recall of the decree obtained behind their back – Held that the High Court's view that their only remedy was to institute a separate suit or seek leave to appeal was erroneous and set aside; applications remitted for fresh determination on merits. [Paras 10–15] Geeta Bai v. K. Arjun Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1004

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 151 — Anti-suit Injunction — Parameters for grant — Principle of Judicial Comity and Restraint - An anti-suit injunction is an equitable and extraordinary remedy by which an Indian court restrains a party amenable to its personal jurisdiction from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a foreign court - Because such an injunction indirectly interjects into the sovereign jurisdiction of a foreign court, it must be granted sparingly, with extreme caution, and not as a matter of routine - The court can grant an anti-suit injunction only if - (i) the defendant is amenable to its personal jurisdiction; (ii) declining injunction would perpetuate injustice; and (iii) the foreign proceedings are shown to be oppressive, vexatious, or before a forum non conveniens. [Para 5] Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2026 INSC 1034

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 13 — Granting anti-suit injunction on premature apprehension of foreign decree's non-enforceability impermissible - An anti-suit injunction cannot be issued at an inchoate stage merely on the speculative assumption that the foreign court might grant a divorce decree on the ground of "irretrievable breakdown of marriage" which may ultimately be unenforceable under Section 13 CPC in India - The question of conclusiveness and enforceability of a foreign judgment arises under Section 13 CPC only after a final decree is passed, and not while the foreign proceedings are pending and all jurisdictional issues remain at large - Vacation of the anti-suit injunction by the High Court upheld. [Relied on Modi Entertainment Network & Anr. v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 341; Dinesh Singh Thakur v. Sonal Thakur, (2018) 17 SCC 12; Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE, (2025) 9 SCC 750; Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1098; Paras 5-10] Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2026 INSC 1034

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing All Issues Does Not Exhaust Rule 2(2), but Embarking upon General Trial Does - The statutory words 'may try that issue first' are distinct from the optional power that the Court 'may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues' - The four procedural operating settings are – i. Court frames only the qualifying issue of law and postpones settlement of other issues; ii. Court frames all issues and contemporaneously directs that the qualifying issue be tried first; iii. Court frames all issues and fixes a date for evidence, but before the court actually embarks upon the trial and evidentiary recording generally, an application under Rule 2(2) is made (mere fixation of a date does not bar exercise of discretion); iv. Court has already embarked upon the trial of the issues generally (e.g., plaintiff has closed evidence and defendants have entered upon evidence) - Once the trial on the issues generally has commenced, the statutory occasion to direct that an issue be 'tried first' has irrevocably passed - The word 'first' is relational and authorizes only a prospective ordering of the trial, not a retrospective reordering or severance of an ongoing composite trial. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to bypass this temporal bar. [Paras 21-47] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Harmonious Reading with Order XX Rule 5 - Limitation Involving Mixed Questions of Law and Fact - Order XX Rule 5 obligates the Court to render findings on each separate issue unless a finding on one or more issues is sufficient for disposal of the suit - This exception applies where a preliminary issue was validly isolated and tried first - where issues have entered a composite general trial, findings must be rendered on all issues to avoid unnecessary remands and piecemeal adjudications - Where limitation depends on determining whether a registered alienation was void ab initio for want of authority under a General Power of Attorney (attracting Article 65 of the Limitation Act) or voidable requiring cancellation (attracting Article 59), it involves mixed questions of fact and law requiring adduction of evidence and cannot be severed for summary dismissal under Order XIV Rule 2(2) or rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d). [Relied on Sathyanath v. Sarojamani, (2022) 7 SCC 644; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557; Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322; Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 INSC 465; Paras 19 – 26, 41-46] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XIV Rule 2, Order XX Rule 5, Order VII Rule 11(d), and Section 151 — Framing of Issues vs. Trying an Issue — Trial of Preliminary Issue — Stage at which Power to Try an Issue First under Order XIV Rule 2(2) Ceases — Ongoing Composite Trial Cannot Be Severed Retrospectively - Scheme and Cumulative Requirements of Order XIV Rule 2(2) - Under the post-1976 amended scheme of Order XIV Rule 2, the general rule under sub-rule (1) is that the Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues - The exception carved out under sub-rule (2) is discretionary and strictly conditional upon three cumulative criteria - (i) it must be an issue of law only; (ii) it must relate either to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force; (iii) the Court must form an opinion that the suit or any part thereof may be disposed of on that issue alone - A mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. [Paras 16-19] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 91, Section 227 — Accused seeking production of unrelied documents at the stage of framing of charges — Permissibility, limits, and procedure for inspection - While an accused is entitled to documents available with the prosecuting agency to shape their defence, the entitlement to demand production of unrelied documents at the pre-charge stage under Section 91 CrPC is not absolute - Internal records of the investigating agency (such as Daily Diary Registers, Dispatch Registers, and Source Information Reports) and case diaries are confidential/privileged and cannot be directed to be divulged or produced - Where the seized but unrelied documents are voluminous, the appropriate procedure is to allow the accused or their authorized representative to inspect the seized documents with the permission of the Court - Upon inspection, the accused may specify in writing the particular document(s) required, signed by both parties, which the prosecution shall keep ready and produce before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage of trial (when relevant prosecution or defence witnesses are examined) - Documents not in the possession or custody of the investigating agency cannot be directed to be produced - the accused remains at liberty to procure them independently (via RTI or defence evidence) to establish their defence. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568; Sarla Gupta and Anr. v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 7 SCC 626; Paras 6–14] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anil Dixit, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1001 : 2026 INSC 1064

