Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Conventional Heads – Omission of Filial Consortium – The Tribunal and High Court failed to award any amount under the head of consortium - Held: The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, and courts must ensure 'just compensation' is awarded even if a legitimate conventional head has been omitted below - The parents of the deceased unmarried son are entitled to filial consortium - Compensation enhanced by Rs. 40,000/- each to both parents (Total Rs. 80,000/-) – Held that the Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact returned by the Tribunal and the High Court unless such findings are shown to be perverse, manifestly erroneous, or based on no evidence. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 24-29] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 166 – Negligence vs. Contributory Negligence – Stationary Vehicle Hazard – A truck was left stationed in the middle of the road at 3:00 a.m. without parking lights, indicators, reflectors, or warning signs - A Wagon-R car rammed into the truck from behind - The driver and owner of the truck did not step into the witness box to substantiate their plea of tyre puncture - Held: The mere fact that a vehicle collides with a truck from behind cannot automatically lead to an inference of negligence or contributory negligence - A stationary vehicle occupying the road in the dead of night without any warning signs poses an evident hazard - In the absence of evidence from the truck driver, the adverse inference drawn by the Tribunal was justified - The proximate cause of the accident was the negligent act of leaving the vehicle unattended on the road without precautionary measures. [Paras 14-18] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 166 & 168 – Just Compensation – Educational Profile and Future Prospects of a Student – Death of a 20-year-old bachelor pursuing Chartered Accountancy (Final) and undergoing articleship - The Tribunal departed from the actual proved stipend income and assessed the income at Rs. 55,500/- per month by factoring in his professional trajectory, educational progression, and imminent entry into the CA profession – Held that while compensation cannot be founded on pure speculation or salary benchmarks of unrelated professionals, the determination of 'just compensation' does not admit to mathematical exactitude - The forward-looking assessment made by the Tribunal sufficiently accounted for the professional potential of the deceased - Reducing the compensation payable to the parents at this stage on account of a technical overlap in methodology (adding 50% future prospects over a forward-looking multiplicand) would not advance substantive justice given the long passage of time since the accident. [Paras 19- 23] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Computation of Future Prospects — Calculation Error by High Court – Held that When an appellate court enhances the base monthly income of a claimant, the percentage towards future prospects must be calculated on the revised/recalculated income, rather than mechanically applying it to the lower income initially assessed by the Tribunal – Held that the claimant suffered an above-the-knee amputation, he will require continuous medical assistance, rehabilitation, and periodic replacement/maintenance of the prosthesis throughout his lifespan - The compensation under this head enhanced from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 2,00,000/-. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 14-27] M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2026 INSC 655

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Permanent Disability vs. Functional Disability — Enhancement of Compensation — Amputation of right leg above the knee — Claimant working as a mason — Assessment of loss of earning capacity – Held that while determining compensation in personal injury cases, the physical disability assessed by medical authorities cannot be mechanically equated with the loss of earning capacity or economic loss - The real test is the assessment of functional disability with reference to the specific nature of the avocation, profession, and age of the injured prior to the accident - Application to Case - The appellant, a 30-year-old mason, suffered a 70% physical permanent disability owing to the amputation of his right leg above the knee - The work of a mason is heavily manual and physically demanding, requiring the continuous use and support of both legs - Because of the amputation, the appellant completely lost his capacity to execute his specific livelihood/trade - Restricting his economic loss to 70% based purely on physical disability was unjustified. Consequently, the functional disability must be assessed at 100%. [Paras 20 - 30] M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2026 INSC 655

Motor Accident Compensation — Fatal Accident of a Minor Child — Recalculation of Loss of Dependency and Conventional Heads - In assessing the compensation for the death of a 5-year-old child caused by a speeding tanker, the High Court erred in reducing the MACT's award - Applying established legal principles for minor victims, the daily wage was assessed based on the skilled worker rates under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, evaluating annual income with a 40% addition for future prospects and a 50% deduction for personal expenses - Applying a multiplier of 18, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹11,44,628/-, distributed across loss of dependency, consortium, estate, and funeral expenses. [Relied on Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, 2025 INSC 1244; In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 INSC 388; Lucknow Public School, Eldico v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 422; Paras 17-19] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Statutory Limitations regarding Pedestrian Rights — Regulatory Framework Deficiencies - The Supreme Court observed that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (and its 1939 predecessor) is primarily built around the "vehicle" as its subject, making human/pedestrian interests merely incidental - While the Motor Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017 impose general safety duties on drivers regarding vulnerable road users, they fail to recognize the fundamental right to walk or prioritize footpaths over motorized roads - The Parliament has not yet established a full-time regulatory body for motor transport or pedestrian safety under the Act. [Paras 6-14] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Remedies — Restitutionary Remedy vs. Motor Vehicles Act Claims — Independent Action for Rights Violation - The Supreme Court distinguished between claims arising out of motor accidents and the violation of pedestrian rights - If the fundamental right to walk on a demarcated footpath is violated due to the failure of state/local actors, citizens are fully entitled to invoke constitutional remedies or public law restitutionary remedies (such as under Sections 38–40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) against the defaulting local bodies - This restitutionary remedy is independent of, and distinct from, any statutory compensation claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [Paras 15 - 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 165(1) & Section 166 – Scope of "Arising out of the use of motor vehicles" – Liability for Natural Calamities / Act of God – Injury caused by the falling of a roadside tree/branch on a stationary vehicle parked to take shelter from rain – Held that for a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act to be maintainable, the motor vehicle itself must play an active role or be part of the proximate cause of the accident - While the term "use" has been liberally interpreted to include stationary or parked vehicles, the mere presence of a victim inside a stationary vehicle where the injury is caused entirely by an external natural event (like a falling tree branch during heavy rain) does not satisfy the requirement of proximate cause under the Act - The vehicle did not play an active role in the accident, as a pedestrian standing under the tree would have faced the same risk - It would be unfair to fasten liability upon the Municipal Corporation under the Motor Vehicles Act for an unfortunate natural occurrence that was not within the contemplation of the authorities. [Paras 10-13] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Inordinate Institutional Delay in Motor Accident Claims — Guidelines for Expediting Claim Disposals — Adoptions of Summary Procedure – The Supreme Court took serious note of the regular feature of systemic, decades-long delay in the adjudication of motor accident claims at the High Court and Tribunal levels, noting an average pendency of 8 years in High Courts and 6 years in Tribunals - Since the Act is a piece of beneficial legislation, long pendency directly denudes its salutary values - Procedural Directives Issued – i. Mandatory Annexures with Claim Petitions - To eliminate repeated adjournments, claimants must strictly accompany petitions with explicit official proof of age (excluding Aadhaar card), formal disability certificates detailing functional impairment from competent doctors, authentic ITRs/salary slips for income claims, and certified medical bills; ii. Listing and Bench Management - Chief Justices of High Courts are requested to issue directives to list matters pending over four years based strictly on chronological order of institution and evaluate increasing the number of MACT roster benches; iii. Summary Procedure Enforcement - Under Section 169 of the Act, Tribunals are encouraged to adopt summary procedures to accelerate expediency - If a Tribunal chooses not to adopt a summary procedure, it must explicitly record reasons for the same. [Relied on Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197; Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 9 SCC 218; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 19-24] Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Introduction of "Loss of Domestic Care" as a Distinct Head - clarified that while 'Loss of Consortium' exclusively addresses the emotional aspects of loss (love, affection, companionship) under the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi, it fails to properly account for the economic lens of domestic contribution - To mitigate this systemic undervaluing, the Court directed that where a case involves the death of a homemaker, a composite sum of Rs.30,000/- per month shall be added under the head of 'Loss of Domestic Care' as a stand-in basic minimum monthly income (provided structural domestic conditions are met) - In cases where the homemaker is also part of the formal workforce, this component shall be in addition to their proven monthly income - This determination is subject to a 10% cumulative revision every three years. [Paras 12 - 20] Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & Section 168 — Just and Fair Compensation — Death of a Homemaker — Valuation of Unpaid Domestic and Caregiving Labour — Concepts of 'Loss of Consortium' vs. 'Loss of Domestic Care' — The Supreme Court introduced a new specific head called "Loss of Domestic Care" to overcome the inherent disadvantage faced by homemakers due to overly conservative notional income estimations – i. The Status of a Homemaker – Supreme Court observed that it is ironic to describe a homemaker as dependent on earning members when the household's functioning depends substantially on them - Elevating the terminology from "housewife" to "homemaker" and ultimately recognizing them as "Nation Builders", the Supreme Court emphasized that a homemaker's contribution is critical to human capital formation, social stability, and economic productivity. Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Claim Petition — Double Benefit / Deduction of Ex-gratia Financial Assistance — Interplay with State Welfare Rules — Eligibility of Mother as a Dependent – i. Deduction of Financial Assistance under Service Rules – held that the High Court was fully justified in deducting the ex-gratia financial assistance amount receivable by the eligible dependents under the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 from the total compensation assessed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The component of "loss of income" or "pay and allowances" cannot be paid a second time to the claimants, as it would exceed the actual pecuniary loss suffered and operate as a financial windfall/windfall profit; ii. Independent Entitlement of a Dependent Mother - While statutory rules must be strictly interpreted, courts cannot lose sight of the paramount object of social welfare legislations, which is to award just and adequate compensation to all dependents - Under the Haryana Pension Scheme of 1964 (read with the 2006 Rules), a dependent parent is ineligible for ex-gratia financial assistance if the deceased employee leaves behind a widow or children - this statutory ineligibility under service rules does not diminish or negate the independent legal injury suffered by the mother under the Motor Vehicles Act; iii. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment by Insurer - Setting off the entire financial assistance amount against the collective pool of compensation thereby depriving a dependent mother of her rightful share under the head of loss of dependency amounts to an illegal and unjust enrichment of the Insurance Company at the cost of a dependent parent - The mother's distinct share ( share of the total loss of dependency) cannot be set off or consumed by the service benefits paid exclusively to the widow and daughter. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma and Others, (2016) 9 SCC 627; Sarla Verma and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121; State of Haryana and Another v. Jasbir Kaur and Others, (2003) 7 SCC 484; Ram Kala Devi v. State of Haryana and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine P&H 12159; Paras 15-25] Sarla Devi v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 578 : 2026 INSC 575

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 166 and 168 — Deductibility of Mediclaim/Medical Insurance from Motor Accident Compensation — The question of law arose whether the amount of money received by a claimant as Mediclaim, in terms of a medical insurance policy, is deductible from the compensation awarded by a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) for medical expenses incurred due to an accident - The Supreme Court held that the amount received as part of a Mediclaim/medical insurance policy is strictly not deductible from the compensation calculated by the concerned Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act (MVA), even if compensation under the head of medical expenses is specifically claimed - Key Principles Articulated by the Supreme Court – i. Statutory Entitlement vs. Contractual Benefit - A statutory benefit under the MVA flows from the authority of law and serves a broader public welfare purpose, whereas a contractual benefit like a Mediclaim policy flows from a private agreement supported by independent premium considerations - These two entitlements operate in separate domains and stand on completely different footings; ii. No "Double Benefit" or Unjust Enrichment - Receiving both payments does not amount to an impermissible "double benefit" or unjust enrichment - The contractual insurance reimbursement is merely the fruit of hard-earned money voluntarily parted with by the claimant in the past in the form of premiums to guard against life's uncertainties; iii. No Windfall for Tortfeasors/Insurers - Allowing a deduction of Mediclaim benefits would result in an unjust and undue advantage to the insurer of the offending vehicle or the tortfeasor, effectively letting them escape liability under the head of medical expenses solely because the claimant had the prudence to secure independent insurance coverage; iv. Different Yardsticks - A Mediclaim policy is strictly capped by a monetary limit defined by the contract, whereas the guiding yardstick under the MVA is the beneficial principle of just and fair compensation, which carries no strict monetary limits. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC (1999) 1 SCC 9; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 9-15] New India Assurance Company v. Dolly Satish Gandhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 504 : 2026 INSC 498

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & 173 — Motor Accident Claim — Enhancement of Compensation — 100% Permanent Disability of a 14-year-old Minor Pillion Rider - Notional Income Evaluation - The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in fixing the minor claimant's notional annual income at a low rate of ₹30,000/- The notional income must be determined based on the prevailing minimum wages admissible for a skilled workman in the state at the time of the accident - Since the minimum wages for a skilled workman in Rajasthan in 2016 were ₹5,746/- per month, Supreme Court rounded it off to ₹5,800/- per month (amounting to ₹69,600/- annually) - After adding 40% for future prospects and applying a multiplier of 18, the loss of income was enhanced to ₹17,53,920/- Supreme Court modified the meager attendant charges of ₹1,21,800/- awarded by the High Court - Pointing out that the minor appellant suffered 100% permanent disability and requires the continuous assistance of two attendants round the clock for the rest of his life, computed the charges using the minimum wages of a semi-skilled workman (₹5,000/- per month per attendant) - Applying a multiplier of 18, the Court enhanced the attendant charges to ₹21,60,000/- To secure the minor's future, the Court directed that 25% of this amount be released immediately, while the remaining 75% be kept in a fixed deposit, with ₹1,50,000/- released annually to earn continuous interest - Supreme Court significantly enhanced compensation under alternative heads to meet the ends of justice: ₹10,000,00/- for mental pain, suffering, and loss of amenities; ₹3,00,000/- for future medical expenses; ₹3,00,000/- for loss of marriage prospects; and ₹1,00,000/- for special diet and transportation, bringing the total modified compensation to ₹56,83,663/- with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, 2020 INSC 135; Paras 8-11] Hansraj v. Mukesh Nath, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 468 : 2026 INSC 454

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Adjudication of Claims – Non-adjudication of Framed Issues – Validity of Driving Licence – Adverse Inference – Despite a specific issue being framed regarding whether the bus driver possessed a valid and effective driving licence, the Tribunal declined to adjudicate it on merits simply because it found the driver not responsible for the accident - The High Court also failed to return any finding on this material issue or address the fact that the driver did not enter the witness box despite filing a written statement - Held, once an issue is framed, it is incumbent upon the adjudicating forum to record a finding thereon, supported by reasons, as it bears directly upon the determination of liability and the rights of the parties - Non-adjudication of such a vital aspect amounts to an incomplete adjudication and undermines the legality of the award - This aspect assumed greater significance as the claimants explicitly pleaded that the driver was undergoing training under a senior driver at the relevant time - The impugned judgments set aside and the matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. [Paras 25 – 34] Parmila v. Rajender, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2026 INSC 420

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Adjudication of Claims – Determination of Negligence – Head-on Collision – Contributory Negligence – The Supreme Court expressed perplexity at the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court which completely absolved the bus driver (Respondent No. 1) of even any contributory negligence, placing the entire blame on the deceased car driver - Held, in motor accident cases, the determination of negligence must be founded upon a balanced and objective assessment of the conduct of all parties involved, particularly where the circumstances suggest a possible sharing of responsibility - The complete exclusion of contributory negligence in a head-on collision ordinarily warrants a careful scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances, including the manner of driving, the point of impact, and other attendant factors - The absence of a reasoned and comparative analysis of the respective actions of both drivers renders the conclusions susceptible to doubt. [Paras 23 - 26] Parmila v. Rajender, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2026 INSC 420

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — High Court's Error — Noted that the High Court of Bombay at Goa erred in dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal as "not maintainable" and refusing to hear arguments on the quantum of compensation - The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration on the issue of quantum. [Relied on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Shila Datta & Ors., (2011) ACJ 2729; Paras 12-16] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gauri Gurudas Gaonkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 348

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 149(2), Section 166, and Section 170 — Right of Insurer to contest on merits — Maintainability of Appeal — The Supreme Court held that when an Insurance Company is impleaded as a party-respondent in a claim petition (rather than merely being a noticee), it has the right to contest the claim on all available grounds, including the quantum of compensation, without being restricted to the limited grounds specified under Section 149(2) of the Act – Supreme Court clarified that if the insurer is already a respondent, it does not require the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 to raise such additional grounds. National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gauri Gurudas Gaonkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 348

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Future Prospects – Permanent Employee aged 50-60 years – Held: As per the settled legal position, an addition of 15% toward future prospects is mandated for a permanent salaried employee within the age bracket of 50-60 years – Noted that the High Court's grant of 10% was erroneous as the deceased was a 59-year-old railway employee - Held: It is a settled proposition of law that the Court or Tribunal is not barred from awarding more compensation than what is claimed, provided the awarded amount is "just and reasonable". [Relied on Sarla Verma and Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121; National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680; Helen C. Rebello and others vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another (1999) 1 SCC 90; Paras 25-30] Sushila v. Sudhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 343

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Just Compensation – Calculation of Notional Income – Deductions based on remaining years of service – Held: Any deduction in income based on the proximity of the deceased to retirement is impermissible in law - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court, which had deducted 50% of the deceased's salary because he had only six months of service remaining - Compensation must be calculated based on the "annual" income of the deceased using the last drawn salary to ensure uniformity and consistency. [Para 22] Sushila v. Sudhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 343

Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy - Obligation of Insurance Companies to report forged policies - When an Insurance Company discovers that a motor insurance policy is forged or fabricated and cannot be acted upon, it is incumbent upon it to lodge a complaint with the police. Failure to do so reflects lack of due diligence and may suggest connivance. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy Public Funds & Vigilance - Insurance companies deal with substantial public funds and are under a corresponding duty to act with responsibility and vigilance while handling claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy - Registration of Criminal Case - A fresh FIR is to be registered. Officers of the Insurance Company who were aware of the fraud and were posted in the concerned branch at the relevant time shall be arrayed as accused. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy - SIT Probe Ordered - The Supreme Court directed the Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu, to constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the fabrication of the insurance policy in question. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 2(30) and 147 – Requisition of Vehicle for Election Duty – Determination of Liability – Whether the registered owner/insurer or the requisitioning authority (State) is liable for compensation in case of an accident involving a vehicle requisitioned under statutory orders - Held: When a public authority requisitions a privately owned vehicle for public purposes (such as Gram Panchayat Elections), the nature of possession and control changes entirely - The registered owner is divested of custody and decision-making power, and the vehicle is placed at the disposal of the State for governmental functions – Held that the requisitioning authority assumes the role of the "owner" for the period of requisition. District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Shifting of Liability from Insurer to State – The insurance policy obtained by the owner covers "regular and lawful use" in the ordinary course - Compelled deployment under statutory command cannot be characterized as "regular use" within the usual contemplation of the insurance contract - To fasten liability on the insurer for risks generated exclusively by governmental action would be to extend the contract beyond the agreed risk - responsibility for accidents occurring during the requisition period rests with the requisitioning authority (State) and not the insurer – Although Section 160 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1950, does not expressly authorize requisitioning manpower, if the authority utilizes the services of the driver provided with the vehicle, it implicitly recognizes the driver's competence to operate the vehicle under its control - The liability remains with the State even if the driver is an employee of the original owner, as the driver operates under official directions during the requisition period. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi (2008) 1 SCC 414; Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam (2014) 14 SCC 142; Paras 8-12] District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Assessment of Disability and Loss of Earning Capacity – Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to reduce the functional disability of the appellant-claimant from 63% to 30% - held that the High Court failed to provide cogent reasons for disregarding the Medical Board's certificate and the neuropsychological report which evidenced severe cognitive impairment, partial blindness, and intellectual disability resulting from a head injury - Noted that for a professional like a Manager, whose role depends on memory and analytical skills, such neurological deficits lead to a profound erosion of faculties essential for employment - the Supreme Court enhanced the functional disability to 100% for the purpose of computing compensation - Supreme Court increased the compensation from ₹35.61 lakh (as fixed by the Madras High Court) to ₹97.73 lakh, restoring and expanding the approach adopted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). [Paras 21 - 30] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260 : AIR 2026 SC 1511

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Duties of Appellate Courts – When an appellate court interferes with the findings of fact recorded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), especially regarding disability assessment, it must undertake a thorough reappreciation of evidence and assign clear, convincing reasons - Mechanical reductions of compensation without independent analysis of medical records are not sustainable in law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 22 - 35] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260 : AIR 2026 SC 1511

Motor accident compensation — Procedural Lapses — Non-joinder of driver — Held: The provision for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to enhance social justice, the rigours of procedure, such as not adding a driver as a party, cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act, especially as the trial is summary in nature. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello & Ors. Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (1999) 1 SCC 90; Sebastiani Lakra vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2019) 17 SCC 465; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 12-17] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241 : AIR 2026 SC 1441

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensation — Deduction of Group Insurance Scheme (GIS) benefits — Held: Amounts received by the dependents of a deceased under an employer-provided group insurance scheme or other contractual/social security benefits cannot be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act - These benefits arise from an independent contractual relationship and lack the requisite nexus with the statutory compensation payable for death in a motor vehicle accident - The principle of balancing loss and gain cannot be invoked to diminish the statutory entitlement to "just compensation." [Paras 14 - 16] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241 : AIR 2026 SC 1441

No-Fault Liability – Principle and International Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that requiring proof of negligence through civil courts or consumer fora imposes an "onerous burden" on families in complex scientific matters - Relying on the principle of no-fault liability (similar to Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), Supreme Court noted that global jurisdictions, including Australia, the UK, and Japan, have implemented dedicated COVID-19 vaccine injury compensation schemes - Supreme Court declined to appoint an independent medical board, finding the existing National and State AEFI Committees adequate for scientific assessment - it reaffirmed the state's duty to maintain transparent surveillance and ensure AEFI data is accessible in the public domain. [Relied on Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine SC 533); In re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic (2021 SCC OnLine SC 372); Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 539/2021); Paras 27-37] Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Compensation – Deduction of Compassionate Financial Assistance – Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 – Rule 5 – The Supreme Court reiterated that financial assistance received under the 2006 Rules which directly replaces "pay and allowances" (loss of income) must be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act to prevent double recovery - components such as family pension, life insurance, and provident fund are not deductible as they do not correspond to the specific head of loss of income. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Procedural Safeguards for Deductions – Proof of Receipt – Deductions from MVA compensation cannot be made based on mere assumptions of eligibility - The Tribunal must first determine the full compensation; claimants must then file an affidavit/declaration regarding the receipt of benefits under the 2006 Rules before the executing court - Adjustments to prevent double recovery are to be made only after receipt is established – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance v. Shashi Sharma (2016) 9 SCC 627; Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181; State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh (2004) 1 SCC 328; Paras on 6, 7, 8] Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 147 — Liability of Insurer — Gratuitous Passenger in Goods Vehicle — "Pay and Recover" Principle — The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's order directing the Insurance Company to first pay the compensation to the claimants and subsequently recover the same from the vehicle owner – Noted that the deceased had hired a tempo primarily to transport a Ganesh idol for immersion, making the act of travelling incidental to the transport of goods - In such circumstances, the deceased is treated as a gratuitous passenger travelling with his goods - Supreme Court distinguished this from cases where a vehicle is hired solely for passenger travel, reaffirming that the benevolent object of the Act justifies the "pay and recover" direction even when the insurer is not otherwise liable under the policy – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Manuara Khatun & Ors. v. Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2017) 4 SCC 796; National Insurance Company Limited v. Saju P. Paul & Anr. (2013) 2 SCC 41; Paras 10-13] Kaminiben v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 174

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 173 — Appeal against Award — Dismissal on ground of Undertaking — Legality of — High Court dismissed the Insurance Company's appeal merely because a local manager had given an undertaking to the Executing Court to satisfy the award - Held: An undertaking to comply with an award, often given under pressure of execution proceedings (such as attachment of office furniture), does not deprive the insurer of its statutory right to challenge the award on merits - The High Court, as the First Appellate Court, is duty-bound to consider the appeal on both law and facts, especially when patent errors in compensation calculation are alleged - Dismissed an appeal without touching the merits caused grave injustice. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 and 168 – Just Compensation – Future Prospects – Held: The addition of future prospects to the established income of the deceased is not a matter of judicial discretion but a mandatory legal requirement. For a deceased who was self-employed or on a fixed salary and below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% towards future prospects is compulsory. The High Court erred in failing to apply this binding precedent. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121; Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 17, 18, 19] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence of Income – Salary Certificate – Held: Determination of income must be founded on proof placed on record and cannot rest on conjecture. Where a salary certificate (Exhibit P-14) and corroborating employer affidavit (PW-3) establish a fixed monthly salary, it is impermissible for courts to assess income at a lower figure without evidence impeaching such documents - Held: Considering the dependents had been pursuing legal proceedings for 15 years since the death of the victim in 2011, the Court enhanced the interest rate to 9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim petition till realization. [Para 32] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium vs. Loss of Love and Affection – Subsumption of Heads – Held: Compensation in death cases is restricted to three conventional heads: loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. "Loss of love and affection" is not a distinct head of compensation and is comprehended within the broader head of "consortium," which encompasses spousal, parental, and filial consortium. [Paras 22 - 29] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(28) — Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; Section 3 — Constitution of India; Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 57 — Taxability of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery/Construction Equipment Vehicles - The Supreme Court held that heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles (such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, etc.) designed for off-road use within factory or enclosed premises are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the second part of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Supreme Court made following findings- i. Definition of Motor Vehicle: While such vehicles may fall under the inclusive first part of Section 2(28), they are specifically excluded by the second part of the definition, which omits "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises"; ii. Constitutional Limitation: Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permits states to tax vehicles "suitable for use on roads”- Noted that if a vehicle is designed for off-road operations and does not derive benefit from public road infrastructure, it cannot be burdened with motor vehicle tax; iii. Gujarat Tax Act Deficiency: noted that Schedule I of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, mentions construction equipment vehicles but prescribes no corresponding rate of tax for them - no tax can be levied or collected from such vehicles; iv. Status of Registration: Merely because such vehicles are registered under the Act does not estop the owner from challenging the liability to pay road tax if the vehicles do not ply on public roads – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; Paras 37-39, 42-45, 55] Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : 2026 INSC 43

Municipality

Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Maharashtra) — Section 3 — Extension of Municipal Limits — Legislative Function — Jurisdiction of Civil Court Barred - The specification, determination, and alteration of municipal limits by the State Government under Section 3 of the MMC Act partakes the character of a legislative function - Its validity or legality cannot ordinarily be the subject matter of adjudication before a Civil Court by way of a suit seeking declaration and injunction - The existence of disputed questions of fact does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction where the subject matter of the dispute lies outside the domain of the Civil Court - A challenge to the inclusion of lands within municipal limits effected in exercise of statutory power under Section 3 of the MMC Act cannot be permitted to be raised belatedly after a lapse of several decades, as such power attains a degree of finality and cannot be unsettled in collateral civil proceedings. [Paras 35 – 40] Unchgaon Village Panchayat v. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2026 INSC 405

Municipality - Expansion of Scope — Impleadment of Capital City Municipalities — Considering the prevalence of such unauthorized activities, Supreme Court expanded the issue to a pan-India basis - It impleaded all Municipal Corporations and Municipalities of the capital cities of all States and Union Territories as party respondents - Supreme Court directed the newly impleaded authorities to conduct a comprehensive inquiry within their jurisdictions to identify residential areas being misused for non-residential purposes - Detailed lists of such cases must be submitted via affidavits personally affirmed by the respective Commissioners by May 15, 2026 - Supreme Court appointed Senior Counsel Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha as Amicus Curiae to assist in the matter. [Paras 6-12] Loganathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 325

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi) – Section 59(d) [as substituted by Amendment Act 67 of 1993] & Section 92, Section 95(1) – Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 – Disciplinary Authority – Competency of the Commissioner to dismiss a Category 'A' Officer – Interpretation of the phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" – The short question was whether the Commissioner was competent to inflict the punishment of dismissal upon a Category 'A' officer, given that the Schedule to the 1959 Regulations designated the 'Corporation' as the competent authority for Category 'A' posts – Held that consequent to the substitution of Clause (d) to Section 59 by Act 67 of 1993 (w.e.f. 01.10.1993), the Commissioner was designated as the disciplinary authority for all municipal officers and employees - The phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" explicitly refers to regulations framed after the date of the amendment (01.10.1993) and does not subject the statutory power to the pre-existing 1959 Regulations - The use of the future-oriented phrase "may be made" denotes futurity and prevents the 1993 statutory amendment from being tethered to older, inconsistent subordinate legislation - the Commissioner is the competent disciplinary authority to pass dismissal orders. [Paras 63-83] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646

Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (Maharashtra) – Section 143-A(3) – The State Government lacks the authority under Section 143-A(3) to unilaterally "foist" arbitration on parties governed by a concluded contract - The power of the State to issue directions under this section is limited to regulating the manner and procedure of octroi collection and does not extend to appointing an arbitrator for the Municipal Council and its agent. Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288 : AIR 2026 SC 1586

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37(1)(b)(ii) — Grant of Bail — Commercial Quantity — Twin Conditions Mandatory — Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 cannot blindly dilute statutory rigors - The recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-condition and a sine qua non for granting bail in offences involving a commercial quantity - The right to a speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a precious constitutional right, but it must be read harmoniously alongside, and not in displacement or opposition to, the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act - Prolonged incarceration during the pendency of a trial does not automatically entail relaxation or mechanical dilution of these statutory twin conditions - Orders granting bail without recording such explicit satisfaction stand completely vitiated and cannot be sustained. [Paras 9,10] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411: AIR 2026 SC 2109 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 130

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Section 67 – Section 8 – Section 22 – Grounds of Arrest – Constitutional Mandate – Article 22(1) and Article 21 – The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of bail by the High Court and ordered the immediate release of the appellants due to the failure of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to provide written grounds of arrest - The appellants, medical professionals at a corporate hospital, were arrested following the recovery of 2000 Tramadol tablets - While the NCB claimed the grounds of arrest were orally explained and noted in a template-style arrest memo, the Court found this insufficient under established legal mandates - Supreme Court emphasized that providing written grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the arrestee. Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25 and 29 — Concurrent Sentences and Cumulative Fines — The Supreme Court addressed whether separate fines could be recovered when substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently - held that since Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code treats both imprisonment and fine as "punishments," a direction for sentences to run concurrently must logically extend to the fine as well - The appellant cannot be compelled to pay a double amount of fine for offences arising out of the same transaction. Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 25 and 29 — Independent vs. Derivative Offences — Section 65 — Default Imprisonment — Supreme Court clarified that Section 25 (allowing premises/conveyance to be used) and Section 29 (abetment/criminal conspiracy) are independent offences that attract separate punishments - Even though these sections do not specify a unique term but refer to the "punishment provided for that offence," they constitute legislation by reference/incorporation - While they are distinct, where they are "parasitic and derivative" or part of the same transaction as the main offence, the rule of wisdom mandates that sentences run concurrently to avoid double jeopardy - Following the settled principle, the Court reiterated that imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a "sentence" but a penalty incurred for non-payment. [Relied on Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (2013) 1 SCC 570; Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1669; Shantilal v. State of M.P. (2007) 11 SCC 24; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600; Paras 6-9] Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Bail — Prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial — Grant of regular bail in commercial quantity case - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused charged under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c) and 29(1) of the NDPS Act for allegedly possessing nearly 22 kg of ganja (commercial quantity), primarily on the ground of delay in trial and the accused having already undergone more than one year of incarceration. Rajadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 462

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Criminal Antecedents Relevant - Previous involvements in similar NDPS offences are a strong indicator that the accused is likely to indulge in similar offences if released on bail, thereby failing the second condition under Section 37. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Prolonged Incarceration - Mere detention for a period of one year and seven months, where the accused faces a possible sentence of up to 20 years, does not by itself justify grant of bail on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when statutory restrictions under special enactments like the NDPS Act are in play. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Sovereignty over Personal Liberty in Drug Cases - In matters involving the supply of narcotic drugs, which constitute a war against the nation affecting public health and the national economy, the sovereignty of the country must prevail over the personal liberty of the accused. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Strict Compliance with Section 37 NDPS Act - While dealing with applications for bail in cases involving commercial quantities of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, courts are mandatorily required to satisfy the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 — i.e., (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Failure to record such satisfaction renders the order granting bail unsustainable. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Co-accused Statements – Noted that the appellant was arraigned as an accused solely on the basis of a statement made by a co-accused (who was apprehended with 6.330 kg of Ganja) - noted that the actual complicity of the appellant is a matter to be thrashed out during trial - Supreme Court restored the bail and directed that the appellant be released on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-8] Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted – Non-compliance with mandatory requirements – Provision of "Third Option" for search – Noted that the High Court's acquittal of the accused was upheld where the Investigating Officer, while apprising the accused of his rights, provided a "third option" to be searched by the Police Officer instead of only a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer - Such an option is contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 50, which only allows for search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate – Held that although the contraband (11 kg 50 grams of Charas) was recovered from a bag carried by the accused, Section 50 was attracted because a personal search was also conducted alongside the search of the bag – noted that the prosecution's case was further weakened by the testimony of PW-8 (shopkeeper), who denied providing an electronic weighing scale as claimed by the police, stating he only possessed traditional scales - This discrepancy rendered the prosecution's version of events doubtful and untrustworthy. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and Another (2014) 5 SCC 345; Suresh and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 1 SCC 550; Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609; Paras 17-18] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 246 : 2026 INSC 240 : AIR 2026 SC 1420

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 8, 21, and 22 – Drugs (Control) Act, 1950 – Sections 5 and 13 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Appellant sought anticipatory bail in a case involving the seizure of 710 bottles of cough syrup from a car registered in his name, though he was not named in the FIR - Noted that since the appellant had already joined the investigation and was cooperating within the limitations prescribed by law, custodial interrogation was not warranted at this stage - allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court's denial of bail, the Supreme Court directed that in the event of arrest, the appellant be released on terms fixed by the trial court, subject to compliance with conditions stipulated under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(b), 22(c), 25, 27-A, and 29 — Grant of Bail — Prolonged Incarceration vs. Seriousness of Offence — Prosecution's Intention to Examine 159 Witnesses — The petitioner was arrested on March 29, 2022, in connection with the recovery of approximately 2428 Kilograms of Mephedrone - Despite the seriousness of the crime, Supreme Court noted that the petitioner remained in judicial custody as an undertrial prisoner for over 3 years and 6 months - the charge was only framed on January 16, 2026, after the Court's previous intervention. Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 107

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28, and 29 — Bail — Commercial Quantity — Prolonged Incarceration — Parity — The Supreme Court granted regular bail to the appellant despite the seizure of a commercial quantity of contraband - noted that the appellant had been in custody for 4 years, 1 month, and 28 days - Relief was further justified on the grounds of parity, as an identically situated accused person traveling on the same flight had already been granted bail by the Court – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order denying bail and directed release on stringent terms, including the surrender of her passport. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127 : AIR 2026 SC 800

