Supreme Court Restores CISF Constable's Dismissal For Second Marriage

The Supreme Court has upheld the dismissal of a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) constable for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage, ruling that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with the punishment imposed in disciplinary proceedings.

A Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Vipul M Pancholi allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India and restored the orders of the disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities dismissing the respondent from service.

Background

The case arose from disciplinary action initiated against the respondent, who joined the CISF as a constable in 2006. In March 2016, his wife lodged a written complaint before the authorities alleging that he had remarried while their marriage was subsisting and had neglected her and their minor daughter. Following the complaint, a charge memorandum was issued accusing the officer of grave misconduct and violation of Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001, which prohibits a member of the force from entering into a second marriage while having a living spouse.

A departmental inquiry found the charges proved. On July 1, 2017, the Senior Commandant dismissed Nath from service. The dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities within the CISF.

The respondent challenged the dismissal before the High Court. A Single Judge, and later a Division Bench, took the view that dismissal was an excessively harsh penalty for the misconduct proved. While holding that contracting a second marriage amounted to indiscipline, the High Court concluded that the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate, particularly considering the financial hardship it would cause to the employee and his family. The matter was remanded to the authorities to impose a lesser penalty.

The Union of India approached the Supreme Court against these directions.

Supreme Court's view

Allowing the appeal, the Court reiterated the settled principle that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not act as an appellate authority in disciplinary matters.

The Bench emphasised that judicial review in service jurisprudence is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the correctness of the decision itself. Interference with punishment is permissible only in limited circumstances, such as when the inquiry is vitiated by violation of natural justice, non-compliance with statutory rules, absence of evidence, or when the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the court.

"It has long been held that under Article 226 jurisdiction, the court is not akin to an appellate Court, its powers are limited to the extent of judicial review. They cannot set aside punishment or impose a different punishment unless they find that there is substantial non-compliance of the rules," the Court observed. Reference was made to the precedents B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610, Union of India v. K.G. Soni (2006) 6 SCC 794 etc.

The Court also examined Rule 18 of the CISF Rules, which treats bigamy as a disqualification and a serious breach of service conditions in a disciplined force. It observed that such rules are not moral censures but service conditions aimed at maintaining discipline, integrity and public confidence in uniformed forces.

"It is important to observe that such Rules are premised on an institutional requirement for all members of the force(s) to maintain the highest standards of discipline, public confidence and integrity. It is generally understood that acts, whether in personal or professional life, if they involve the possibility of domestic discord, financial vulnerability or divided responsibilities, they have the potential to adversely impact operational efficacy given mental/psychological stability is key. It is also to be noted that these rules are not a moral censure, but simply a service condition, which, it need not be stated, an employer is perfectly within their rights to prescribe, so long as such conditions are not arbitrary, disproportionate or violative of constitutional protections, which in any event stand taken before us. For instance, where the personal law applicable to a service member permits either polygamy or polyandry or the first marriage of such a service member was void, voidable or the like, then, regulation by the employer without due regard therefor would step into the undesirable realms of overregulation, removed from the paramount interests of service discipline."

Holding that the rule was clear and unambiguous, the Bench said that the High Court erred in substituting its own view on punishment for that of the competent authority. The Court invoked the principle “dura lex sed lex” – the law is harsh, but it is the law – and held that unpleasant consequences of enforcing the rule cannot dilute its mandate.

"it is trite in law that any provision of law or rule framed under a statute prescribing penal consequences, has to be strictly construed for the conditions that can trigger such a clause must be flowing from the words employed therein. It is also settled that when such a rule presents any ambiguity, the interpretation which favours the person sought to be penalised, is to be preferred. In the instant case, it cannot be said that there is any ambiguity. The words of the clause are clear. There is no averment as to the proper procedure not been followed in the disciplinary proceedings. The maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard, but it is the law” is attracted in this case. Inconvenience or unpleasant consequences of violation of law cannot detract from the prescription of the law."

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgments and restored the dismissal order passed by the CISF authorities.

Case : Union of India v Pranab Kumar Nath

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1250

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