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 227 & 228 — Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 468 & 471 — Framing of charge of forgery — Non-recovery or non-production of original forged document along with chargesheet does not entitle accused to discharge - The absence of the original document alleged to have been forged is not fatal to the prosecution at the threshold stage of framing charge and does not sound the death knell of the criminal proceedings - The prosecution is entitled to lead secondary or circumstantial evidence at trial to establish the commission of forgery beyond reasonable doubt - At the stage of framing charges under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, the Court cannot embark upon a roving inquiry or sift evidence as if conducting a mini-trial - it is sufficient if the material on record creates a grave suspicion against the accused. [Paras 6 - 20] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Distinction from Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC - Public Law Remedy of Compensation - Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(2) BNSS) operates on a distinct footing - In default bail cases, re-arrest is permissible upon filing of the chargesheet on cogent grounds, whereas breaches under Article 22(1) and 22(2) occur at the threshold of the arrest itself and violate fundamental rights, requiring strict judicial safeguards before custody can be sought again - For illegal detention in violation of Article 22(2), the constitutional court may direct payment of compensation under public law remedies as exemplary damages / palliative relief for infringement of civil liberties, without relegating the citizen solely to private law remedies, though reserving liberty to claim damages under private civil law. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; Paras 28-36] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 & 164 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 – Omissions in previous statements – Maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' – Held - Statements recorded under Section 161 and Section 164 CrPC are not substantive evidence; their legitimate use is strictly confined to contradicting the witness under Section 145 Evidence Act - An omission matures into a contradiction only if the omitted fact is irreconcilable with the court testimony or is one which the witness would ordinarily have been expected to state - Omission of background and contextual facts (such as antecedent ill-treatment or threats) by an illiterate witness does not destroy the credibility of her core account of sexual assault and strangulation - The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply in India - courts must separate the grain from the chaff and act on the reliable core. [Relied On Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505; Selvamani v. State of T.N., (2024) 19 SCC 112; Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 INSC 525; Paras 32, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 235(2) & 354(3) – Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 21 – Sentencing Principles – Same-Day Sentencing – Aggravating vs. Mitigating Circumstances – Intermediate Sentence of Natural Life Imprisonment without Remission – Held - (i) Imposing the death sentence on the same day as conviction violates Section 235(2) CrPC as expounded in Allaudin Mian - the sentencing court must provide an effective opportunity to place individualised mitigating circumstances on record; (ii) The High Court's formulation evaluating the "crime test at 100% and criminal test at 0%" is legally flawed - the criminal test can almost never be zero, and sentencing courts cannot ignore the circumstances of the offender; (iii) Although "instrumental silencing" (murdering a child victim to destroy evidence and suppress the rape) is an aggravating circumstance of the highest order, it relates to the crime and does not automatically establish that the criminal is beyond reformation - The State failed to discharge its burden of proving that the accused was incorrigible - The convict had no prior criminal antecedents, suffered severe childhood deprivation, maintained unblemished prison conduct over eight years, and showed no psychiatric disorder; (iv) Applying the Sriharan doctrine, life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission serves as an adequate and severe intermediate punishment to meet the ends of justice while keeping the possibility of reform intact - Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. [Relied On Allaudin Mian v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 16 SCC 584; Manoj v. State of M.P., (2023) 2 SCC 353; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546; Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460; Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 15 SCC 401; Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1043; Paras 148, 149, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 167, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 201, 202, 203] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 391 & 367 – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Legal aid counsel appointed on the very date when the star witness was examined and cross-examined in a capital case – Held - Appointing a legal aid counsel and recording the complete deposition of the key prosecution witness on the self-same day without providing adequate opportunity to prepare violates the standard of effective legal assistance and meaningful cross-examination guaranteed under Article 21 - this infirmity stood adequately cured when the Supreme Court invoked Section 391 read with Section 367 CrPC to direct a curative further cross-examination of the witness through counsel of the accused's choice with the complete record furnished in advance - Her testimony must be appreciated by reading together her original deposition and the further cross-examination. [Paras 4, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Commercial Contracts — Interpretation and Business Efficacy - Commercial documents must be interpreted to give full effect to the intention of the parties and commercial efficacy to contractual terms as understood and intended - If a demise charter were deemed to survive despite contractual termination until physical repossession is completed, an owner's termination right would be held hostage to the defaulting charterer's evasive conduct or technical delays outside the owner's control. [Relied on M/s Tomorrowland Limited v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited & Anr., 2025 INSC 207; Paras 19, 32-39] Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2026 INSC 1055

Constitution of India — Article 145(3) read with Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XXXVIII Rule 1 — Split Verdict on Reference to Constitution Bench - In a batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 6, 7, and 8(2) of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 for excluding the Chief Justice of India and institutionalizing executive dominance in the Selection Committee, the two-Judge Bench delivered a split opinion on whether the challenge must be referred to a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3) – Per Dipankar Datta, J. (Rejecting the plea for reference) - Merely raising a constitutional question or challenging a novel enactment does not attract Article 145(3), if the foundational constitutional principles have already been authoritatively settled by Supreme Court - The Constitution Bench in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161, definitively held that the Election Commission of India must be insulated from exclusive executive control and that free and fair elections form part of the basic structure - What remains is only the application of these settled standards to the newly enacted 2023 Act - Applying settled law does not amount to interpreting the Constitution under Article 145(3) - The interim committee in Anoop Baranwal was a transient pro tem measure under Article 142 until legislative intervention, and examining whether the 2023 Act passes the muster of Article 14 and Article 324 is within the domain of the regular Bench. [Paras 49-88]. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2026 INSC 1040

Constitution of India — Article 20(3), Article 22(5) — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 23 — Preventive detention based on extra-judicial confession made to police — Inadmissibility and invalidity - A confessional statement made before a police officer cannot, by itself and in the absence of independent material lending support thereto, constitute the basis for forming the subjective satisfaction necessary to sustain an order of preventive detention - Under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (analogous to Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), confessions made before police officers are inherently suspect and excluded from evidence - If such a confession is too tainted to be received in evidence for proving guilt, it cannot legitimately constitute a valid ground for preventive detention, particularly when procured under alleged threat or torture in violation of Article 20(3) - Under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the inclusion of an irrelevant or legally impermissible ground strikes at the root of the detenu's right to make an effective representation and vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. [Relied on Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569; Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur, (2010) 9 SCC 618; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424; Distinguished from Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N., (2006) 5 SCC 676; E. Subbulakshmi v. State of T.N., (2017) 1 SCC 757; Paras 15, 30–36, 38–39] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Safety in Public Spaces & Institutional Accountability - The right to live with dignity, free from fear of violence, is an intrinsic facet of the fundamental guarantee of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution - Recurring sexual offences in public parks, roads, and transit facilities across Delhi-NCR expose a systemic failure of law enforcement and civic administrative bodies - Public spaces cannot be allowed to turn into high-risk zones due to poor lighting, lax patrolling, and deficient surveillance - Mere expressions of concern and solidarity by authorities, devoid of accountability, do not solve institutional security lapses - measurable responsibility must be fixed upon authorities entrusted with crime prevention and public order. [Paras 5-15] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996