National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016

National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 – Rule 28 – Amendment of Petition before Registration – Abuse of Process – held that alterations or substitutions in the memorandum of parties (names of allottees) made after the initial filing but before formal "registration" by the Registrar do not constitute an abuse of process - Under Rule 28(3), a party is allowed to rectify and amend a returned petition - An application is only treated as "validly filed" once it is complete in every respect and registered under Rule 28(4). [Paras 23, 24] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 14, 2(m) and Schedule I - Jurisdiction of NGT - Removal of Encroachment - The Supreme Court set aside an NGT order directing the removal of a temple and associated structures allegedly built on land earmarked for a park/open space - held that for the NGT to exercise jurisdiction under Section 14, there must be a "substantial question relating to environment" involving the implementation of specific enactments listed in Schedule I of the Act - Since the dispute involved alleged violations of Municipal Laws and Town Planning Acts which are not included in Schedule I, the NGT lacked the jurisdiction to order the removal of the encroachment. Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(m) - Substantial Question Relating to Environment - Definition includes instances of direct violation of specific environmental statutory obligations affecting the community at large, substantial damage to environment/property, or measurable damage to public health. Jurisdiction is strictly limited to the seven central environmental laws specified in Schedule I. [Paras 7-10] Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 – Jurisdiction – Substantial Question Relating to Environment –The NGT's jurisdiction is limited to civil cases involving a "substantial question relating to environment" arising from enactments in Schedule I - Held: Issues intrinsically connected to building plan violations and land-use disputes already under adjudication by the High Court do not qualify as substantial environmental questions for NGT intervention - Every dispute pertaining to the environment is not a "substantial question" under Section 2(1)(m) of the Act. [Relied on Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 534; Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody, (2025) 4 SCC 150; State of M.P. v. Centre for Environment Protection Research & Development, (2020) 9 SCC 781; Paras 104 - 106] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 15 – Remedial Jurisdiction – Enhancement of Compensation – The NGT is competent to enhance compensation recommended by a Joint Committee if it finds the amount inadequate to reflect the scale and impact of violations - Such an exercise of informed discretion, where expert findings are filtered and integrated into a reasoned outcome, does not amount to an abdication of adjudicatory functions. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Sections 15 and 20 – Environmental Compensation – Quantification Metrics – Project Cost and Turnover – The Supreme Court upheld the power of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to use project cost or turnover as a relevant yardstick for calculating environmental compensation - held that while a uniform formula is not prescribed by statute, linking the scale of operations to environmental harm is a permissible exercise of discretion under the 'Polluter Pays' principle - Larger operations signify a larger environmental footprint, and it is logical for companies profiting from scale to bear higher responsibility for environmental costs. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

National Highways Act, 1956

National Highway - Toll on National Highways covered by Union List; States can levy toll only on other roads - Held, the levy and collection of toll/fee on National Highways by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) falls squarely within the legislative competence of the Union under Entry 23 read with Entry 96 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Toll collected for the use of National Highways is a fee traceable to Entry 23 (highways declared by or under law made by Parliament to be national highways) read with Entry 96 (fees in respect of any of the matters in the Union List) of List I. The expression “tolls” under Entry 59 of List II (State List) must be confined to charges levied by States on roads/highways other than National Highways. Once a road is declared a National Highway, legislative competence shifts exclusively to the Union. Rule 8 of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rate and Collection) Rules, 2008 is intra vires the Constitution and the National Highways Act, 1956. There is no lack of legislative competence or excessive delegation. The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court judgment which had upheld the constitutional validity of toll collection on National Highways, including through concessionaires. T.S.R. Venkatramana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 326

National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3-J — Entitlement to Solatium and Interest — Nature of Application of Tarsem Singh-I — The Supreme Court clarified the temporal application of its decision in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304 - While the declaration of Section 3-J as unconstitutional operates from the inception of the provision, Supreme Court issued specific directions to prevent the reopening of long-settled cases and to manage the financial implications on the public exchequer – Key Points – i. Settled Cases: Landowners whose claims were concluded prior to the date of the Tarsem Singh-I judgment (September 19, 2019) without any pending litigation (Appeals, Writ Petitions, or SLPs) are not entitled to reopen their cases to claim solatium or interest; ii. Pending Litigation: In cases where litigation was pending as of September 19, 2019, landowners are entitled to 'solatium' and 'interest' as per the 1894 Act standards; iii. Interest on Solatium: Landowners are entitled to 'interest on solatium' only from the date such specific claims were raised; iv. No Recovery: The Supreme Court clarified that these directions do not authorize the NHAI or the Union of India to seek refunds or recovery of solatium or interest already paid to landowners. [Relied on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304; Paras 13-17] National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2026 INSC 291

Natural Justice

Natural Justice — Audi Alteram Partem — Non-joinder of Necessary Parties — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment for striking down bye-laws in rem without impleading or hearing all affected District Milk Unions - Adjudicating upon the internal governance of autonomous bodies without granting them an opportunity of hearing is a substantive violation of natural justice. [Relied on Dattatreya v. Mahaveer (2004) 10 SCC 665; Paras 14-22] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Natural Justice — Requirement of Specific Show-Cause Notice for Blacklisting — Rule 10.5 of Contractor Registration Rules, 2012 — A valid basis for a blacklisting order requires a particularized and unambiguous show-cause notice - The notice must clearly spell out the intention to blacklist to provide the noticee an adequate and meaningful opportunity to defend themselves - A general notice asking "why action should not be taken" for negligence is insufficient for the purposes of blacklisting - The final order cannot travel beyond the bounds of the show-cause notice. A.K.G. Construction and Developers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 321 : 2026 INSC 312 : AIR 2026 SC 1884

National Security Act, 1980

National Security Act, 1980 – Section 3 - The appellant was detained under the NSA following an incident of unauthorized digging and construction near Shree Krishna Janam Bhoomi and Dwarkadeesh Temple in Mathura, which led to the collapse of several houses, loss of three lives, and widespread panic. He was already in judicial custody when the detention order was passed. He made representations to both the detaining authority and the State Government, which were not promptly forwarded and considered. The State Government considered the representation only after approving the detention order. Even if a person is in custody, a detention order under Section 3 of the NSA can be passed if there is a reasonable apprehension that his release would lead to acts prejudicial to public order. However, the constitutional safeguard of expeditious consideration of the detenu's representation is mandatory and cannot be breached. The preventive detention order and its approval were quashed. The appellant was directed to be released forthwith. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Navy Act, 1957

Navy Act, 1957 – Section 15(2) read with Regulation 216 of Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations, 1967 – Termination of Service – While the Government/Chief of Naval Staff has the power to terminate services for misconduct, such power must be exercised based on specific foundational facts: (i) meaningful consideration of misconduct reports, (ii) satisfaction that a court-martial is inexpedient, and (iii) an opinion that further retention of the officer is undesirable – Appeal allowed. [Paras 20 - 27] 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - When a company or NGO authorises a specific individual to sign and issue cheques on its behalf, along with the responsibility of making payments under an agreement, such person is treated as the 'drawer' of the cheque and attracts criminal liability under S. 138 NI Act, upon dishonour. The Treasurer of an NGO, who was appointed as the authorised signatory to execute an MoU, sign cheques, and make payments to the respondent, was the 'face' of the organisation and solely responsible for the consequences of the dishonoured cheque. The Court clarified that the liability arises when the conditions under Section 141 NI Act are satisfied, even for authorised signatories. Mere designation as an authorised signatory does not automatically absolve personal liability if the person is the one who actually signed the cheque and was entrusted with the payment obligation. Reliance on Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh (2024) was held to be misplaced in the facts of this case. The conviction was upheld; however, considering the appellant was only the Treasurer, the sentence was modified. The appellant was directed to pay a fine of ₹1.5 crore to the respondent (TSSPDCL) within two months, with default rigorous imprisonment of one year. K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2026 INSC 555

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act for dishonour of cheque can be quashed, if the parties enter into a settlement and the offence is compounded under Section 147 of the NI Act. Parsharvanath Weld Wires v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 585

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Sections 138 and 141 – Offences by Companies/Societies – Vicarious Liability of Office Bearers – Scope of Quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. – Mere designation as an office bearer of a society/company is insufficient to attract vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act in the absence of specific averments disclosing an active role in the conduct of its business affairs - a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted while construing a complaint. If the complaint, read as a whole alongside the documentary material on record, discloses a sufficient factual foundation and prima facie participation of the office bearers in the underlying financial transactions (such as being signatories to the MoU, cheques, or promissory notes), the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold - in the absence of any specific factual foundation connecting an office bearer to the transaction beyond a general assertion of their official status, prosecution against such person cannot be sustained – Held that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings against respondents 1, 2, and 4 (Vice-President, Treasurer, and Manager) whose active involvement was prima facie established through their signatures on the financial documents/cheques related to the transaction - the quashing of proceedings against respondent No. 3 (Executive Member) was justified as no specific role or signing of documents was attributed to him beyond a general assertion of his designation - Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Another (2005) 8 SCC 89; National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another (2010) 3 SCC 330; Ashok Shewakramani and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (2023) 8 SCC 473; S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan (2023) 10 SCC 685; Paras 28 - 42] Mansi Finance v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 559

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 & Section 141 — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Part III (Sections 96, 101, 124, 128) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 357) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Section 395) — Interplay between Individual Moratorium and Cheque Bounce Proceedings - Core Principles Enunciated by Supreme Court - i. Predominantly Criminal Character of Section 138 - Although arising out of an inherently civil dispute or transaction, the "deeming fiction" under Section 138 of the NI Act attaches strict criminal liability as a measure of public policy and deterrence to maintain commercial integrity. It cannot be treated on par with a mere civil recovery mechanism; ii. Tiered/Bifurcated Approach to Section 138 - Proceedings under Section 138 must be bifurcated into two tiers - Tier-I (Criminal Aspect) which is mandatory and results in personal criminal liability (imprisonment or fine); and Tier-II (Compensatory Aspect) which is a discretionary exercise of power under Section 357 CrPC / Section 395 BNSS aimed at victim reparation; iii. Inapplicability of Moratorium on Criminal Aspect (Tier-I) - The interim moratorium under Section 96 and statutory moratorium under Section 101 of the IBC (Part III) do not stay the criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings - Liability to pay a fine is an "excluded debt" under Section 79(15)(a) of the IBC, and the moratorium cannot be used to evade personal criminal accountability; iv. Applicability of Moratorium on Compensatory Aspect (Tier-II) - The moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC apply strictly to the compensatory aspect of Section 138 - If a criminal court adjudicates that compensation is payable, the recovery and enforcement of such compensation against the debtor or his property must be temporarily halted during the moratorium period to prevent the depletion of the asset pool and allow breathing space; v. Vicarious Liability of Directors Undergoing Personal Insolvency - Where a corporate entity cannot be proceeded against due to a legal snag, the personal criminal liability of its Directors under Section 141 survives - if such a Director is undergoing personal insolvency or bankruptcy under Part III of the IBC, the expression "any debt" under Sections 96 and 101 is broad enough to include the statutory compensatory liability shifted onto him - while the criminal trial against the Director continues, the recovery of any ordered compensation from him or his properties remains stayed under Sections 96, 101, 124, and 128 of the IBC - Finding a deep-seated systemic conflict between the literal procedural mechanisms and the overarching social objective of penal deterrence under the NI Act, the Division Bench referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a three-judge Bench to conclusively determine the precise penal orientation of Section 138 and the exact extent of moratorium protections applicable over it. [Relied on P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Private Limited, (2025) 6 SCC 781; Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 545; Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, (2025) 4 SCC 629; Paras 141-185, 186 - 211] Dineshchand Surana v. UCO Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2026 INSC 579

Negotiable Instruments – Delay in Presentment – Section 75A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – While delay in presentment is excused if caused by circumstances beyond the holder's control (such as a strike), the presentment must be made within a "reasonable time" as soon as the cause of delay ceases to operate - The bank's failure to act on the immediate working days following the strike precluded the protection of Section 75A. [Paras 56] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 141 – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Essential Averments – Held, merely being a Director of a company is insufficient to make a person liable under Section 141 - It is an essential requirement to specifically aver in the complaint that, at the time the offence was committed, the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company - Signing a Board Resolution regarding major directional issues does not ipso facto evidence involvement in the day-to-day management of the affairs of the company. [Paras 6 - 8] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Reverse Onus Clause – Held: Section 139 is a reverse onus clause included to improve the credibility of negotiable instruments - It is obligatory for the Court to raise this presumption once the factual basis (issuance/execution of the cheque) is established - Dismissing a complaint before trial on the ground that the debt was not legally enforceable, without allowing the complainant to lead evidence, ignores the statutory mandate - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Sessions Court and High Court, restoring the complaint.. It held that since the signatures and issuance were not disputed, the existence of a legally enforceable debt is a matter of trial. [Relied on Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, 2010 INSC 289; Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, 2023 INSC 888; Paras 8-11] Renuka v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : 2026 INSC 327

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 and 139 – Dishonour of Cheque – Legally Enforceable Debt – Rebuttal of Presumption at Pre-trial Stage – Held: At the stage of issuance of process, the Court is only required to see if the basic ingredients of Section 138 are prima facie satisfied, including the issuance of the cheque, its dishonour, and the service of statutory notice - Once the drawer does not dispute the signature or the issuance of the cheque, the statutory presumption under Section 139 comes into play, shifting the burden to the drawer to prove that the cheque was not issued for a legally enforceable debt - This rebuttal is an exercise to be undertaken during the trial through evidence and cannot be dislodged in a summary manner at the pre-trial stage. Renuka v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : 2026 INSC 327

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dishonour of Post-dated Cheques – Presumption of Cheating – Dishonour of a post-dated cheque by itself is not sufficient to presume the existence of a dishonest intention at the time of issuance - Post-dated cheques are often issued to discharge existing or future liabilities and do not carry a representation of sufficient funds at the time of issuance - While dishonour may trigger proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, it does not ipso facto amount to cheating under Section 420 IPC unless dishonest intention is proved from the start. [Relied on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2011) 1 SCC 74; Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Another v. State of Kerala and others (2015) 8 SCC 293; Paras 12-20] V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 372 and 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Right of Complainant as 'Victim' – Conflict of Judgments – Reference to Larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed a conflict between a recent co-ordinate Bench decision in Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) and earlier decisions in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) regarding whether a complainant in a Section 138 NI Act case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC or can appeal directly as a 'victim' under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Separate Cause of Action – Held that a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque, provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete - The fact that multiple cheques arise from a single transaction does not merge them into a single cause of action - Once a cheque is issued in discharge of liability and subsequently dishonoured, a presumption of liability in favour of the complainant arises - The burden of proving the absence of a debt or liability lies with the accused and must be discharged during the trial – Noted that the High Court, while exercising power under Section 482, must avoid conducting a "mini-trial" or usurping the function of the Trial Court when disputed factual questions exist - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that maintaining two separate complaints for the same underlying debt (one for personal cheques and one for firm cheques) amounted to parallel prosecution - held that since the instruments were distinct, drawn on different accounts, and presented on different dates, the law does not bar separate prosecutions - Questions regarding whether cheques were issued as alternative securities or in substitution of one another are mixed questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the threshold under Section 482 - Noted that statutory weight must be given to the presumption under Section 139 - Quashing proceedings prematurely overlooks this legal presumption which operates in favor of the complainant. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 745 M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234; Paras 26-45] Sumit Bansal v. MGI Developers and Promoters, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2026 INSC 40

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 and 142(1)(b) - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Karnataka High Court that had treated the sequence of condoning delay and taking cognizance as interchangeable or a "curable irregularity" – Noted that under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the power to take cognizance of a complaint filed after the prescribed period is expressly subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for the delay – Held that an order taking cognizance before the delay is formally condoned is legally unsustainable and satisfaction of the Court regarding sufficient cause for delay must precede the act of taking cognizance of a belated complaint - Supreme Court made following Findings: i. Mandatory Sequence: The satisfaction of the Court regarding "sufficient cause" resulting in the condonation of delay must precede the act of taking cognizance; ii. Irregularity not Curable: Held that High Court's view that taking cognizance before condoning delay is a "curable irregularity" is not in keeping with the statutory mandate of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b); iii. Impact of Misrepresentation: noted that the respondent (complainant) contributed to the procedural error by erroneously stating in her complaint that it was filed within time – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC 129; Paras 13-15] S. Nagesh v. Shobha S. Aradhya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : 2026 INSC 27 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 12

Official Secrets Act, 1923

Official Secrets Act, 1923 - The appellant, a retired Major General and former Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat (R&AW), was prosecuted under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with Sections 409 and 120B IPC for publishing a book containing allegedly classified information relating to India's external intelligence. The CBI filed a chargesheet and sought to keep the relied-upon classified documents in a sealed cover. The Trial Court directed supply of the documents to the accused under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The High Court modified this order and permitted only inspection of the documents. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. Documents forming part of the chargesheet which are relied upon by the prosecution must ordinarily be supplied to the accused. Withholding them merely on the ground that the case involves the Official Secrets Act is impermissible. The Court relied upon Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Satyen Bhowmick, (1981) 2 SCC 109, held that Section 14 of the OSA does not take away the valuable right of the accused to receive copies of relied-upon documents. The apprehension of the prosecution regarding national security is not sufficient to override this right. Adequate safeguards exist under Section 5 of the OSA, which penalises any unauthorised disclosure of such documents even by the accused or his lawyers outside the court proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the CBI to supply typed copies of the documents sought by the appellant under Section 207 Cr.P.C. within two months. Inspection of the documents, if required, may be permitted during court proceedings by the Trial Court. This judgment reinforces the primacy of fair trial rights even in cases involving national security and official secrets. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614

Official Secrets Act, 1923 - the invocation of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 does not bar or justify the denial of supply of documents relied upon by the prosecution in the chargesheet to the accused. Mere apprehension that supply of such documents would endanger the safety and security of the country is not a valid ground to withhold them. An accused has a statutory and fundamental right under Section 207 Cr.P.C. to receive copies of the documents relied upon in the chargesheet, as denial of the same would cause serious prejudice to his right to a fair trial and effective defence. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614

Online Gaming - Alternative Source of State Legislative Competence – Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Independent of Entry 34, the State Legislatures derive complete competence to regulate and ban online staking platforms under Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Public order is an expression of wide connotation that encompasses public safety, social tranquillity, and the prevention of social and economic disorders - The rampant, digitally-mediated addiction and massive financial accumulation by online platforms trap vulnerable sections and disrupt the "even tempo of the life of the community," creating an immediate threat to the orderly state of society. [Relied on: Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; State of Rajasthan v. Shri G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544; Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 677; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Paras: 332 – 357] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594

Online Gaming

Online Gaming - Distinction and Correct Application of Landmark Precedents (RMDC Line & K.R. Lakshmanan) - Supreme Court clarified that the landmark rulings in RMDC-I, RMDC-II, and K.R. Lakshmanan were misunderstood by the High Courts - None of these decisions foreclosed the State's power over betting on games of skill – i. RMDC-I & RMDC-II Clarified - In RMDC-I, the definition of "prize competitions" was held to be a gambling adventure as it invited the general public to forecast uncertain future events where common masses lacked statistical expertise – the Supreme Court in RMDC-I approvingly cited Hamilton's Hedaya, which explicitly states that even chess (a game of pure skill) constitutes gambling if anything is staked - RMDC-II explicitly left scope for States to step in if games of substantial skill started to pose problems for the State or cause public harm; ii. K.R. Lakshmanan Clarified - The immunity granted to horse-racing was based on a specific statutory exception carved out by the legislature itself and was limited to highly-regulated betting inside the physical club premises on the day of the race. It cannot shield the "veil of invisibility" and uncontained access inherent in online cyberspace gaming. [Distinguished: State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I), AIR 1957 SC 699; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II), AIR 1957 SC 628; Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 244-245, 251-253, 279, 282-289] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594

Online Gaming - Introduction of Stakes Converted Games of Skill into Betting/Gambling – Res Extra Commercium – Supreme Court ruled that while a genuine skill-based competition played without stakes does not amount to gambling, the moment real monetary stakes are introduced, the activity constitutes betting and gambling - A player or third person placing a bet on the uncertain outcome of a game of skill with the hope of winning more than what was staked transforms the business into a betting enterprise. [Relied on: M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770; P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187; Paras 264-320] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594

Online Gaming - No Manifest Arbitrariness under Article 14 – Empirical Evidence and Policy Decisions - The amended provisions do not suffer from manifest arbitrariness or discrimination under Article 14 - The classification and prohibition of staking money in cyberspace are backed by empirical studies, expert committee reports (such as the Justice K. Chandru Committee), and large-scale public surveys detailing severe socio-economic distress, gaming addiction, financial ruins, and child development harms - The State is fully competent to take such policy decisions for public welfare. [Relied on: Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, (1978) 1 SCC 636; Paras 292, 305, 306 – 331, 350-365] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594

Onus of Proof and Collusion

Onus of Proof and Collusion – Noted that appellant, being the mother of the Managing Director of the judgment-debtor company, failed to produce the tripartite agreement that allegedly facilitated the sale - Held that the sale cannot be deemed to be "without notice" of the existing liability, especially given the relationship between the parties and the long-standing nature of the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Danesh Singh and others v. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs. (2025 INSC 1434); Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 144; Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew (2023) 20 SCC 76; Paras 10-13] R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Other Backward Classes (OBC)

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - Key Principles Held – i. Primacy of the 1993 Office Memorandum (OM): A mere executive letter of clarification (dated 14.10.2004) cannot override or alter the substantive framework of a parent policy like the 1993 OM - If a clarification introduces new conditions that alter rights, it ceases to be clarificatory and becomes an impermissible amendment; ii. Exclusion of Salary and Agricultural Income: Under the 1993 OM, income from salaries and agricultural land must be excluded from the "Income/Wealth Test" (Category VI) - Supreme Court affirmed that income from salaries alone cannot be the sole criterion for Creamy Layer status; parental status and category of post are essential factors; iii. Hostile Discrimination: Denying OBC-Non-Creamy Layer (NCL) status to children of PSU/private employees based on salary while granting it to similarly placed Government servants (Group C and D) who reach similar income levels is "hostile discrimination." - It treats equals as unequals; iv. Constitutional Imperative: The exclusion of the creamy layer is a constitutional necessity to ensure benefits reach the truly backward - this exercise must be rational and non-arbitrary - directed the Union of India/DoPT to consider the claims of respondent candidates and intervenors based on these principles and to create supernumerary posts as required to accommodate those who satisfy the NCL criteria. [Relied on Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1; Paras 24 33, 37-43] Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - The Supreme Court dismissed a batch of appeals filed by the Union of India against various High Court judgments which had ruled in favor of candidates from the OBC category - The central controversy was whether the salary of parents employed in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private sectors could be the sole basis for "Creamy Layer" exclusion in the absence of established "equivalence" with government posts - held that treating PSU/private employees differently from Government servants (where salary is excluded from the income test) constitutes hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Jurisdictional Fact – Applicability of Statutes – The applicability of the PG Act depends on "jurisdictional facts" - facts that must exist before an authority can assume jurisdiction - If an employee falls under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e), the Controlling Authority lacks jurisdiction to award benefits under the PG Act - – Section 14, which provides an overriding effect to the PG Act over other enactments, can only be invoked by those who first qualify as "employees" under Section 2(e) – Noted that since the appellants were excluded by the definition itself, the overriding clause cannot be applied to defeat the specific exclusion. N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(e) – Definition of "Employee" – Exclusionary Clause – Employees of Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin – The Supreme Court held that retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), which functions under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), are not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act (PG Act) - Noted that HWP is an adjunct or ancillary of the DAE and is not a separate corporate entity or PSU - Since the appellants held civil posts under the Central Government and were governed by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, they fall squarely within the exclusionary limb of Section 2(e) of the PG Act – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 732; Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164; Paras 12, 13] N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Statutory Interpretation – Section 2(e) of PG Act – Use of "Means" and "Does Not Include" – The use of "means" coupled with "does not include" signifies exclusionary language that strictly removes certain classes from the scope of the provision – Noted that a person holding a post under the Central or State Government who is governed by any other Act or Rules providing for gratuity is excluded at the threshold from the definition of "employee". N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Pension

Pension as Property – Article 300A of the Constitution of India – Pension is not a bounty or a matter of largesse; it is a deferred portion of compensation for past service that matures into a vested and enforceable right - Withholding accrued arrears of disability pension, which became due following judicial determination and government policy, constitutes a deprivation of property under Article 300A – Noted that the decision in Union of India v. Ram Avtar (2014) is a judgment in rem - Therefore, the Union of India should have extended the benefit of broad banding to all eligible ex-servicemen automatically rather than requiring them to file individual applications. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 125 & 266 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 2008 – Regulation 44, 173 & 175 – Defence Security Corps (DSC) – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Deficiency in Service – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India, holding that personnel of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) are entitled to seek condonation of shortfall in their qualifying service (up to one year) for the purpose of a second service pension - Key Findings – i. DSC as Part of Armed Forces: DSC constitutes a "Corps" of the Indian Army under the Army Act, 1950, and its personnel are recognized as "Armed Forces personnel"; ii. Applicability of General Rules: Paragraph 266 (1961 Regulations) and Paragraph 173 (2008 Regulations) stipulate that pensionary awards for DSC shall be governed by the same rules applicable to the Regular Army, unless specifically inconsistent; iii. No Inconsistency: There is no "inconsistency" or express prohibition in the DSC - specific chapters against the condonation of shortfall provided in Regulation 125 (1961) or Regulation 44 (2008); iv. Calculation of Service: Before applying condonation, the length of service must be determined by treating a fraction of a year between 3 to 6 months as a completed half-year, as per Note 5 of the MoD letter dated 30th October 1987; v. Executive Letters vs. Regulations: The Government cannot override or amend statutory Pension Regulations through administrative letters (such as those dated 20th June 2017 and 22nd March 2022) to bar condonation benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Surender Singh Parmar, (2015) 3 SCC 404; Paras 31-48] Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2026 INSC 286

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 173 – Guide to Medical Officers, 2002 – Paragraph 6 – Supreme Court noted that compensation cannot be awarded for any disablement or death arising from intemperance in the use of alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, as these are matters within the member's own control – Appeal dismissed. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Pharmacy Act, 1948

Pharmacy Act, 1948 – Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 – Repugnancy – Classification and Equality – Articles 14 and 16 - Supreme Court ruled out repugnancy between the State Cadre Rules and Central legislation/regulations - While the Pharmacy Act and 2015 Regulations govern professional standards and create a "pool" of registered pharmacists, they do not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for public employment. The State Cadre Rules operate in the distinct domain of public recruitment – The prescription of a Diploma as an essential qualification is not arbitrary or irrational - noted a valid "intelligible differentia" based on:i. Course Structure: Diploma holders undergo 500 hours of compulsory hospital training compared to 150 hours for B.Pharma students; ii. Employment Avenues: Diploma holders have more limited career opportunities compared to degree holders, who can apply for higher posts like Drug Inspectors or industrial roles. [Relied on Zahoor Ahmad Rather & Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad & Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 404; Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 362; &K Service Selection Recruitment Board & Anr. v. Basit Aslam Wani & Ors. (2020); Paras 47-55, 59 – 64] MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Police

Police Manual - Media Briefing - The Supreme Court directed all States to formulate a policy for police media briefing, taking into account a "Police Manual for Media Briefing" furnished before it by amicus curiae. The Court has given 3 months' time to the states to do the needful. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Practice and Procedure

Practice and Procedure – Abuse of Process – Maintainability of Miscellaneous Applications in Disposed-of Matters – Absolute Bar on Review in the Garb of Clarification – Applicants sought to rewrite the final order under the guise of an application for clarification – Held - A post-disposal miscellaneous application is not maintainable to challenge the validity of a signed order or to seek a material modification - It lies strictly for rectifying clerical or arithmetical errors, or in exceptional circumstances where the main order is executory and has become impossible to implement due to subsequent developments - Applicants failed to file the mandatory affidavit on solemn affirmation under Circular F.No.01/Judl./2025 verifying such executory impossibility - The application being a gross abuse of the process of law to browbeat the Court's authority, it was dismissed with exemplary costs. [Relied on Surendra Singh v. State of U.P., (1953) 2 SCC 468; Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 9 SCC 124; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985; Paras 16 - 18, 19 - 31] Fakir Mamad Suleman Sameja v. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 490 : 2026 INSC 483

Practice and Procedure – Miscellaneous Application for Recall – An application for recall of an order dismissing an SLP cannot be used as a "second innings" to litigate issues that were not part of the original proceedings - noted that the original SLP arose from a suit for specific performance, whereas the MA attempted to introduce new grievances related to separate insolvency proceedings - While fraud can vitiate proceedings, such a claim must be proven and cannot be invoked on mere assertion. [Paras 10-15] Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Practice and Procedure – Misconceived SLPs – Article 136 – The Supreme Court observed that the petitions were "misconceived at the threshold" as they combined a challenge to a High Court order with a prayer to secure the benefits of that very same order - Discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be invoked to grant relief that does not arise from an adjudication of the petitioners' rights on merits. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Practice and Procedure – Remand by High Court – Requirement of Deciding All Issues – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had remanded a service matter to the School Tribunal based on a single technical point regarding the Secretary's authorization to initiate proceedings - Held: When several issues arise for determination, a Court should ideally record findings and reasons for each issue rather than focusing on just one "decisive" point - This approach ensures clarity, provides finality for litigants, and assists the appellate court with a reasoned decision. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Practice and Procedure – The "Consider Jurisprudence" – The Supreme Court criticized the routine practice of courts issuing directions to "consider" or "reconsider" claims as a means to "throw the ball out of the Court" - Such practice is counterproductive, harms the legal system, and delays justice - Courts must articulate directions in clear terms, specifying the method and manner of compliance to leave the government with no choice but to comply, appeal, or face contempt. Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Precedent

Precedent — Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta - A judgment is an authority only for what it actually decides - The binding element of a judgment lies in its ratio decidendi, i.e., the principle of law which was necessary for the determination of the issue that directly arose for consideration and was consciously adjudicated upon - Observations which stray beyond the contours of the issue in question do not partake of the character of a binding precedent. [Relied on Pradeep Oil Corporation v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another, (2011) 5 SCC 270; The State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmad, AIR 1973 SC 2520 / (1973) 2 SCC 547; Tata Steel Limited v. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2015) 15 SCC 55; Union of India and Another v. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 204; Para 41-55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406

Precedent & Judicial Discipline – Conflict between Coordinate Benches – Reference to Larger Bench: The Supreme Court was faced with a perceived divergence of views between coordinate Benches regarding the manner in which the three-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) is to be applied in UAPA cases - In Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026), a two-judge Bench held that the inquiry into delay must be contextual and cannot be a mechanical override based on time alone - Conversely, a later coordinate Bench in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency (2026) expressed serious reservations, observing that Gulfisha Fatima adopted a narrower reading that hollowed out the constitutional force of K.A. Najeeb - Held: A coordinate Bench cannot, by strong observations, effectively unsettle the ratio of an earlier coordinate Bench while continuing to sit in equal strength - When a doubt goes to the root of the legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the stage of criticism, as it introduces uncertainty in the administration of justice -To protect the authority of the Court and establish clarity across pending trials under special statutes, the proper course is reference - The Registry was directed to place the papers before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2026 INSC 2); Paras 10-25] Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 533

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Maintenance of Records under PCPNDT Act - Reaffirming the earlier judgment in Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, the Court held that non-maintenance or deficiencies in mandatory records (particularly Form F) is not a mere technical or clerical lapse, but a serious violation that serves as a springboard for the offence of female foeticide. Proper record-keeping is essential to prevent misuse of diagnostic techniques for illegal sex determination. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Sex Ratio Data & Continuing Concern - While acknowledging improvement in sex ratio at birth (from 896 females per 1,000 males in 2015-17 to 918 in 2022-24 and NFHS-5 figures showing 929), the Court noted that it still remains below the biologically expected level (~950+). Several States continue to report below-national-average ratios. The progress was described as “incomplete and uneven” and only a “partial course correction.” The Court referred to the decline in India's ranking in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2025. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Societal Change Required - The Court observed that true equality and change in societal mentality — where the birth of a girl child is no longer considered a matter of concern — is still a distant goal. Government schemes such as Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana, and others reflect continued efforts to combat systemic bias, but these do not warrant any relaxation in the enforcement of the PCPNDT Act. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Strict Enforcement of PCPNDT Act - the PCPNDT Act must continue to be enforced with utmost strictness. Despite improvement in overall sex ratio, sex-selection practices and deep-rooted patriarchal preference for the male child persist in the country. Dilution of the provisions or leniency towards infractions cannot be countenanced. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - The appellant-doctor faced prosecution under Section 23 of the PCPNDT Act for alleged violations of Sections 4(3), 5, 6, 29 and the Rules, due to deficiencies and blanks in Form F maintained at his sonography centre. The Supreme Court upheld the cognisance taken by the Judicial Magistrate and the refusal of the High Court to quash the proceedings, finding no merit in the challenge regarding the competence of the Appropriate Authority (District Civil Surgeon) or the nature of the violations. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The criminal proceedings against the appellant were allowed to continue. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Section 30(1) – Search and Seizure – Collective Decision Required – The power to authorize a search under Section 30(1) must be exercised by the "Appropriate Authority" collectively as defined under Section 17 - An individual member, including the Chairperson/Civil Surgeon acting alone, cannot legally authorize a search – Noted that in this case, the search was directed solely by the Civil Surgeon without the association of the other two members (District Programme Officer and District Attorney), rendering the search technically illegal. [Paras 41 - 50] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 9 and Rule 10 – Maintenance of Form F – Maintenance of records in "Form F" is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Non-maintenance or inaccurate maintenance of records constitutes a "springboard" for the offence of female foeticide and amounts to a contravention of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act - Even if sex determination is not proven, the failure to maintain statutory records is a punishable offence under Section 23. [Paras 33 - 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Admissibility of Evidence Collected in Illegal Search – Rule of Relevancy – Even if a search is conducted in infraction of statutory procedures (such as Section 30 of the PCPNDT Act), the materials or records seized during such search are not automatically discarded. Materials gathered in an illegal search remain admissible in evidence subject to the test of relevancy and genuineness – Noted that Court must, however, examine such evidence with greater care. [Paras 50 - 52] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Discharge in Police Case vs. Statutory Complaint – A discharge order passed by a Magistrate in a criminal case arising from an FIR (Police Investigation) has no bearing on a separate complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 28 of the PCPNDT Act - The Act mandates cognizance only upon a complaint by the authorized authority, and police investigation is generally discouraged for these specialized offences – appeal dismissed. [Relied on Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC Online SC 2495; Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283; Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector (Investigation), New Delhi, (1974) 1 SCC 345; Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 822; Paras 28, 37, 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882; Section 41 — Non-arbitrability and Public Policy — Merely because a statute (like Section 41 of the 1882 Act) confers exclusive jurisdiction on a specific court for certain types of disputes (licensor-licensee/landlord-tenant), it does not ex proprio vigore (by its own force) neutralize arbitration clauses in private agreements. The Court distinguished the present case - where possession had already been handed over and the dispute was purely a monetary claim from cases requiring special statutory protection - Arbitration clauses find their roots in Section 28 of the Contract Act - Exceptions 1 and 2 to Section 28 expressly provide that a contract to refer disputes to arbitration is not rendered illegal or void as a restraint of legal proceedings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on In re Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Paras 19–26] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Custody and Child Psychological Evaluation – Child-Centric Jurisprudence - Sections 24, 33(5), 36, and 39 – Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 12 – Psychological Evaluation of a Child Victim Intersecting with Custody/Visitation Disputes - The High Court modified its initial order for a single independent expert by constituting a four-member multi-layered panel of experts to evaluate a 10-year-old child victim for facilitating reconnection with the father, who is facing active criminal prosecution under the POCSO Act – Held that the High Court's approach suffered from a fundamental flaw as it failed to examine the detrimental impact that a multi-layered evaluative process conducted by numerous professionals could have on the psychological well-being of the child - Legal procedures involving child victims must remain child-sensitive, trauma-informed, and protective of their emotional security - The statutory framework of the POCSO Act, particularly the principle of minimum exposure under Section 33(5), consciously recognizes that repeated legal or forensic engagement carries a severe risk of "secondary victimisation" and "re-traumatisation" - While courts exercising parens patriae jurisdiction are not altogether precluded from seeking expert psychological assistance when POCSO allegations are pending, any such process must strictly adhere to the requirements of demonstrable necessity, institutional neutrality, proportionality, and minimum intrusion – The Supreme Court further emphasized that the emotional growth and welfare of a child are deeply intertwined with the parental subsystem - courts should focus on calling for psychological assessment reports of the parents themselves before subjecting the child to further forensic or clinical scrutiny - The impugned orders of the High Court were modified, and the matter was remitted to the Family Court to evaluate the parent's mental health first and coordinate with the child's existing therapeutic counsellor. [Paras 31, 41- 82, 85-93] Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : 2026 INSC 638

