Asset Reconstruction Company Can Step Into Bank's Shoes In Cheque Bounce Case, But Must Prove It Is 'Holder In Due Course': Supreme Court

  • Section 482 of the CrPC | Cheque Bounce Case | Time-Barred Debt | Appellate Court
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    The Supreme Court held that an Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC) that acquires a bank's financial asset under Section 5 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) can seek substitution as complainant in a pending complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).

    A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu observed so while dismissing a Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the accused persons against a Bombay High Court judgment that upheld the substitution of the ARC.

    The petitioners were accused in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The original lender (Axis Bank Ltd.) had received three post-dated cheques from them, which were later dishonoured.

    The bench noted that an assignment agreement between Axis Bank and Assets Care and Reconstruction Enterprises Ltd (Respondent 1/R1) refers to and includes the three post-dated cheques, the cheque return memos and the Section 138 demand notice. It also conferred the right to institute, continue and enforce legal proceedings including the pending complaints.

    The Metropolitan Magistrate allowed the ARC's substitution application in 2018. The Sessions Court later dismissed the revision petition filed by the accused in 2021. Subsequently a writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court which was also dismissed in August this year.

    Aggrieved by the High Court's dismissal an SLP was filed before the Supreme Court, which framed the question as whether an ARC that acquires a bank's financial assets, including cheques taken as security under a Deed of Assignment under Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act, can be substituted as complainant in a pending Section 138 prosecution in place of the bank that originally filed it as payee.

    Before the Supreme Court, Senior Advocate Siddhartha Dave argued for the petitioners that there is no authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement on the question. Reliance was placed on the Bombay High Court decisions in Indorama Synthetics (India) Ltd v State of Maharashtra and Tayal Cotton Pvt Ltd v State of Maharashtra which dealt with Section 446 of the Companies Act and Section 14(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) respectively. Based on this, it was contended that Sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the SARFAESI Act should be read to exclude an assignee's right to substitute itself as complainant in Section 138 proceedings. It was further argued that the ARC is not the 'payee' of the cheques, and the High Court wrongly held it to be a 'holder in due course' through the deeming fiction in Section 5(2) of the SARFAESI Act, overlooking the three cumulative conditions in Section 9 of the NI Act. Dave also submitted that the words 'other proceedings of whatever nature' in Section 5(4) should be read ejusdem generis with 'suit' and 'appeal'. It was also contended that if the High Court judgment is upheld, it would convert every criminal prosecution under Chapter XVII of the NI Act into a transferable 'financial asset' tradeable amongst ARCs; permit strangers to the negotiable instrument to prosecute drawers for a personal, penal offence; and render Section 142(1)(a) of the NI Act a dead letter.

    Perusing the submissions, the Supreme Court first held that Indorama Synthetics and Tayal Cotton could not be relied upon by the petitioners as they were under different statutory provisions that “operate in different milieu whereas Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act is intended to achieve a distinct object.” It observed that the “High Court was right in not being guided thereby.”

    With regards to scheme of Section 5, the bench observed as follows:

    “To summarise, the scheme of Section 5 is that on acquisition of the financial assets, the ARC is deemed to be the lender and as a sequel thereto, all rights, title and interest of the bank/financial institution vest in the ARC. The ARC can, subject to fulfilment of the statutory requirements, continue pending proceedings instituted by the bank/financial institution, as if it were the original secured creditor.”

    The Court also explained that Section 5(2) provides for substantive vesting of rights, Section 5(4) provides 'procedural continuity', and Section 5(5) governs the procedure courts and authorities must follow on a substitution request which is subject to the application being made with the consent of the originator.

    Rejecting the ejusdem generis argument, the Court observed as under:

    “The principle of ejusdem generis would have no application whilst interpreting either sub-section (4) or sub-section (5). Sub-section (4) has an in-built exception clause. When expressly referring to the SICA, Parliament in its wisdom provided that if a reference to the BIFR abates under SICA, then sub-section (4) of Section 5 will not save it. However, this exception does not apply to all proceedings; it applies to only one proceeding, i.e., under the SICA. The words “suit, appeal or other proceeding” are not qualified as 'civil' or 'recovery' proceedings; on the contrary, the expression “other proceeding of whatever nature” is deliberately unqualified. It takes colour from the engrafted exception – the third proviso to Section 15(1), SICA – which relates to a proceeding before the BIFR, a proceeding that is neither a suit nor an appeal. The exception, thus, shows that “other proceeding” cannot be read ejusdem generis with the words “suit” and “appeal” and is intended to travel beyond suits and appeals, which are generally associated with civil proceedings, and to include proceedings of a different nature, including a complaint under Section 138, N.I. Act relating to a financial asset. This interpretation is also consistent with the legislative object underlying Section 5, which is to facilitate acquisition of financial assets and ensure continuity of the rights and remedies attached thereto. The fact that a proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is criminal in form would not, by itself, exclude it from the expression “other proceeding of whatever nature”, provided that it relates to the financial asset acquired by the ARC and was pending by or against the bank or financial institution on the date of such acquisition. Sub-section (4) of Section 5, for all intents and purposes, having provided for a continuity and the words “other proceeding of whatever nature” used by Parliament being very wide, the same must be allowed to operate in its full amplitude. Such width is intentional to ensure that no proceeding relating to the financial asset is lost for want of a party to prosecute it.”

    The bench also clarified that while a pending complaint under Section 138 does not abate on assignment to an ARC of the financial asset/debt under Section 5(1) of the SARFAESI Act, such assignment does not, per se, make the ARC the payee or the holder in due course.

    The Court held that to continue the proceedings, the ARC must still prove the following:

    (i) the dishonoured cheque was transferred and delivered to it along with the financial asset and not merely the underlying debt;

    (ii) there has been an endorsement or assignment in its favour sufficient to constitute it a holder in due course under Sections 8 and 9 of the NI Act;

    (iii) the ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act are satisfied; and

    (iv) there is no attempt to improve upon the case of the original complainant or secured creditor.

    “Therefore, while permitting a substitution, the ARC has to be put to strict proof that the ARC is the 'holder in due course'. Such question(s) of fact must obviously be decided on the basis of evidence led at the trial,” the bench observed.

    In the light of aforesaid, the SLP was dismissed.

    “We, therefore, dismiss the special leave petition.”

    “However, it is clarified that apart from the points decided by the trial magistrate while granting the prayer for substitution of the first respondent, since confirmed by the Sessions Court and ultimately by the High Court in the impugned judgment, all other contentions of the accused/petitioners, available in law, are kept open for being urged before the trial magistrate for being decided in accordance with law,” the bench clarified.

    Appearances:

    For Petitioners: Mr Siddhartha Dave, Sr Adv; Ms Poonam Tahilyani, Adv; Mr Aniruddha Deshmukh, AOR

    Case Title :  Kishore Avarsekar & Ors. v Assets Care and Reconstruction Enterprises Ltd & OrsCITATION :  2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1166
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