Constitution of India — Article 22(1), Article 22(2), and Article 21 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 50, Section 57, and Section 167 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Dismissal or Removal by Subordinate Authority — Identifying the "Appointing Authority" — Call Letter for Training vs. Regular Order of Appointment - The respondent was selected as a recruit and issued a Call Letter dated 03.05.1979 by the Commandant to report for training, which explicitly stipulated that appointment as a regular Rakshak was contingent upon successful completion of initial training - Following completion of training, the Assistant Commandant issued Battalion Order dated 04.12.1979 appointing the respondent as a Rakshak and posting him to the 7th Battalion - the respondent was removed from service by the Adjutant (an officer equivalent in rank to Assistant Commandant) for unauthorized absence of 72 days - The First Appellate Court and the High Court erroneously set aside the removal on the ground that the Commandant was the appointing authority and the Adjutant was subordinate to him, violating Article 311(1) - Reversing the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the Call Letter was merely an offer and a direction to undergo mandatory training - The substantive appointment was made only via the Battalion Order dated 04.12.1979 issued by the Assistant Commandant - Since the Adjutant who passed the removal order was equal in rank to the Assistant Commandant and not subordinate, the bar under Article 311(1) of the Constitution was not attracted. [Relied on Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway, (1979) 4 SCC 289; Union of India & Anr. v. Chandra Pal Pandey, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 176; P. Karuppaiah (Dead) through LRs v. General Manager, Thiruvaluvar Transport Corporation Ltd., (2018) 12 SCC 663; Paras 6–12, 15, 24–26] Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2026 INSC 1047

Constitution of India — Article 32 / Article 226 — Delayed Payment of Salary and Non-EPF Arrears — Grant of Simple Interest at 6% per annum — Concept of Interest - Salary, retiral benefits, and earned emoluments are rightful monetary entitlements - Interest is compensation/recompense for unjust deprivation of the use of money lawfully due to an individual - Although corporations possess separate juristic personalities, successor welfare States cannot shelter behind the corporate veil to leave employees remediless after decades of deprivation - Balancing the financial burden of the exchequer with restitution for prolonged withholding, simple interest @ 6% per annum awarded on salary/wages arrears from the due date till actual realization. [Paras 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59] Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 995 : 2026 INSC 1061

Constitution of India – Articles 21, 226, 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173(8), Section 482 – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Constitution of India — Per Satish Chandra Sharma, J. (Allowing the plea for reference) - The 2023 Act was enacted by Parliament pursuant to Anoop Baranwal - There is no prior authoritative decision of the Supreme Court testing the constitutional validity of the 2023 Act - Whether Parliament was constitutionally justified under Article 324(2) in excluding an independent or neutral selector (such as the CJI) from the Selection Committee and retaining an executive majority raises a seminal and substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution which has never been decided before - Under Article 145(3) read with Order XXXVIII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, such a pristine question of constitutional interpretation must be decided by a Bench of not less than five Judges. [Relied on Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161; People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399; Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 595; Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (NJAC Case), (2016) 5 SCC 1; Paras 5-20]. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2026 INSC 1040

Constitution of India — Procedure for Re-arrest / Fresh Custody Following Release for Breach of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) - An accused who has suffered a breach of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) does not enjoy a blanket permanent immunity from re-arrest - the investigating agency cannot automatically re-arrest the accused by executive fiat - Re-arrest requires prior judicial sanction/imprimatur; i. The investigating agency must file a formal application for custody before the concerned Magistrate setting forth the reasons and necessity for re-arrest and custodial interrogation, accompanied by an explanation for the initial default; ii. Such application can be moved only after furnishing the written grounds of arrest to the accused; iii. To eliminate foul play or collusion, the application must bear the prior endorsement of the immediate superior authority; iv. On the administrative side, the superior authority must transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate departmental/disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer(s); v. The Magistrate shall decide the application expeditiously, preferably within one week, adhering to principles of natural justice, and may grant custody only upon being satisfied with the bona fides of the explanation and the genuine necessity for re-arrest; vi. The same procedure applies mutatis mutandis to breaches under Article 22(2). [Paras 24 - 38] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 2(1)(g) – Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM – Fire Insurance – Repudiation of claim on grounds of false declaration, manipulated accounts, and suspected arson – Scope and effect of policy forfeiture clauses - Held, when an insured willfully makes false declarations or relies on manipulated books of account and inflated inventory to buttress an insurance claim in violation of policy conditions (specifically Policy Conditions No. 6 and 8), the insurer is lawfully entitled to reject and repudiate such claim in its entirety without further ado - The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) erred in casually brushing aside findings recorded in multiple detailed surveyor reports and the report of an investigative agency which demonstrated that unusable dead scrap was lying in the affected shed rather than usable raw material, the books showed an imaginary yield and arbitrary consumption to create non-existent book stock, and the fire-fighting and loss-minimization efforts were non-genuine - the order of the NCDRC awarding compensation was set aside and the repudiation was sustained. [Paras 31-35] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023

Criminal Jurisprudence — Principle of Issue Estoppel — Relitigation of settled issues barred - Section 173(5) & 173(8) — Production of additional documents - Where a Division Bench of the High Court had previously declined to quash an FIR and chargesheet under Section 482 CrPC on the specific ground that the original plan was missing, a subsequent petition under Section 482 before a Single Judge raising the identical challenge against the order framing charges is barred by the doctrine of issue estoppel - A party cannot relitigate a proposition of fact or law distinctly raised and settled in earlier proceedings between the same parties - The requirement under Section 173(5) to submit all documents with the chargesheet is directory and not mandatory - The prosecution is not precluded from placing additional documents gathered during further investigation on record after the filing of the chargesheet. [Relied on Rama Shanker Lal & Ors. v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 905; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 INSC 522; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Paras 11 - 21] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032

Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Custody of Minors — Financial Capacity of Parents — Consideration of Paternal Grandparents' Pension - Meeting the financial and educational needs of minor children is the primary obligation of the parents. Where the father earned a modest salary of Rs. 17,000/- per month and channelled his energies into litigation rather than enhancing his earning potential, while the mother earned Rs. 3 Lakhs per month as a university lecturer in the UK, the combined pension received by the paternal grandparents cannot be treated as supplementing or filling the gap of the father's statutory and moral obligations. [Paras 45-49] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Section 7-Q — Mandatory Statutory Interest on Delayed EPF Dues - Provident fund is a statutory social security benefit accrued during employment and cannot be treated as an ordinary monetary claim - The liability to pay simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum under Section 7-Q of the Act is an automatic, mandatory consequence of law that does not rest on administrative discretion or contractual stipulations - Such statutory interest must be computed from the date the EPF amounts fell due until the date of actual payment, irrespective of the corporate entity becoming non-functional or the principal amount being disbursed belatedly. [Paras 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 59] Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 995 : 2026 INSC 1061