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - In exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 5(1) and 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 (10 years rigorous imprisonment) after the appellant and the victim solemnised their marriage following the victim attaining the age of majority and the appellant paid ₹10,00,000 as compensation to the victim. The Court took note of subsequent events, including the victim's statements expressing her desire to settle the matter and live with the appellant as his spouse, and the absence of any objection from the State (subject to the order not being treated as a precedent). The appeals were allowed and the judgments of the Trial Court and Madras High Court were set aside. The appellant and the victim were left free to live peacefully as spouses in society. Maruthupandi v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 614

Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court – i. Rising Trend in Vexatious Litigation & 'Matrimonial Bouquets' - Supreme Court expressed serious concern over the growing trend of litigants using the legal machinery as an 'arm-twisting' tactic to settle personal scores in matrimonial disputes - It noted the emergence of a 'matrimonial bouquet' where sweeping, vague, and omnibus criminal allegations are thrown widely to implicate entire families - Courts must exercise utmost caution, scrutinize complaints thoroughly, and "separate the wheat from the chaff" to protect the rights of innocent citizens and prevent docket explosion; ii. Abuse of POCSO Act in Family Disputes - Supreme Court painfully took judicial notice of instances where complaints under the POCSO Act are weaponized by an estranged spouse against the other, using impressionable children as tools to extract higher monetary settlements or escape civil/commercial liabilities - Such heinous accusations, when prima facie vague and lacking material backing, must be nipped in the bud; iii. Duty of the Bar - Legal practitioners have a profound social responsibility to restrain clients from initiating false or exaggerated criminal proceedings arising out of domestic discords rather than encouraging multiple cases. [Relied on State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735; Geddam Jhansi vs. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2025) 3 SCC 756; Paras 9-10] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - The presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012 does not arise merely on the basis of the testimony of the child victim. The presumption applies only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the commission of the alleged sexual offence. Where the testimony of the child victim is unreliable, not fully credible, or suffers from material discrepancies, the presumption cannot be invoked on the strength of such statement alone. Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 401

Protection of Interest of Depositors

Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (Maharashtra) – Sections 2(c), 2(d) and 3 – Scope and Definition of "Deposit" and "Financial Establishment" – Transaction termed as a "loan" falling within the ambit of MPID Act – Distinction between IPC offences and MPID Act remedies - Held: The nomenclature given to a transaction is irrelevant. Even if a transaction of advancing money is treated or termed as a "loan", it satisfies the necessary attributes and ingredients to constitute a "deposit" within the wide amplitude of Section 2(c) of the MPID Act if it involves the receipt of money returnable after a specified period with or without interest - looking at the expansive definition under Section 2(d) of the Act, private individuals or entities accepting such money assume the character of a "Financial Establishment" - The machinery under the MPID Act and the criminal proceedings under the IPC operate in entirely distinct statutory fields - Merely because the appellants were unsuccessful in establishing offences under Sections 420, 409, and 405 of the IPC, it would not imply a legal embargo or bar against invoking the specific independent recourse provided under Section 3 of the MPID Act. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. 63 Moons Technologies Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 457; Paras 5-7] Alka Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 507 : 2026 INSC 489

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 12 – Quashing of Proceedings – Abuse of Process – Respondent-Wife filed a DV complaint eight months after the settlement and only after the husband initiated contempt proceedings - The complaint lacked specific allegations of violence and was deemed a "premeditated afterthought" to sustain litigation after resiling from the settlement - Held: Continuance of such proceedings constitutes an abuse of the process of law. DV proceedings quashed - Once parties enter a settlement authenticated by a mediator and confirmed by a Court, they cannot be allowed to reverse its effects by pursuing original or subsequent complaints. Deviation from mediated settlements attacks the foundational basis of the mediation process. [Relied on: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Ruchi Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agarwal, (2005) 3 SCC 299; Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; Trisha Singh v. Anurag Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1191; Paras 29, 30, 37-41] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Demand and Acceptance – Proof of Demand – While proof of demand is a sine qua non for conviction, it can be inferred from the overall evidence and the conduct of the parties - Noted that the accused admitted to accepting the money but provided a false and inconsistent explanation (claiming it was a loan repayment), which serves as a compelling circumstance pointing toward guilt - The evidence of a person allowed to be cross-examined by the party who called him is not "washed off the record" - The Judge of fact must determine if the witness is thoroughly discredited or if parts of the testimony remain believable in light of other evidence. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC 727; Paras 11-18] State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Conviction Restored – Hostile Witness – Efficacy of Testimony – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal, holding that the testimony of a hostile witness cannot be discarded in toto if certain portions remain creditworthy - Even if a complainant prevaricates or turns hostile regarding the specific demand at the time of the trap, the prior demand established through the First Information Statement (FIS), affirmed in court and corroborated by independent witnesses, is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Criminal courts cannot, by judicial directions, introduce a new procedural stage not contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for the conduct of trials. The procedure for criminal trials, including prosecutions under the PC Act, must be strictly followed as laid down in the CrPC/BNSS read with the provisions of the PC Act. Courts cannot create an additional pre-charge stage for examining sanctioning authorities. Section 311 CrPC, being a general provision relating to inquiries and trials, cannot be interpreted to override or bypass the specific stages of trial prescribed in the Code, particularly the stage of framing of charges. A High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot rewrite the procedural law or issue directions that require all Sessions Courts/Special Courts to examine sanctioning authorities before framing of charge or commencement of trial. The Supreme Court emphasised that while the validity of sanction can be challenged at appropriate stages as per law (including under Section 19(4) of the PC Act), it does not warrant creation of a mandatory pre-trial examination procedure through judicial fiat. Directions issued by the High Court were accordingly set aside. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : 2026 INSC 650

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Demand of Bribe - Mere presence of a public servant at the place where a superior officer allegedly accepts a bribe is not enough to infer criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. The prosecution must establish a prior meeting of minds and a shared criminal intent through cogent and substantive evidence. In the absence of proof of demand of illegal gratification by the accused, conviction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Ingredients of Criminal Conspiracy — Conspiracy cannot be inferred on the basis of suspicion or mere association. There must be clear material showing a meeting of minds to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The offence is complete only when such a meeting of minds is established. The prosecution failed to produce any evidence of prior agreement or concert between the respondents and the principal accused. Mere presence during the alleged transaction does not establish the necessary mens rea for criminal conspiracy. Additionally, the withholding of the tape recording of the alleged demand justified drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution. The appeals were dismissed. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – Liability of public servant for indirect demand of bribe through subordinates – Scope of “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person - A public servant is liable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 even if he does not personally demand or receive the bribe, provided he attempts to obtain an undue advantage through a third party or for the benefit of another person (including subordinates). Explanation 2 to Section 7 expressly covers situations where the illegal gratification is sought indirectly or for another person, and the actual receipt of the bribe is not essential for attracting liability at the prima facie stage. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector on the ground that there was no direct demand or acceptance of bribe by him. The Court held that the Sub-Inspector's alleged instructions to the complainant to “do something for the other police officials” or “make those boys happy”, coupled with a demand of ₹50,000 routed through a third person and subordinates, constituted a veiled demand and an “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person” within the meaning of Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2 of the PC Act. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – The requirement of a direct, personal and express demand by the public servant himself is not warranted by the statute. Explanation 2 broadens the scope to include indirect demands and benefits to others. Senior public servants cannot escape liability by orchestrating the collection of bribes through subordinates while maintaining personal deniability. A narrow interpretation of Section 7 would create a dangerous loophole in anti-corruption law and render Explanation 2 redundant. At the stage of quashing an FIR, the Court must examine whether the allegations prima facie disclose commission of the offence. Questions of guilt or innocence are to be decided at trial. The FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused public servant were restored. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574

Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 – Section 2(f), 100, 101, and 102 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 2(s) and 2(o) – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37 : 2026 CriLJ 708

Article 14 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 17A - Vires of Section 17A - Whether the requirement of prior approval for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation into offences relatable to recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant is unconstitutional? - Held (per Nagarathna, J.) - Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down - The provision is a resurrection of the Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, both of which were previously struck down by the Supreme Court - Resurrection of Struck-down Provisions: Section 17A is an attempt to reintroduce a prior approval regime that was already declared unconstitutional in larger bench decisions. It is "old wine in a new bottle" and does not remove the basis on which Section 6A of the DSPE Act was invalidated - The primary object of the Act is to effectively curb the "cancerous growth of corruption" - Section 17A forestalls even a bare preliminary enquiry, thereby protecting corrupt officials rather than merely honest ones - The provision is arbitrary because it requires approval from the very government department to which the public servant belongs - This creates a "policy bias" and a "conflict of interest," as the authority granting approval may have been involved in the same decision-making process, leading to a lack of objectivity and neutrality - The classification based on the nature of duties (recommendations or decisions) to protect a certain class of public servants is illegal and violates the mandate of equality before the law - The expression "Government" or "competent authority" in Section 17A cannot be substituted with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" through interpretation, as such substitution would amount to impermissible judicial legislation. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 68; Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1; Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532; Paras 19-22] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A — Constitutional Validity — Reading Down (per K.V. Viswanathan; J) — The Supreme Court delivered a split verdict, holding the constitutional validity of Section 17A but read it down to mandate an independent screening mechanism - held that the "previous approval" of the Government/Competent Authority for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation must be preceded by an independent screening of the information/complaint by the Lokpal (for Central Government employees) or Lokayukta (for State Government employees) - The recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta shall be binding on the Government/Authority. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees – The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - It is incorrect to contend that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) holds exclusive jurisdiction or that its prior consent is mandatory for the ACB to proceed. [Para 3] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 170

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Scope of Previous Approval – Demand of Illegal Gratification –The protection under Section 17A, which requires previous approval for enquiries or investigations into decisions taken or recommendations made by a public servant in the discharge of official duties, does not apply to cases involving the demand of illegal gratification - Noted that Section 17A was enacted with a specific object and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be applied to bribery/extortion cases as these do not constitute "official functions or duties." [Paras 6-7] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 170

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 4 and 156 — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 172

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Difference between Section 6A (DSPE Act) and Section 17A (PC Act) — While Section 6A was struck down in Subramanian Swamy for being discriminatory (protecting only high-ranking officers), Section 17A is applicable to all levels of public servants - the requirement for an independent screening mechanism remains a constitutional necessity to prevent the "chilling effect" on honest officials while ensuring the accountability of the corrupt - In cases where the public servant is not covered under the jurisdiction of the Lokpal/Lokayukta, the competent authority must commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information before granting or refusing approval. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682; K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655; Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1: Paras 50, 81, 93, 98-100] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Rule of Law — Independence of Investigative Agency — The executive cannot have the unbridled power to foreclose an enquiry into corruption allegations against its own officials, as this would violate the "rule of law" and the principle of independent investigation - Any decision to block an enquiry must be taken by a body independent of the executive - SOP) — Held that the existing SOP (dated 03.09.2021) governing Section 17A to be "wholly unsatisfactory" as it failed to provide for an independent screening mechanism and allowed the executive to judge the actions of its own limbs. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 – Penal Code, 1860 – Section 120B – Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7 and 13(2) – Illegal Gratification – Trap Proceedings – Evidentiary Value of Shadow Witness – Credibility of Independent Witnesses – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an Excise Constable caught in a trap for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹500 - held that the testimony of a shadow witness (PW-2) cannot be branded as "interested" merely because they are acquainted with the complainant - To disqualify a witness as interested, the defense must provide specific material demonstrating actual hostility. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Production of Material Objects – Tainted Currency Notes – The appellant argued that the failure to produce tainted currency notes before the Court was fatal to the prosecution - Supreme Court dismissed this contention as it was raised for the first time during oral arguments at the Supreme Court and was never pleaded in the Trial Court, High Court, or the Special Leave Petition. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 - Section 2(i) — Definition of "Street" — Interpretation of "Same Place or Locality" for Re-release - Held, the definition of "street" under Section 2(i) of the parent Act expressly limits the expression to public spaces such as ways, roads, lanes, or open spaces to which the public has access - This definition must guide and inform the interpretation of subordinate rules - the expression "same place or locality" used for the re-release of dogs cannot be interpreted in an unbound manner to include private premises, controlled-access spaces, or sensitive institutional campuses. [Paras 44 - 48] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 2(1)(u) – "Proceeds of Crime" – The definition is wide enough to include property equivalent in value to the property obtained from criminal activity - This allows for the attachment of alternate property if the direct proceeds of crime are unavailable – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1; Paras 37-52] Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 45 – Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(3), 8(7), and 8(8) – Interplay between Adjudication, Confiscation, and Restoration – Finality of Confirmation Order – Held: Section 8(7) and Section 8(8) are stand-alone provisions - An application for confiscation under Section 8(7) can only be decided by the Special Court once the confirmation order passed under Section 8(3) attains finality - If a confirmation order is challenged before a higher forum (Appellate Tribunal or High Court), a "deemed embargo" operates on the conclusion of proceedings under Section 8(7) until that challenge is resolved - The Special Court must refrain from deciding Section 8(7) applications while an appeal under Section 26 is pending, as the doctrine of merger applies. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(7) – "Material before it" – The expression "material before it" in Section 8(7) has a limited import, primarily to demonstrate the contingency (death of accused, proclaimed offender, etc.) and entitlement to possession - A party who suffered an adverse order under Section 8(3) can only seek relief under Section 8(7) if there is "new material" not previously considered by the Adjudicating Authority or higher forums. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(8) and 2016 Rules – Claim for Restoration – An application under the second proviso to Section 8(8) for restoration of property during trial is maintainable only if the claimant satisfies the essential conditions under Rule 2(b) and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 - This includes acting in good faith, not being involved in money laundering, and suffering a quantifiable loss. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 258

Preventive Detention

Preventive Detention – National Security Act, 1980 – Consideration of Detenu's Representation - A detenu's representation against a preventive detention order must be considered by the concerned Government at the earliest point of time. Belated consideration of the representation vitiates both the detention order and its approval. The Supreme Court set aside the detention order passed under the National Security Act, 1980, holding that the State Government's failure to consider the detenu's representation at the earliest opportunity rendered the detention illegal. The Court emphasized that the detaining authority is duty-bound to forward the representation to the State Government immediately, and any delay in its consideration amounts to a violation of the fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Preventive Detention — Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 — Section 3 — Bootlegger — Maintenance of Public Order vs. Law and Order — Non-application of Mind — Failure to invoke ordinary laws of the land - Held: The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the activities of the appellant were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" had no real basis - A bald and stereotypical averment that the appellant's activities are prejudicial to public order is legally insufficient - To invoke the stringent powers of preventive detention, there must be cogent material on record to demonstrate that the alleged activities disrupted public order, rather than just affecting 'law and order' - In the present case, despite five registered cases under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, the Investigating Agency made no effort to arrest the appellant under ordinary criminal law, even though the offences are cognizable - Where a person can be effectively dealt with under the ordinary laws of the land, the invocation of preventive detention laws is unwarranted in the absence of cogent material showing a distinct breach of public order - the preventive detention order cannot be sustained and is quashed. [Relied on Arjun v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3718; T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990) 2 SCC 456; Paras 12 - 14] Vidyawant v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 510

Preventive Detention – Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986 – Section 2(a), 2(f) and 3 – Detention of "Drug Offender" – Law and Order vs. Public Order - Subjective Satisfaction and Extraneous Factors - Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority manifested an intention to detain the detenu "at any cost" - held that preventive detention should not be used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to resist bail – Held that if the detenu violated bail conditions, the appropriate remedy was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law, which the State failed to do - Resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure is unsustainable – Held that mere registration of three criminal cases involving "Ganja" does not automatically impact "public order" unless there is specific material showing the activities caused harm, danger, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public - The detention order failed to indicate how the detenu's acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as opposed to mere "law and order" - Law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed - Liberty cannot be jeopardized unless the case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute – Held that simply declaring the detenu a 'habitual drug offender' was not sufficient for preventive detention unless shown how detenu's actions specifically threatened public order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others 2023 INSC 788; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14; Paras 8-10] Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2026 INSC 41 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 161

Primacy of Statutory Rules over Executive Orders - Supreme Court addressed a conflict between the NDCT Rules, 2019 and a DHR Order dated March 3, 2024, which attempted to remove the Department of Health Research (DHR) from its regulatory role in stem cell research - held that executive instructions cannot supplant or whittle down the effect of statutory rules - Clause 2(vi) of the March 3, 2024 order was declared non est to the extent of its conflict with Rules 17 and 18 of the NDCT Rules - The administration, promotion, or advertisement of stem cell therapy for ASD outside an approved clinical trial setting is categorized as "professional misconduct" under Regulation 7.22 of the IMC (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 - Errant clinics are liable for cancellation of registration and penalties under the Clinical Establishments Act, 2010 - Held that stem cell therapies for ASD cannot be offered as a commercial service and must be restricted to clinical trial settings - To protect patients currently undergoing treatment, the Secretary, MoHFW is directed to consult with AIIMS and the NMC to provide a solution for re-routing these patients to institutions conducting legitimate clinical trials, with a compliance report due within four weeks. [Relied on State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150; Paras 136-138, 151, 123, 145-151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Prison Reforms

Prison Reforms – Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) – Overcrowding – Constitutional Rights of Prisoners – Gender Discrimination – Cost-Effectiveness – Supreme Court issues comprehensive directions for the assessment, establishment, and expansion of Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) and open/semi-open barracks across all States and Union Territories to address chronic prison overcrowding (occupancy rate of 120.8% nationally) and facilitate the reformative objective of punishment. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Privity of Contract

Privity of Contract – Notice to Insurer – Essentiality - Since the insurance company was neither made a party to the agreement between the appellant and the insured, nor was a copy of the agreement supplied to it, the insurer cannot be called upon to make good the loss suffered by the appellant - A letter of subrogation issued unilaterally by the financier without the execution/participation of the insured person is legally invalid – held that the principle in Sundaram Finance Ltd. regarding ownership under a hire-purchase agreement can only be applied when the precise nature of the executed agreement is clear. In the present case, the nature of the agreement/endorsement (whether it was a "Hire-purchase", "Hypothecation", or "Lease") was not clearly specified. [Para 10, 11, 12] K. Prakashchand v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 634

Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988

Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Section 27 and Section 45 – Civil Confiscation vs. Criminal Prosecution – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Double Jeopardy – Adjudication and confiscation under Chapter IV of the Benami Act are civil actions directed against the property itself to remedy a statutory violation, whereas personal criminal prosecution is governed by Chapter VII - Confiscation is a civil consequence tested on the principle of preponderance of probabilities and does not amount to prosecution or criminal punishment - Simultaneous or successive initiation of both civil confiscation and criminal prosecution does not attract the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Once a competent judicial determination declaring a transaction to be benami attains finality in a civil suit, the property is liable to absolute confiscation by the Central Government, and it is unnecessary to relegate the matter to the statutory Adjudicating Authority under the Act. Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465

Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 2(9), 3, 4, 5, and 27 – Benami Transaction – Retrospective Operation of 2016 Amendment – Fiduciary Capacity Exemption – Employer-Employee Relationship– The amendments introduced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, being declaratory, procedural, curative, and machinery-oriented, operate retrospectively and can be invoked in respect of past benami transactions - To determine whether a transaction is benami, the substance must prevail over form, and the Court must look at the real nature of the transaction beneath any camouflage - The expression "fiduciary capacity" under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) must receive a restricted construction and covers explicitly enumerated classes (trustee, executor, partner, director, etc.) or categories notified by the Central Government - An ordinary employer-employee relationship or a commercial arrangement supported by reciprocal financial consideration does not constitute a fiduciary relationship - Where a plaintiff provides the consideration to purchase agricultural lands in the name of an employee/name-lender to circumvent statutory restrictions under the land reforms law, the arrangement squarely falls within the mischief of a prohibited benami transaction. [Paras 18 – 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification – Held: Since the Appellants were extended the benefit under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, they shall not incur any disqualification affecting their service careers arising out of the conviction - Held: While Section 360 CrPC and the 1958 Act share a common reformative thread, their frameworks differ - Section 360 CrPC creates eligibility distinctions based on age and gender, whereas Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act extend benefits universally, focusing on the nature of the offence and the character of the offender - Held: The 1958 Act is a beneficial legislation intended to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders into society - Its provisions must be interpreted in a purposive manner, and where two views are possible, the interpretation must favor the beneficiaries. [Relied on Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (1981) 1 SCC 447; Paras 28 - 45] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Sections 3 and 4 – Applicability where sentence is fine only – Held - The benefit of Section 4 of the 1958 Act is available to an offender who has been sentenced only to payment of fine - The expression 'release' in Section 4 cannot mean release only from custody; it must be read as releasing the offender from the obligation to serve the sentence, including the payment of fine - Any reference to 'punishment' in the 1958 Act must be construed as per Section 53 IPC and Section 4 BNS, which undoubtedly include 'fine'. [Paras 24, 25, 26] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Effect of Probation on Conviction and Departmental Action – The Supreme Court reiterated that the release of an offender on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction - The conviction of the accused or the finding of the court that he is guilty remains untouched, as it is the sine qua non for an order of release on probation – Held that in a case where a workman obtained employment as a Helper by using his brother's educational certificates and impersonating him, Supreme Court held that such misconduct justifies departmental action - that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not preclude a department from taking action for misconduct leading to an offence or conviction – Noted that Section 12 only removes "disqualifications" provided by other laws (e.g., for holding office or seeking elections) but does not sweep away the factum of guilt or the misconduct resulting in conviction - a person dismissed from service due to conviction is not entitled to reinstatement merely because they were granted the benefit of probation - While the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's observation that conviction alone is not a ground for removal, it declined to interfere with the modified punishment of "compulsory retirement" in this specific instance, noting that the respondent-workman had since passed away and the appellant did not wish to unsettle benefits accrued to the family. [Relied on Union of India Vs. Bakshi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 426; Paras 9-13] Superintending Engineer v. Labour Court Madurai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 78

Procedural Fairness

Procedural Fairness – Right to Cross-Examination – Supreme Court noted that the finding of professional misconduct was based merely on "bald allegations" in the complaint without the complainant being examined on oath or the appellant-advocate being afforded the right of cross-examination – Held that such findings are legally unsustainable when the substratum of the complaint has ceased to exist due to an amicable settlement between the parties. [Paras 7- 10] Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94

Property Law

Property Law — Physical Possession vs. Underlying Title — Relief of Injunction Physical possession, such as cultivating crops, does not automatically equate to a valid underlying title of a land. Suit or relief of a permanent injunction cannot be treated under a superficial view if the underlying title itself is inherently defective or void. (See: Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, (1998) 2 SCC 642; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, (2024) 13 SCC 455; Rangammal v. Kuppuswami, (2011) 12 SCC 220; Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242) A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Property Law – Co-ownership and Definition of Landlord - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 3 & 8 – Share certificates of land – Interest in land includes things attached to the earth, such as walls or buildings – Holders of share certificates of the land are co-owners of the building built thereon – Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Section 5(3) – Definition of 'Landlord' – A co-owner of the building who is entitled to receive rent or receives rent on behalf of another falls squarely within the statutory definition of a 'landlord' and possesses the locus to maintain an eviction petition. [Paras 42-46] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Property Law / Land Revenue Records – Evidentiary value of mutation entries regarding possession – Held, while mutation entries alone do not create or transfer ownership rights, when such revenue records continue for many years, are supported by registered sale transactions, and remain unchallenged for a long period (a decade in the present case), they become relevant factors while considering possession and the conduct of the parties. [Paras 45 - 53] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529

Property Law — Declaration of Title — Adverse Possession — A claim for perfection of title by adverse possession cannot be sustained against the State/Union regardless of the duration of possession if the claimant fails to prove the specific point of time and basis upon which their predecessors entered possession - a decree obtained in an earlier suit where the true owner (Union of India) was not impleaded is non-est and not binding upon the Union – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148; State of Karnataka v. K.C. Subramanya, (2014) 13 SCC 468; Paras 7- 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Public Auction

Public Auction – Duty of Disclosure – Failure to disclose pending litigation – Refund with Interest – The Supreme Court set aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had dismissed a writ petition filed by an auction purchaser - The appellant had purchased property in an open auction conducted by The Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, but the Trust failed to disclose that the property was subject to a pending lawsuit - Held, it is the legal duty of authorities (such as banks, recovery officers, or state bodies) conducting public auctions to disclose all known encumbrances and litigation in the auction notice - Suppressing such material facts invalidates the sale and renders the auction fraudulent or vitiated by material irregularity - Public auctions must ensure fairness, objectivity, and be free from suspicion or bias - emphasized that restitution is a "moral imperative" and an inherent jurisdiction of every court to prevent unjust enrichment - An innocent auction purchaser who acts in good faith and pays hard-earned money should be restored to their original position if the auction lacks legitimacy - directed the Trust to refund the deposit of Rs.1,57,04,580/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit (19.07.2021) within six weeks – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority vs. Corporation Bank & Ors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 953; Paras 9 – 13] Viney Kumar Sharma v. Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Public Employment

Public Employment – Selection Process – Rescheduling of Physical Endurance and Measurement Test (PE&MT) – Effect of Non-Appearance due to Illness - The Supreme Court set aside the directions of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and the Delhi High Court which had allowed a candidate to reappear for the PE&MT with a subsequent batch - held that when an advertisement explicitly stipulates that the schedule for selection tests is final and cannot be altered under any circumstances, candidates do not have an enforceable right to seek rescheduling based on minor ailments like cold, cough, or fever. Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314

Backward Community Status – Exercise of Discretion – Level Playing Field - Supreme Court clarified that belonging to a backward community cannot be a decisive factor in tilting the scales of justice in matters of public employment selection - Adjudicatory bodies (Tribunals and High Courts) must operate within well-defined boundaries of discretion and should not allow "grace, charity or compassion" to interfere with maintaining a fair level playing field – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-11] Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314

Public Employment — Doctrine of Estoppel/Acquiescence — Unemployed Candidate accepting Contractual Appointment under Economic Compulsion — The choices for the unemployed are few - Joining a post on a contractual basis and working for a considerable period does not estop the employee from challenging the patent illegality or arbitrariness in the selection procedure, nor does it wipe out the violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (Paras 6, 10 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Public Employment — Regularisation of Para-Teachers / Contractual Employees — Scheme-based appointments vs. Cadre posts — Para-teachers engaged on a contractual basis under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan ("SSA") sought blanket regularisation as permanent Assistant Teachers/Sahayak Acharyas bypassing the statutory recruitment rules — Held that a prayer for regularisation from a scheme post to a State cadre post changes the character of the appointment - A scheme post under the SSA is jointly funded and continues until the scheme ceases, whereas a cadre post is governed by Article 309 of the Constitution of India creating public employment via constitutionally aligned recruitment processes - A direct leap from one to the other, bypassing statutory rules, creates an unsanctioned mode of recruitment which is prohibited - Para-teachers have a right to participation and consideration under the statutory rules, but do not possess an absolute right to blanket regularisation. [Paras 19 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93

Public Services and Recruitment

Public Services and Recruitment – Disclosure of Marks for Candidates Outside Zone of Consideration - The TNPSC challenged the direction to individual candidates to reveal the marks of those who failed to fall within the zone of consideration – Held that where a recruitment process has been heavily gridlocked in litigation for over five years, it is in the interest of justice and public interest to disclose individual marks to provide transparency and bring closure to the dispute, provided that the candidates are not granted copies of their physical answer sheets. [Relied on Joint Directors and Central Public Information Officer and Another v. T.R. Rajesh, 2018 INSC 179; Paras 20- 22] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645

Public Services and Recruitment – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – noted that the TNPSC contested the eligibility of candidates claiming the PSTM quota based on certificates issued by the Heads of their respective educational institutions, arguing for independent verification through the Directorate of Technical Education - Held: A certificate issued by the Head of the Institution certifying that the candidate pursued their education/diploma course in the Tamil medium is sufficient to act upon, especially when the recruitment notification did not prescribe any additional criteria or require a verification letter from the Directorate of Technical Education. [Paras 19-21] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645

Public Services and Recruitment – Selection Process – Experience Criteria – Retrospective Renewal of Workshop Approvals – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – Disclosure of Marks – Broad-based Level Playing Field - Workshop Experience Criteria & Retrospective Approval - Recruitment to 113 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector-Grade II by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC) pursuant to a 2018 notification became heavily mired in litigation - The Division Bench of the Madras High Court directed a fresh recruitment exercise after verifying candidate experience in petrol and diesel fitted engines, and instructed the State to take a decision on granting retrospective renewals to the respective workshops where candidates gained experience – Held that the High Court's directions were cogent and legally sound - Due to the lack of a uniform policy regarding retrospective workshop approval, decisions left to the sole discretion of the Director were arbitrary - Candidates who gained experience at workshops acting on behalf of the Government, or whose renewal applications were pending, cannot be penalized for administrative delays beyond their control - Directing a conscious decision on retrospective renewal ensures a level playing field, bringing more meritorious candidates into a larger selection pool, which aligns with public interest - No vested right to appointment is created merely by inclusion in a previously revised selection list when the right to participate in the fresh process is preserved. [Paras 15, 16, 17] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645

Quantum Of Maintenance

Quantum Of Maintenance – Factors To Be Considered – While Fixing the quantum, courts must consider the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children, the husband's actual income, and his liabilities - The financial position of the wife's parents is immaterial - The fact that a wife is educated or capable of earning is not a sufficient ground to deny or reduce maintenance if her independent income is insufficient to maintain the lifestyle of the matrimonial home – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and others (2015) 6 SCC 353; Rajnesh v. Neha and another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain (2017) 15 SCC 801; Shailji v. Khobbanna (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712; Paras 10-15] Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Right of Appeal

Right of Appeal — Nature of Remedy — Fair Procedure — Externment Orders — Civil and Criminal Consequences — Held: A right of appeal is a substantive right and an integral component of fair procedure, particularly where the impugned orders (such as externment) entail serious civil and criminal consequences affecting the liberty, movement, livelihood, and reputation of a person - In the absence of an express legislative command to the contrary, an interpretation that preserves the appellate remedy and advances substantial justice must be preferred over a technicality that defeats it. [Relied on Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 13; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791; Paras 20-27] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669

Right to Information Act, 2005

Right to Information Act, 2005 — Section 24(4) — Exclusion of Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) from RTI Purview — Validity of Notification — SPE Not an "Intelligence and Security Organisation – The Supreme Court held that the Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) cannot be classified as an "intelligence and security organisation" within the meaning of Section 24(4) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 - the State Government's Notification dated August 25, 2011, to the extent that it sought to completely exclude the SPE from the application of the RTI Act, is excessive, does not conform to the parent statute, and is bad in law - The sphere of operation of the SPE under the MP Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 is strictly confined to investigating specified offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code (Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII) - It serves as an investigative arm to assist the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt under Section 7 of the MP Lokayukt Evam Up-Lokayukt Adhiniyam, 1981, which only deals with complaints of corruption, misconduct, or malfeasance against public servants. Neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE is conferred with any jurisdiction or mandate relating to internal security or state/national intelligence - the principle of institutional parity with central intelligence or security organisations listed in the Second Schedule of the RTI Act does not apply. [Paras 13-22] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644

Railway

Railway - Passengers purchasing railway tickets over the counter cannot be denied the benefit of travel insurance when the same facility is available to those booking tickets online. Union of India v. Radha Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Real Estate

Real Estate and Statutory Compliances – Occupancy Certificate (OC) – A developer cannot compel a purchaser to accept possession without a valid Occupancy Certificate - Obtaining an OC is a statutory pre-condition integral to the lawful delivery of possession - Failure to obtain the same constitutes a deficiency in service. [Paras 25 - 29] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Real Estate - Subsequent Purchasers – Right to Compensation – A subsequent purchaser is entitled to seek the same relief as the original allottee - The right to claim compensation for deficiency in service travels with the allotment and cannot be denied merely because the party stepped into the shoes of the original allottee at a later stage – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725; IREO Grace Realtech Private Limited v. Abhishek Khanna (2021) 3 SCC 241; Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 71; Samruddhi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd. (2022) 4 SCC 103; Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority 2024 INSC 667; Para 18-22] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 – Auction Sale – Finality of Sale vs. Adequacy of Valuation – Limited Remand – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to remit the matter to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for the limited purpose of reconsidering the valuation of properties, even after the auction sale was confirmed - While the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser deserve protection, this protection is not absolute - If credible issues regarding the adequacy of valuation or the fairness of the reserve price fixation arise, the court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the recovery process realized the maximum possible value for the secured asset. Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237 : AIR 2026 SC 1460

Recovery Proceedings

Recovery Proceedings – Objective of Auction – The primary goal of an auction is to obtain the most remunerative price for a property through competitive bidding, ensuring transparency and fairness - A process that compromises competitive bidding increases the risk of underbidding or inadequate pricing - The principle of finality in judicial sales does not shield the process from examination regarding valuation or reserve price fixation - Recovery processes must be fair, transparent, and based on proper value assessments to balance the interests of both creditors and borrowers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Rajiv Kumar Jindal v. BCI Staff Welfare Association (2023) 238 Comp Cas 227: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 507; Paras 15-19] Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237

