The Supreme Court has flagged the increasing number of cases in which pleas of juvenility are being raised for the first time before it, observing that the trend points to a serious gap in the understanding and implementation of the Juvenile Justice Acts (JJAs) by police and courts.

A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar, in a judgment delivered on Wednesday (September 2, 2026), set aside the 21-year-old conviction of a man who was found to have been a juvenile on the date of the offence. The Court held that once his juvenility had been established by the Juvenile Justice Board, the High Court was duty-bound to consider his case in accordance with the law applicable to children in conflict with law.

"This case brings to the limelight a serious issue which has hindered the implementation of the JJAs. We must remember that the impact of industrialisation, urbanisation and migration changed the people's daily lives. They started migrating from rural areas to the cities as a result of which there was an explosion in population. The cohesiveness of communities started weakening and the family gradually lost effective control over the children. Poverty, inequality, illiteracy and the discriminatory environment in which a child grows trigger delinquent behavior in the child, and he becomes a victim of the crime. The rise in the number of cases coming to this Court raising the plea of juvenility for the first time in this Court indicates in ample measures that there is a huge gap in the understanding of law by the stakeholders."

The Court said that while investigating officers are often focused on bringing an accused to book, courts before which a juvenile is produced frequently fail to give adequate attention to determining the child's age. In the process, the statutory mandate of the Juvenile Justice Acts (JJAs) is overlooked and the rights of children in conflict with law are violated.

"The investigating officers are generally obsessed with the motto to bring the culprit to book and the Courts before whom a juvenile is produced do not focus attention on the assessment of age of the juvenile. But in the process, the mandate of law is overlooked and the rights of a juvenile in conflict with law get violated; the child becomes a casualty."

The Court said the State has a responsibility to reintegrate juveniles into society rather than permanently stigmatise them, and called for stronger implementation of the existing juvenile justice framework, effective monitoring of investigative processes and compliance with statutory safeguards.

"A child should not be treated as a criminal. He is a victim of the circumstances. Sometimes he is drawn to the crime world due to socio-economic or emotional and psychological reasons. The State owes a responsibility to reintegrate the juveniles in society, rather than permanently stigmatizing them. It is well remembered that children are the greatest assets of any nation and they should be nurtured and grown as responsible citizens, mentally alert, physically fit and morally healthy to contribute to the betterment of society. The greatest recompense that the State can gain from expenditure on children is in the form of a powerful human resource which would be ready to take its place in the forward march of the nation. In conclusion, the existing system needs further strengthening, effective monitoring of investigative processes and implementation of the statutory provisions."

The Court's observations came while allowing the appeal of Mahavir @ Anvish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, and reaffirming that a claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, including after the final disposal of a criminal case. Delay in raising such a claim, the Court held, cannot by itself defeat the statutory protection available to a child where credible material establishes juvenility.

To decide the case, the Supreme Court began with the Preamble to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), which proclaims that a child “shall enjoy special protection” and be given the opportunities to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually, and socially “in a healthy and normal manner and in the conditions of freedom and dignity.” It referred to the Geneva Declaration (1924) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), which recognises children as social, economic, political, civil, and cultural actors with rights to survival, protection, development, and participation.

Explaining the doctrinal basis for judicial intervention in matters concerning children, the Court traced the concept of parens patriae, an English common law doctrine, under which the Crown had both the power and the duty to protect persons unable to protect themselves. Citing Lord Eldon's observations in Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort and Lord Redesdale's opinion in Wellesley v Wellesley, the bench noted that this jurisdiction has historically rested on “the obvious necessity that the law should place somewhere the care of persons who are not able to take care of themselves.”

The Court also referred to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v Fisher, that legislatures may bring a child “into one of the Courts of the state without any process at all, to subject to the state's guardianship and protection” in order to save it from becoming a criminal. It observed that the parens patriae role has been recognised by the Indian Supreme Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v SP Sahi and Sheela Barse (II) v Union India, which held it to be the state's duty to look after children and ensure the full development of their personality.

The bench also discussed the provisions of the Constitution of India, Article 15(3) (permits special provisions for children), Article 39 (e) and (f) (directive principle for the state to protect children of tender age and ensure their development “in the conditions of freedom and dignity”, and Article 45 (directive principle for childhood care). It also referred to Sections 82 and 83 of the IPC (now Sections 20 and 21 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), which shield children below the age of twelve years from criminal liability in the absence of sufficient maturity of understanding, as reflecting the same protective philosophy within the penal law.

The Court also traced the evolution of juvenile justice jurisprudence in India, from the Apprentices Act (1850) and the Reformatory Schools Act (1876), through the Children Acts enacted by various states, between 1920 and 1982, to the first uniform national law, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. It noted that the 1986 Act itself suffered from anomaly, as the age of juvenile was fixed at 16 years for boys and 18 years for girls. This anomaly was corrected by the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, which brought all children below the age of 18 years within a uniform protective framework. It, therefore, came in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The Court described the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 as a “very exhaustive legislation which seems to take care of every aspect of the Juvenile Justice.”

“It is spread over 112 sections and appears to be a complete Code in itself. The way every provision has been framed starting from the Preamble gives the impression that the JJA 2015 is intended to provide a wholesome solution to the problems relating to children,” the bench observed.

Relying on Umesh Chandra v State of Rajasthan, Gopinath Ghosh v State of West Bengal, Bhola Bhagat v State of Bihar, Pratap Singh v State of Jharkhand & Anr, Hari Ram v State of Rajasthan & Anr, Dharambir v State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr, and Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh & Anr v State of Uttar Pradesh, the bench reaffirmed the settled position that the relevant date for determining juvenility is the date of commission of the offence, not the date of trial or production before the court. It also affirmed that a claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage, including after final disposal of the case. It further affirmed that delay in raising such a claim is not fatal, provided credible material is placed before the court.

The Court also remarked that courts must adopt purposive and child-centric interpretation. “Given the purpose behind the JJAs, every Court is obliged to give effect to the child welfare legislations. The Courts are required to adopt the route of purposive interpretation whenever a progressive beneficial legislation is under review. It is the duty of the Court to discern the object behind each provision in the context of the background in which a particular provision is framed and enacted. We may also recollect that long back Sheela Barse (II) sent a message to the nation that it is a duty of all Courts to give retrospective effect to the child-related legislations so as to ensure that the children are not denied the legal protection that the legislature intends to confer upon them. The provisions of the JJAs must be given their fullest meanings and should receive wide interpretation to cover every conceivable circumstance leaning in favor of the children,” the bench stated.

Applying the aforesaid to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found that once the Juvenile Justice Board had found the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the incident, it became “the bounden duty of the High Court to consider the case of the appellant in accordance with the applicable laws on juvenile.”

In the light of the above, the Supreme Court has set aside the High Court's order as well as the conviction order. The appellant was, thus, discharged from his bail bonds.

Also from the judgment - 'Child Should Not Be Treated As Criminal': Supreme Court Sets Aside Conviction On Juvenility Claim After 21 Years

S. 362 CrPC Does Not Curtail High Court's Inherent Power To Recall Judgment Resulting In Miscarriage Of Justice: Supreme Court

Case: Mahavir @ Avnish v State of Madhya Pradesh

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892

Appearance:

For Appellant: Mr Prashant Shukla, Adv.

For Respondent: Mr Surjeet Singh, Adv. and Mr Aditya Vaibhav Singh, Adv.

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