Evidence Act – Solitary Witness / Related Witness / Child Sexual Abuse - Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 134 & 106 – Appreciation of Evidence in Intra-Household Sexual Offence – Solitary Witness – Testimony of Mother against Husband – Held: Section 134 establishes that evidence is to be weighed and not counted; conviction can be founded on a single reliable witness - A related witness is distinct from an interested witness - The mother of a victim child testifying against her own husband renounces her home and security, making it inherently improbable that she would shield the real killer of her daughter to falsely frame her husband - offences committed within the secrecy of a household seldom occur before multiple witnesses; demanding independent corroboration of a standard impossible to attain would confer immunity upon perpetrators - As an inmate of the house possessing special knowledge under Section 106, the burden rested on the appellant to offer a plausible explanation of how the child suffered sexual violation and homicidal death. [Relied On Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (1957) 1 SCC 700; Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1953) 2 SCC 36; State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752; Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 28, 29, 30, 31, 38, 39] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114A — Presumption as to Absence of Consent — Scope and Applicability - The statutory presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act does not apply mechanically merely because the prosecutrix denied consent - The denial of consent must be assessed in the overall matrix and context of her entire testimony - When surrounding facts, conduct, and lack of resistance demonstrate voluntary accompaniment and stay over multiple days, absence of consent cannot be accepted - mere presence of spermatozoa in vaginal swabs does not conclusively establish rape in the absence of internal or external injury and in the face of consensual conduct - A charge of rape must be proved beyond reasonable doubt on hard, credible evidence and not on surmises, conjectures, or personal value judgments of the trial judge - Even if the conduct of the accused is considered immoral or unethical, immorality sans credible evidence cannot justify a conviction under criminal law. [Paras 18-27] Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2026 INSC 1054

Evidence Act, 1872 - Witness Conduct – Abused and Coerced Woman – Absence of Immediate Reporting or Flight – Held - Courts must not assess the credibility of abused women or witnesses to trauma against preconceived, stereotyped notions of 'ideal' or 'expected' behaviour - Silence, prolonged cohabitation, and delayed reporting often arise from trauma, terror, economic dependency, learned helplessness, and coercive control in violent relationships - Perpetrators who secure silence through terror cannot subsequently exploit that very silence or lack of flight to attack the credibility of the victim or witness - Mere access to a mobile phone where the husband controlled the saved contacts does not denote liberty. [Relied On Rana Partap v. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327; XYZ v. State of M.P., (2021) 16 SCC 179; Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590.; Paras 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) & Section 6 – Child Victim's Disclosure – Admissibility as Dying Declaration and Res Gestae – Held - The verbal account given by a six-year-old child to her mother narrating the sexual assault immediately after the incident forms part of the "circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death" under Section 32(1) Evidence Act, as the sexual assault and the throttling were proximate, continuous, and connected stages of a single transaction aimed at silencing her - Expectation of death is not required under Section 32(1) - The disclosure is also admissible under Section 6 as res gestae, being spontaneous and proximate to the occurrence - The statement was strongly corroborated by the post-mortem finding of a fresh tear at the fourchette. [Relied On Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 4 SCC 161; Paras 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 8, 24 & 103 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 293 – Conduct of Accused; Extra-Judicial Confession; Defective Investigation; Absence of Male DNA – Held - (i) An extra-judicial confession made voluntarily before family members upon being confronted is admissible and provides corroboration; (ii) The appellant's subsequent conduct under Section 8 (inquiring whether the child had revealed anything, refusing hospitalisation, and attempting immediate burial) demonstrated consciousness of guilt; (iii) Under Section 293 CrPC, a DNA analysis report submitted by a Government Forensic Science Laboratory is admissible without calling the expert as a witness, especially when the accused did not seek to summon the expert under Section 293(2) - The absence of male DNA in a vaginal smear after the body had been washed prior to post-mortem does not displace the ocular account and genital tear; (iv) Lapses in investigation (such as lodging an FIR against an unknown person or delay in recording witnesses under Section 161) cannot ensure to the benefit of the accused when trustworthy ocular and medical evidence proves the case beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403; Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518; State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567; Paras 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 119] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Fire Insurance – Presumption of accidental fire – Limits – Where reasonable suspicion exists of instigation by insured - Held, the legal principle that the precise origin or cause of a fire is immaterial so long as the claimant is not the instigator does not apply where there is reasonable cause to suspect arson, deliberate staging, or gross lack of bonafide fire-minimization efforts by the insured - Where physical verification contradicts the very occurrence of massive structural fire damage, material has been pre-demolished, and the insured willfully engages in delaying tactics in informing authorities, the claim cannot be allowed merely by presuming the fire to be accidental. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited v. Pradeep Kumar, (2009) 7 SCC 787; Khatema Fibres Limited v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another, (2023) 15 SCC 327; Sri Venkateswara Syndicate v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another, (2009) 8 SCC 507; Paras 26-30] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — Section 25 — Custody Battle — Welfare and Best Interest of Child — Re-integration Process - Custody of the minor daughter restored to the father in accordance with earlier binding decrees - To prevent emotional shock, the matter was remitted to the Family Court to effect structured, phased re-integration of the child with the father, overseen by a designated expert committee consisting of CBI officers and NIMHANS psychiatric faculty. [Paras 35, 36, 78–86] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — Section 7 & Section 25 — Custody of Minors — Relevant Considerations — Professional Movement vs. "Nomadic Lifestyle" — Mother's Financial and Career Endeavours - The Family Court and High Court awarded sole custody of two minor children (son and daughter) to the father, inter alia, on the ground that the mother led a "nomadic lifestyle" by frequently changing academic jobs across different Indian cities between 2019 and 2021 - Reversing this view, the Supreme Court observed that the mother, holding a Ph.D. in Engineering, was compelled to leave the matrimonial home under stressful circumstances and had to change jobs because the father persistently harassed her with numerous RTI applications at her workplace (IIT Jodhpur) - The mother's efforts to cement her standing in academia, earn financial security, and secure a respectable teaching position at the University of Hull (UK) cannot be branded as leading a "nomadic life"; such efforts demonstrate a committed approach to securing the children's future. [Paras 44 - 50] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Hindu Law — Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 14(1) read with Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, Section 3(2) — Enlargement of limited estate into absolute ownership — Claiming or effecting actual partition is not a sine qua non - Under Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, upon the demise of a male Hindu coparcener intestate prior to 1956, his limited interest in the coparcenary property devolves upon his widow - Where the widow continues to hold or reside in the property backed by this pre-existing statutory right (jus ad rem) and remains in legal/constructive possession thereof at the time of commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, her limited interest blossoms into absolute ownership by operation of Section 14(1) - Actual partition between the widow and the surviving coparcener is not a sine qua non for the statutory enlargement of her right into absolute ownership. [Paras 11-15] Ganapati v. Prabhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2026 INSC 1033