Recruitment and Selection

Recruitment Process – Judicial Interference – Rejection of Online Applications – Held: In large-scale public recruitment where applications are processed via software, errors in application or supporting documents inevitably lead to rejection - Courts should not ordinarily entertain challenges to such rejections as they risk stalling the recruitment process for thousands of aspirants. [Relied on UPSC v. Gaurav Singh & Ors. (2024) 2 SCC 605; Divya v. Union of India and Others (2024) 1 SCC 448; Paras 20-28] Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351: AIR 2026 SC 1860

Equitable Consideration - Right to Appointment - Relief based on equitable considerations cannot be claimed as a matter of right to protect an inherently illegal selection that breaches essential threshold qualifications - Where a required minimum qualification (such as a specialized work experience external to the post) remains unfulfilled at the threshold, subsequent continuation in service or regularization under interim protections cannot substitute or cure the initial defect in eligibility - Participation in a selection process or fulfilment of eligibility conditions does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Where the selection process itself stands vitiated due to non-scrutiny of essential qualifications at the threshold, the appropriate course for the Court is to set aside the selection rather than substituting one illegality with another by directing the positive appointment of an unsuccessful or waitlisted candidate. [Relied on On substitution of qualifications: Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 404; Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v. University of Rajasthan and Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 168; am Sarup v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1979) 1 SCC 168; Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 328; Paras 23-54] Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391

Essential vs. Preferential Qualification - Power to Relax & Exercise of discretion - A candidate who does not possess the prescribed minimum essential qualification cannot be treated as eligible merely on the strength of holding a higher academic degree or achieving a higher merit position - Preferential qualifications operate only within the zone of eligible candidates and cannot supplant, override, or dilute the primary requirement of essential eligibility - The existence of a statutory power of relaxation under Recruitment and Promotion (R&P) Rules does not imply it can be presumed or automatically applied - Any departure from prescribed eligibility criteria requires a structured, conscious, and reasoned exercise of discretion, which must be demonstratingly recorded in writing by the recruiting agency - In a public selection process, transparency and adherence to declared criteria are paramount. Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391

Moulding of Relief — Elimination of Ad-hocism & Timely Recruitment — Though blanket regularisation was denied, the State of Jharkhand had earmarked a 50% horizontal quota for para-teachers in its 2012 and 2022 Recruitment Rules —Held: The State cannot resist the prayer for regularisation while simultaneously failing to give effect to its own statutory mechanism for absorbing para-teachers. To ensure security of employment and eliminate perpetual ad-hocism, the Court molded the relief by issuing a strict time-bound calendar (Immediate and Annual Recurring Schedules) directing the State to notify and fill the 50% earmarked vacancies exclusively from eligible para-teachers every academic year. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148; Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Union of India v. Ilmo Devi, (2021) 20 SCC 290; Paras 23, 24] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Interpretation of Rules and Advertisements — Principles of Eligibility — When the language of a recruitment advertisement admits of only one clear and unambiguous interpretation requiring the "possession" of a degree, considerations of enlarging the candidate pool or promoting competition cannot be invoked to adopt an alternative interpretation - Accepting a contention that qualifications can be acquired at any stage prior to the interview introduces uncertainty into the selection process and imposes an unwarranted administrative burden on the selecting authority. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444

Recruitment and Selection — Migration from Reserved to General Category — Teachers Recruitment — The principal issue is whether candidates belonging to reserved categories, who have availed relaxation in a qualifying examination (TET) to become eligible for the main selection process (TAIT), are entitled to migrate to the open/unreserved category on the basis of merit secured in the main examination - Held - The requirement of obtaining 60% marks in the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) is not an essential eligibility condition, as the NCTE guidelines permit the appropriate Government to grant relaxation to reserved category candidates - Relaxation in qualifying marks for an eligibility test merely creates a "level playing field" and does not amount to a concession in the actual selection process - If a reserved category candidate secures higher marks in the final merit list (TAIT) than the last selected candidate in the general category, they are entitled to be adjusted against the general category - The High Court's view that such candidates are ineligible for the open category is erroneous. [Relied on Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119; Vikas Sankhala & Ors. v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 350; Paras 22-32] Chaya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : 2026 INSC 277

Re-evaluation

Re-evaluation of Answer Sheets – Absence of Statutory Provision – Held: The High Court rightly restated the settled legal position that re-evaluation of an answer sheet is impermissible unless the governing rules, regulations, or policy expressly provide for it – Held that if an answer key has been vetted by the High Court on the administrative side, any judicial challenge to its correctness should ideally be referred back to an administrative committee or a committee of subject experts (including eminent law professors and language experts) for reassessment – Supreme Court should not take the responsibility of determining the correctness of specific answers itself - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions to award marks for specific questions and delete others - The matters were referred to an administrative committee of the High Court to re-examine the disputed questions (Nos. 8, 74, and 96) and provide an opinion to the Public Service Commission. [Paras 7-9] Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Rent Control and Eviction

Evidence – Partnership and Reconstitution – Mere production of rent receipts in the name of the original firm does not prove continuity of tenancy if the original tenant has retired and divested himself of legal control - Failure to produce an original partnership deed or registered reconstitution deed leads to an adverse inference against the tenant's claim of a bona fide partnership. [Relied on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78; Jagan Nath (D) through LRs v. Chander Bhan and another (1988) 3 SCC 57; Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam (2004) 4 SCC 794; Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others (1993) 1 SCC 499; Paras 12 - 14] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348

Rent Act, 1999 (Karnataka) – Section 27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) – Unlawful Sub-letting – Proof through Partnership Device – Sub-letting requires the parting of legal possession and exclusive right to enjoy the property - While a tenant may induct partners into a business, if the "partnership" is a cloak to conceal the divestment of the original tenant's control and legal possession, it constitutes unlawful sub-letting - The initial burden lies on the landlord to show a third party is in exclusive possession and the original tenant is absent - Once a prima facie case of exclusive possession by a stranger is established, a presumption of sub-letting arises, and the onus shifts to the tenant to prove the occupation is lawful. [Paras 13- 14] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348

Rent Act, 1999 (Karnataka) – Section 46 – Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that the High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal or undertake a fresh evaluation of evidence under the guise of examining "legality, correctness, or propriety" - Revisional power is supervisory and qualitatively distinct from appellate jurisdiction - Interference with findings of fact is permissible only if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from manifest illegality. [Para 12] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348

Rent Control Act, 1958 (Delhi) — Section 3 & Section 14(1)(a) — Government Grants Act, 1895 — Sections 2 & 3 — Non-applicability of Rent Control Law to Government Grants - The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act), being a legislation intended to regulate conventional tenancies arising under the general law, does not extend to nor govern a holding originating in and regulated by a Government grant - A grant made under the Government Grants Act, 1895 (GG Act) constitutes a legal relationship whose incidents and enforceability are governed exclusively by the tenor of the grant and the statutory protection inhering therein - Its legal character does not derive its content from ordinary landlord-tenant relationships under general law, but instead flows from the sovereign grant and the conditions embodied therein - eviction proceedings instituted against the Union of India under Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act for premises occupied under a perpetual lease deed originating from a Government grant are vitiated at their inception for want of jurisdiction. [Paras 45-55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406

Rent Control and Eviction — Bonafide Requirement — Subsequent Events — Death of Landlord — Held: The proposition that on the death of the original landlord, the bonafide need comes to an end and the legal heirs cannot seek eviction on the basis of their need, cannot have a blanket application - It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. While rights are generally adjudicated as they existed at the commencement of the lis, courts are not precluded from taking cautious cognisance of subsequent developments to mould relief in accordance with law and current realities. [Para 17] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Crucial Date for Adjudication — The bonafide requirement of a landlord must generally be assessed as of the date the eviction petition was filed - Subsequent events intervening during protracted litigation only overshadow the genuineness of the requirement if they are of such nature and dimension as to "completely eclipse" the need and cause it to lose significance altogether - The High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not examining whether the alleged subsequent event—the letting out of another room materially changed the ground of relief in light of the entire evidence on record - In the interest of justice, the proceedings were remanded to the Trial Court (Small Causes Court, Mumbai) for fresh adjudication - The parties were granted liberty to amend pleadings and lead further evidence to address the impact of subsequent events occurring during the pendency of the litigation. [Relied on Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh [2002 INSC 533]; Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [(2004) 8 SCC 490]; Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2 SCC 604]; Paras 6-10] Maria Martins v. Noel Zuzarte, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2026 INSC 376

Rent Control and Eviction – Bona Fide Requirement and Comparative Hardship - Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Sections 13(1)(g), 13(1)(l), and 13(2) – Eviction suit filed by co-landlord – Landlord-tenant relationship – Acquisition of alternate accommodation by tenants – Temporary co-occupation of another portion of the building by the co-landlord during the pendency of the suit due to the death of a parent does not negate her bona fide need – Tenant cannot dictate to the landlord the suitability of the tenanted premises or insist on utilizing some other property – In assessing comparative hardship, the acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenants shifts the balance in favor of the landlord – Selling alternative accommodation during the pendency of a suit to avoid eviction reflects a conduct that tilts relative hardship against the tenant. [Paras 51-53, 56 - 60] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021 (UP); Section 38(2) - Jurisdiction of Rent Authority - Judicial Discipline - The Supreme Court censured the Rent Authority for entertaining a restoration application and staying eviction after the Supreme Court had already dismissed the tenant's Special Leave Petition and Review Petition with a direction to vacate - Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 38(2), the Rent Authority's jurisdiction is limited to tenancy agreements and does not extend to questions of title or ownership. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299

Registered Documents

Registered Sale Deed – Presumption of Validity and Genuineness – Minor discrepancies in Attestation – A registered sale deed carries a formidable presumption of validity, sanctity, and genuineness which cannot be lightly brushed aside on conjectures or insignificant peripheral variations - The heavy burden to dislodge this presumption rests on the challenger to prove fraud, coercion, or fundamental illegality - Unlike wills or gifts, attestation is not a statutory requirement for the execution or legal validity of a sale deed - minor variations in the description or residential details of an attesting witness, recorded decades after execution, cannot be treated as material contradictions striking at the root of the transaction or dislodging the statutory presumption. [Relied on Hemalatha (D) by LRs vs. Tukaram (D) by LRs and Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 106; Jamila Begum (Dead) Through LRs. vs. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through LRs., (2019) 2 SCC 727; Rattan Singh vs. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300; Paras 51- 59] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652

Registered Documents – Presumption of Validity – Standard of Proof to Declare a Registered Sale Deed as "Sham" – A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is a solemn act imparting a high degree of sanctity to the document; therefore, courts must not lightly or casually declare it a "sham" - The burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger, requiring material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title. [Paras 31 - 33] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Representation of the People Act, 1951

Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Section 21(3) – Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Constitution of India – Articles 324, 325, 326 & 327 – Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Electoral Rolls – Power of the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct state-wide Special Intensive Revision – The expression "for any constituency or part of a constituency" in Section 21(3) of the RP Act includes "many" or "all" constituencies if state-wide reasons like rapid urbanization, migration, and duplication pollute the rolls - The non-obstante clause in Section 21(3) frees the Commission from the ordinary procedural limitations of Section 21(2), allowing it to shape the course of revision as it thinks fit, provided it records cogent reasons. [Paras 35 – 50] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Sections 16, 19 & 23(4) – Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 9(2) – Scrutiny of Citizenship for Electoral Eligibility – The ECI is empowered to undertake a limited, prima facie enquiry into the citizenship status of an individual to satisfy itself of the baseline eligibility condition under Section 16 of the RP Act - There is a distinction between an administrative satisfaction for electoral purposes and a formal adjudication of status under the Citizenship Act - ECI's decision does not amount to a final declaration of non-citizenship - In cases of doubt, the ECI must refer the individuals to the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955 for final adjudication within a reasonable timeframe - Aadhaar Card can be treated as a 12th identity document for registration under Section 23(4) of the RP Act but does not constitute proof of citizenship. [Paras 157-178] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Section 8A, Section 99, and Section 123 – Corrupt Practices – Power of Disqualification – Issue- Whether the High Court, while setting aside an election on the grounds of corrupt practices, has the jurisdiction to directly disqualify a candidate for a specific period? - Held: No, The power to pass an order of disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, rests solely with the President of India and not with the High Court – Held that - i. Statutory Procedure for Disqualification - Under Section 8A of the RP Act, 1951, once a person is found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under Section 99, the case must be submitted to the President of India for determination of whether the person shall be disqualified and for what period; ii. Role of the President and Election Commission - The President must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission before making a decision and is bound to act according to such opinion; iii. Excess of Jurisdiction - In the instant case, the High Court erred by directly disqualifying the appellant for six years in its operative order - By doing so, the High Court exercised powers and jurisdiction that are statutorily reserved for the President of India; iv. Operative Portion Set Aside - The Supreme Court set aside Clause 2 of the High Court's order which had disqualified the appellant for six years - noted that since the 2016-2021 term had already lapsed, the challenge to the setting aside of the election was no longer a "live issue". [Paras 7-12] K.M. Shaji v. M.V. Nikesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 107 : 2026 INSC 111

Reservation

Reservation – Purpose and Function of Roster/Register – Supreme Court clarified that a reservation roster or register is an administrative, post-based instrument maintained to record cadre composition and monitor representation over time - It is not a parallel selection mechanism used during the recruitment process to displace candidates who secure an unreserved place on their own merit – Noted that the roster defines the number of vacant posts for advertisement and ensures that the lawful quota for specific categories is not exceeded within the cadre. [Relied on Rajasthan High Court & Anr. v. Rajat Yadav & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 14112 of 2024); Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 4 SCC 542; Paras 27 – 34] Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Retrospective Application

Retrospective Application of Cess — Execution Proceedings: Noted that in the case of Prakash Atlanta (JV), the Court held that NHAI could not unilaterally deduct cess during execution proceedings for a contract that was terminated in 2008, based on a State notification issued in 2010 - Such a deduction was an "afterthought" and lacked contractual or statutory basis for retrospective application to a closed contract. [Paras 43, 54, 60] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Revision

Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Failure to Apply Judicial Mind — Held: The High Court "ignominiously" reduced the sentence without stating cogent reasons or considering that the Trial Court had already shown leniency by awarding only three years against a maximum of ten years under Section 307 IPC - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's sentence, directing the respondents to surrender within four weeks. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem Alias Chamaru and Another (2005) 5 SCC 554; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh (2019) 14 SCC 151; Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. & Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842; Hazara Singh vs. Raj Kumar and others (2013) 9 SCC 516; Paras 22-34] Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) read with U.P. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 – Rule 8 – Mandate of Neighbourhood Schools to Grant Admission - Once the State Government scrutinizes application forms, prepares an allocation list, and forwards it to a neighbourhood school, the school has no option but to grant immediate admission to the allocated student - Schools cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the State Government or delay admission under the guise of examining a student's eligibility - While a school may make a representation to the concerned authority regarding any disagreement, it cannot wait for the outcome of such representation and must admit the student in the interregnum to prevent delays in securing the child's fundamental right to education under Article 21A of the Constitution. [Paras 7 – 14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23 – Minimum Qualifications for Teachers – Clearing the Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) is not a mere procedural requirement but an essential component of the mandatory minimum eligibility criteria for any teacher appointment - Both new entrants and in-service teachers who do not possess the requisite NCTE qualifications must clear the TET within a time-bound manner as a pre-condition for regularization, continuation, or future promotion. [Relied on Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 INSC 1063; Paras 18-25] Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 6, 8, 9, 12, and Article 51A(k) of the Constitution – Positive Right to Elementary Education and Co-relative Duty Bearers - The identification of the right to elementary education as a positive right recognizes co-relative duties and identifies five distinct duty bearers responsible for its realization, reiterated the following: i. Appropriate Government: Obligated to establish and ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, with financial responsibilities shared between Central and State Governments (Sections 6, 7, and 8); ii. Local Authority: Obligated to ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, maintain records of children up to 14 years, and monitor admission, attendance, and completion of elementary education (Section 9); iii. Neighbourhood Schools: Obligated to provide free and compulsory education and admit children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups to the extent of at least 25% of the class strength (Section 12); iv. Parents/Guardians: Constitutionally recognized obligation to provide education opportunities to their child under Article 51A(k); v. Elementary School Teachers: Play the most crucial role in nation-building through the development of a student's mind and character. [Relied on Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2026 INSC 56); Paras 10-14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23(2) Provisos & Right to Quality Education — Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) is a mandatory eligibility requirement and a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21-A of the Constitution of India - The statutory framework of Section 23 does not operate retrospectively to invalidate past appointments; instead, it provides a prospective, time-bound mechanism for in-service teachers to secure the minimum qualifications necessary to maintain elementary education standards - The services of teachers cannot be protected at the cost of the educational future of children. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 29(2)(f) – Curriculum and Evaluation Procedure – Medium of Instruction in Mother Tongue: Section 29(2)(f) is a key provision aimed at securing the delivery of quality education in a real and substantive sense - It proceeds on the well-established pedagogical premise that instruction imparted in the child's mother tongue or regional language significantly enhances comprehension and learning outcomes - Imparting education in an unfamiliar language impedes understanding, risks impairing foundational development, and engenders a sense of alienation or apprehension, thereby defeating the purpose of elementary education. [Paras 17 - 39] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Five Duty Bearers – Supreme Court identified five core duty bearers responsible for the realization of the right to education: (i) the appropriate government, (ii) local authority, (iii) neighbourhood schools, (iv) parents/guardians, and (v) primary school teachers. [Para 6, 15] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Constitutional Mandate and Fraternity – The Supreme Court issued a slew of directions for the effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Noted that the 25% reservation in unaided neighbourhood schools is a deliberate constitutional strategy to operationalize equality of status and social integration - It seeks to concretize the principle of fraternity by creating shared institutional spaces where children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds can form solidaristic bonds and "lose suspect identities" based on caste or class. [Paras 7–10] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Implementation Hurdles – Digital Literacy and Transparency – Supreme Court noted significant barriers to accessing the 25% quota, including digital illiteracy regarding online application processes, language barriers, and a lack of information on seat availability - Noted that despite RTI information showing vacant seats, eligible children are often turned away due to procedural technicalities. [Paras 5-7] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 38 – Direction to Frame Rules –Finding that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the NCPCR are merely guidelines and lack the character of enforceable rules, Supreme Court directed "appropriate authorities" to prepare and issue necessary rules and regulations under Section 38 of the Act - Such subordinate legislation must prescribe the specific method and manner for admissions under Section 12(1)(c) to ensure the statutory policy does not remain a "dead letter." [Paras 15–16] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 7(5) and Rule 20(3) – The State Government has an "onerous duty" to provide funds for the Act's implementation - Under Rule 20(3), instructors must be paid at par with regular teachers having similar qualifications and experience - The State cannot deny payment citing the Central Government's failure to release its 60% share; the State must "pay and recover" the balance from the Union - Reaffirmed that the existence of an alternative remedy (under Section 24(3) of the Act) is a rule of "prudence and self-restraint," not an absolute bar - Since the matter was already adjudicated on merits by the High Court, relegating parties to an alternative forum would defeat the ends of justice - directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay an honorarium of ₹17,000/- per month to all instructors with effect from 2017-18. [Relied on Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 632; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107; Jaggo v. Union of India and Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3826; People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235; Paras 41-69] U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Sections 3 and 19 — Mandatory Norms and Standards — Held that "Free education" under Section 3 includes the removal of any financial or gender-specific barrier, such as the cost of sanitary napkins, that prevents a child from pursuing education - The provision of separate toilets and "barrier-free access" under Section 19 and the Schedule is a mandatory constitutional and statutory obligation that cannot be avoided by pleading a paucity of funds - Key Directions Issued by the Court: i. Toilets - Provision of functional, gender-segregated toilets with usable water and hand-washing facilities in all schools; ii. Menstrual Absorbents - Free distribution of oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins and the establishment of "MHM Corners" with spare uniforms and innerwear; iii. Disposal - Installation of safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant disposal mechanisms; iv. Awareness - Integration of gender-responsive curricula by NCERT/SCERT and sensitization of both male and female teachers; v. Monitoring - Periodic inspections by District Education Officers (DEO) including anonymous student feedback. [Relied on: Right to Education: Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666; Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P.(1993) 1 SCC 645; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39; Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 1; Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 641; Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1; Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1; State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty(2011) 3 SCC 436; Paras 159 – 172, 173-180] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Implementation and Monitoring Framework - Noting persistent gaps and minimal compliance by various States and Union Territories nearly eight years after the enactment of the 2016 Act, the Supreme Court directed a structured assessment of its implementation - Following the appointment of Nodal Officers across almost all States/UTs, the Supreme Court entrusted the National Law Universities (NLUs) under "Project Ability Empowerment" to undertake a substantive, detailed evaluation of compliance with statutory mandates, institutional mechanisms, and accessibility measures - National Law University, Delhi was specifically directed to map the extent of compliance achieved by the Union of India, with a mandate for a Joint Secretary-rank officer from the Department of Social Justice and Empowerment to coordinate. [Paras 12 - 16] Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2026 INSC 441

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Policy of "Own Merit" and Upward Movement of PwBD Candidates - The Supreme Court endorsed the policy framework of the Union of India (DoPT) regarding the adjustment and upward movement of Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD). A PwBD candidate selected on the basis of their own merit, without availing relaxed standards, must be adjusted against unreserved (UR) vacancies and not against the reserved quota - those who avail relaxed standards are to be adjusted against reserved vacancies - This principle applies to both direct recruitment and promotions (including seniority-cum-fitness and selection-based promotions) - Facilitative measures like the provision of a scribe or compensatory time do not constitute relaxed standards, whereas relaxations in cut-off marks, age, or number of attempts do - Disability itself shall not be treated as a relaxed standard in medical fitness tests for determining "own merit". [Paras 9, 10] Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2026 INSC 441

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) - Persons who are forcibly made to consume acid and those who suffer internal injuries due to acid attack, even without external disfigurement, are included within the definition of 'acid attack victims' under the RPwD Act. Shaheen Malik v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 646

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Appointment to Public Posts – Suitability of Posts for Mental Illness and Specific Learning Disabilities (SLD) – Change in Rule Position during Pendency of Litigation – The Supreme Court directed the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to accommodate candidates suffering from 'mental illness' and 'Specific Learning Disability' (SLD) in Group 'C' posts - Although the posts of 'Auditor' were initially identified as unsuitable for these specific benchmark disabilities in 2018, a subsequent Gazette Notification dated 04.01.2021 by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment expressly identified Group 'C' posts as suitable for such categories – Supreme Court directed the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) to forward the dossiers of the candidates within two weeks - It further ordered that if the posts advertised in 2018 are already filled, the respondents must create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates. [Paras 17-21] Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2026 INSC 232

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Intersectionality and Gender Justice – Supreme Court highlighted that disability-based discrimination is often intersectional, particularly for women, who face multiple axes of discrimination. Redressal of disadvantage must account for these intersecting identity markers to ensure substantive equality is not rendered unworkable by a "parochial understanding of discrimination." - Disability inclusion is a vital component of the "Social" dimension in the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) framework - Enterprises have an obligation to view disability rights from a non-discrimination angle and as a strategic advantage rather than just a compliance issue. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Section 2(y) and Section 2(s) – Concept of Reasonable Accommodation – Intersectionality of Disability and Gender – The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench order of the Calcutta High Court which had denied employment to a female candidate with 57% disability (visual impairment and partial hemiparesis) on the technical grounds of the recruitment panel having expired - held that "reasonable accommodation" is a fundamental "gateway right" rooted in Articles 14, 21, and 41 of the Constitution, essential for substantive equality - Technicalities such as the expiry of a recruitment panel cannot obstruct "complete justice" when the denial of employment was due to the employer's failure to recognize multiple disabilities and provide necessary adjustments. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Sections 2(r) and 33 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Arbitrary Ceiling on Disability – Validity of fixing a 60% maximum disability limit for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that upheld the denial of appointment to a candidate with 90% locomotor disability – Held that the RPwD Act, 2016 establishes a "floor" (minimum 40%) for benchmark disability but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary "ceiling" that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they can perform the functional requirements through reasonable accommodation - Key Principles – i. Arbitrariness of Disability Caps: Prescribing an upper limit of 60% disability for a legal professional role (ADA) has no rational nexus with the nature of duties, which primarily require mental alacrity and legal acumen; ii. Reasonable Accommodation: The State has a positive obligation to make necessary modifications to ensure persons with disabilities enjoy rights on an equal basis - A candidate's capability must be assessed on actual functional competence rather than an abstract medical percentage; iii. Statutory Misinterpretation: By fixing a maximum limit, the respondents essentially "rewrote" the statutory definition of "benchmark disability" to the detriment of the protected class – Directed Respondent No. 1 directed to issue an appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks and the State of Himachal Pradesh is directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant for unjust denial of appointment and prolonged litigation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C. (2021 5 SCC 370); Paras 22-40] Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2026 INSC 253

Rights of Persons with Disabilities – All India Bar Examination (AIBE) and Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) – Provision of Scribes – Eligibility Criteria for Scribes - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs to revisit and modify existing policies regarding the provision of scribes for specially-abled candidates - Supreme Court accepted the petitioners' suggestion that specially-abled candidates (specifically those with visual impairment) are entitled to scribe assistance, provided the scribe is an undergraduate not pursuing law or humanities – Noted that there is no bar on using a scribe who possesses qualifications higher than 10+2 schooling - Key Directives: i. Implementation: The Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs must implement and formally notify these modifications well before the next examination cycle; ii. Compliance: A compliance affidavit is required to be filed within two weeks. [Paras 2-4] Yash Dodani v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 150

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - Section 26(1) & Explanations 1 to 4 – Determination of Market Value – Applicability to National Highways Act, 1956 – The provisions of the 2013 LA Act relating to the determination of compensation are fully applicable to land acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 - The Arbitrator cannot determine the market value of an industrial land by placing reliance on a single sale deed relating to a small residential plot in an adjoining village - Under Section 26(1)(b) read with Explanations 1 and 2, the lands must be of a "similar type", and the methodology requires working out an "average sale price" from multiple deeds rather than relying on a singular transaction. [Paras 8 - 11] Project Director, National Highways Authority of India v. Alfa Remidis Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2026 INSC 480 : AIR 2026 SC 2415

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Statutory Interpretation - Interplay with Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 74 of the 2013 Act – i. The Supreme Court held that Section 74 of the 2013 Act, which provides for appeals to the High Court, does not "expressly exclude" the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Condonation of Delay) is applicable to appeals filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act; ii. Mandatory nature of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court emphasized that for a special law to oust the Limitation Act, the exclusion must be "clear, apparent and manifest." Mere prescription of a specific period of limitation in a special statute does not amount to an express exclusion of the 1963 Act; iii. Interpretation of Section 103 of the 2013 Act - Section 103, which states the Act is "in addition to and not in derogation of any other law," facilitates borrowing from the Limitation Act to ensure the 2013 Act functions as a complete code - Barring the application of the 1963 Act would render Section 103 redundant and otiose; iv. Nature of the Authority under the 2013 Act - The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority is treated as a "Civil Court" and its proceedings are "judicial proceedings" - An award passed by the Authority under Section 69 partakes the character of a "decree" and a "judgment" under the CPC - This reinforces the judicial nature of the appellate remedy under Section 74; iv. Land Acquisition Initiated under 1894 Act (Section 24(1)(a)) - In cases where proceedings began under the 1894 Act but no award was passed before January 1, 2014, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation apply - This includes the appellate mechanism under Section 74 of the 2013 Act - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, condoned the delays, and directed the High Courts to adjudicate the first appeals on their merits. [Relied on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129; H.S.I.I.D.C. Ltd. v. Deepak Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 51; Paras 59-85] Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 130 : 2026 INSC 138

Role of the Bar

Role of the Bar – Professional Ethics – Supreme Court emphasized that the Bar has an important role in ensuring litigation does not become endless - Counsel are expected to place the full procedural history with clarity and advise litigants against pursuing repetitive proceedings that seek to reopen concluded issues. [Relied on Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347; Paras 7-9] Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) — Ingredient of "in any place within public view" — Essentiality of public gaze — Sine qua non for constituting offences under the Act - To make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act of hurling caste-based abuses must take place at "a place within public view" or within the public gaze - Even if the incident happens at a private place, the public must have access to notice what is happening to satisfy this requirement - A residential house cannot be considered "a place within public view" when the incident occurs within its four walls and no independent member of the public is present to witness it. [Paras 5 – 9] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468

Quashing of Prosecution – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – Essential Ingredients - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal prosecution against the appellant, holding that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of an incident, without a specific overt act or intentional insult directed at the complainant's caste, does not satisfy the statutory requirements for an offense under the SC/ST Act – Noted following points – i. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) - To constitute an offense under this section, there must be an intentional insult or intimidation with the specific intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place within public view Noted that mere fact that a complainant belongs to a protected community is insufficient; the insult must be because of their caste identity - Even knowledge of the complainant's caste is not enough to attract this section without the intent to humiliate; ii. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(s) - This section requires the accused to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe "by the caste name" in public view - noted that the intent behind the abuse must be found to be denigrating toward the caste, resulting in a feeling of caste-based humiliation - Merely saying a caste name or simple abuse does not automatically constitute an offense; iii. Application to Facts - Held that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained allegations of the appellant uttering any specific words or performing overt acts - The allegations were deemed general in nature and failed to prima facie constitute an offense – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 224; Paras 11-20] Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 62

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 14-A – Nature of Appellate Jurisdiction – Held that an appeal under Section 14-A is a statutory first appeal on both facts and law – Noted that High Court does not function merely as a revisional or supervisory court but as a first appellate court obliged to independently evaluate the material on record - A mechanical affirmation of a Trial Court's order without independent scrutiny is inconsistent with settled appellate jurisprudence. [Paras 17, 18] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3 — Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 — Clause 3 — Effect of conversion to Christianity on Scheduled Caste status —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash criminal proceedings under the SC/ST Act initiated by a person who had converted to Christianity and was practicing as a Pastor - Held, that as per Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste - Since the appellant indubitably professed Christianity by performing pastoral duties for over a decade, his caste status as a member of the Madiga community stood "eclipsed in the eyes of law" upon conversion - once the foundational requirement of caste status is extinguished, the statutory protection under the SC/ST Act is no longer available. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Quashing of Charges – Requirement of Knowledge – The Supreme Court quashed charges under the SC/ST Act against the appellant, observing that "knowledge" of the victim's caste is an essential ingredient for attracting liability under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Held that where the FIR and Section 161 CrPC statements are silent on the use of casteist slurs or the specific identity of the victims as SC/ST members, the charge cannot stand - Allowing proceedings to continue without a prima facie disclosure of statutory ingredients amounts to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 36; Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 4 SCC 720; State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39; Paras 14, 15, and 19] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Statutory vs. Non-Statutory Benefits — Reliance on State Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 341) extending benefits to converts is misplaced regarding central statutory enactments - Held, that such executive orders only apply to "non-statutory concessions" like economic support schemes and cannot override the Presidential Order or apply to statutory benefits/protections under Central Acts like the SC/ST Act. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Securities Law

SARFAESI Act, 2002 – Rule 9(4) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Auction Sale – Delay in payment of balance 75% consideration – Right of Redemption – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside an auction sale where the balance 75% of the bid amount was deposited by the auction purchasers approximately 15 months after the auction - held that even if judicial interim orders restrained the "confirmation" of sale, such orders (specifically the High Court order dated 15.12.2020) did not prevent the secured creditor from accepting the balance consideration. E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303

SARFAESI Act, 2002 — Section 13 — Recovery of Dues and Dispossession — Default by Educational Institution — Complete disregard for the rule of law and wilful disobedience of court orders — Eviction and Closure of School - Petitioners/borrowers, running an educational institution (Chaitanya Public School & Junior College), defaulted on a loan of approximately ₹5.06 crore from the secured creditor - Despite multiple undertakings, promises, and paying schedules submitted before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the High Court, and the Supreme Court, the petitioners failed to clear their dues - they engaged in "strong-arm tactics" and trespassed onto the secured asset after possession was legally transferred to the secured creditor - They also failed to cooperate with the court-appointed Administrator - The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners showed an extreme lack of solicitude for the rule of law and aggravated the contempt already committed - Balancing the interest of the students who had completed their final examinations, Supreme Court ordered the permanent closure of the school - Granted liberty to the secured creditor to seek police assistance from the Superintendent of Police, Kolhapur, to obtain peaceful, vacant possession of the premises for an auction sale - The secured creditor was also directed to obtain a fresh valuation report from a Government valuer to fix the reserve price for the auction - Due to the ordered closure, the appointment of the Administrator was recalled - The Special Leave Petition was dismissed with a cost of ₹1 lakh imposed on the petitioners. [Paras 10 - 19] Chaitanya Bahuuddeshiya Shikshan Prasarak Mandal v. Auxilo Finserve Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 416 : 2026 INSC 408

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 - Rule 9(4) – Mandatory Timelines – Supreme Court emphasized that Rule 9(4) prescribes a mandatory outer limit of three months for the payment of the balance purchase price - A transaction proceeding in violation of this statutory timeline remains inchoate and cannot be used to irreversibly divest a borrower of their secured assets, especially when the delay is not attributable to the borrower. E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303

SEBI Circular dated 02.11.2001 – Client/Customer Level Position Limits – Mode of Calculation – Position limits under the 2001 SEBI Circular are applicable on the combined open positions across all derivative contracts on an underlying stock at an exchange - It is erroneous to calculate client-specific position limits or market concentration merely on the basis of a singular, specific one-month series (e.g., November futures series) instead of aggregating holdings across all series (including near-month, mid-month, and far-month futures along with options) of that underlying stock on the exchange. [Paragraphs 151 - 154] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585

SEBI Circular dated 02.11.2001 – Principle of "What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly" – Principal-Agent Relationship and Position Limits – A client cannot circumvent the prescribed individual client-level position limits by splitting trades and appointing multiple independent entities/agents to open separate accounts for its sole benefit - Since the 2001 SEBI Circular creates an implicit duty to disclose trades that cross mandated thresholds, executing such aggregate transactions through a non-disclosed principal-agent arrangement violates the circular's disclosure requirements. [Relied on Firm of Pratapchand Nopaji v. Firm of Kotrike Venkatta Shetty, (1975) 2 SCC 208 and Jagir Singh v. Rambir Singh, AIR 1979 SC 381; Paras 139 - 140] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585

Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 – Regulation 2(1)(c), 3 and 4 – Definition and Proof of 'Fraud' and 'Market Manipulation' – Inducing another person to deal in securities remains a strict requirement for establishing fraud under Regulation 2(1)(c) - Where the respondent authority is unable to show or prove direct inducement or injury to third parties, a higher burden of proof is cast upon it to cogently and sufficiently establish the factum of price manipulation. In such cases, the standard of proof required is a higher degree of the preponderance of probabilities - Motives and suspicions alone cannot form the sole basis for holding that there was fraudulent intent. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanhaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; SEBI v. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. (2018) 13 SCC 753; Paragraphs 175 - 207] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585

Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 – Regulations 3 and 4 – Hedging vs. Market Manipulation – Concentration of Open Interest – Concentration of positions or "cornering the market" by itself cannot be considered per se manipulation or a fraudulent device under the PFUTP Regulations if it is validly justified by the commercial consideration of hedging - Hedging includes anticipatory hedging to mitigate risk against potential price corrections - There is no legal mandate or policy requiring a perfect 1:1 ratio of hedges to stock quantity, nor was there any legal requirement in 2007 for a specific board resolution or a pre-existing written policy to execute equity derivatives hedges. [Relied on Pankaj Oil Mills v. CIT, 1976 SCC OnLine Guj 33; Paras 187 - 193] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585

Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 – Section 18A – Validity of Derivative Contracts Exceeding Position Limits – Section 18A of the SCRA nowhere mandates that a transgression of the client-level position limits specified by an Exchange or SEBI Circular will automatically have the effect of voiding or nullifying the underlying derivative contracts - Where the regulatory text prescribes explicit penalties (such as fines, suspension, or expulsion) but does not expressly mandate nullification as a consequence of a violation, courts cannot read a "void transaction" theory into the text by implication. [Paras 145 - 146] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 9(3), Rule 9(4), and Rule 9(5) — Mandatory Nature of Timelines for Payment of Auction Sale Consideration — Absence of Written Agreement for Extension of Time — Effect of Non-Compliance - Setting aside the auction sale, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Rule 9 of the SARFAESI Rules are not ornamental or directory, but are couched in mandatory terms that go to the root of the validity of the sale - Under Rule 9(4), the balance purchase price must be paid within fifteen days of the confirmation of the sale, or within such extended period as agreed upon in writing between the parties - Any deviation from this timeline, in the absolute absence of a demonstrably valid written agreement for an extension executed prior to the payment, constitutes a material irregularity that completely vitiates the auction process - The failure of the borrower or guarantor's legal heirs to liquidate outstanding dues cannot serve to validate or sanctify a sale process that is fundamentally infirm and non-compliant with the governing statutory rules. [Relied on Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, (2013) 10 SCC 83; IDBI Bank Ltd. v. Ramswaroop Daliya, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2878; Paras 25 – 42] M.R. Vasumathi v. Authorized Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : 2026 INSC 633

Securities Law – SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP) – Regulations 3 and 4 – Fraudulent Diversion of Funds – Ratification by Shareholders – Legality of Post-Facto Approval - Core Issue: Whether a company that raises funds through preferential allotment for specific disclosed objects can, after immediately diverting those funds for unauthorized purposes, legitimize the illegality through a subsequent shareholders' resolution – Supreme Court noted the following – i. PFUTP and Fraud: The definition of "fraud" under PFUTP Regulations is expansive and does not require a strict "deceit" element as per common law - Diversion of funds raised for a specific object to an undisclosed purpose constitutes a breach of Regulation 3 and Regulations 4(2)(f), (k), and (r); ii. Irregularity vs. Illegality: Supreme Court distinguished between an "irregularity," which can be regularized, and an "illegality," which cannot - An act that is "ultra vires" or violates statutory regulations impacting public interest and multiple stakeholders cannot be ratified even if all shareholders agree; iii. Public Interest Dimensions: SEBI Regulations have public law dimensions designed to protect the integrity of the market - A private resolution by shareholders cannot wipe off a crystallized liability or waive rights involving public policy; iv. Parallel Proceedings: Held, that the Whole Time Member (WTM) and the Adjudicating Officer (AO) operate in separate fields the former for protective measures/disgorgement and the latter for imposing penalties and both proceedings are maintainable on the same set of facts. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Brahmanandam (2008) 5 SCC 241; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; Paras 41-66] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Terrascope Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2026 INSC 245

Sentencing

Sentencing - Death Penalty - Directions - A. Trial Courts shall call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances once the accused is convicted and prior to sentencing. B. High Courts must call for such reports at the admission stage of death reference if not obtained by the trial court. C. Reports must be comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated time. Parties must be given an opportunity to peruse the reports and make submissions. High Courts may call for a fresh report if the one submitted is inadequate. D. In every death sentence confirmation reference, the concerned Legal Services Committee shall provide a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two Advocates with minimum 7 years' practice, irrespective of private counsel being engaged. E. Each High Court shall maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters. F. National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) shall frame guidelines for collection of mitigating circumstances, including socio-economic background, mental health, antecedents, and potential for reformation. Trained teams may be engaged for fieldwork. The Court expressed serious concern over the inadequate quality of legal representation and systemic failure in collecting mitigation evidence in death penalty cases, reiterating the principles laid down in Manoj & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC 35. The Supreme Court stayed the execution of the death sentence of the appellants and directed the State of Bihar to submit jail conduct reports, work performed, and psychological evaluation reports. This judgment aims to ensure a more structured, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing process in capital punishment cases. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424

Sentencing - Death Penalty - Reports on Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances - Mandatory Duty of Trial Courts - Duty of High Court - Constitutional Imperative - In all cases where the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, the trial court must, as a matter of course, call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances immediately after conviction and before pronouncing sentence. If the trial court fails to call for such reports, the High Court shall mandatorily call for them at the stage of admission of the death sentence reference. Failure to obtain such reports at the earliest stage undermines the sentencing process, deprives courts of crucial material necessary for a balanced and reformative approach, and leads to avoidable delays at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424

Sentence Modification — Substitution of Life Imprisonment with Period Already Undergone - While maintaining the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, the Supreme Court took into account that the incident dated back to 1984, the co-convicts had been granted state remission, and the appellant had served over 18 years of actual imprisonment - Modifying a life sentence to a fixed-term sentence or the period already undergone is permissible provided the sentence served exceeds 14 years - Sentence modified to the period already undergone, and immediate release directed. [Paras 45 - 62] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598

Sentencing Discretion – While the statutory minimum was six months, Supreme Court exercised its discretion to reduce the three-year rigorous imprisonment sentence to the period already undergone (approximately one year) - This decision was based on the advanced age of the surviving appellants, the fact that the incident occurred nearly four decades ago (1985), and the prolonged pendency of the proceedings – Appeals partly allowed. [Relied on K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721; Paras 20-22, 27-28] Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Sentencing – Mitigating Circumstances – Delay and Age – While sustaining the conviction, the Court modified the sentence due to the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age - The appellant was approximately 40 years old at the time of the offense (1990) and 75 years old at the time of the final judgment – Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the statutory minimums: 6 months for Section 7 and 1 year for Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. [Paras 15-25] Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Service Law

Artificial Breaks – Supreme Court observed that the breaks in service were "artificial in nature" as the Appellants were consistently re-engaged and continued to discharge their duties on the same posts. Such breaks do not reflect genuine abandonment of service. Long service cannot be disregarded by labeling initial employment as ad hoc and relying on artificial breaks - Supreme Court directed the regularization of the Appellants' services with effect from the date similarly situated persons were regularized under the 26.05.2003 policy - Appellants are entitled to continuity of service, increments, and retiral benefits, though actual financial benefits are restricted to the period from the date of the order/reporting for duty. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi and Others (2006) 4 SCC 1; Para 20-22] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Service Law - Conduct of Aspirants – Lack of Drive and Initiative - Supreme Court observed that the respondent's failure to physically report for the test on the scheduled date, despite being mobile on the previous day, demonstrated a "lack of drive and initiative" - For candidates aspiring to join the police force, such "tardy and lethargic conduct" is undesirable - Held that in competitive public employment, opportunities must be "grabbed with both hands". Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314

Service Law - Departmental Inquiries - Allegations of bias - Where an employee has previously levelled allegations of bias against the Disciplinary Authority, the said Authority must recuse herself/himself from conducting or concluding the disciplinary proceedings. The principle that “justice should not only be done but should also be seen to be done” must be strictly adhered to in departmental inquiries. National Bal Bhawan v. Khazan Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 363

Service Law — Disciplinary Enquiry — Principles of Natural Justice — Requirement of Oral Enquiry — Held that even if a case is based solely on documentary evidence, unless the relied-upon documents are admitted by the charged employee, a witness must be examined to prove those documents and be tendered for cross-examination - Unless the charged employee accepts guilt in clear terms, an enquiry must be held where the employer leads evidence first, followed by an opportunity for the delinquent to cross-examine witnesses and lead defense evidence - An evasive reply to a departmental charge-sheet does not amount to an admission of guilt; the burden to prove the charge remains with the employer - Failure to produce any witness when charges are denied vitiates the enquiry. [Relied on Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Limited & Another vs. Raghunath Singh Rana & Others (2016) 12 SCC 204; Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1963 SC 1914; State of Uttaranchal & Ors. v. Kharak Singh (2008) 8 SCC 236; Paras 13-18] Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2026 INSC 305

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Meaning of "Pending" – Effect of Show Cause Notice – Supreme Court observed that for a show-cause notice to trigger the "deemed pendency" of disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulations, it must clearly indicate an intention to institute disciplinary action - A mere request for an explanation regarding alleged irregularities, stating that "further course of action will be taken" in the absence of a reply, does not constitute the institution of disciplinary proceedings. [Paras 36, 37] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328

Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Natural Justice — Reasoned Order — Supreme Court emphasized that in cases where no regular inquiry is conducted and the delinquent is deprived of cross-examination, the show cause notice and the final order are critical safeguards - A "cryptic or mechanical" rejection of a detailed, non-frivolous defense violates principles of natural justice - Vague expressions like "morally convincing evidence" fall short of the required standard for recording findings in disciplinary proceedings. [Paras 31 - 33] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Quantum of Punishment – Principle of Parity – Higher Responsibility of Senior Officers – Doctrine of Accountability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had modified the punishment of 'dismissal from service' to 'compulsory retirement' on the ground of parity with co-delinquents - held that the respondent, holding the post of Senior Manager (MMGS-III Scale), cannot be equated with co-delinquents who were an officer and a gunman - Authority carries accountability; the higher the rank, the stricter the scrutiny and degree of responsibility - The differentiation in rank and the increased trust reposed by the employer in a Senior Manager constitutes a compelling ground for a more stringent punishment compared to subordinates involved in the same misconduct – Noted that Interference with the quantum of punishment is warranted only if the decision is strikingly disproportionate, irrational, or shocks the conscience of the Court - Noted that equating a branch manager with a gunman is in "outrageous defiance of logic and reason". [Relied on Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1983) 2 SCC 442; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611; Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 46; Paras 9-16] Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 322 : 2026 INSC 313

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings vs. Criminal Trial – Standard of Proof – Held: Even when proceedings stem from identical allegations, their nature, scope, and standards of proof are fundamentally different (preponderance of probabilities vs. proof beyond reasonable doubt) - An acquittal in a criminal case is not automatically determinative of departmental liability, and the pendency of a criminal trial remains a valid statutory bar to the release of gratuity under Rule 69(1)(c). [Relied on Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors. vs. Bishun Das (1967 [1] SCR 836); Paras 12-16] Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326

Service Law – Extraordinary Pension – Uttar Pradesh Civil Services (Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 1981 – Mandatory Sanction of the Governor – Writ of Mandamus – Substitution of Discretion – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to pay extraordinary pension to the widow of a doctor shot dead while on duty - held that under Rule 4 of the 1981 Rules, no award of extraordinary pension can be made except with the sanction of the Governor, which involves the exercise of administrative discretion. State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337

Service Law – Administrative Discretion – Judicial Review – Held that ordinarily, the Court will not exercise the power of statutory authorities or substitute its own decision for that of the authority conferred with discretionary powers - noted that since the Governor had no occasion to examine the request or exercise discretion under the Rules, the High Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus was unwarranted. [Relied on Union of India Vs. S.B.Vohra and Ors. (2004 INSC 5); Paras 10-16] State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337

Service Law – Inquiry / Departmental Inquiry – Power to order de novo / fresh inquiry – Rule 10 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 – The Disciplinary Authority ordered a de novo inquiry against a Judicial Officer after rejecting an inquiry report that found only one out of eight charges proved - The High Court upheld this decision - Quashing the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that the expression "further inquiry" as mentioned in Rule 10(1) of the Rules does not mean a fresh or a de novo inquiry, but only a further inquiry - If the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the Inquiry Authority's findings, Rule 10(2) mandates it to record reasons for disagreement and record its own findings if the evidence on record is sufficient - A notice directing a de novo inquiry is completely impermissible under the mandate of Rule 10. [Relied on Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs Dilip Patilal Patel (C.A. No. 29/2004); Paras 10 - 12] Chandni Prateek Sharma v. High Court of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 420

Service Law - Interpretation of Recruitment Notification – A clause stating that "in case of non-availability of qualified UR (PWD-LV) candidate, the vacancy will be filled by PWD candidates of other categories" does not bar more meritorious PWD candidates from social reserved categories from competing for the UR post in the first instance - Such clauses must be read in consonance with the constitutional principles of equality under Articles 14 and 16. [Relied on Saurav Yadav v. State of U.P. (2021) 4 SCC 542; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Deepa E.V. v. Union of India (2017) 12 SCC 680; Paras 28-47] West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330

Service Law – Non-Stigmatic Reversion – "Unsatisfactory" Performance - Stigmatic vs. Non-Stigmatic Orders – Reversion or termination based on Annual Assessment Reports (AARs) characterizing a performance as "unsatisfactory" or "below average" does not cast a stigma - To amount to a stigma, the language used in the order must explicitly impute something over and above mere unsuitability for the job - Highlighting an employee's unsuitability or unsatisfactory work is merely an unexceptional assessment of performance and is not ex facie stigmatic. [Relied on Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, [2021] 1 SCR 51; State of U.P. and Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal, [2004] 3 SCR 337; Paras 14-19] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Service Law - Pre-condition for Migration – Held that a reserved category candidate seeking appointment against an Unreserved vacancy must not have availed themselves of any relaxation in eligibility criteria (such as age or experience) meant specifically for the reserved category - Merit must be the sole decisive factor for Unreserved posts. West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330

Service Law — Quantum of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality and Equality — Imposing the harshest punishment (dismissal) on a subordinate for complying with a wrongful order, while the superior officer who issued the order receives a lenient penalty (severe displeasure), is arbitrary and violates the principle of equality - Following the principle that 100% back wages require an affidavit stating the employee was not re-employed, and in the absence of such material on record, the Court awarded 50% back wages from the date of illegal dismissal until superannuation. [Relied on Union of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu (2001) 5 SCC 593; Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520; Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 4 SCC 225; Paras 37 – 41] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366

Service Law – Recruitment – Basic Eligibility and Medical Fitness – Police Constable – Suppression of Material Facts / Suppressio Veri and Suggestio Falsi – Lack of eligibility goes to the root of the matter – An appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once the factum of ineligibility comes to light – A candidate claiming parity or applying for consideration of their case for appointment must clearly disclose and spell out all material factors, including medical fitness - The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the State Public Services Tribunal which had interfered with the termination of a Police Constable who suffered from a 'knock knee deformity' - The respondent's initial selection in 2005 was cancelled in 2007 after a Medical Board found him medically unfit due to knock knees - After a series of litigations arising out of en-masse cancellations of the recruitment drive, the respondent sought and obtained provisional reinstatement in 2013 by claiming parity with another candidate (Nitin Kumar Upadhyay), without disclosing his own medical unfitness - Supreme Court observed that the respondent was well aware that his appointment had previously been cancelled on the very ground of being medically unfit - Failing to disclose this to the appointing authority amounts to deliberate suppression (suppressio veri and suggestio falsi) because such disclosure would have disentitled him from even being considered for the post - Supreme Court rejected the technical argument that the departmental proceedings incorrectly cited 'colour blindness' instead of 'knock knees' - It held that a technical defect in the charges does not permit a person with one disqualifying medical deformity to join service merely because they do not suffer from a different deformity listed in the notice - Lack of basic eligibility goes to the root of the matter, and an appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once ineligibility on the relevant date comes to light. [Relied on Vishnu Vardhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1505; Paras 18-22] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajay Kumar Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 399 : 2026 INSC 394

Service Law – Regularisation and Permanent Status – Non-compliance with Final Judicial Directions – Scope of Subsequent Proceedings – Model Employer Guidelines - Finality of Judicial Orders & Limited Scope of Subsequent Review - When a judicial direction (ordering the creation of posts and regularisation of casual labourers on a permanent footing) has attained finality up to the Supreme Court, the scope of consideration in subsequent proceedings is strictly confined to examining compliance with those directions - It is wholly impermissible for the High Court in a subsequent round of litigation to reopen the issue on merits, re-examine whether the services could be regularised, or rely on original selection defects to deny relief - The obligation of the State to act as a model employer flows directly from the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which strikes at arbitrariness and mandates fairness, non-discrimination, and reasoned decision-making - The State cannot dilute final judicial mandates or treat a segment of its workforce especially those contributing indirectly to national endeavours of paramount importance with indifference or arbitrariness. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 10-29] R. Iyyappan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : 2026 INSC 431

Service Law — Regularisation — Validity of State Notifications — Group 'B', 'C', and 'D' employees — Distinction between "Irregular" and "Illegal" appointments — The Supreme Court examined the validity of Haryana Government Notifications dated 16.06.2014, 18.06.2014, and 07.07.2014, which sought to regularise contractual/ad hoc employees – i. Validity of Notifications dated 16.06.2014 and 18.06.2014: Supreme Court held these notifications valid as they were intended to grant benefits to employees who were eligible under the 1996 policy but were left out due to its administrative withdrawal - Since these employees occupied sanctioned posts and met prescribed qualifications at the time of initial engagement, their appointments were "irregular" but not "illegal"- The High Court's quashing of these two notifications was set aside; ii. Invalidity of Notifications dated 07.07.2014: Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to strike down the 07.07.2014 notifications - These policies were found arbitrary as they sought to regularise employees engaged without any public advertisement or interview, and utilized a future cut-off date (31.12.2018), which bypassed regular recruitment processes. (Paragraph 21); iii. Protection under Article 142: Despite striking down the 07.07.2014 notifications, the Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to protect the services of those ad hoc employees who have already secured benefits and remain in service - to balance equity, such employees are to be placed at the lowest pay scale admissible to their posts. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) INSC 216; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) INSC 993; State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari (2010) INSC 469; Paras 18 – 25] Madan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2026 INSC 379

Service Law – Regularization of Ad Hoc Employees – Doctrine of Parity – Artificial Breaks in Service – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the Appellants' claim for regularization of services - The Appellants, appointed as peons and clerks on an ad hoc basis in 1995-96, were denied regularization by the State on the grounds of non-continuous service due to breaks ranging from 5 to 187 days - Supreme Court found that the State had regularized 46 other similarly placed employees who had service breaks ranging from 64 to 334 days periods significantly longer than those of the Appellants - held that the State cannot selectively deny the application of policy instructions to identically situated persons without cogent justification. [Para 17-19] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Service Law – Reservation – Horizontal Reservation – Mobility from Reserved to Unreserved (Open) Category –The Supreme Court set aside the Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment which held that an Unreserved PWD vacancy must be filled by an Unreserved candidate if available, regardless of more meritorious PWD candidates from reserved social categories - Held, the "Unreserved" or "Open" category does not constitute a separate communal or social category - It represents an open pool available to all candidates irrespective of their social category (SC/ST/OBC), provided they satisfy the specific criteria of the horizontal reservation (e.g., PWD-LV) - Reaffirmed that meritorious candidates belonging to reserved social categories (SC/ST/OBC) who also fall under a horizontal reservation category (like PWD) are entitled to be appointed against the Unreserved horizontal quota based on their merit - A less meritorious candidate from the Unreserved category cannot "steal a march" over a more meritorious reserved category candidate for an Unreserved post. West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330

Service Law – Retrospective Refusal – Held, that a communication refusing voluntary retirement made after the expiry of the notice period and after the employee has already ceased work cannot be given retrospective effect to undo a retirement that has already become effective by operation of law - any chargesheet issued or dismissal order passed after the date of such deemed retirement is illegal and without jurisdiction. [Relied on Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam (1977) 4 SCC 441; B.J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat (1978) 2 SCC 202; State of Haryana v. S.K. Singhal (1999) 4 SCC 293; Tek Chand v. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290; UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor (2007) 6 SCC 694 & (2008) 5 SCC 257; Paras 30 - 45] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328

Service Law – Reversion / Repatriation – Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion - Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 311(2) – ICAR functions as an autonomous Society whose recruitment and service conditions are governed by its own rules and bye-laws—hence, Article 311 is not attracted – A transfer, reversion, or repatriation is ordinarily an incidence of service and cannot per se be considered punitive - Judicial review of administrative discretion is narrowly confined to evaluating the decision-making process rather than the merits or fairness of the conclusion itself - It must strictly assess whether the action was arbitrary, irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable, particularly regarding whether it imposes penal or stigmatic consequences without due procedure - Allegations of mala fides must be supported by clear, cogent, and concrete material, and cannot be entertained merely on conjectures or the sequence of events. [Paras 9, 10, 11-16] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Service Law - Seventh Central Pay Commission – Para 7.4.13 (iv) (b) – Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU) to Level 9 – Eligibility of Junior Engineers – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant NFU to Level 9 (Grade Pay of ₹5,400) to Junior Engineers (JEs) in the Border Road Organization (BRO) who completed four years of service in Level 8 (Grade Pay of ₹4,800) - rejected the Union's contention that NFU is only applicable to those whose entry-level Grade Pay was ₹4,800 - It held that introducing an "entry-level" requirement constitutes adding an extra condition not found in the plain reading of the recommendations - The only condition precedent for the grant of ₹5,400 Grade Pay is the completion of four years in the Grade Pay of ₹4,800, regardless of whether that level was reached through promotion or the MACP Scheme - Noted that the Central Pay Commission's recommendation cannot be loosely construed to deny a benefit to an employee by creating an additional condition to deny the benefit of the pay commission – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 11-13] Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2026 INSC 311

Service Law - Supreme Court Observations - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting several procedural lapses – i. No Admission of Guilt - rejected the respondent's argument that an "evasive" reply constituted an admission under the Evidence Act - A departmental charge-sheet is not a plaint, and the burden of proof lies strictly on the department unless the charge is categorically admitted; ii. Mandatory Oral Enquiry - Relying on Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Limited, Supreme Court held that under Regulation 85 of the 1975 Regulations (and Rule 84 of the 1980 Service Rules), it is mandatory to hold an oral enquiry when charges are refuted; iii. Order of Evidence - The department must lead evidence first to prove the charges before asking the delinquent for a defense. In this case, no witnesses were produced to prove the documents or the charges, rendering the enquiry "vitiated" - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal and recovery orders - The Federation was granted liberty to conduct a de novo enquiry within six months - If no such enquiry is held, the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full benefits and arrears of salary. Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2026 INSC 305

Service Law – Transfer vs. Change in Cadre – Fundamental Distinction – The Supreme Court illuminated the clear and substantive legal difference between a "transfer" and a "change in cadre" - A transfer refers merely to a change in the place of posting of an employee within the same cadre or service, acting as an incident of service routinely exercised for administrative convenience without impacting seniority, rules, or substantive status - a change in cadre is exceptional, altering the very structural framework within which the employee's service, seniority, promotional avenues, and conditions are regulated, thereby requiring specific statutory authority or higher-level approval. [Para 7] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404

State Apathy and Litigation Delay – Award of Costs – Mandate for Expeditious Disposal – Supreme Court expressed deep anguish over gross administrative apathy where an employee, eligible for appointment in 1997, had to litigate for nearly three decades (until 2026) to secure his rightful cadre allocation - Noting that the appellant spent 22 years fighting the State instead of being close to his cognitively disabled son for family support, the Court awarded exemplary costs of ₹1,00,000/- to be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh - to tackle the systemic issue of long-pending service disputes pushing employees close to superannuation, Supreme Court requested the Chief Justice of the High Court to ascertain such pending cases and distribute them across benches for expeditious disposal. [Paras 11, 12, and 13] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404

State Reorganisation – Cadre Reallocation Criteria – Exceptions for Medical Hardships – The broad principles governing the allocation of State cadre employees to successor States primarily include option, followed by domicile (Home District), and lastly by inclusion of the junior-most personnel in the reverse order of seniority - Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) guidelines carve out specific exceptions to facilitate allocation based on option for certain vulnerable classes, including handicapped persons and defined medical hardship cases - The exception for "Mental Illness" explicitly covers the employee or their "family" (which includes dependent children) - Where a candidate's child is cognitively challenged, the allocation must be governed strictly by the option exercised by the employee. [Paras 8, 9, and 10] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404

Service Law – Voluntary Retirement – Interplay between Pension Regulations and Service Regulations – Deemed Acceptance – The Supreme Court held that under Regulation 29(2) of the UCO Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995, a notice for voluntary retirement becomes effective automatically upon the expiry of the notice period unless the appointing authority specifically refuses to grant permission before such expiry - Supreme Court clarified that while Regulation 20(3) of the Service Regulations creates an embargo on leaving service during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, these provisions must be read harmoniously - If the competent authority fails to pass a positive order of refusal within the notice period, the voluntary retirement takes effect ipso facto by efflux of time. [Paras 17 - 26, 43] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328

Service Rules – Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 – Rule 19-A – Proviso to Rule 19-A expressly allows for relaxation in educational qualifications for promotion on the basis of "special experience/competence/seniority" - The appellant, having 28 years of experience and a clean track record, was unanimously recommended for the post of Society Manager - The Registrar's cryptic rejection without assigning reasons was deemed unsustainable. Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353

Prosecution Subordinate Service Rules, 1978 (Rajasthan) — Rule 12 — Academic Qualification — Deletion of Proviso Allowing Final Year Students — Relevant Date for Eligibility — The Supreme Court held that the relevant date for determining the eligibility, including the minimum essential educational qualification, is the date of submission of the application pursuant to the recruitment advertisement, and not any subsequent stage prior to the examination or interview. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444

Equal Pay for Equal Work — Principle Explained — Claim for pay parity by contractual para-teachers with regular Assistant Teachers—Held: Equal pay for equal work is not an automatic entitlement. The claimant must demonstrate that their duties, responsibilities, qualifications, accountability, and conditions of service are qualitatively and substantially identical to those of regular employees. Contractual para-teachers, though performing similar classroom functions, are not assigned the full range of responsibilities attached to regular Assistant Teachers. [Para 20-25] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Departmental Inquiry - Police Service - Fraud and Dual Employment - Judicial Review - Appeal against the High Court Division Bench judgment which set aside the dismissal of a Constable - The respondent was alleged to have secured simultaneous appointments in the Jharkhand Police (as Ranjan Kumar) and the Bihar Police (as Santosh Kumar) using forged documents and assumed identities - The Supreme Court reiterated that in departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - Strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to domestic enquiries; any material with logical probative value is admissible - Held, the High Court under Article 226/227 cannot act as an appellate authority to reappreciate evidence or interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on no evidence - The Division Bench erred in substituting its own view over the concurrent findings of the disciplinary, appellate, and revisional authorities - A member of the police force must maintain the highest degree of integrity - Fraud at the threshold of entry strikes at the root of public employment. Forensic evidence, including fingerprint and photographic comparisons, confirmed that the respondent used dual identities to deceive two sovereign employers - To do complete justice, Supreme Court exercised its power under Article 142 to quash the respondent's second appointment in the Bihar Police and directed the initiation of criminal proceedings for cheating and forgery. [Relied on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610; State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491; Union of India v. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617; Paras 8-26] State of Jharkhand v. Ranjan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2026 INSC 466

All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) – Voluntary Retirement from Service (VRS) – Final Authority of the Central Government - The Supreme Court held that the voluntary severance of an employer-employee relationship pursuant to a VRS notice by an All India Service officer mandatorily requires the acceptance of the Central Government - The Central Government is the ultimate repository of authority over career-terminating decisions for such officers and possesses the final word in deciding a request for VRS - It is not bound by the recommendation or opinion formed by the State Government - The act of "acceptance" under the first proviso to Rule 16(2A) is not a mere automatic, routine, or ministerial function; rather, it requires a genuine, independent assessment and a well-considered exercise of discretion based on the entire material available on record - while not bound by the State Government's views, the Central Government's independent decision must still actively engage with and consider the views expressed by the State Government, as it possesses direct supervisory knowledge of the officer. [Relied on Ashok Kumar Sahu v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 704; Paras 10 - 22] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550

All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) read with DoPT Guidelines dated 16.10.1980 [Guideline 3(ii)] – Service Law – Vigilance Clearance – Distinction Between "Pending" and "Contemplated" Disciplinary Proceedings - The Supreme Court clarified the conditions precedent under Guideline 3(ii) for rejecting a VRS request on vigilance grounds – i. Pending Proceedings: A disciplinary proceeding is legally considered "pending" only when a formal charge-sheet/charge-memorandum has been issued and served upon the employee - The mere existence or pendency of a preliminary investigation or complaint prior to the issuance of a charge-sheet does not amount to "pending" disciplinary proceedings; ii. Contemplated Proceedings: "Contemplation" in the context of disciplinary action connotes a deliberate, concrete intention to act on a complaint - It requires the existence of a genuine possibility or contingency that formal departmental proceedings will follow a given complaint, rather than the mere passive existence of an unexamined pending complaint. [Relied on Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; State of Haryana v. Dinesh Singh, (2024) 13 SCC 357; State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 SCC OnLine All 240; Paras 23-34] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550

Service Jurisprudence – Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – Arrears Limitation – Held - Pensionary benefits constitute a recurring and continuing cause of action - A substantive claim for pension cannot be rejected or defeated solely on the ground of delay and laches - the grant of financial arrears must be balanced with settled principles of limitation; where the claim was not raised prior to approaching the court, arrears shall remain restricted to a period of three years and two months preceding the filing of the Original Application before the Tribunal. [Relied on Jagrit Mazdoor Union (Regd.) and Others v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. and Another, 1990 Supp SCC 113; Yashwant Hari Katakkar v. Union of India and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 113; M.L. Patil (Dead) through LRs v. State of Goa and Another, (2023) 1 SCC 660; Vinod Kumar and Others v. Union of India and Others, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Jaggo v. Union of India and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Paras 79-83] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Service Jurisprudence – State as a Model Employer – Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 – Equity and Social Justice – Held that long-serving employees who have rendered continuous, uninterrupted service spanning decades and have been functionally assimilated into the regular framework cannot be retained in a precarious status to deny them social security - The distinction between temporary and permanent employment becomes substantively illusory when the nature of duties performed is identical to regular employees - The State, as a model employer, is bound by constitutional mandates to ensure fair conditions of work and economic justice. [Paras 35-40] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Service Law - A person with higher qualification cannot be appointed to a post exclusively reserved for candidates with lower educational qualifications - Suppression of higher qualification renders appointment non-est. The Supreme Court held that when a post is specifically earmarked for candidates possessing lower educational qualifications (e.g., up to 10th standard), a candidate who possesses higher qualifications and suppresses the same to secure appointment deprives genuinely eligible and deserving candidates of the opportunity. Such an appointment is liable to be cancelled. The State, as a model employer, is justified in reserving certain posts for less educated persons so that they are not required to compete with more highly qualified candidates. Permitting over-qualified candidates to occupy such posts would defeat the very object of the reservation. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581

Service Law - Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation - Directions - Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers' inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. [Relied: Union of India v. Harananda, (2019) 14 SCC 126] (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Service Law - Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government's prerogative, but CAPF officers' grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Service Law - The respondent was appointed as a temporary Bank Attendant in Syndicate Bank against a post reserved for candidates having qualifications up to the 10th standard. He concealed the fact that he was a graduate. The Management terminated his services upon discovering the suppression. The High Court set aside the termination and ordered reinstatement. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's order. Held, Mere possession of higher qualification does not entitle a candidate to claim appointment to a post for which lower qualification is prescribed. - Suppression of higher educational qualification in such cases amounts to fraud on the public employment process. - Public employment must be offered strictly in accordance with the prescribed qualifications so that all eligible candidates get a fair opportunity. Appeal allowed. Termination of the respondent upheld. [Relied on: Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P. & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581

Service Law – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Non-communication of Entries: Obligation to communicate ACR entries, adverse or otherwise - The respondents contended that prior to the 2008-09 policy shift, only 'Average' or 'Below Average' gradings were communicable – Held that the nomenclature of an entry is immaterial; its determinative effect is what matters - Even a 'Good' or 'Very Good' entry becomes adverse in character if it makes an incumbent ineligible for promotion or prejudicially affects empanelment prospects - Non-communication of such entries carries civil consequences, depriving the employee of a fair opportunity to seek redressal or make representations. [Paras 12 – 17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Service Law – Department of Posts – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Circular dated 30.11.1992 – Rule 10(1-B) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 – Entitlement of temporary status casual labourers to pensionary benefits in the absence of formal regularisation – Held - A casual labourer, upon conferment of "temporary status" and subsequent completion of three years of continuous service in that capacity, is treated at par with temporary Group 'D' employees - This parity functions as a parity in substantive service benefits (including leave, increments, GPF, and pensionary benefits) rather than an identity of formal service status - The expression "after regularisation" in Clause 6 of the 1991 Scheme does not restrict or act as a mandatory prerequisite for the core entitlement to a pension; rather, it provides an additional benefit of counting 50% of the past temporary status service towards retirement benefits once a formal order of regularisation is passed - The foundational right to a pension for such employees flows independently from the operational framework of the Scheme, the Departmental Circular dated 30.11.1992, and Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 - If a temporary status casual labourer completes the minimum qualifying service of 10 years after attaining parity with temporary Group 'D' employees, they are entitled to superannuation pension, retirement gratuity, and family pension upon death, even in the absolute absence of a formal order of regularisation. [Paras 47-76] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Service Law – Destruction of Records – Weeding Out During Pendency of Litigation – Adverse Inference - The respondents admitted that the appellant's original ACR service records were destroyed/weeded out in 2013, despite the active pendency of the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court filed in 2009 – Held that Service records are mandatorily required to be retained until the final conclusion of judicial proceedings - The destruction of the records during the pendency of the litigation severely prejudiced the appellant's case and precluded judicial scrutiny - a strong adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the employer-respondents. [Paras 15-17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Service Law – Direct Recruitment – Recruitment Procedure – Primary Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Societies Limited Staff Service Rules, 2003 – Rule 3, Rule 14(a) & Rule 15 – Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984 – Section 36 – Validity of appointments challenged on the ground of non-compliance with amended Rule 3 due to the absence and lack of concurrence of the mandatory official members (Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Inspector Cooperative Societies, and District Manager, HAFED) in the Board of Directors (BOD) meeting finalizing the appointments – Held, that a public recruitment process can be split into three distinct stages: (i) notification/advertisement, (ii) method of selection (interview/written test), and (iii) final appointment by the competent authority - If the first two stages do not suffer from any fundamental defects (such as lack of publicity, fraud, manipulation, or appointment of unqualified candidates), the entire recruitment process cannot be rendered void ab initio due to a procedural loophole at the third stage - The requirement under Rule 3 regarding the presence and concurrence of non-elected official members is supervisory and salutary in nature, designed to ensure cross-checking and adherence to norms - The absence of such officials constitutes a curable procedural irregularity, not a fatal illegality going to the root of the selection - Candidates who entered service in good faith through an advertised, merit-based process cannot be made to suffer for institutional lapses or procedural omissions committed by the authorities - The third stage of the recruitment process is severable from the first two - The defect is rectifiable by directing the Cooperative Society to reconvene the BOD meeting in strict compliance with Rule 3 to re-examine the qualifications and recommendations of the selected candidates, without reopening the validly concluded initial phases of advertisement and interview - Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside and appeal allowed with directions. [Paras 20-22, 40-52, 60-64] Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2026 INSC 641

Service Law – Vested Rights & Equity – Long Unblemished Service – Vitiation Ex Post Facto - Equity & Proportionality – Appellants rendered more than a decade of continuous, unblemished service from 2014 onwards without any personal allegations of fraud, malpractice, or lack of eligibility – High Court invalidated appointments after 10 years based on internal procedural non-compliance – Supreme Court held that it is highly inequitable to deprive employees of their livelihood after long years of service due to institutional lapses over which they exercised no control - The interest of justice is served by treating the defect as curable and reviewing the third stage rather than directing a total invalidation of the recruitment process. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714; disctinguished from Ramjit Singh Kardam v. Sanjeev Kumar, (2020) 20 SCC 209; Paras 49-62] Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2026 INSC 641

Service Law – Fixation of Pay – Weightage for Past Service – Promissory Estoppel – Withdrawal of pay weightage benefits on the ground that Railway Service is not Central Government Civil Service – Held that unjustified, The Board, having explicitly accepted the pro-rata pension contribution from the Railways and acted upon its own "Board Orders" and settlements for years, is estopped from unilaterally withdrawing the benefit of weightage from the appellant - The High Court erred in holding that because the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 do not apply to railway servants, their service cannot be reckoned for pay fixation. [Relied on Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36; Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 60; State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884; Paras 32-39, 44 - 47] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562

Service Law – Promotion – Applicable Rules – Date of Vacancy vs. Date of Consideration – Recruitment Rules – Amendment by Substitution – Meaning and Effect - Held that the right to be considered for promotion is governed exclusively by the statutory rules in force at the time the actual consideration for promotion takes place, and not by the rules that existed when the vacancies originally arose - Public servants do not possess a vested right to be considered under the old or repealed rules - Held that the term "substitution" used in amending or subordinate legislation ordinarily has the effect of deleting the old provision and bringing the new provision into existence in its place - The old rule ceases to exist from the text, and subsequent consideration must be done under the newly substituted rules unless the legislature intended otherwise - Where promotions were granted on a purely ad-hoc basis subject to the outcome of a pending litigation, they do not constitute a "completed act" or create a vested right to protection under the repealed rules - Allowing the Civil Appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment - The Apex Court held that the legal foundation applied by the High Court was incorrect in view of the three-Judge bench decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar (2022), which explicitly overruled the Y.V. Rangaiah doctrine - Supreme Court ordered that all existing vacancies must be filled strictly in accordance with the 2016 Rules. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh & Others v. Raj Kumar & Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680; State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 INSC 505; Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India & Others, (2019) 17 SCC 590; Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1; Paras 20- 30] Jagdish Prasad v.P.M. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : 2026 INSC 572

Service Law – Promotion – Indian Railway Medical Service – Evaluation Criteria & Allocation of Points - Challenge to non-promotion to the post of Chief Medical Director in Higher Administrative Grade (HAG) - The Railway Board's promotion policy dated 22.05.1996 prescribed a whole-number point system for Annual Confidential Report (ACR) gradings - The Selection Committee awarded the appellant a fractional score of 19.5 points despite her five-year ACR grading being uniformly 'Very Good' (which mandated 20 points) – Held that there is no provision in the promotion policy for awarding points in fractions - The assessment was made without an objective basis, and the appellant must be deemed to have secured 20 points based on her consistent 'Very Good' gradings. [Paras 16] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Service Law – Retrospective Promotion – Retiral Benefits vs. Arrears of Salary - Appellant retired from service during the pendency of litigation – Held that where an employee is found to have been treated unfairly in the promotional evaluation, but the original service records are unavailable due to inadvertent weeding out, granting dynamic monetary relief like arrears of salary on a 'no work, no pay' relaxation may not be feasible - the ends of justice are met by directing the grant of notional promotion from the date her juniors were promoted, along with a mandatory re-fixation of pension and payment of retiral arrears. [Relied on Prabhat Ranjan Singh v. R.K. Kushwaha, 2018 INSC 796; Dev Dutt v. Union of India, 2008 INSC 630; distinguished from Union of India v. Chaman Rana, 2018 INSC 230; Paras 18, 19] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Service Law – Status of Railway Servants – Civil Post under the Union – Article 309 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India – Whether a railway servant ceases to be a member of the civil service of the Union merely because separate service rules govern their recruitment, conduct, control, and pension – Held that No, A railway servant remains a person holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Union under the administrative control of the Central Government - The delegation of powers to the Railway Board does not separate the status of a railway servant from that of a Central Government employee, as the Railway Board functions as the Government of India itself for railway administration - Service under the Railway Board is service under the Central Government. [Paras 42, 43] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562

Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — De Novo Adjudication before Labour Court — Right to Fresh Post-Enquiry Show-Cause Notice on Quantum of Punishment - Where a domestic enquiry is found to be defective/perverse and the employer successfully proves the misconduct by leading independent evidence de novo before the Labour Court, the disciplinary authority cannot mechanically impose the penalty of dismissal by relying solely on the original show-cause notice that was founded upon the vitiated domestic enquiry - Even if the finding of misconduct attains finality, the regulatory mandate of an explicit post-enquiry notice (such as Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005) requires a fresh application of mind by the disciplinary authority to the findings that ultimately survived the de novo adjudication - The delinquent employee must be given a fresh opportunity to show cause and plead mitigating or extenuating circumstances against the proposed punishment in light of the post-remand findings. [Relied on Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727; Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813; Paras 38-56] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Service Law — Proportionality of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality — Dismissal from Service - Dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty which leaves a permanent stigma, impairs future public employment prospects, and devastates the employee and their dependent family members - The mere fact that a proved act falls within the broad head of "misconduct" does not mean dismissal must follow as a matter of course - Where the charges involve internal office indiscipline, insubordination, or minor tampering with office documents, but completely lack any element of financial misappropriation, corruption, moral turpitude, or proven pecuniary loss to the employer, a punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate for an employee with over two decades of unblemished service - The disciplinary authority must carefully evaluate mitigating factors such as length of service, age, past record, and the absence of dishonesty to examine whether a lesser penalty would meet the ends of justice. [Relied on Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, AIR 2010 SC 75; Paras 105-111] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Service Law — Quantum of Punishment — Amalgam of Penalties — Double Punishment for Single Misconduct - A disciplinary authority acts illegally and without jurisdiction if it creates an amalgam of separate substantive penalties for the same misconduct unless expressly authorized by the rules - Where an employee is visited with the ultimate penalty of dismissal, an additional direction in the same order treating the entire past period of suspension pending enquiry as a substantive "punishment" is impermissible and cannot operate as an independent or additional penalty - The monetary and service consequences of the suspension period must strictly be decided only in terms of the regulatory provisions governing regularizations (Regulation 88(a)(v)), which explicitly protect subsistence allowance already paid or payable. [Relied on Union of India v. S.C. Parashar, (2006) 3 SCC 167; Paras 84-89] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Service Law — Suspension — Prolonged Suspension and Entitlement to Subsistence Allowance — Continuous Reporting Conditions - Suspension is not an indefinite condition of civil and economic disability - Under the MSEDCL Service Regulations, any suspension continuing beyond six months mandates a formal review and recommendation by a higher authority - In the absence of an order on record reviewing or validly continuing the suspension beyond the initial six months, an employer cannot perpetually rely on a week-to-week office reporting condition to mechanically deny subsistence allowance for a prolonged suspension spanning nearly eleven years - While non-compliance with the reporting condition may be scrutinized for the initial regulatory period of six months, the employee is legally eligible for subsistence allowance for the remaining post-six-month period up to the date of final dismissal. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale, (1983) 3 SCC 387; O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 328; Paras 58-73] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019 (Haryana) — Rules 2, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(g), 7, and 23 — Compassionate Appointment vs. Compassionate Financial Assistance — Structural Distinction — Applicability of Suspension Clause during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – Held that Rule 23(1) Applies Exclusively to Financial Assistance, Not Compassionate Appointment - The plain, unambiguous language and text of Rule 23(1), as well as its marginal heading, confine its operation strictly to "compassionate financial assistance" - It contains no express or implicit reference to "compassionate appointment" - Extending a provision textually confined to financial assistance to cover compassionate appointment would amount to judicial legislation rather than statutory interpretation - Purposive construction cannot be used to override unambiguous text or plug a perceived legislative gap - The Rules of 2019 maintain a meticulous and deliberate structural separation between the two forms of relief across all definitional, procedural, eligibility, and administrative domains - Rule 5(1)(a) defines financial assistance as a monthly monetary payment, whereas Rule 5(1)(b) defines compassionate appointment as public employment - The two are qualitatively distinct forms of relief - The omission of "compassionate appointment" from Rule 23(1) must be regarded as deliberate - Absence of Sequential Hierarchical Bar for Compassionate Appointment - Rule 5(1)(f) (defining family for financial assistance) utilizes a strict cascading sequencing mechanism using the word "failing" across multiple sub-clauses, creating a mandatory priority bar - Rule 5(1)(g) (defining family for compassionate appointment) merely lists eligible categories (widow/widower, children, dependent siblings) and completely omits any "failing" or conditional language - no absolute statutory bar prevents the consideration of a child's claim for compassionate appointment solely because the widow's claim has not been conclusively determined, particularly where the widow has explicitly renounced her claim - Constitutional Validity of Rule 23(1) Upheld within its Proper Domain - Rule 23(1) is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution - It is a temporary, regulatory, and preventive measure not a penal one aimed at preventing a person criminally culpable for an employee's death from accessing the welfare scheme - The classification has a rational nexus with its object - its validity does not extend its applicability to the field of compassionate appointment, which it does not govern – The Supreme Court noted a significant anomaly in the Rules of 2019: the lesser form of relief (financial assistance) is suspended during criminal trials for the murder of the employee, while the substantially greater form of relief (permanent public employment) lacks a corresponding safeguarding provision - While the Court cannot rewrite the rules to rectify this lacuna, it is strongly desirable for the State Government to introduce appropriate amendments to bridge this legislative gap. [Relied on Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 329; M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2925; Paras 15-45] Atul Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2026 INSC 640

Accelerated Promotion – Counter-Extremism/Naxal Activities – Parity in Treatment – Judicial Review of Committee Decisions – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant accelerated promotion to a police constable (Respondent) who resisted a Naxalite attack on a police station - The State had denied the promotion claiming the Respondent's role was "nominal" compared to a colleague (G. Venkat Reddy) who received the benefit – Supreme Court found the Committee's assessment "perverse" as it was admitted that the Respondent, while on roof-top guard sentry duty, fired more rounds at the Naxalites than the promoted colleague and was instrumental in repelling the attack - Held, when collective efforts repel an attack, it is unfair to belittle the role of individual personnel to deny them benefits intended to boost the morale of the force - While the Court's intervention in decisions taken by specialized Committees for out-of-turn promotion is minimal, such decisions are not immune to interference if they are found to be unfair or based on perverse findings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. Sanjay Shukla (Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 2023, decided on March 27, 2023; Paras 9, 10] State of Telangana v. P. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2026 INSC 258

Allocation of Cadre – Indian Police Service (IPS) – Request for re-allocation to 'insider' vacancy – Finality of Selection – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of an IPS officer seeking re-allocation from the Tamil Nadu cadre to an 'insider' vacancy in the Rajasthan cadre from the 2004 examination batch - held that cadre allocation cannot remain fluid indefinitely, as it would lead to a "chain reaction" of reshuffling among selected candidates from the same batch – Noted that the appellant, who was third in the merit list for the 'insider' vacancy, raised his grievance in 2010, six years after the selection process - noted that the appellant had already served in the Tamil Nadu cadre for over two decades by the time of the final hearing. Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Allotment of Housing – Eligibility Criteria – Nepotism and Self-Aggrandizement – Supreme Court set aside the allotment of super deluxe flats to a Governing Body member (Respondent No. 3) and his subordinate (Respondent No. 4) – i. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 3: The allotment was deemed a "blatant display of self-aggrandizement" as the respondent did not satisfy the mandatory six-month deputation period at the time of application and had not submitted a timely application or earnest money deposit (Para 13, 14); ii. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 4: The Court found that Respondent No. 4 did not fall within the stipulated pay-band level (Level 10 to 20) and that the Governing Body's decision to "regularize" the allotment by carving out an exception was an arbitrary exercise of power. [Paras 15, 16] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Appointment of Director General of Police (DGP) – Role of UPSC and State Government – Delay in submitting proposals – Selection Guidelines – i. Mandate for Regular Appointment: The Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of appointing a regular Director General of Police (Head of Police Force) in accordance with the time-frame and scheme established in Prakash Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1; ii. Obligation of UPSC: Despite inordinate delays by State Governments in submitting proposals, the UPSC is obligated to convene the Empanelment Committee Meeting (ECM) to prevent further aggravation of the situation and to ensure meritorious senior officers are not overlooked; iii. Ad hoc Arrangements Criticized: The Supreme Court expressed concern over States preferring ad hoc arrangements (appointing acting DGPs) instead of regular appointments, which led to the UPSC inserting paragraph 4(xii) into its guidelines requiring States to seek leave from the Supreme Court for delayed submissions; iv. Enforcement Mechanism: To ensure compliance with the Prakash Singh mandate, the UPSC is authorized to: a. Write to State Governments for timely proposals whenever a vacancy arises; b. Move an application before the Supreme Court for enforcement if a State fails to submit a timely proposal; v. Accountability: held that those responsible for the delay in submitting proposals shall be held accountable. [Paras 7-11] Union Public Service Commission v. T. Dhangopal Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Conflict between State/UT Act and UGC Regulations – Legislative Competence – Doctrine of Repugnancy - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to strike down Section 14(5) of the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act) for being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 - held that since UGC Regulations trace their source to Entry 66 of List I (Union List), they possess an overriding effect over State/UT legislations enacted under Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List) - The Search-cum-Selection Committee for a Vice-Chancellor must necessarily include a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, and its members must not be connected with the University - Key Legal Issues & Rulings – i. Primacy of Entry 66 List I over Entry 25 List III - Supreme Court reiterated that while both the Union and States can legislate on "Education" under Entry 25 of List III, such power is expressly subject to Entry 66 of List I (Coordination and determination of standards) - Any State legislation that impinges upon or dilutes the standards prescribed by the Union under Entry 66 is ultra vires; ii. Mandatory Nature of UGC Regulations - Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which mandates the inclusion of a UGC nominee in the Search-cum-Selection Committee, is an integral component of "standards in higher education." - Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, which omitted this requirement and included a government official (Pro-Chancellor) in the committee, was declared invalid; iii. Doctrine of Repugnancy and Article 254(2) - noted that the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 and the need for Presidential assent apply only when both Central and State legislations operate within the Concurrent List - Since the UGC Act and Regulations are referable to List I (Entry 66), the question of curing repugnancy via Article 254(2) does not arise; iv. Exercise of Article 142 Powers - Despite finding the appointment procedure illegal, Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to allow the appellant to complete his tenure (ending December 2026) - This was done to avoid "grave stigma" to the academician and administrative disruption, noting there were no allegations against the appellant's integrity or merit. [Relied on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45; Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Paras 37-43, 46-48, 51-52] Dr. S. Mohan v. Puducherry Technological University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2026 INSC 100 : AIR 2026 SC 730

Character and Suitability for Disciplined Force – Held that a candidate for the police force must possess impeccable character, rectitude, and integrity - The employer, through a screening committee, has a wide realm of discretion to assess the suitability of a candidate based on their criminal antecedents, even if an acquittal has been recorded - An acquittal based on technical grounds or "benefit of doubt" does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Consumption of Vacancy – Supreme Court observed that even if a senior candidate (Rishikesh Meena or Rajesh Kumar) does not join or accept an 'insider' vacancy, the next candidate in the merit list does not gain an automatic right to claim allocation to that specific post - Finality must be attached to the selection and allocation process to prevent administrative instability – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 9-12] Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Contractual Employment through Third-Party Contractor vs. Direct Contractual Employment – Claim for Minimum Time Scale of Pay – Distinction in Law – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing the Municipal Council to pay the minimum time scale of pay to workers engaged through third-party contractors - held that a valid distinction exists between persons employed directly by a State entity and those engaged through an intermediary contractor - While regular employment involves transparent, merit-based procedures open to all citizens, contractors have absolute discretion in selecting personnel to be sent to the principal employer - Granting equal benefits and status to contractor-engaged workers would sanction an arbitrary recruitment process and bypass constitutional safeguards for public employment. [Relied on Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and others, (2019) 13 SCC 82; Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education and Another Vs. Raj Kumar Mishra and Another, Civil Appeal No. 4014 of 2025; Paras 8-11] Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Dearness Allowance (DA) — Legally Enforceable Right — Financial Inability of State — The Supreme Court held that the right to receive Dearness Allowance is a legally enforceable right that accrued in favor of the employees of the State of West Bengal – Held that while the State has the discretion to formulate its pay structure, once it incorporates a specific standard (like the All-India Consumer Price Index - AICPI) into its statutory rules (ROPA Rules, 2009), it cannot deviate from that mechanism through executive memoranda. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Departmental Enquiry – Post-Superannuation – Lack of Jurisdiction – Adoption of Rules – The Supreme Court quashed a departmental enquiry initiated against a retired employee of the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (MSWC) approximately 11 months after his superannuation - Held that in the absence of specific provisions in the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Service Regulations, 1992, the Corporation could not ipso facto apply the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, to initiate proceedings against a retired employee without a conscious decision or resolution by the Board of Directors to adopt such rules - that a public-sector corporation cannot initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement in the absence of an express enabling provision in its service regulations. Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Departmental Inquiry — Proof of Misconduct — Fabrication of Medical Certificate — Graver the charge, greater the need for caution and circumspection — Findings of Inquiry Officer based on "word against word" without expert verification held perverse — Where a charge of forgery entails mandatory dismissal, fair play requires a thorough investigation consistent with principles of natural justice – Facts - The appellant, a Court Attender, was dismissed from service on charges of unauthorized absence and submitting a fabricated medical certificate. The Inquiry Officer relied on the statement of a Medical Practitioner (PW-2) who denied issuing the certificate, despite admitting the appellant consulted him and that the letterhead belonged to him - The High Court upheld the dismissal - Supreme Court Findings – i. Perversity in Findings: The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer's conclusion was perverse as it was based on no credible evidence - noted that the rubber stamp on the disputed certificate was identical to the one used by the doctor on official notices; ii. Need for Handwriting Expert: Since the certificate was fully handwritten and the doctor's undisputed signatures varied, the Inquiry Officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert before recording a finding of forgery; iii. Standard of Proof for Grave Charges: When charges involve consequences like loss of livelihood, investigations must be consistent with the requirement of the situation and fair play. [Relied on Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454; Paras 31-45] K. Rajaiah v. High Court for the State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 140 : 2026 INSC 142 : AIR 2026 SC 890

Disciplinary Inquiry – Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant alleged a gross breach of natural justice, claiming the inquiry officer abruptly closed proceedings on August 1, 2017, preventing the completion of cross-examination of management witnesses - The High Court erred by not considering these allegations of procedural lapses and the merits of the Tribunal's original findings while ordering a remand. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Disciplinary Proceedings against Judicial Officers – Removal from service based solely on judicial orders – Permissibility – Appellant, a judicial officer with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed for granting bail in four cases under the M.P. Excise Act without expressly mentioning the "twin conditions" of Section 59-A - Held: Merely because a judicial order is wrong, erroneous, or fails to refer to a statutory provision, it cannot be the basis for disciplinary action unless there is evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration - The High Court must exercise great caution and protect honest officers from unmerited onslaughts based on motivated complaints. Order of removal set aside with full back wages. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Disciplinary Proceedings – Continuance after Superannuation – Permissibility of Punishment – Punjab and Sind Bank Officers' Service Regulations, 1982; Regulation 20(3)(iii) – Punjab and Sind Bank Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995; Regulation 48 - The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a retired bank officer challenging a punishment of "reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay" imposed after his superannuation - Key Findings by Supreme Court – i. Continuance of Proceedings: If service rules permit, disciplinary proceedings initiated before superannuation can be continued and brought to a logical conclusion even after the employee attains the age of superannuation; ii. Legal Fiction of Service - Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulations creates a legal fiction where the officer is deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded; iii. Implementability of Punishment - The Court rejected the argument that only penalties under Pension Regulations could be imposed post-retirement - held that a punishment of reduction in pay scale relates back to the date of superannuation and is implementable because pension is computed based on the salary last drawn/payable; iv. Misconduct by Bank Officers: A bank officer holds a position of trust - Failure to ensure the end-use of a loan constitutes a financial irregularity that exposes the bank to risk and amounts to misconduct, regardless of whether an actual loss was suffered. [Relied on Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. Rabindranath Choubey (2020) 18 SCC 71; Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank and Another (2007) 9 SCC 15; State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249; Paras 25-37] Virinder Pal Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2026 INSC 266

Distinction between "Honourable Acquittal" and "Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt" – An honourable acquittal occurs when the court definitively concludes that the accused did not commit the offence - In contrast, an acquittal based on a "benefit of doubt" due to a weak prosecution case or lack of credible evidence is a technical consideration and does not constitute a "clean chit". [Para 5] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Equitable Relief – Creation of Supernumerary Post – To balance the equities between a candidate already in service (Appellant) and a deserving candidate deprived of selection due to a contested answer (Respondent No. 3), Supreme Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post – Appellant to retain seniority over the new appointee. [Relied on Vikas Pratap Singh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2013) 14 SCC 494; Paras 7 - 11] Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Forest Service (IFS) – Cadre Allocation – Migration of Reserved Category Candidate to Unreserved Vacancy – Effect of relaxation at Preliminary Examination stage – The Supreme Court held that a reserved category candidate who avails "relaxed standards" (concessions) at the Preliminary Examination stage cannot be treated as a candidate selected on "General Standards" for the purpose of cadre allocation against an unreserved vacancy, even if they secure higher marks than a general category candidate in the final merit list - rejected the High Court's view that "General Standards" only refers to the qualifying marks in the Main Examination - If a candidate's entry into the Main Examination was made possible only through a relaxed cut-off in the Preliminary Examination, they are ineligible to claim an unreserved/General Insider vacancy. Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 33(ii) – Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 & 5 – Rights of Nominee – Release of GPF Dues – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India challenging a High Court order that directed the release of GPF amounts to the nominee of a deceased employee - The Government argued that under Section of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, amounts exceeding Rs. 5,000/- require a succession certificate/probate even for a nominee – Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Rs. 5,000/- threshold established in 1925 has lost relevance due to inflation - held that Rule 33(ii) of the 1960 Rules, framed by the Government itself, stipulates that GPF amounts shall be payable to the nominee regardless of the amount – Held that Section 5(1) of the Act contains a non-obstante clause giving primacy to a valid nominee to receive the funds to the exclusion of others - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 33(ii) must be construed harmoniously to avoid rendering the nomination process "otiose" – Noted that a nominee is a "mere trustee" to collect funds and not the beneficial owner - Releasing funds to a nominee does not bar other legal heirs from claiming their share in a competent court – Noted that the Government should not involve itself in protracted litigation regarding the estates of deceased employees, as requiring probate in cases of valid nominations unnecessarily makes the state a party to private disputes – Petition dismissed. [Relied on CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 5; Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424; Paras 9-15] Union of India v. Paresh Chandra Mondal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Indian Navy – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) – Selection Process Fairness – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Appeal against Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) order directing fresh Selection Boards for SSCOs who were denied PC in 2020 and 2022 – Appellants contended that ACRs were "casually graded" during periods when they were ineligible for PC, leading to an inherently skewed merit assessment - Held, the appraisal process was inevitably affected from its inception because Reporting Officers were conscious that these officers had no avenue for career progression – High gradings in a bell-curve system were reserved for those with future prospects, while ineligible officers received average marks serving no institutional purpose – The conversion of "Not Recommended for PC" endorsements (recorded when officers were ineligible as a matter of policy) into substantive disqualifications once they became eligible is arbitrary – This circularity, where past ineligibility was transformed into "deemed unsuitability," resulted in an uneven playing field. [Para 16-17] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Interpretation of "Ratio" vs "Quota" – The Supreme Court clarified that the 11% allocation was intended to upgrade the cadre by ensuring experienced graduates are appointed to Supervisor posts, previously filled from the open category direct recruitment - This earmarking did not reduce the chances of SSLC-only holders, as their 29% ratio remained intact and was not reduced by the amendment. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Internally Selected Candidates – Reckoning of Seniority from Date of Appointment/Training vs. Date of Commencement of Probation - Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Service Regulations), 1967 – Regulations 10(9), 87(1), and 97 – Determination of Seniority: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment which had ruled that seniority for direct recruits should only commence from the date their probation started (after completion of training) - held that according to the plain language of the Regulations, a person is considered to be "on duty" and "appointed to a class of service" from the moment they perform duties or commence prescribed training/instruction. [Relied on Govt. of A.P. v. P. Bhaskar (2008) 11 SCC 687; 2008 INSC 267; Paras 19-24] M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Key Directions issued – i. Deemed Service for Pension: SSCWOs released from service during the pendency of litigation (excluding JAG and AEC cadres) are deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service and are entitled to pension and consequential benefits; ii. Grant of PC: SSCWOs currently in service who secured the 60% cut-off in the 2020/2021 Selection Boards shall be granted Permanent Commission, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance; iii. Policy Review: The Army is directed to review the method of evaluation of ACRs and cut-offs for future batches to address the disproportionate impact on women officers. [Para 66, 67] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Limited Scope of Judicial Review – Held that courts should not override the wisdom of the employer or substitute their own view regarding a candidate's suitability unless the decision is demonstrably mala fide, arbitrary, or whimsical - The Division Bench erred by intruding into the functional realm of the screening committee – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 797; State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591; Para 7-9] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Merit-Based Selection – No Edge for Graduates – The selection process, involving an OMR and main written test focusing on pediatric health, provided a level playing field - The fact that non-graduates significantly outnumbered graduates in the final selection (235 out of 317) dispelled any apprehension that graduation conferred an unfair advantage or "edge" in the examination – Noted that The High Court's interpretation that the quotas were mutually exclusive was termed a "judicial fiat" that interfered with the executive's rule-making authority. "What the executive did not think fit to do by prescription in the Rules, could not have been done by a judicial fiat" – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sanjay Kumar v. Narinder Verma (2006) 6 SCC 467; Paras 13-23] Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Paucity of Funds as a Defense — Supreme Court categorically rejected the State's plea of financial inability or paucity of funds as a ground to deny the payment of statutory dues like DA - Once a legal right is established, the State, as a "model employer," must honor its obligations regardless of the financial burden - Findings returned in the first round of litigation, which declared DA a legally enforceable right and were reaffirmed by the dismissal of a review petition, attain conclusive finality and bind the parties. [Relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Sivanandan CT v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 161; hayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 1; Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224; Paras 39-59] State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Payment of Gratuity – Retention of Staff Quarters – Adjustment of Penal Rent from Gratuity – Reciprocal Obligations – The management of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) challenged the High Court's direction to release the full gratuity with interest to retired employees who had failed to vacate official accommodation – Held that the obligation of an ex-employee to vacate staff quarters and the obligation of the management to release gratuity are mutual and reciprocal - Neither can be enforced in isolation - Under Rule 3.2.1(c) of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, 1978, the management is expressly empowered to withhold gratuity for non-vacation of company accommodation - no interest is payable on the gratuity amount withheld during the period of unauthorized occupation. [Paras 19 & 20] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Pensionary Benefits — Representation for Compassionate Consideration — While refusing to interfere with the dismissal order due to the appellant's history of multiple offenses (imprisonment in 1980 and severe reprimands in 1989 and 1994), Supreme Court permitted the appellant to submit a representation to the authorities for the grant of pension - The authorities are at liberty to consider this on its own merits, taking into account the appellant's 36 years of service, though this is not a mandatory direction to grant such pension. [Relied on Yasodhar Kamat Vs. Director General, Border Security Force and Ors., (2021) 13 SCC 333; Para 7]. Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Recruitment and Selection – Right to Appointment – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Change in Policy – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to appoint candidates who completed the Ayurvedic Nursing Training Course from Government institutions without a fresh selection process - held that mere admission to a training course does not confer an automatic right to appointment, especially when the policy environment has shifted – noted that respondents claimed a right to appointment based on a decades-old practice where all 20 candidates from the sole Government college were absorbed into service - Supreme Court noted that since 2012, the State permitted private institutions to impart the same training, leading to an exponential increase in candidates (from 20 seats to 311 institutions by 2019-20) – Held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be applied where a substantial shift in circumstances and limited vacancies make the earlier practice impossible to sustain. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Recruitment – Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) – Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services – Selection to the post of Supervisor – Eligibility of Graduate Anganwadi Workers to compete in the 29% quota reserved for SSLC holders - Special Rules for the Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services, 2010 – Amendment effective from 01.01.2014 – Distribution of Vacancies – Held that the 11% ratio carved out specifically for Anganwadi Workers with a graduate degree does not exclude such graduates from applying under the 29% quota earmarked for Anganwadi Workers with SSLC and 10 years' experience - held that graduates naturally possess the lower SSLC qualification; therefore, unless the rules expressly prohibit higher qualifications or exclude graduates from the general pool, they are eligible to compete in both categories. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – Key Principle – Absence of Waiting List – Under the 1997 Rules, there is no provision for the preparation or operation of an additional or waiting list - A vacancy arising from a selected candidate's failure to report for duty or complete pre-appointment formalities must be treated as a fresh vacancy for subsequent recruitment – Noted that once a select list is exhausted or finalized as per the statutory rules, its operation cannot be enlarged to fill vacancies caused by non-joining – Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-21] State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that directed the State to consider a candidate for a post left vacant due to the non-joining of a selected candidate - held that when recruitment rules specifically define the contours of a select list and do not provide for a reserve or additional list, a post left unfilled cannot be claimed as a right by the next candidate in line. State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Reserve List/Waiting List – Validity Period – Locus Standi of Public Service Commission (PSC) – The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court which had directed the appointment of wait-listed candidates after the statutory expiry of the reserve list – Supreme Court noted down following points- i. Locus Standi of PSC to Appeal - held that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) has the locus standi to maintain a writ appeal even if the State (Appointing Authority) does not challenge the order - As a constitutional body under Article 315, the PSC is a "person aggrieved" when judicial directions mandate recommendations that bypass statutory rules or its independent advisory role; ii. Nature of Waiting List: A waiting list is not a perennial source of recruitment and does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Its purpose is to address contingencies such as non-joining of selected candidates within the same recruitment cycle; iii. Operation and Expiry of Reserve List (Rule 24/Rule 21): Under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Legal State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1981, and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, the reserve list remains valid for only six months from the date the original list is forwarded to the Appointing Authority; iv. held that the period of validity must be calculated from the date of recommendation, not from the date a vacancy arises due to non-joining; v. Mandamus cannot be issued to "pick up" names from a list that has already expired by the time the writ petition is filed – Supreme Court rejected the plea that because some candidates were recommended after the expiry of the list, others must also be recommended - Article 14 constitutes a positive concept; a court cannot mandate the State to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity committed in favour of others – Appeals allowed. [Relied on U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar, (2018) 10 SCC 535; A.P. Public Service Commission v. Baloji Badhavath, (2009) 5 SCC 1; Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 72; Paras 46-90] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2026 INSC 64

Recruitment to Police Force – Criminal Antecedents and "Honourable Acquittal" – Scope of Judicial Review – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order which had directed the State to treat a candidate's acquittal as "honourable" and reconsider him for the post of constable (driver) - The respondent was previously charged with serious offences involving moral turpitude, including kidnapping and rape (Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(c) IPC), but was acquitted by the trial court by being given the "benefit of doubt". State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Regularization of Casual Workers - Parity in Treatment - Irregular vs. Illegal Appointment - The Appellants, engaged as daily-wage workers (Sweepers and Cook) with the Income Tax Department since the 1990s, sought regularization of their services - The Tribunal and High Court denied relief, citing non-fulfillment of the 10-year continuous service criteria as of 10.04.2006 per the Umadevi (3) judgment - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting that the Appellants were similarly situated to other daily-wage workers whose services were already regularized under Court orders – Noted that "irregular" appointments (where procedures like interviews were followed) should be distinguished from "illegal" backdoor entries - It observed that the perennial nature of the work, evidenced by subsequent outsourcing, necessitated regular posts - Denying regularization by misapplying Umadevi (3) to long-serving employees performing indispensable duties is contrary to equity - Services ordered to be regularized from 01.07.2006 with consequential benefits – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravi Verma and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 2795-2796 of 2018); Raman Kumar and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4146 of 2023); Jaggo Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2024 INSC 1034); Paras 7-10] Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 159 : 2026 INSC 156 : AIR 2026 SC 997