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Scope of Section 14(1) vs. Section 14(2) — Meaning of 'possessed by' - The expression "possessed by" in Section 14(1) has the widest amplitude and embraces constructive or legal possession backed by a vestige of title - Section 14(2) acts strictly as a proviso and applies only where an instrument creates a fresh, independent right for the first time without any underlying pre-existing claim - As a widow's right to maintenance and succession is a pre-existing right under Shastric law recognized by the 1937 Act, Section 14(1) governs - upon becoming absolute owner under Section 14(1), the widow possesses full testamentary capacity to bequeath the property by Will. [Relied on V. Tulasamma & Others v. Sesha Reddy, (1977) 3 SCC 99; Raghubar Singh & Ors. v. Gulab Singh & Ors., (1998) 6 SCC 314; Paras 8 - 15] Ganapati v. Prabhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2026 INSC 1033

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 — Schedule I — Clause providing for forfeiture in E-Auction Notice — Failure of successful bidder to pay balance consideration within 90 days — Legality of forfeiture of EMD and part-consideration - Where a bidder participates in an e-auction on an 'as is where is' basis with prior notice of defects/pending litigation regarding title deeds, and voluntarily pays 25% of the bid amount (comprising 10% EMD and a portion of balance consideration) without protest, failure to deposit the remaining balance consideration within the maximum 90-day window renders the forfeiture clause in the auction notice operative and automatic - Even if Schedule I of the Liquidation Process Regulations, 2016 limits EMD to 10% of reserve price and does not expressly mandate statutory forfeiture, the explicit contractual conditions of the e-auction notice bind the bidder - The NCLT erred in applying the equitable "Triple Test" (hidden agenda to rig auction, lack of financial capacity, or prevention by extraneous reasons) to order a refund - Subsequent realization of a higher value in a re-auction reflects inherent market value and does not absolve the defaulting bidder whose failure disrupted the time-bound liquidation process - The forfeiture of the entire deposited amount was valid, and the NCLAT order affirming the forfeiture was sustained. [Relied on Potens Transmission & Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Apex Buildsys Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1543 of 2023 (affirmed by Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4116 of 2022); Distinguished from Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, (2024) 6 SCC 641; Paras 11–17, 19–22] M/s. Asj Finsolutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram Bajaj, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2026 INSC 1062

Insurance Act, 1938 – Section 64UM(1-A), Section 64UM(2) Proviso – Surveyors and Loss Assessors – Evidentiary value of surveyor reports – Requirement of recording reasons for appointing a second surveyor / investigative agency - Held, although the assessment of loss by an approved surveyor under Section 64UM(2) is a prerequisite for settling a claim exceeding the statutory threshold, the surveyor's report is neither sacrosanct nor conclusive and is not the last word binding either the insurer or the insured - While an insurer cannot appoint a second surveyor as a matter of course without recording cogent reasons, appointment of subsequent surveyors/investigators is fully permissible where the preliminary surveyor expressly observes serious abnormalities requiring meticulous investigation to rule out arson and hypothetical loss - consumer fora cannot ignore joint/final surveyor reports containing detailed empirical data; doing so causes a serious miscarriage of justice. [Paras 18-25] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Hemkund Duplex and Board Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2026 INSC 1023

Judicial Process — Inordinate Delay in References to Larger Benches — Suggestion for Permanent Constitution Bench - Noting the grave delay in deciding references (often taking between 5 to 20 years or more, as witnessed in Anoop Baranwal and Jai Bir Singh), which causes institutional embarrassment, the Bench collectively placed the papers before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench to resolve the vires of the 2023 Act, and urged the CJI to explore the necessity of setting up a permanent 5-Judge Constitution Bench to decide pure constitutional controversies expeditiously. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2026 INSC 1040

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Relocation of Children to Foreign Jurisdiction — Cultural Ethos vs. Best Interests - Rejecting the father's contention that relocation to the UK would lead to the loss of Bengali cultural ethos, held that there is no presumption that relocating abroad deprives children of their cultural roots, particularly when the mother herself belongs to the community and can nurture them accordingly - The mother was permitted to take both children to the United Kingdom, secure their admission in school, and file an undertaking to produce them as and when directed by Indian Courts. [Paras 51, 60–62] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 3(iii), (iv), (vi), and (ix) — Child's Voice and Best Interest - The statutory principles of participation, best interest, safety, and non-waiver of rights under Section 3 of the JJ Act make it imperative that the disclosure, emotional comfort, and safety of the child cannot be compromised - The son's morbid fear and reluctance towards the father, established during Chamber interactions and multiple independent counselling reports, cannot be overridden - Entrusting custody to the accused parent would also jeopardize a free and fair trial. [Paras 55, 56] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Labour and Service Jurisprudence — Daily-Wagers — Unchanging Flat Wage Rates over Decades — One-Time Lump-Sum Relief - Computing back dues of daily-wagers uniformly at a historical flat rate of ₹42.50 per day over several decades (from 1992 onwards) disregards inflation, cost of living, and revised minimum wages - Remitting the matter for fresh wage determinations after decades of litigation would prejudice finality - To balance equities, a one-time lump-sum sum of ₹1,00,000/- directed to be paid to each daily-wage worker in addition to already disbursed wages. [Paras 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 59] Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karamchari Maha Sangh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 995 : 2026 INSC 1061

Media Guidelines & Responsible Journalism — Section 72, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 & Section 23, POCSO Act - Media outlets, journalists, and digital platforms bear a constitutional and ethical duty of restrained, empathetic journalism - Sensationalized headlines, graphic/lurid descriptions, and insensitive phraseology cause secondary trauma and are strictly deprecated - Direct or indirect disclosure of the identity of sexual assault victims or minors is statutorily prohibited under Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 23 of the POCSO Act - Media houses urged to provide dedicated columns/airtime pro bono displaying emergency helplines and protective systems. [Relied on Avishek Goenka v. Union of India & Anr., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 265 of 2011; Paras 17-19] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996

Motor Vehicles & Public Transport Safety — Total Prohibition on Window Films / Tinted Glass - Law enforcement authorities directed to strictly enforce complete prohibitions against aftermarket tinted, black, or solar-control films on vehicle windows, noting that such concealment facilitates heinous offences - Police ordered to impound non-compliant vehicles, strip illegal films, and prosecute violators without exceptions - Delhi High Court on its administrative side directed to assign the highlighted cases to designated Fast Track Special Courts and ensure trials conclude expeditiously, preferably within one year from commencement - High Court Registrar General directed to place comprehensive pendency and disposal data on record. [Para 12-14] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996

National Security Act, 1980 — Section 3(2) — Mere filing of charge-sheet and pendency of criminal cases — Invocation of preventive detention to defeat bail — Subversion of criminal process - The mere filing of a charge-sheet amounts only to an opinion of the investigating agency and does not constitute conclusive proof of guilt or disturbance of public order - While the pendency of a criminal prosecution is not an absolute bar to preventive detention (Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal affirmed), invoking preventive detention on the very same allegations when an accused has obtained or is likely to obtain bail demonstrates that the power was used punitively rather than preventively, seeking to subvert judicial orders of bail - The mere existence of multiple cases is not per se a ground for detention absent cogent, proximate material showing an imperative need to prevent future prejudicial activity - Impugned detention order and confirmation set aside with costs of Rs. 10 Lakh imposed on the State. [Relied on Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244; Paras 49–59, 63–69] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067

National Security Act, 1980 — Section 3(2), Section 8 — Scope of Judicial Review — Non-disclosure and non-supply of foundational material - Where the grounds of detention asserted that the detenu was identified as the mastermind via CCTV footages and call records with a "Boss," but neither the CCTV recordings nor the call records/mobile data formed part of the 22 documents relied upon or supplied to the detenu or produced before the Court, reliance on such undisclosed material is fatal to the detention order - A detention order cannot be founded on material that was never furnished to the detenu. [Relied on Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur, (2010) 9 SCC 618; Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587; State of Rajasthan v. Talib Khan, (1996) 11 SCC 393; Paras 44–48] Mulla Afroz v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2026 INSC 1067

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 (prior to 2013 amendment) read with Section 366 — Appreciation of Prosecutrix's Sole Testimony — Rule against Selective Acceptance and Partial Rejection of Evidence - While conviction for rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, her testimony must be of unimpeachable character and inspire the confidence of the Court - There cannot be partial rejection of the evidence of the prosecutrix to record acquittal under Section 366 IPC (holding she was a consenting major who travelled willingly) and simultaneous partial acceptance of the very same testimony to convict the accused under Section 376 IPC - Where the prosecutrix was determined to be a major (approx. 19 years old) who accompanied the accused voluntarily for 5–6 days across busy markets, intersections, and public transport without raising any hue, cry, or alarm, her testimony was a "bundle of contradictions" and not credible. [Paras 20, 20.3, 22, 22.1, 24, 25, 28, 29] Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2026 INSC 1054

Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 read with Section 34 – Sentencing Discretion of the Supreme Court – Modification of Sentence – Factors to be Considered – Held - In determining an appropriate special category sentence, Constitutional Courts must apply the principle of proportionality, balancing the aggravating factors of the crime with the mitigating factors of the convict - While the premeditated murder of a mother and two minor children by slitting their throats was grave, the appellants had already served over 11 and 12 years of actual custody and demonstrated satisfactory prison discipline - ordinary life imprisonment with early remission would be inadequate, but life imprisonment for the rest of their natural lives would be disproportionate - The Supreme Court, exercising its powers as a Constitutional Court, substituted the Sessions Court's illegal direction and sentenced the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a fixed term of 25 years without the benefit of statutory remission. [Relied On Navas alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, (2024) 14 SCC 82; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Paras 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048

Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 vs Sections 376AB, 376DA, 376DB – Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 – Statutory Interpretation of "Imprisonment for Life" – Held - Where the Parliament intended imprisonment for life to mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life excluding ordinary remissions, it enacted express statutory provisions to that effect, as seen in Sections 376AB, 376DA, and 376DB inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 - The Parliament chose to retain Section 302 IPC in its existing form without such express stipulations - It is impermissible for a Sessions Court to read into Section 302 IPC an enhanced punishment that the legislature chose not to insert, thereby supplementing the statutory penal code - Prescribing punishments is an exclusively legislative function. [Relied On Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Paras 14, 22, 23, 24] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048

Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 376AB, 376(2)(f), 376(2)(n), 201 – POCSO Act; Sections 5, 6, 29 – Plea of Alibi – Held - A plea of alibi must be established with certainty to demonstrate that presence at the scene was impossible - Since the appellant's own testimony placed him back at the house prior to the throttling, the alibi collapsed - The foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault having been established through direct ocular, dying declaration, and medical evidence, Section 29 POCSO statutory presumption operates, and the false counter-plea of the appellant provides an additional link under Section 106 Evidence Act. [Relied On Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 166; Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283; Paras 110, 111, 113, 114, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 53 & 45 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 432 to 435 – Incompetence of Sessions Court to Impose Special Category Sentence Curtailing Statutory Remission – Held - (i) While imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC means imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of the convict, such sentence is inherently subject to the statutory powers of remission and commutation vested in the appropriate Government under Sections 432 to 435 CrPC; (ii) A Court of Session, while sentencing an accused to life imprisonment for murder under Section 302 IPC, is not competent to issue a direction that the convict shall "remain in prison till the rest of their life" so as to exclude or curtail the Government's statutory remission powers; (iii) The power to evolve and award a special category of sentence specifying a term of imprisonment beyond 14 years or for the remainder of natural life without the benefit of statutory remission as an alternative to the death penalty belongs exclusively to the Constitutional Courts (the Supreme Court and the High Courts) and cannot be exercised by the Sessions Court or any other inferior court. [Relied On Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Kiran v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2863; Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 2 SCC 323; Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25-34] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Appreciation of Evidence — Discrepancies between Complainant and Trap/Shadow Witnesses - Where the shadow witness and official independent witness admitted during cross-examination that the alleged handing over or recovery of the tainted bribe money did not occur in their presence, and there were unresolved material contradictions regarding the exact location of recovery (shirt pocket versus trouser pocket), the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts of demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction set aside. [Relied on P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; Aman Bhatia v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013; Paras 17-22] Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2026 INSC 1031