Relief – One-time Measure to Prevent Protracted Litigation – Supreme Court noted this was the third round of litigation and a fourth round (fresh Selection Board) would not yield equitable results due to inherently skewed ACRs – Supreme Court modified AFT directions to grant PC directly to specific categories: (a) SSCWOs inducted prior to January 2009; (b) SSCWOs inducted after January 2009 in branches other than Law, Education, and Naval Architecture; and (c) Male SSCOs barred by initial terms, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance – Released officers within these categories deemed to have completed 20 years of service for pensionary benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja (2020) 13 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Amit Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 20 SCC 486; Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47; Para 54-56] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Relief – Superannuation during Pendency – Held that since the appellant has reached the age of superannuation, reinstatement is no longer possible - The High Court, on fresh consideration, must determine: (i) whether the Tribunal's interference with the disciplinary action was justified, and (ii) the appellant's entitlement to back wages and retiral benefits – Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-11] Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Reopening of Concluded Litigation – Delay and Laches – "Fence-sitters" – The Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petitions filed by primary school teachers seeking to revive a service dispute that had attained finality over a decade ago - The petitioners sought directions similar to a 2021 High Court order which directed the consideration of a representation for higher grade pay scales - held that the petitioners, whose services were terminated in 1994 and whose prior challenges were dismissed in 2009 and 2011, were not "identically situated" to the 2021 petitioner who was still in service. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Rule 27 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction – Held that even if assumed that the 1982 Pension Rules were applicable through the residuary Clause 110 of the 1992 Regulations, observed that Rule 27(2)(b)(i) mandates prior sanction of the Government for instituting proceedings after retirement - rejected the Corporation's argument that a "general sanction" was accorded at the time the 1992 Regulations were originally approved, clarifying that the word 'shall' in the rule implies a mandatory safeguard for each specific case to prevent unwarranted proceedings against superannuated employees – Regulation 110 of the 1992 Regulations is a miscellaneous/residuary provision intended to cover silent areas - it does not confer automatic jurisdiction to initiate departmental enquiries against retired employees unless the Corporation has formally adopted the relevant Government rules at an appropriate level – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666; Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, (2010) 15 SCC 322; Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515; Paras 18-30] Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Salary Payment and Creation of Posts – Private Aided vs. Self-Financed Schemes – Respondents (lecturers) sought government salary payments and post sanctions for subjects run under a self-financed scheme - The High Court had repeatedly issued "reconsideration" directions without deciding the existence of a legal right, leading to a "Second Season" of episodic litigation spanning 16 years - Held: Constitutional and statutory remedies are not for academic discourse; if a case deserves relief, it must be granted "then and there, unflinchingly". Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Selection and Recruitment – Migration of Reserved Category Candidates to Unreserved Category – Own Merit – The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that a candidate belonging to a reserved category (SC/ST/OBC) who secures marks higher than or equal to the cut-off marks of the General (Unreserved) category, without availing any concession or relaxation, must be treated as a General category candidate and adjusted against unreserved posts - Such candidates are "own merit" candidates and their selection does not count against the quota earmarked for the backward classes - Migration or "Merit Induced Shift" of reserved category candidates to the open category is a manifestation of the principle of equality - The "Open Category" is not a quota but is available to all candidates regardless of their social category, provided they meet the criterion of merit. Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Selection Criteria – Criteria Appointments and Career-Enhancing Courses – Supreme Court found that SSCWOs were systematically denied criteria appointments and access to important courses (e.g., Junior Command Course) due to their perceived lack of a "future" in the Army - While these may not have a high numerical weightage in computerized evaluation, they significantly influence the "Value Judgement" component (5 marks), which often becomes determinative when officers miss the cut-off by narrow margins. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Seniority from Initial Joining - Administrative Instructions vs. Statutory Regulations - Supreme Court clarified that the period of training is an integral part of service and must be counted for seniority - Regulation 97 specifies that seniority is determined by the rank in the list of approved candidates, and the date of joining duty marks the commencement of the relationship with the service, regardless of whether the candidate is on a consolidated pay during training or a regular scale during probation - rejected the application of the "cyclic order" (Proviso to Regulation 97) because the direct recruits were selected/appointed in 2000 and 2001, while the internal candidates were promoted in May 2002 - Since they were not recruited in the same calendar year, the direct recruits appointed earlier maintain their seniority over those appointed later - noted that any Board Proceedings (BPs) or terms in appointment letters that run contrary to the statutory Regulations (10(9) and 87) cannot override the legal position that seniority counts from the first date of joining for training. M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Service Jurisprudence – Deemed Permanency and Substantive Appointment – Supreme Court ruled that instructors continuing for over ten years in a row against mandatory student-teacher ratio requirements acquire a degree of permanency - Even if originally contractual, these appointments are treated as "substantive in character" because they were made through a public selection process and the nature of work is permanent and integral to the institution - The PAB is the sole central authority with financial powers to approve budgets and fix honoraria under the scheme - Once the PAB approved a proposal to pay ₹17,000/- per month, the State Executive Committee had no authority to unilaterally reduce or ignore this determination. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Termination of Service – Validity of Degrees – Prospective Application of Judicial Declaration – Protection of Students' Careers - The appellants were appointed as librarians by the State of Bihar in 2010 based on Bachelor of Library Science (B.Lib) degrees obtained in 2004 from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur - This university was established under the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya Act, 2002 - in Professor Yash Pal v. State of Chhattisgarh (2005) 5 SCC 420, the Supreme Court had declared the 2002 Act ultra vires, resulting in the cessation of all universities established under it - Relying on this, the State of Bihar terminated the appellants' services in 2015, contending their degrees were unrecognized - The Patna High Court upheld the termination - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the termination orders – i. Protection of Students' Interests: In Professor Yash Pal, Supreme Court specifically directed the State to protect students currently studying by affiliating their institutions with existing State universities - held that this logic extends to students who had already passed out before the Act was struck down, provided the university was not bogus and actual study was imparted; ii. No Fault of Appellants: The appellants could not be held at fault for studying in a university established under a then-valid State law - the State of Bihar appointed them in 2010—years after the Yash Pal judgment—meaning the State was or should have been aware of the legal status but allowed them to work for over five years; iii. Relief: directed the reinstatement of the appellants with continuity of service - back wages were denied as the appellants had not performed duties during the intervening period and the State was not solely at fault – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prof. Yashpal and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420; Paras 12-18] Priyanka Kumari v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2026 INSC 167 : AIR 2026 SC 1500

Vacancy Cap – Sanctity of 250-Vacancy Ceiling – Supreme Court rejected the Union's contention that the annual cap of 250 vacancies for PC is sacrosanct - Historical data revealed the cap was frequently breached for exigencies like the Kargil War or policy transitions - held that the vacancy cap cannot act as a shield against remedial action where the method of assessment is found to be unfair and discriminatory - Male officers cannot claim a legitimate expectation to compete only against other males for PC vacancies - Following the Delhi High Court's 2010 judgment in Babita Puniya, all parties were aware that women were entitled to PC consideration - Any expectation that runs contrary to the constitutional mandate of gender equality is inherently illegitimate. [Relied on Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 32-64] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Vacancy Computation – Dynamic Vacancy Model – Validity of the methodology used in the December 2020 Selection Board – Held, the "Dynamic Vacancy Model" was a rational one-time mechanism to distribute vacancies across 24 batches while maintaining the Navy's pyramidal structure and operational agility – The use of '15' as a divisor is anchored in service realities, representing the approximate years of service accompanying a grant of PC – The methodology does not suffer from arbitrariness or discrimination - Held, unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy's failure to disclose the evaluation framework and vacancy computation methodology prior to the 2020 and 2022 Boards violated basic norms of fairness and transparency. [Para 25, 38-48] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Effect of Abnormal and Unexplained Delay - The Supreme Court reiterated that an unexplained and abnormal delay in the initiation and conclusion of disciplinary proceedings defeats justice and causes inherent prejudice to the delinquent employee - A government servant has a fundamental right to have disciplinary proceedings against them concluded expeditiously - Subjecting an employee to protracted proceedings without any fault on their part inflicts unnecessary mental agony and monetary loss - Supreme Court must balance the need for clean and honest administration against the seriousness of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the charges when determining if delayed proceedings should be terminated. [Relied on State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154; Para 30, 31] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Medical Ethics – Shift of Charges and Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant, a retired medical professor, faced a show-cause notice from the Medical Council of India (MCI) alleging that he had falsely appeared as faculty for inspection in two different medical colleges during the same academic year - The appellant successfully defended this charge by demonstrating that he was abroad during the second inspection - the Ethics Committee, acting on the directions of the Executive Committee, subsequently found the appellant guilty of a separate charge failing to disclose his previous appearance at another medical college within his declaration form - This alternative charge was never part of the original show-cause notice, and no opportunity for an explanation was given to the appellant regarding this omission - Held: The procedure adopted by the Executive Committee suffers from a serious flaw and amounts to a clear breach of the principles of natural justice - A disciplinary authority cannot punish a delinquent employee on a completely different or alternative charge that was not originally framed, without giving a fresh show-cause notice or providing a fair and reasonable opportunity to respond - Such an action constitutes a denial of a fair hearing. [Relied on Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 SCC Online SC 2192; Paras 12] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453

Service Law – Promotion vs. Selection Post – Restructuring of Cadre and Framing of Rules under Article 309 – Vested Right to Promotion – Supercession of Executive Instructions: The respondents, serving as Assistant Section Officers, sought directions for the curation of a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) to consider their promotion to the post of Assistant Regional Transport Officer (ARTO) based on Executive Instructions dated 17.11.1981 - the State restructured the cadre, making the Government the appointing authority, and subsequently framed the Odisha Transport Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution - The 2021 Rules mandated filling the ARTO posts through a competitive examination conducted by the OPSC - The High Court directed the State to convene the DPC under the old Executive Instructions, holding that the vacancies arose prior to the new rules and that the pending recommendation for a DPC was saved from supersession - Allowing the appeals of the State, the Supreme Court held – i. An employee does not possess a vested right or a legitimate expectation to be promoted - The limited right available is only for the consideration of candidacy in accordance with the "rule in force" as on the date the consideration takes place; ii. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must necessarily be filled on the basis of the law/rules that existed on the date when they arose - The Government is fully entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up existing vacancies prior to the amendment or framing of new rules, especially when a restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient administration; iii. Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India strictly supersede any prior departmental executive instructions, circulars, or memoranda; iv. The savings clause in the 2021 Rules exempting "things done or omitted to be done" cannot save a mere inter-departmental letter or recommendation to convene a DPC, as it does not constitute a completed or concluded act under the old instructions; v. Furthermore, the post of ARTO was a selection post and not a promotional post - Ranking or position in a gradation list does not confer an automatic right to promotion to a selection post where merit and policy-driven selection methods govern - The method of selection is a matter of policy vesting entirely with the Government. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Raj Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 773; Union of India v. Somasundaram Viswanath, (1989) 1 SCC 175; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910; Paras 13-28] State of Odisha v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 514 : 2026 INSC 505

Service Law – Selection Process – Appointment – Indefeasible Right – Preservation of Records – Adverse Inference - No Indefeasible Right to Appointment - The State or its instrumentalities, while filling vacancies, are obligated to adhere to the principle of comparative merit based on performance - It is well-settled law that even if a candidate's name appears in a select list, they do not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment in the absence of a specific rule entitling them to such appointment - Where neither the recruitment rules nor the advertisement prescribed a duration for preserving selection records, the non-production or destruction of records after the finalization of appointments cannot be deemed mala fide - Mere non-production of examination records does not justify drawing an inference that the candidates had cleared the written test, especially when there is no material on record to indicate they had passed - A direction for appointment cannot be granted when the qualifications for the advertised post have subsequently been revised by the employer. [Relied on Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh & Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 15; Mohd. Rashid v. Director, Local Bodies, New Secretariat & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 582 [Para 13]; State of Manipur & Anr. v. Takhelmayum Khelendro Meitei & Ors., (2019) 3 SCC 331; Para 13-18] Durgapur Steel Plant v. Bidhan Chandra Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 481 : 2026 INSC 459

Service Law – Seniority and Promotion – Merger of Cadres – Interference by Court after long efflux of time –Dispute regarding inter se seniority between employees of the Engineering Department and the merged Town Planning Department of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation. G.O. (Ms.) No. 237 dated 26.09.1996 prescribed that Assistant Engineers transferred from the Town Planning Department were to be placed below the existing Assistant Engineers of the Engineering and Water Supply Department - The Government issued G.O. (D) No. 19 dated 18.01.2005 granting notional promotion to the Appellant (from the Engineering Department) with effect from 14.04.1997 and placing him above the redesignated Town Planning Inspectors - Challenged by Respondent No. 1 after a lapse of nearly two decades - The Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside G.O. (D) No. 19 long after the retirement of Respondent No. 1 and without noticing that a Three-Member Committee had previously scrutinized the promotions and found no illegality - both parties had already been promoted to higher posts subsequently, leaving no surviving contest - Interventions by third parties at the Supreme Court stage rejected as they were "fence-sitters" agitating stale claims. Impugned judgment set aside and G.O. (D) No. 19 restored. [Paras 16 - 26] T. Gnanavel v. R. Sasipriya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2026 INSC 446

Service Law — Imposition of Cost on Government Servant — Scope of Liability — A government servant cannot be penalized or made personally liable for heavy costs for adhering to a validly operating Government Order (G.O.) at the relevant point of time - An official following executive instructions limiting recruitment to sanctioned posts acts in accordance with the law, and subsequent retrospective changes or quashing of such instructions by a court cannot fasten adverse liability on them. [Para 6] C. Poorna Chandran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 508

Service Law — Model Employer — Principle of Approbate and Reprobate - The State repeatedly gave solemn undertakings before the High Court to frame a policy to regularize the left-out eligible workers, but subsequently resiled by citing Umadevi as a legal embargo and issuing a restrictive Office Memorandum in 2012 - Held, the State, as a model employer, bears a heightened constitutional obligation to act with probity, fairness, candor, and consistency - It cannot constantly give undertakings before a constitutional court and then resile from them on narrow technical grounds - The State cannot invoke the principle of approbate and reprobate to avoid its obligations. [Paras 37, 66 – 72] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Service Law — Moulding of Relief — Regularisation with Retrospective Seniority but without Backwages —Supreme Court directed the Institute to issue a regular appointment letter to the appellant within four weeks, placing him as the last candidate in the seniority list of Assistant Professors appointed through the same selection process, granting continuity of service but without any financial or monetary benefits for the past period. (Para 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Service Law — Regularization — Scope of Umadevi Judgment - The State contended that post the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, no regularization can be effected for employees not initially appointed against duly sanctioned posts - Held, Umadevi cannot be invoked as a blanket barrier or a mechanical shield to justify prolonged, exploitative engagements of a temporary/ad-hoc nature where employees have continuously performed perennial, essential, and recurring functions of the State for decades -Distinction between "illegal" and "irregular" appointments must be maintained. Long and continuous service is a highly relevant consideration. [Paras 73 – 76] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Service Tax

Service Tax — Finance Act, 1994 — Sections 65(40), 65(41), 65(105)(zu), 66A — Reverse charge — “Event Management Service” — Fees paid to foreign booking agencies for procuring speakers for Hindustan Times Leadership Summit — HELD: Not taxable as Event Management Service — Booking of speakers is distinct from managing, organizing, planning, or presenting an event — Mere procurement of speakers does not amount to “event management” — Presence of speakers being essential to the Summit does not convert booking agents into “event managers” — Tax cannot be imposed by stretching the statutory definition — Strict interpretation of taxing statutes must prevail – Further held that i. The contracts with Washington Speakers Bureau and Harry Walker Agency were speaker-booking contracts, not contracts for event management; they did not involve management of venue, logistics, stage, publicity, sound, light, security, invitations, or coordination of the event; ii. “Event management” under Section 65(40) requires services relating to planning, promotion, organizing, or presentation of an event; mere facilitation of a speaker's appearance does not satisfy this test; iii. The CBIC/TRU Circular dated 08.08.2002 supports the assessee, as it contemplates an event manager as one who manages venue, stage, artists, logistics, and production of the event — functions absent in the present case; iv. Even if speakers are central to the Summit, participation in the event is not equivalent to managing the event; booking agents cannot be treated as “event managers”; v. Applying the principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, tax cannot be imposed by analogy or inference if the service does not fall squarely within the statutory entry; vi. Applying the common parlance test, ordinary understanding of “event management” does not cover speaker-booking services – Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 SCC Online SC 2006; CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, 1967 SCC Online SC 154 (Para 46); Indo International Industries v. CST, (1981) 2 SCC 528; Paras 28, 37-41, 44-48] HT Media Ltd. v. Principal Commissioner Delhi South Goods and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : 2026 INSC 66 : AIR 2026 SC 560

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Section 18 – Appeal against ICC Recommendations – Jurisdiction of Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act is maintainable before the Armed Forces Tribunal when read in juxtaposition with Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Held that the High Court erred in holding that the appellant had no right of appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act against the recommendations of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Short Service Commission

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - Key Findings - i. Structural Distortion in Evaluation: ACRs authored in an environment where SSCOs had no future in the service are "structurally distorted" and cannot be deployed to their disadvantage when they are suddenly placed in a competitive fray for PC; ii. Arbitrary Implementation of Policy: The hurried implementation of Human Resource Policy (HRP) 01/2019, which introduced new criteria like "Categorisation" and "Mandatory In-Service Courses" (MISCs) without providing a reasonable gestation period, deprived officers of a meaningful opportunity to meet eligibility requirements; iii. Pregnancy and Gender Equality: The failure to accommodate officers who lost a round of consideration due to a temporary lowering of medical category on account of pregnancy amounts to arbitrariness - The choice to become a parent cannot be equated with an unwillingness to pursue professional advancement. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors (Civil Appeal No. 14681/2024); AU Tayyaba v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 688; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 14-17, 26-32, 35-39] Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - The Supreme Court has held that evaluating Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) for Permanent Commission based on ACRs authored during a period when they were ineligible for PC is inherently unfair and arbitrary - Supreme Court held that the evaluative lens applied by assessing officers is conditioned by the available career trajectory; thus, reports intended only to assess suitability for short-term extension cannot be retrospectively treated as reliable indicators for long-term retention or advanced leadership potential - While declining reinstatement for released officers due to operational effectiveness, Supreme Court directed that SSCOs considered in the 2019–2021 Boards be deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service for pensionary benefits as a one-time measure - For future Boards, the Air Force must disclose vacancies and detailed evaluation criteria prior to the selection process. Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985

Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) – Repeal and Abatement of Proceedings – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Section 252 and Eighth Schedule – Noted that after the repeal of SICA on 01.12.2016, any appeal pending before the AAIFR stood abated - Companies were granted a 180-day window to approach the NCLT under the IBC - Where Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (JUL) and Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. (GDCL) failed to file any reference before the NCLT within the prescribed period, the appeal pending before the AAIFR abated, and the BIFR's recommendation for winding up of the company stood revived. [Paras 173–174] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364

Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026

Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 – Statutory Nature and Enforcement – Supreme Court observed that the SWM Rules, 2026 (effective from 01.04.2026), framed under Sections 3, 6, and 25 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and placed before Parliament as per Section 26, are not mere delegated legislation but represent the "will expressed by the parliament" - The transition to a "digital-first circular economy framework" introduces Extended Bulk Waste Generator Responsibility (EBWGR) and mandates a four-stream waste segregation (Wet, Dry, Sanitary, and Special Care). Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Special Courts

Special Courts Act, 2009 (Bihar) — Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant if the property is held by a relative or spouse who was also put to notice – Noted that "abatement" in criminal proceedings discontinuation due to the death of the accused is distinct from "acquittal" and does not constitute a comment on the merits of the case - Under Section 19 of the BSCA, confiscated property can only be returned in two specific scenarios: (a) modification or annulment of the order by the High Court, or (b) acquittal by the Special Court - Since the Act does not account for the death of a public servant as a ground for returning property, and because non-public servants can be proceeded against for holding illegally acquired assets, the High Court is required to decide such appeals on their merits rather than dropping them due to the death of the primary accused. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183; Gurmail Singh v. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559; Para 8-12] State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2026 INSC 272

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Discretionary Relief – Impact of Unexplained Delay / Laches in Filing Suit – Approaching Court at the Fag End of Limitation - For claiming an equitable relief like specific performance, the plaintiff's conduct must be beyond reproach - Merely filing a suit within the three-year statutory limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act is not enough - The plaintiff must approach the Court promptly and with diligence - An unexplained delay or waiting until the fag end of the limitation period to file a suit after a categorical refusal/breach by the defendant reflects a clear lack of continuous readiness and willingness, thereby disentitling the plaintiff to discretionary relief. [Relied on N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115; His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526; Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) by LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243; Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512; Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, (2024) 13 SCC 80; Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 311; Paras 35-42] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) – Financial Readiness – Evaluation of Financial Documents Generated Post-Suit - To establish financial readiness, the plaintiff must place reliable and acceptable evidence on record proving the availability of sufficient funds at the relevant time namely, within the contractually stipulated period or at the time of filing the suit - Financial documents, such as Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs), generated several years after the institution of the suit cannot be accepted as proof of financial readiness during the crucial interregnum between the agreement's execution and the suit's filing. [Paras 35-43] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) (Prior to 2018 Amendment) – Specific Performance of Contract – Continuous Readiness and Willingness – Nature, Burden of Proof, and Financial Capacity - The relief of specific performance is an equitable remedy rooted in discretion and governed by settled legal principles - Section 16(c) mandatorily requires a plaintiff seeking specific performance to explicitly aver and continuously prove both "readiness" (signifying financial capacity) and "willingness" (reflecting conduct and intent) from the date of the execution of the agreement right up to the date of the decree - Failure to satisfy these requirements disentitles the plaintiff to relief. [Paras 29-31] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) – Readiness and Willingness – Requirement of – Readiness and willingness must be gathered from the entirety of facts and circumstances, including the overall conduct of parties - It is not a theoretical requirement; payment of a substantial portion of the sale consideration can be a significant indicator of the plaintiff's readiness - so long as a suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the relief - reiterated that the question of readiness and willingness is a question of fact to be determined based on the conduct of the parties and material circumstances. [Relied on Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap v. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar (2020) 15 SCC 731; Paras 11-21] A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Key Legal Findings by Supreme Court – i. Validity of Agreement- The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court's finding that the sale agreement was genuine and valid, noting that the defendant's plea of it being a "security document" was an improbable afterthought unsupported by evidence; ii. Adverse Inference- The defendants' failure to reply to the plaintiff's legal notice creates an adverse inference against them; iii. Readiness and Willingness Established - The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, by paying approximately 93% of the consideration and issuing a legal notice promptly after the defendants became evasive, demonstrated sufficient continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Act. A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 — Exercise of Discretion — While considering applications for rescission or extension of time, the Court must adopt a justice-oriented approach and balance equities - The test is whether the decree-holder's conduct amounts to a "positive refusal" or "willful negligence" to perform their part - Delay in deposit need not be explained with the same rigor as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court may compensate the judgment-debtor for the delay by imposing additional terms or costs on the decree-holder - The doctrine of merger applies only when a higher forum passes an order on merits - An order dismissing an appeal for non-prosecution (default) is specifically excluded from the definition of a "decree" under Section 2(2) of the CPC and does not result in the merger of the Trial Court's decree with the Appellate Court's order - An application under Section 28 should be treated as an application in the original suit and numbered as an interlocutory application, even if filed before the Execution Court (provided it is the court of first instance). [Relied on Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642; Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 584; Sardar Mohar Singh v. Mangilal, (1997) 9 SCC 217; Paras 25-38] Anand Narayan Shukla v Jagat Dhari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2026 INSC 463

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 — Extension of Time and Rescission of Contract — A decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree - Supreme Court does not become functus officio after passing the decree and retains jurisdiction until the sale deed is executed - Under Section 28, the Court has discretionary power to either rescind the contract or extend the time for deposit of purchase money - There is no automatic rescission of the decree for non-payment within the stipulated period unless the decree specifically provides that the suit shall stand dismissed upon such failure. Anand Narayan Shukla v Jagat Dhari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2026 INSC 463

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Execution of Decree for Specific Performance — Conditional Decree — Deemed Dismissal upon Default - Whether a decree of specific performance becomes inexecutable if the plaintiff-decree holder fails to deposit the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated by the Court - Held: Yes, A decree passed in a suit for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree, and the Court retains control over it until the sale deed is executed or the decree is rendered inexecutable - If a conditional decree directs the execution of a sale deed subject to the deposit of the balance sale consideration within a specified period, the obligation is reciprocal - Non-compliance with the condition to deposit the amount within the stipulated time without applying for an extension within that period leads to the automatic dismissal of the suit - Supreme Court rejected the contention that subsequent permission by the Executing Court to deposit the money after the expiry of the period amounts to a "deemed extension" or condonation of delay - Once the time limit expires without compliance or an extension application, the decree ceases to exist in the eyes of the law and becomes completely inexecutable. Habban Shah v. Sheruddin, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2026 INSC 451

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Necessity of Formal Application for Rescission of Contract - Is it mandatory for the judgment-debtor to file a formal application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act to rescind the contract before objecting to the executability of a defaulted decree? - Held: No, moving an application under Section 28 of the Act for rescinding the contract due to non-compliance is optional and immaterial - The failure of the judgment-debtor to seek formal rescission does not revive a decree that has already become inexecutable due to a default in payment - Supreme Court in given circumstances is not powerless to treat the contract as rescinded for non-compliance with the condition. [Relied on P.R. Yelumalai v. N.M. Ravi (2015) 9 SCC 52; Prem Jeevan v. K.S. Venkata Raman and Another (2017) 11 SCC 57; Balbir Singh and Another v. Baldev Singh (Dead) Through LRs and Others (2025) 3 SCC 543; N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and Others (1995) 5 SCC 115; Paras 22-50] Habban Shah v. Sheruddin, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2026 INSC 451

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Specific Performance of Contract — Readiness and Willingness — Non-appearance of plaintiff in the witness box — Effect of — Adverse Inference and Rebuttal - Non-appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box to prove the plaint case gives rise to an adverse presumption that the case set up is incorrect - this adverse presumption is a rebuttable presumption - If the presumption is successfully rebutted by other cogent evidence on record, it would not be material or applicable - Where the plaintiff's Manager deposes about the entire transaction based upon personal knowledge, having worked with the plaintiff since the execution of the agreement, such evidence cannot be discarded and sufficiently corroborates the plaint allegations, thereby successfully rebutting the adverse inference. [Paras 41, 42 & 43] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 31 – Intersection with Criminal Law – Held, it is a gross error to hold that criminal proceedings cannot be initiated unless registered instruments (like sale deeds) relied upon by the accused are first cancelled by a civil court - Civil and criminal remedies can proceed simultaneously even when allegations are identical. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 41-60] Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2026 INSC 362

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sham and Nominal Documents – Loan Transaction vs. Sale Agreement – Probative Value of Contemporaneous Documents – Held that where a registered sale agreement and a separate MoU are executed on the same day, purchased from the same stamp vendor, and witnessed by the same individuals, such facts strongly probablize the defense that the sale agreement was merely security for a loan transaction rather than a genuine sale. [Paras 10-12] Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Discretionary Relief – Bona Fides of Plaintiff – Suppression of Material Facts – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit for specific performance where the plaintiff suppressed the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) executed on the same day as the sale agreement - held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief that must be denied if there is even a slight doubt regarding the plaintiff's bona fides or if material facts have been withheld from the Court - A plaintiff approaching the Court with "unclean hands" by failing to mention a contemporaneous document that characterizes the sale agreement as a sham/nominal document for a loan transaction is not entitled to relief. Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 41(h) — Injunction when refused — Maintainability of suit for injunction simpliciter when title and possession are in dispute — The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision that a suit for a bare mandatory injunction is not maintainable when there is a serious cloud over the title and possession of the property - the appropriate and efficacious remedy is to seek a decree for possession and declaration of title, rather than mere injunction - A suit for mandatory injunction without seeking possession is barred under Section 41(h) as an equally efficacious relief can be obtained through the usual mode of a suit for possession. [Para 13, 16, 22, 23] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Necessary Parties – While a lis pendens transferee is not a necessary party, the vendor remains a necessary party in a suit for specific performance to fulfill contractual obligations and special covenants - if the vendor's estate is represented by multiple substituted heirs, the death of one such heir without timely substitution of their own LRs does not lead to the abatement of the entire appeal if other heirs of the vendor are still on record – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram & Others (1971) 1 SCC 265; Bhurey Khan v. Yaseen Khan (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 331; Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Deorajin Debi (Smt.) & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 941; Lala Durga Prasad and Others v. Lala Deep Chand and Others (1953) 2 SCC 509; Shivashankara v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char 2023 LiveLaw SC 261; Paras 36 - 44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Equitable Relief – Refund and Restitution – Complete Justice - In a suit for specific performance concerning an Agreement to Sell from 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness as he lacked the financial wherewithal to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5.21 crores on the due date and failed to visit the Sub-Registrar's office - Noted that the respondents also failed to fulfill contractual obligations regarding property mutation and conversion - Holding that the grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief after a passage of seventeen years – Supreme Court emphasized that equity must prevent unjust enrichment and restore parties to their original positions when both are at fault - To adjust equities and bring quietus to a dispute protracted for over a decade, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's order (which had allowed forfeiture of Rs. 60 lakhs earnest money) and directed the respondents to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores) to the appellant for full restitution – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5-8] Subhash Aggarwal v. Mahender Pal Chhabra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : 2026 INSC 11

Sports Law

Sports Administration – Applicability of S. Nithya Directions to Cricket Associations – Mandatory Inclusion of Sports Persons – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions which had applied the mandate from S. Nithya v. Union of India (requiring 75% of members and key office bearers to be eminent sports persons) to a District Cricket Association - Held, the directions in S. Nithya arose from the specific context of athletics governance and are inapplicable to Cricket associations, which are governed by the specialized regulatory framework established in the BCCI case. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - Cricket Administration – District Cricket Associations – Conformity with BCCI Constitution – Held, the judgment in BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar does not mandate that District Associations must model their regulations and bye-laws on the exact lines of the BCCI Constitution - While State Associations are required to bring their constitutions in conformity with the BCCI, this requirement does not automatically extend to the internal composition and business of District-level bodies through judicial review. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - Public Character of Sports – Material Resources of the Community – The Court emphasized that sporting facilities and opportunities are "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) and organizers are "institutions of the national life" under Article 38 - District Associations should volunteer to adopt "Sadhana" (endeavor) toward good governance, transparency, and the exclusion of conflicts of interest to ensure sports do not remain a privilege of the urban economic elite – Appeal allowed. [Relied on BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar (2016) 8 SCC 535; Paras 13-23] Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - The Supreme Court lifted the ban imposed on BJP Leader Anurag Thakur from holding office in the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 143

Stale Claims and Representations – The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of reviving stale or dead claims by making repeated representations followed by a prayer to "consider" them is disapproved - Rejection of a belated representation does not furnish a fresh cause of action - Courts must satisfy themselves that a claim relates to a "live issue" before issuing directions for consideration. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Stamp Act

Stamp Act, 1899 / Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Insufficient Stamping – Effect on Insolvency Claims - The defect of insufficient stamping of a document is curable in nature and does not go to the root of the validity of the instrument or render it void or unenforceable - The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State and is not intended to be used as a weapon by a litigant to defeat the cause of opponents - an insolvency claim cannot be rejected or negated merely because the underlying corporate guarantee is alleged to be insufficiently stamped or lacks payment under a specific state stamp legislation when executed in another jurisdiction. [Paras 28 - 32] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Procedure for Impounding – Section 33 and 37 – When an insufficiently stamped document is produced before a Court, it must be impounded under Section 33 – Supreme Court has two options: (i) admit the document after collecting the deficit duty and the ten-fold penalty, then send a copy to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 37(1); or (ii) transmit the original document to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 37(2) for adjudication of duty and penalty. [Relied on In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Gangappa v. Fakkirappa, (2019) 3 SCC 788; Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana, (1962) 2 SCR 333; Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal, (1978) 3 SCC 236; Paras 15-21] Krishnavathi Sharma v. Bhagwandas Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 309 : 2026 INSC 300

Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) – Section 34 Proviso – Mandatory Nature of Penalty – Supreme Court noted that under the proviso to Section 34, an insufficiently stamped document can only be admitted in evidence upon payment of the deficient duty along with a mandatory penalty of ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof - The High Court erred in traveling beyond its jurisdiction by absolving the party from this mandatory penalty. Krishnavathi Sharma v. Bhagwandas Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 309 : 2026 INSC 300

Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) – Sections 33, 34, 37, 38, and 39 – Admissibility of Unstamped/Insufficiently Stamped Documents – Power of Courts to Exempt Penalty – Held: The High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, direct the payment of deficient stamp duty while simultaneously exempting the mandatory penalty - The power to determine valuation and decide on the penalty payable rests with the competent authority (Deputy Commissioner) under the Act - Non-payment of stamp duty is a curable defect, but a document can only be admitted in evidence after it is properly stamped and the requisite penalty is paid. Krishnavathi Sharma v. Bhagwandas Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 309 : 2026 INSC 300

Stamp Act - Agreement to Sell - Stamp Duty - Possession - Relationship between Landlord and Tenant - Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 - The Supreme Court addressed whether an agreement to sell, entered into by a tenant who had been in possession of the property for fifty years, should be treated as a "conveyance" for the purpose of charging stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 47A of Schedule I-A of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 – Supreme Court noted Key Findings – i. Nexus of Possession: For Explanation I to Article 47A to apply, the delivery of possession must have a nexus to the agreement to sell meaning it must "follow" the agreement or be "evidenced" by it as a result of the sale transaction; ii. Continuance of Tenancy: Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession remained that of a tenant and was not converted to that of a vendee - This was evidenced by the fact that the respondent successfully pursued an eviction order against the appellant as a tenant even after the agreement to sell was executed; iii. Nature of Agreement: Since the possession was not "followed by" or "evidenced" as a result of the agreement to sell, but rather preceded it by fifty years due to a pre-existing tenancy, the agreement did not constitute a "deemed conveyance" - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, ruling that the appellant was not liable for additional stamp duty or penalty and directing the Trial Court to mark the agreement as an Exhibit. [Distinguished from Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 329; Paras 6-12] Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2026 INSC 59 : AIR 2026 SC 637

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955; Rule 22(i)(a), Rule 22(i)(c), Rule 20 and Rule 7 — Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 33C(2) — Entitlement to Pension — Voluntary Abandonment vs. Voluntary Retirement — Qualifying Service - Maintainability of Claim under Section 33C(2) of ID Act - The Supreme Court noted that while the Labour Court and High Court dismissed the appellant's petition at the threshold on the technical ground of non-maintainability holding that proceedings under Section 33C(2) are executionary in nature and cannot adjudicate disputed pensionary rights the Court chose to decide the matter on its merits. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Computation of Qualifying Service under Rules 7 and 20 - Applying Rules 7 and 20, Supreme Court held that pensionable service is reckoned from the date of confirmation (admission to the fund) and not the initial date of appointment - the appellant's service (17.02.1979 to 12.12.1998) totalled 19 years, 9 months, and 25 days, failing to meet the mandatory 20-year threshold. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility for Pension under Rule 22(i)(c) — Voluntary Retirement Requirement - The appellant sought pension under Rule 22(i)(c), which requires 20 years of pensionable service and retirement at the employee's request in writing – Noted that the appellant ineligible as his cessation of service was not "voluntary retirement" but a "voluntary abandonment of service" declared by the Bank following his unauthorized absence from 24.01.1998 to 11.12.1998 and failure to respond to notices. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility under Rule 22(i)(a) — Age and Service Criteria Under Rule 22(i)(a) - an employee must complete 20 years of service and attain 50 years of age – Held that appellant failed both conditions, as his service was less than 20 years and he had not reached the age of 50 at the time of cessation - Even if the probation period were included, the claim would fail due to the age requirement. [Relied on Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Radhey Shyam Pandey, 2020 (6) SCC 438; Rugmini Ganesh w/o Ganesh Raman Iyer vs. State Bank of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3884; Paras 17-32] K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