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) — Bribery — Proof of demand and acceptance is sine qua non for establishing guilt under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) — Mere recovery of tainted money insufficient - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes or phenolphthalein powder reaction, in the absence of cogent evidence establishing a prior demand and subsequent acceptance of illegal gratification, is fatal to the prosecution's case and cannot form the basis of conviction under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act - Proof of demand is the gravamen of the offence - In the absence of primary direct oral or documentary evidence or reliable circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the public servant voluntarily demanded and accepted gratification knowing it to be a bribe, an inferential deduction of guilt cannot be drawn. [Paras 13-21] Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2026 INSC 1031

Preventive Policing & Public Safety Audits — Interim Measures Directed - Pending review of status reports concerning the operational status of the National Database on Sexual Offenders (NDSO), Investigation Tracking System for Sexual Offences (ITSSO), Emergency Response Support System (ERSS - 112), Women Helpline (181), and Safe City Projects, the Court issued urgent time-bound directives - (i) Commissioner of Police to form dedicated district teams headed by an officer not below the rank of DSP to audit vulnerable pockets and prepare district-wise vulnerability maps; (ii) Continuous patrolling and deployment of security in public parks and transit hubs; (iii) Comprehensive lighting and CCTV audits to eradicate blind spots; (iv) Integration of citizen grievance portals (e.g., CM Jan Sunwai Portal) with geo-tagging to track and remediate infrastructure defects. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12] In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 996

Private International Law — Matrimonial Proceedings — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens — Connecting Factors - Where both parties, despite solemnizing their marriage in India, lived together in London for years, established their matrimonial home and substantial financial arrangements in the UK, and the wife was a habitual resident of the UK, significant connecting factors pointed towards the UK being the forum conveniens - The UK Family Court being seized of the forum and jurisdictional objections, the Trial Court in India committed a patent error in issuing an ex-parte anti-suit injunction restraining the wife from pursuing her matrimonial claims in the UK. [Para 5] Mihir Prakash Bajoria v. Vidushi Jain Bajoria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2026 INSC 1034

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 10 read with Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Section 75 & IPC, Sections 323, 504, 506 — False Implication in Matrimonial Discord — Quashing of FIR - Following extensive matrimonial and custody litigation where the father had attained final custody orders up to the Supreme Court, the mother lodged an FIR alleging aggravated sexual assault of the minor child by the father - A comprehensive multi-disciplinary investigation conducted by a Special Committee of the CBI, assisted by child and adolescent psychiatrists and clinical psychologists from NIMHANS, established that the child displayed no behavioural indicators or signs of sexual trauma, the CCTV and witness statements contradicted the allegations, and the narrative was shaped by prolonged exposure to family conflict and loyalty dilemmas - Held, the prosecution was a gross abuse of process engineered solely to create a ruse to regain custody - FIR and consequential proceedings quashed. [Paras 18, 24–34, 78, 79] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 35 (erstwhile Sections 41, 41-A CrPC) — Dual Threshold Test & Safeguards against Unwarranted Arrests - Taking judicial notice of the alarming rise in false POCSO complaints by warring spouses as an "arm-twisting tactic" to settle scores or defeat custody claims, the Supreme Court laid down mandatory safeguards where two threshold conditions exist - (i) an offence under POCSO is alleged against a parent or family member residing under the same roof, and (ii) an existing matrimonial dispute of any form exists between the parents – i. Safeguard 1 (Police Investigation) - The Investigating Officer (IO) or Special Juvenile Police Unit (SJPU) shall not act in haste to make mechanical arrests - Discretion under Section 35 BNSS requires an objective "reason to believe" - The IO/SJPU shall mandatorily engage the services of an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry/clinical psychology (drawn from the DCPU register under Rule 5 of POCSO Rules, 2020) to conduct an independent evaluation of the child before taking coercive steps - In exceptional cases where material is palpable, this may be dispensed with for reasons recorded in writing - The report is an aid to exercise discretion and not the sole basis for a chargesheet or closure; ii. Safeguard 2 (Private Complaints under Section 33 POCSO Act) - Where a private complaint alleging POCSO offences is directly filed before the Special Court amid matrimonial strife, the Court must not take cognizance or issue summons mechanically - The Special Court shall order an evaluation by a child psychiatrist/clinical psychologist before forming an opinion on issuing process, unless exceptional circumstances warrant dispensing with it by written order; iii. Safeguard 3 (Guardianship & Custody Courts) - The mere registration of a POCSO FIR against a parent shall not ipso facto disqualify the parent or defeat their claim for custody; the Family Court must independently examine the prima facie veracity of the allegations on a case-to-case basis. [Relied on Geddam Jhansi and Anr. v. State of Telangana and Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263; Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana & Anr., (2025) 3 SCC 756; Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1004; Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 260; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 48-63, 64-70, 73-77] R v. E, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2026 INSC 1049

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) — Pending Chargesheet against Father — Disqualification from Custody — Pre-mature High Court Comments on Quashing/Merits - Where the minor son made disclosures before psychiatrists at NIMHANS resulting in the lodging of an FIR and filing of a chargesheet under the POCSO Act against the father, granting custody of the child to the father while he is facing criminal prosecution is unwarranted, unjustified, and contrary to the paramount welfare of the child - the High Court erred in making observations in a guardianship appeal labelling the POCSO allegations as a "motivated counterblast," especially when quashing proceedings were pending before the High Court of Calcutta; such adverse observations were premature and expunged - Even if the father were to succeed in quashing the FIR, the child's spontaneous apprehensions and safety cannot be subordinated to the father's claim for custody. [Paras 46(ii), 52 – 57] Debarati Bhunia Chakraborty v. Suman Sankar Bhunia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2026 INSC 1043

Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 — Departmental Enquiry — Principles of Natural Justice — Ex-Parte Proceedings Due to Willful Non-Appearance - Where the delinquent employee was duly served with the charge-sheet, submitted his written defence, and had notice of the date fixed for enquiry, but failed to appear despite having been declared medically "fit for travel" by a railway doctor, the Enquiry Officer committed no illegality in proceeding ex-parte - Principles of natural justice require affording a reasonable opportunity of defence, which was satisfied; an employee cannot subsequently invalidate proceedings by remaining wilfully absent. [Paras 27, 28] Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2026 INSC 1047

Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 — Section 6 & Section 9 read with Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 — Rules 20 & 43, Schedules I & II — Scope of "Appointment Shall Rest with Chief Security Officer" - The phrase "appointment of members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer" in Section 6 does not mean exclusive appointing power is retained solely by that officer - The proviso to Section 6 and Rule 20 read with Schedule I expressly authorize other superior officers, including the Assistant Security Officer/Assistant Commandant, to appoint Senior Rakshaks and Rakshaks - Rule 43 read with Schedule II explicitly empowers the Assistant Security Officer/Adjutant to impose the penalty of removal on Rakshaks - the disciplinary order passed by the Adjutant was strictly within statutory competence. [Paras 17–24] Union of India v. Ramdhani Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2026 INSC 1047

Railways Act, 1989 — Section 124-A — Bona Fide Passenger — Loss or Absence of Ticket — Initial Burden of Proof & Preponderance of Probabilities - Mere absence or non-recovery of a train ticket from the body of a deceased/injured passenger does not negate the claim of being a bona fide passenger - The initial burden of proof can be discharged by the claimants by filing an affidavit/statement on oath stating relevant facts, whereupon the burden shifts to the Railways to rebut the same - Where the father of the deceased specifically deposed on oath that his son had purchased a ticket which was lost along with personal effects, and railway witnesses admitted they never searched the victim's pockets when he was found injured, the initial burden stood discharged - Given that the victim remained hospitalised for over a month before succumbing to injuries, tickets are unlikely to be preserved in normal course - High Court erred in reversing the award on a narrow interpretation regarding non-production of ticket. [Paras 7-11] Sukhabhai Nanjibhai Makwana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2026 INSC 1056

Railways Act, 1989 — Section 124-A — Strict Liability Principle - Compensation under Section 124-A is governed by the principle of strict/no-fault liability - The plea of the Railways that the victim sustained a self-inflicted injury merely because he fell from a crowded general compartment while standing near the door cannot be sustained to defeat the claim - An investigation/DRM report prepared after an unexplained, inordinate delay (over seven months after the incident and prompted only after receiving notice of the claim petition) cannot be relied upon by the Railways to deny compensation - Railways cannot take advantage of their own delay in failing to conduct an expeditious and prompt inquiry as mandated under Rule 7. [Relied on Union of India v. Rina Devi, (2018) 2018 INSC 469; Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar & Others, (2008) 2008 INSC 577; Paras 5-12] Sukhabhai Nanjibhai Makwana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2026 INSC 1056

Tenders — Interpretation of Technical Experience Criterion — Specialised nature of duty - A mandatory tender condition requiring proof of successful execution of "annual collecting User Charges/Parking Fees work" for a public authority cannot be satisfied by experience in organizing temporary cattle fairs as a lessee under the Punjab Cattle Fairs (Regulation) Rules, 1968 - Levying parking fees as an incidental activity of managing a fairground space does not equate to the specialized, continuous, and accountable duty of collecting and remitting public user charges - unverified experience certificates of third-party partnership firms cannot be attributed to a sole proprietorship bidder without establishing a proven legal nexus. [Paras 25-30] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025

Tenders — Revenue considerations vs. Mandatory Eligibility - Quoting a higher financial bid (higher revenue to the public exchequer) cannot cure technical ineligibility - Comparison of financial bids is permissible only among tenderers who are first found technically eligible - otherwise, mandatory eligibility norms would be rendered completely illusory - Tender conditions cannot be mandatory in the abstract and directory in favour of a chosen bidder. [Relied on Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 517; Agmatel India (P) Ltd. v. Resoursys Telecom & Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 362; Kimberley Club (P) Ltd. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors., 2025 INSC 1276; Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corpn. v. Anoj Kumar Agarwala, (2020) 17 SCC 577; Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489; Galaxy Transport Agencies v. New J.K. Roadways, (2021) 16 SCC 808; Paras 34, 35] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025

Tenders and Public Contracts — Eligibility Criteria — Scope of Judicial Review — Patent arbitrariness and decisions dehors the terms of the NIT - While constitutional courts exercise restraint in tender matters and ordinarily defer to the employer's interpretation of its own terms, such deference is available only when the interpretation is manifestly in consonance with the tender language and subserves its purpose - Where an interpretation cannot reasonably be borne by the text, condones non-compliance with an essential eligibility condition, or acts in patent arbitrariness, judicial review is warranted to set aside the award. [Paras 14-33] Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2026 INSC 1025

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Interplay Between Stage of Investigation and Stage of Sanction under Section 45 UAPA - Extinction of Right to Default Bail - While sanction for prosecution under Section 45 UAPA and Section 196 CrPC is an embargo on the Court taking cognizance (and not a bar to merely filing a charge sheet), the sanctioning authority requires an independent review of all collected investigative material under Section 45(2) to apply its mind - Where the prosecution requires additional time to collate retrieved scientific data to present a complete report before the sanctioning authority, such grounds cannot be discarded as invalid or flimsy - The High Court erred in holding that awaiting sanction was the sole reason accepted and thereby invalidating the extension order - Since the order dated 18.01.2023 granting a valid 15-day extension was lawful and within the statutory framework of Section 43D(2)(b), the accused acquired no indefeasible right to default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC upon the expiry of earlier periods - the charge sheet having been filed within the extended timeframe. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, (2024) 2 SCC 632; State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178; Judgebir Singh @ Jasbir Singh Samra v. National Investigation Agency, (2023) 17 SCC 48; Paras 26 – 35] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Section 43D(2)(b) and Section 45 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 167(2), Section 173(2), and Section 196 — Investigation — Extension of Time for Completing Investigation — Default Bail — High Court Cannot Pre-emptively Declare Investigation Complete or Sever Intertwined Reasons – i. Extension of Time under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA — Pendency of Data Analysis & Retrieval of Forensic Evidence - An extension of time beyond 90 days up to 180 days under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA is statutorily permissible upon the Public Prosecutor's report demonstrating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention - The analysis of scientific data, digital evidence retrieved from forensic science laboratories (mobile devices, hard drives, audio recordings), and financial verification of foreign funds form an integral part of ongoing investigation that must be concluded prior to filing a complete charge sheet; ii. Holistic Interpretation of Prosecutor's Report vs. Premature Declaration of Completion of Investigation - Statements in an extension application indicating that "there is enough evidence to file a charge sheet" cannot be read in isolation or ripped out of context to mean that the investigation is complete in all respects - Investigation of cognizable offences falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and Courts cannot artificially truncate or curtail statutory investigative powers or declare the investigation complete when specialized analysis of digital and financial material remains ongoing. [Paras 14 - 33] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021