Subordinate Legislation

Subordinate Legislation — Grounds of Challenge — Distinction from Plenary Legislation – Held that A piece of subordinate legislation does not enjoy the same degree of immunity as a statute enacted by a competent legislature. It can be validly challenged and struck down if it fails to conform to the parent statute under which it is made, exceeds the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act, or is contrary to any other law of the land - The Supreme Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal filed by the Special Police Establishment - maintained the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court directing the supply of information regarding the prosecution sanction process to the respondent - The Notification dated August 25, 2011, issued by the General Administration Department of Madhya Pradesh, was struck down to the extent that it excluded the SPE from the applicability of the RTI Act - The Supreme Court clarified that it did not examine the notification's validity regarding the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences, which will continue to operate normally. [Relied on Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others (1984 INSC 231); State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. P. Krishnamurthy and Others (2006 INSC 177); Para 15-22] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644

Subordinate Legislation — Suo Motu Jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts — Striking Down an Invalid Rule/Notification in the Absence of Explicit Challenge or Prayers in Pleadings - The absence of a specific prayer or explicit pleadings challenging the validity of a piece of subordinate legislation (such as a government notification) does not deter a Constitutional Court from evaluating and declaring it invalid if it patently violates fundamental rights or exceeds the authority conferred by the enabling parent statute – Held that while suo motu powers to strike down subordinate legislation must be exercised sparingly and with caution, a writ court as the "sentinel on the qui vive" has the plenary duty to guard against breaches of law and logic. When a party relies heavily on an invalid notification to deny statutory rights (like information under the RTI Act), the Court can test its vires, provided a full and fair opportunity is afforded to the State to defend the legislation - In the present case, since the Advocate General and Senior Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh were heard extensively and allowed to file written submissions to justify the Notification's validity, the lack of an initial challenge by the writ petitioner before the High Court was not fatal. [Relied on Bharathidasan University and Another v. All India Council for Technical Education and Others (2001 INSC 454); Union of India and Others v. Manjurani Routray and Others (2023 INSC 787); Paras 8-11] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644

Succession Act, 1925

Succession Act, 1925 – Section 263 & Section 283(1)(c) – Revocation of Probate – Just Cause – Suppression of Material Facts & Non-issuance of Citations - The Supreme Court restored the order of the District Court revoking the probate of an unregistered Will, which had been granted to the testator's daughter - Supreme Court found that Respondent No. 1 had deliberately suppressed material facts and failed to implead necessary parties, including her two brothers (or their legal heirs) and the subsequent purchasers/alienees (Appellants) who had acquired rights over the suit property prior to the initiation of the probate proceedings - Pendente Lite vs. Prior Alienees - A clear distinction must be made between a transferee pendente lite and an alienee who acquires an interest in the testator's estate prior to the commencement of probate proceedings - An alienee who acquires an interest prior to the filing of the probate petition is an interested party entitled to special citations under Section 283(1)(c) of the Act - Just Cause for Revocation - Fraudulent suppression of material transactions (such as a registered sale deed executed by the testator during his lifetime after the alleged execution of the Will) and the intentional omission to cite parties who have a caveatable or slight interest in the estate constitutes a "just cause" under Explanation (b) and Illustration (ii) of Section 263 of the Act. S. Leorex Sebastian v. Sarojini, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2026 INSC 400

Succession Act, 1925 – Section 263 – Caveatable Interest – Entitlement to Oppose Probate - Any interest in the estate of the deceased, however slight, or even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle an aggrieved party to file a caveat, oppose a testamentary document, or seek revocation of probate if the grant was obtained without their knowledge or proper citations - A purchaser who acquires an interest from the legal heirs or from the testator himself during his lifetime falls within the ambit of a person "who ought to have been cited" under Illustration (ii) to Section 263. [Relied on Basanti Devi v. Ravi Prakash Ram Prasad Jaiswal, (2008) 1 SCC 26; Sunil Gupta v. Kiran Girhotra, (2007) 8 SCC 506; Seth Beni Chand v. Kamla Kunwar & Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 554; G. Gopal v. C. Bhaskar and Ors, (2008) 10 SCC 489; Paras 20-25] S. Leorex Sebastian v. Sarojini, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2026 INSC 400

Succession Act, 1925 – Sections 372 and 383 – Succession Certificate – Revocation of Certificate – Held that a succession certificate is liable to be revoked under Section 383 if the application is defective or material facts are suppressed - Describing the widow of the deceased incorrectly as the wife of another person and failing to implead a known minor heir constitutes a serious legal infirmity justifying the invocation of Section 383. [Relied on Parimal vs. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545; Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 757; Para 8-10] Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306

Succession Act, 1925 - Inherent and Plenary Powers of Constitutional Court — Testamentary Jurisdiction — Protection of Estate in medio — held that a High Court, while sitting in its testamentary jurisdiction, does not cease to be a Constitutional Court of Record or a Court of Equity - When an estate is brought under the protective umbrella of the Court through the appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, it is in custodia legis – If the Supreme Court discovers glaring irregularities, deceit, suppression of bank accounts, or siphoning of funds by a self-styled executor using shell or dormant trusts, it cannot remain a silent spectator - It is entirely within the inherent and plenary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India to direct a police investigation to unearth the fraud, safeguard the property, and protect the process of the Court from abuse - Key Takeaways & Statutory Interpretations – i. Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 211, 247 & 307 — Authority of Executor vs. Administrator pendente lite - While an executor derives authority from the Will, such authority is not a license to plunder cash assets when rival Wills are propounded and the matter is fiercely contested - The appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 suspends the powers of the executor, making the Administrator the "hand of the court" to preserve and maintain the estate; ii. The Succession Act is Not a Bar to Criminal Investigation - The Indian Succession Act governs the administration of estates but does not grant immunity to individuals committing criminal breach of trust, forgery, or conspiracy; iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 340 - Directing a criminal investigation into a larger conspiracy of siphoning funds through fraudulent banking transactions does not strictly fall under Section 340 of the CrPC (which deals with offences affecting the administration of justice) - broader inherent powers can be exercised without being strictly shackled by the procedural bars or appellate restrictions under Section 341 of the CrPC – iv. No Prejudice Caused by Investigation - Mere initiation of an investigation to uncover the truth and assist the Testamentary Court in tracing siphoned assets does not infringe upon personal liberty or cause actual or substantive prejudice. [Relied on Paras M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433; Anthony C. Leo v. Nandlal Bal Krishnan, (1996) 11 SCC 376; Pandurang Shamrao Laud v. Dwarkadas Kalliandas, 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 154; Paras 28-43] Bai Avabai Hormusji Tata Trust v. Shernaz Faroukh Lawyer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 542 : 2026 INSC 540

Validity and Proof of Execution – Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 – Succession Act, 1925; Section 63 – Requirements for proving a Will – The court must evaluate whether the Will was executed by the testator and represents their final testamentary disposition - Proof does not necessitate mathematical accuracy, but must satisfy the conscience of a prudent mind - Compliance with statutory formalities under Section 63 of the Succession Act is mandatory, requiring attestation by at least two witnesses who signed in the presence of the testator - Examination of at least one alive and capable attesting witness satisfies the evidentiary requirement to prove due execution - If suspicious circumstances shroud the execution, the propounder bears a heavier initial onus to dispel them by offering cogent explanations to satisfy the judicial conscience. [Paras 27 – 29] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Exclusion of Natural Heirs – Whether the exclusion of natural heirs amounts to a suspicious circumstance – The primary objective of executing a Will is to alter the natural line of succession - Mere deprivation or exclusion of natural heirs, by itself, is legally insufficient to construe a circumstance as suspicious or to invalidate a Will outright - Prudence requires an indication of the testator's mind regarding the disposition; however, where the terms of the Will explicitly state that sufficient provisions or properties have already been provided to the spouse and children during the testator's lifetime, such exclusion cannot vitiate the validity of the Will. [Paras 32 - 34] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Succession Act, 1925 - An application for revocation of probate under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 filed in 2022 to revoke a probate granted in 1995 was barred by limitation. The limitation period under Article 137 begins to run from the date the applicant acquires knowledge (including constructive knowledge) of the grant of probate. Initiation of mutation proceedings pursuant to the probate and service of notice thereon in 2011/2013 constitutes constructive notice to the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents. Failure to inquire into the basis of such notice precludes a later plea of ignorance in 2019. A party receiving notice from a Court is expected to make reasonable inquiries regarding the same. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the Single Judge's judgment dismissing the revocation application as time-barred. Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2026 INSC 602

Succession Act, 1925 - Revocation of Probate – Limitation – Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 applies - Where the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not prescribe any period of limitation for grant of probate or for filing an application for revocation of probate already granted, such proceedings are governed by the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a limitation period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2026 INSC 602

Telecom Law

Telecom Law – Spectrum Allocation – Liability for Reserve Price – Effective Date for Commencement of Liability - The Supreme Court held that telecom licensees whose Unified Access Service (UAS) licences were quashed by the Court on February 2, 2012, but who continued operations to ensure non-disruption of services to the general public, are liable to pay the reserve price fixed for the November 2012 auction starting from February 2, 2012 – Held that the liability commences from the date the original licences were declared illegal and quashed, not from the date of subsequent orders or the date of fresh auctions. Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174 : AIR 2026 SC 1123

Telegraph Act, 1885

Telegraph Act, 1885 – Section 4 – Nature of Telecom License – The Central Government possesses the exclusive privilege of establishing and operating telecommunications - A license granted under the proviso to Section 4 is a contract between the licensor and licensee but is not an ordinary commercial agreement; it is a statutory grant shaped by public law obligations. [Paras 18, 32] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Tender Process

Public Tender — Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) — Permissibility of Fixed Deposit (FD) vs Demand Draft (DD) for out-of-state bidders — Interpretation of tender terms — Mandatory vs Directory - The High Court disqualified the appellant (an out-of-state bidder) on the ground that it submitted its EMD in the form of a Fixed Deposit (FD) instead of a Demand Draft (DD) - The High Court interpreted the relevant tender terms as rendering a DD strictly mandatory for out-of-state bidders - Reversing the High Court's view, the Supreme Court analyzed Clause 2.13 and Clause 2.15 of the Notice Inviting Tender - noted that Clause 2.13(a)(iv) permitted EMD submission via "Approved Interest Bearing Security", a character that a Fixed Deposit (FD) definitely possesses - Clause 2.13(b) and Clause 2.15 employed the permissive phrase "may submit" and "may" concerning the submission of a bank draft by out-of-state bidders – Held that the terms of the tender document clearly indicate that the requirement of providing a DD for out-of-state bidders was merely an option and not a mandatory condition - A Fixed Deposit issued by a scheduled bank in favor of the tendering authority satisfies the technical requirements of the EMD under the category of an "Approved Interest Bearing Security" - The High Court erred in invalidating the appellant's technical qualification. [Paras 7- 10] RR Constructions and Infrastructure v. Gayatri Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 530 : 2026 INSC 514

Tender Process – Comparison of Dissimilar Plots – Irrationality – the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) cancelled the appellant's bid for a 3150 sq. metre plot on the ground that smaller plots (123-132 sq. metres) fetched higher rates per square metre - Held, the subject plot (large industrial area) cannot be compared with smaller plots as demand for the former is scarce - Cancelling a bid based on such comparison constitutes an "irrelevant consideration" and is "arbitrary, whimsical, and irrational". Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Town Planning

Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (Maharashtra) — Section 149 — Bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Court — Planning Authority Actions - Where a public notice is issued by a Municipal Corporation in its capacity as a planning authority under the MRTP Act alleging unauthorized constructions and proposing demolition, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is expressly barred under Section 149 of the MRTP Act - Reliefs aimed at restraining a Corporation from exercising powers traceable to such statutory authority fall within the domain of public law and cannot be effectively adjudicated in a civil suit designed for the determination of private civil rights inter se parties. [Paras 36 - 43] Unchgaon Village Panchayat v. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2026 INSC 405

Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (Punjab) – Sections 70, 75, 76, 79, 80 and 81 – Master Plan – Change of Land Use (CLU) – Legality of granting CLU for a 'Red' category industry in a 'Rural Agricultural Zone' contrary to the notified Master Plan. Held: A Master Plan is a statutory instrument, not a mere policy document. Once published in the Official Gazette, it binds both authorities and the public - Land use permissibility must be determined with reference to operative zoning; it cannot be displaced by ad hoc permissions or internal administrative file notings. Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Town Planning - Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 – Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 – Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 – Property Tax vs. Service Charges – Exemption from Municipal Taxation - Territorial Jurisdiction of Municipal Corporation over Industrial Areas - the Trans Thane Creek (TTC) Industrial Area developed by the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) falls within the notified municipal limits of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) - The revenue jurisdiction of the villages remains unaffected by their vesting with the MIDC for development - The power to impose and collect property tax (which includes water tax, sewerage tax, general tax, etc.) vests exclusively with the Municipal Corporation under Sections 127 and 128A of the MMC Act - the MIDC is only empowered under Section 17 of the MID Act to levy fees or service charges to cover its maintenance expenses - A fee/service charge linked to a specific amenity involves the element of quid pro quo and cannot be equated to a tax - the NMMC has the authority to levy property tax even if plot holders pay service charges to the MIDC. [Paras 58 – 69, 73-89] Arjun Dass v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2026 INSC 592

Town Planning - Scope of Exemption Under Clause 7(1) of the First Schedule, MRTP Act - The statutory exemption from property tax provided under Clause 7(1) of the First Schedule of the MRTP Act applies not only to the MIDC itself but extends to all individual unit/plot holders occupying lands vesting in the MIDC - Restricting this exemption solely to the authority would render the provision otiose and absurd - This tax exemption is conditional and remains operational only so long as the industrial authority continues to provide the municipal amenities - Once the maintenance and infrastructure responsibilities are transferred to the Municipal Corporation (as done via the MoU/Agreement dated 01.12.2005 between MIDC and NMMC), the exemption ceases to exist - the NMMC is fully empowered to collect property tax from the plot holders from the date of such transfer. [Relied on Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) 1 SCC 412; Corporation of Calcutta and Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 65; Sreenivasa General Traders and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1983) 4 SCC 353; Government of Kerala and Another v. Mother Superior Adoration Convent, (2021) 5 SCC 602; Paras 97 – 105] Arjun Dass v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2026 INSC 592

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 – Section 126(1)(b) – Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 – Regulation 34 & Appendix VII-A – Acquisition of Reserved Land – Grant of Additional Transferable Development Rights (TDR) / Floor Space Index (FSI) for Development of Amenity - The Landowner surrendered land reserved for a 'garden' and developed the amenity at its own cost as per Municipal specifications - The Appellant-Corporation released TDR for the bare land but rejected the claim for additional amenity TDR, citing an Letter of Intent (LOI), a registered Undertaking, and a Maintenance Agreement wherein the Landowner had agreed not to claim amenity TDR in exchange for maintaining the garden on an "adoption basis" for 20 years – Held that Statutory compensation under Section 126(1)(b) is two-fold - (i) FSI/TDR equal to the area of land surrendered, and (ii) additional FSI/TDR against the development/construction of the amenity - Once statutory compensation is ordained, the executive cannot impose extra-statutory conditions or contract out of the statute via negotiations to derogate from the landowner's rights - There is an inherent imbalance of bargaining power between the acquiring authority and the landowner - The condition in the LOI, Undertaking, and Maintenance Agreement forcing the landowner to abjure a part of statutory compensation is invalid - Granting maintenance rights on an adoption basis is independent of the statutory right to acquisition compensation and cannot substitute it. [Paras 43 - 49, 51 - 56] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517

Trademarks Act, 1999

Trademarks Act, 1999 – Title and Registration – The Supreme Court clarified that the NCLT and NCLAT are not the appropriate fora to decide highly contentious issues of trademark title involving technical collaboration agreements, contingent assignments, and the effect of BIFR restraint orders - Supreme Court set aside findings on title from both the NCLT and NCLAT, leaving the parties free to litigate the issue of title before a competent civil court or authority. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels (P) Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 583; SREI Multiple Asset Investment Trust Vision India Fund v. Deccan Chronicle Marketeers (2023) 7 SCC 295; Ebix Singapore (P) Ltd. v. Educomp Solutions Ltd. (CoC) (2022) 2 SCC 401; Paras 26- 47] Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 52 — Doctrine of Lis Pendens — Validity of transfers pendente lite - Transfers of the suit land made by a party during the pendency of the litigation/appeal are governed by the principle of lis pendens - A transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio but remains subservient to the rights of the parties eventually determined by the court, and must abide by the ultimate decree passed in the litigation - if the decree of specific performance is ultimately maintained and executed via due process, the sale deeds executed by the defendants to third parties during the pendency of litigation are held to be non est. [Relied on Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 573; Rajesh Kumar vs. Anand Kumar and Others, (2024) 13 SCC 80; Bholaram vs. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414; Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 213; Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397; Paras 25-30, 45, 46] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 105 and Section 108 — Indian Easements Act, 1882; Section 52 — Lease vs. Licence — Interpretation of Deeds — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had re-characterized a registered 99-year lease deed as a licence - held that when the nomenclature, text, and context of a document clearly indicate a "lease simpliciter," courts should not resort to purposive construction or ex-post facto circumstances to infer a different intention - A unilateral cancellation of such a registered lease deed, without bilateral agreement or meeting conditions under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is illegal and non-est. General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Specific Performance – Execution of Decree – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, and 102 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation, as a transferee pendente lite, has no right to obstruct the execution of the decree and remains bound by the outcome of the proceedings, holding the transfer strictly subservient to the decree - Key findings held i. Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Transferee Pendente Lite: The principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is based on equity, good conscience, justice, and public policy - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the ultimate decree of the court, irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or acted in good faith; ii. Registration of Lis Pendens (Bombay Amendment): Under the Maharashtra amendment to Section 52, once a notice of lis pendens is registered, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with so as to affect the rights of any party under a subsequent decree - The lack of knowledge of the proceedings is not a valid defense against the application of this doctrine; iii. Execution against Obstructionists: In execution proceedings for the delivery of immovable property, the Executing Court has the mandate under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 98 CPC to remove any person bound by the decree, including a transferee pendente lite, who resists or obstructs possession; iv. Adjudication of Rights in Execution: All questions relating to the right, title, or interest of an obstructionist arising under Order XXI Rule 97 must be determined by the Executing Court under Rule 101 and not by a separate suit - For transferees pendente lite, their title is subservient to the decree and is effectively extinguished by the court-executed sale deed; v. Interplay between Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act: While Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act protects subsequent transferees for value without notice at a stage prior to the institution of a suit, it must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024 SCC Online SC 3727); Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200; Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805); Paras 41-64] Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 44 : 2026 INSC 52

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 58(c) – Mortgage by Conditional Sale vs. Outright Sale – No transaction shall be deemed a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition for reconveyance is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale - In the absence of such a clause in the registered Sale Deed, the transaction cannot be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale. [Paras 44 - 49] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Trial Delay and Witness Management

Trial Delay and Witness Management — Noted that the prosecution expressed intent to examine 159 witnesses - noted that even examining 50% of these witnesses would take a "pretty long time" and questioned the necessity of multiplying witnesses on the same issues – noted that the prosecution should focus on important witnesses to establish its case rather than prolonging the trial - While acknowledging the gravity of the NDPS charges, exercised its discretion in favor of the petitioner due to the overall delay and the age of pending cases in the Trial Court - Bail granted subject to terms imposed by the Trial Court and specific conditions including a travel restriction to Ankleshwar, Gujarat, and surrender of passport. [Paras 5-11] Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 107

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Direction to Universities — Respondent – Supreme Court directed the Universities to furnish information to the UGC regarding students who obtained questionable degrees in technical branches - The UGC shall then take decisions based on the principles laid down in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro - Order passed in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Relied on Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. VS. Rabi Sankar Patro & Ors., (2018) 1 SCC 468; Paras 6-8] University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Distance Education — Technical Degrees — Validity of Degrees — Primacy of Statutory Bodies — The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of the UGC in making regulations for distance education - it modified a High Court order that had validated technical degrees obtained via distance learning through interim orders – Held that technical education (Engineering) requires practical, hands-on training and cannot be conducted via distance mode without express AICTE approval - Following the precedent in CMJ Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors., Supreme Court held that the UGC is the appropriate statutory authority to consider the consequences of its orders and take necessary actions regarding the annulment of illegal degrees. University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 10(a)(i), 10(a)(iv) and 38(1) – Criminal Conspiracy – Mistaken Identity – Appreciation of Evidence – Material Improvements – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Conduct of Accused - Glaring contradictions, material improvements, and lack of Test Identification Parade (TIP) render the prosecution's identification of the accused wholly doubtful – Consequent conviction based on flawed identification cannot be sustained - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a Sri Lankan national convicted for offences under the UAP Act, 1967, the IPC, the Poisons Act, 1919, the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Passport Act, 1967 - The prosecution alleged that the appellant was the absconding accused named "Sri" (A-5) who had conspired to rejuvenate the banned LTTE organization by supplying cyanide capsules and equipment - The appellant maintained a consistent defense of mistaken identity, asserting his true identity as "Ranjan." - Key Principles Established by the Supreme Court – i. Material Improvements in Testimony Deconstruct Credibility - The star prosecution witnesses (PW-8 and PW-9) introduced the appellant's name ("Ranjan") as an alias for the absconding accused ("Sri") for the very first time during the current trial - Their complete silence on this aspect during the investigation and previous split-up trials of co-accused constitutes a substantive and material improvement that severely dents their credibility - Such deep-rooted improvements cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential lapses of memory; ii. Inapplicability of the Abuthagir Principle to Improvements - The principle that a mere belated disclosure of a fact by a witness cannot solely discard their testimony applies strictly to a delay in the examination of witnesses during investigation. It cannot be extended to cover cases featuring substantive material improvements over distinct prior judicial depositions; iii. Absence of Corroborative Material and TIP - Where the identity of an accused is heavily disputed and the accused is tied to an alias post-arrest, the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) combined with a complete lack of contemporaneous official or police records linking the two identities prior to the arrest invalidates the identification process; iv. Inconsistency of Innocent Conduct with Absconding Status - The open residence of the appellant at a registered refugee address for years and his active engagement with a foreign embassy to secure a visa and local police clearance are wholly inconsistent with the behaviour of an absconding accused fleeing a serious UAPA charge. [Relied on Vishwanatha v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 482; Para 47 – 61] Sri v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 521 : 2026 INSC 516

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Section 43-D(5) — Constitution of India — Article 21 — Bail — Prolonged Incarceration — Judicial Discipline — Binding Nature of Precedents — Grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the UAPA and the NDPS Act on the ground of prolonged incarceration and gross delay in the trial - The appellant was in custody for over 5 years and 11 months with more than 350 prosecution witnesses remaining to be examined - Restrictive statutory provisions under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail where an undertrial's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 has been infringed - The rigors of statutory bail restrictions "melt down" when there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial - The legislative intent cannot invert the core constitutional relationship between personal liberty and detention - Even under stringent special statutes like the UAPA, "bail is the rule and jail is the exception". Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 298

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 43D(5), 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 – Grant of Bail – Prolonged Incarceration vs. Statutory Bar – Constitutional Perspective under Article 21 – Role Differentiation in Conspiracy – Governing Principles for Bail under UAPA - emphasized that the "prima facie true" standard under Section 43D(5) does not reduce the judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of prosecution assertions, but requires a threshold inquiry of real content- i. Contextual Inquiry into Delay - that the constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt, but whether continued detention remains constitutionally permissible. This is "necessarily contextual" and includes factors like the nature of allegations, the trial's realistic trajectory, and causes contributing to delay – ii. Individualized Role Differentiation- Supreme Court rejected a "case-centric" approach in favor of an "accused-specific" one. It distinguished between those with "strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality" and those whose roles were "peripheral or episodic"- iii. Speedy Trial vs. Statutory Embargo - While recognizing the right to a speedy trial as a foundational guarantee under Article 21, the Court held that "delay simpliciter" does not automatically eclipse the statutory regime enacted by Parliament for special category offences. Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 32

Urban Areas

Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (Haryana) – Section 3(3A) – De-licensing and Validation – Power to grant a license includes the implied power to withdraw, modify, or de-license, as supported by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – Held - The 2020 Amendment to the 1975 Act retrospectively validated de-licensing actions taken by the authorities. [Para 71, 72] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act) — Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) — Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 — Sections 3 and 4 — Mandatory requirement of notice for taking possession - The Supreme Court examined whether the mere "paper possession" recorded by the State, without serving the mandatory notice under Section 10(5) to the actual possessors of the land, would prevent the abatement of proceedings under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Supreme Court of India has held that proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would abate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 if the State failed to take actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with law, including by serving mandatory notice on the persons in possession under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act - Held that section 10 of the ULC Act distinguishes between the "vesting" of land (acquisition of title/interest) and the "taking of possession." Under Section 10(3), what vests is de jure possession, not de facto (actual physical) possession – For the State to acquire de facto possession, it must follow one of three methods: i. Voluntary surrender by the landholder; ii. Peaceful surrender following a mandatory written notice under Section 10(5) served upon the person in possession; iii. Forceful dispossession under Section 10(6) only if the person fails to comply with the Section 10(5) notice - In the absence of evidence showing actual physical possession was taken after serving notice on the appellants (who were in actual possession), the State's claim of "paper possession" is insufficient. Consequently, the proceedings relating to the land abate by operation of law under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280; AP Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447; Paras 19-23] Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2026 INSC 21

Value Added Tax

Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UP) – Schedule II, Part A, Entry 103 vs. Schedule V, Entry 1 (Residuary Entry) – Classification of "Sharbat Rooh Afza" - The Supreme Court held that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is classifiable as a "fruit drink" under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the UPVAT Act, taxable at the concessional rate of 4%, rather than as an unclassified item under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5%; held that - 1. Inclusive Nature of Entry 103 - Supreme Court observed that Entry 103 is an inclusive and umbrella entry covering "processed or preserved vegetables and fruits, fruit drink and fruit juice."- Since the entry does not prescribe a minimum quantitative threshold for fruit content, it is improper to read a rigid percentage requirement into it that the Legislature did not provide; 2. Essential Character Test - Supreme Court applied the "Essential Character Test" as embodied in Rule 3(b) of the HSN Explanatory Notes - It held that while invert sugar syrup constitutes 80% of the volume, it merely acts as a carrier and preservative - The flavor, aroma, and beverage identity are derived from the 10% fruit juice and herbal distillates, which impart the product's distinctive character as a refreshing drink; 3. Common Parlance vs. Regulatory Classification - Supreme Court clarified that regulatory classifications under food safety laws (like the Fruit Products Order, 1955) are intended for quality control and safety, not fiscal classification - A fiscal statute must be interpreted based on how the product is understood in common or commercial parlance; 4. Burden of Proof on Revenue for Reclassification - Supreme Court reiterated that the burden of proof lies squarely on the Revenue to establish that a product falls within a residuary entry or an entry different from that claimed by the assessee - In this case, the Revenue failed to produce trade inquiries or market evidence to displace the appellant's classification; 5. Avoidance of Residuary Clause - Recourse to a residuary entry is impermissible when a commodity can reasonably be brought within the ambit of a specific entry. Denying a product "parentage" in a specific entry and consigning it to the "orphanage of the residuary clause" is against the principles of classification – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424; Hindustan Ferodo Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (1997) 2 SCC 677; CCE v. Connaught Plaza Restaurant (P) Ltd (2012) 13 SCC 639; Paras 16, 19-22, 24-27, 30] Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2026 INSC 195

Victimology vs. Penology

Victimology vs. Penology — Compensation as a Substitute for Punishment — Held: Victim compensation under Section 395 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (or Section 357 CrPC) is an addition to, and not an alternative for, the sentence imposed - Compensation is restitutory, whereas punishment is punitive and intended to create deterrence - Reducing a sentence for a grave offence (Section 307 IPC) in exchange for monetary payment is a "dangerous" practice akin to "Blood Money" and is not acceptable in the Indian criminal justice system. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164

Waqf Act, 1995

Waqf Act, 1995 – Effect of 2013 Amendment – Overruling of Precedents – Noted that the 2013 Amendment removed the sub-stratum of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf only regarding the Tribunal's lack of power to remove encroachers (now covered under Section 54) - the larger principle that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to specific statutory powers remains valid - Supreme Court found the expansive interpretation of Section 83 in Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari to be divergent from the correct legal position established in Ramesh Gobindram. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Waqf Act, 1995 – Sections 6, 7, 83, and 85 – Jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal vs. Civil Court – Ouster of Civil Court Jurisdiction – Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal to determine whether a property is a waqf property or not is limited to properties specified in the "list of auqaf" - The "list of auqaf," as expanded by the 2013 Amendment, includes both lists published after a survey under Chapter II and registrations made under Chapter V (Section 37) - Section 83 is not an omnibus provision conferring expansive jurisdiction on the Tribunal for any dispute relating to waqf; rather, it enables the constitution of the Tribunal for matters specifically required "under the Act" to be determined by it - The ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction under Section 85 is not absolute and is confined only to matters expressly conferred upon the Tribunal by the statute. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Wakf Law — Service Inam — Character of Property — Restriction on Alienation Lands granted as "service inam" for religious or charitable purposes partake the character of endowed property and are impressed with a public trust. Their alienability is completely restricted; individual holders and their successors-in-interest possess no transfer or alienable title. Any subsequent transfer is void ab initio, incapable of conferring a valid title upon purchasers. [Paras 13 - 25] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Wakf - Service Inam land attached to a Mosque is Wakf property and cannot be alienated - Lands granted as 'Service Inam' for rendering religious or charitable services to a mosque form part of Wakf property. Such grants are impressed with a public/religious trust and are inalienable. A grant of land for religious or charitable purposes recognised under Muslim law does not confer absolute title on the grantee. The property retains the character of a Wakf. (Relied on: Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, (1998) 2 SCC 642) Hari Shankar Jain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Waqf Act, 1995 - Distinct Nature of Offices - Declaration and succession to the office of Sajjadanashin is a religious affair governed primarily by custom, usage and/or nomination by the predecessor, and does not fall within the exclusive domain of management and administration of Waqf properties. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438

Waqf Act, 1995 - Jurisdiction - Disputes relating to succession to the office of Sajjadanashin of a notified Waqf/Dargah are maintainable before the Civil Court and are not barred by the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal or Waqf Board, which primarily deal with administrative matters. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438

Waqf Act, 1995 - Recognition of Sajjadanashin does not extinguish independent legal rights of other family members or beneficiaries in the Waqf properties under Waqf law. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had erroneously held that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction and that the power to appoint Sajjadanashin vested exclusively with the Waqf Board. The Court restored the decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court declaring the rightful Sajjadanashin on the basis of a valid Khilafatnama and remitted the connected matters for expeditious disposal on merits. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438

Waqf Act, 1995 - Sajjadanashin of a Dargah and Mutawalli of a Waqf are Distinct Offices - The office of **Sajjadanashin** is a spiritual and religious position as the head of the Dargah/Waqf institution, whereas the office of Mutawalli is a secular administrative position relating to the management of the Waqf properties. The two offices are fundamentally distinct and cannot be treated as one and the same, even though a Sajjadanashin may also be appointed as Mutawalli under Section 32(2)(g) of the Waqf Act, 1995. A Mutawalli, however, cannot ipso facto function as Sajjadanashin. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438

Waqf Act, 1995 - Succession - In Muslim religious institutions, the office of Sajjadanashin may devolve by established custom or by nomination through instruments such as Khilafatnama. A document merely conferring authority to act (such as a General Power of Attorney) does not amount to nomination to the spiritual office of Sajjadanashin. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438

Water Disputes

Water Disputes - The Supreme Court directed constitution of a Tribunal for resolving disputes pending between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka over sharing of Pennaiyar river water resources. The Court ordered the constitution of a Water Disputes Tribunal by the Central Government within 1 month. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 106

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Custody & Welfare of Captive Elephant - The Supreme Court directed the State of Kerala to immediately take over the custody of the captive elephant Raman (Kerala's tallest elephant) and house it in an appropriate rescue or rehabilitation centre. Courts “cannot be a mute spectator” in matters concerning the welfare of voiceless animals. Turning a blind eye to the commercial exploitation of animals, especially in violation of court orders and undertakings, would amount to failure in judicial duty. Jayakrishna Menon v. Krishnankutty, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 — Section 55 — Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 2(xxiii) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 120-B, 284 and 289 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Non-compliance with Mandatory Special Procedure — Power Exercised Without Jurisdiction is Void Ab Initio - Key Legal Propositions held – i. Cognizance Under Special Statutes: Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 explicitly mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a statutory complaint filed by an authorized officer - A police report or chargesheet under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. (or corresponding provisions of the BNSS) cannot be treated as a statutory complaint - Cognizance taken on the basis of a police chargesheet for offences under the 1972 Act is legally impermissible and unsustainable in law; ii. Definition of Psychotropic Substance - Under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act, 1985, a substance must be specifically listed in the Schedule of the Act to qualify as a "psychotropic substance" - The conscious omission of the legislature in not including "snake venom" or "antibodies to snake venom" in the NDPS Schedule means these substances cannot be construed as psychotropic substances - the recovery of snake venom antibodies does not warrant the invocation of the NDPS Act – iii. Jurisdictional Nullity and the Ripple Effect - When an initial action or investigation by an agency is undertaken in the complete absence of authority or statutory jurisdiction, the entire subsequent proceeding suffers from a fundamental illegality and is rendered void ab initio - Procedural irregularities can be cured, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction cannot be regularized or saved – iv. Double Jeopardy / Re-litigation on IPC Offences - Ingestion of allegations pertaining to Sections 284 and 289 of the IPC that were already the subject matter of an earlier complaint where a closure report was filed noting no cognizable offence or cruelty was established cannot form the basis of a subsequent criminal proceeding by a different agency lacking jurisdiction. [Relied On: State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655; Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1987) 1 SCC 533 (as emphasized in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409); B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Paras: 14-40] Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2026 INSC 329

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Statutory Compliance and Regulatory Oversight — Role of Central Zoo Authority (CZA) - Held: Consequent upon the CZA cancelling the "mini zoo" recognition of A.N. Jha Deer Park under Section 38H(6) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 due to persistent non-compliance and expiry of its license, continued retention of animals without statutory recognition is impermissible in law - based on the Central Empowered Committee's (CEC) scientific assessment, a maximum population of 38 deer (15 males and 23 females) may conditionally be retained at the park, strictly subject to formal approval, infrastructure upgrades, and continuous regulatory oversight by the CZA. New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419

Wildlife Protection and Conservation — Animal Welfare Protocols — Soft-Release Methodology and Guidelines - Held: Noting that previous translocations were conducted in an unduly harsh manner, Supreme Court directed that all future translocations must mandatorily follow "soft-release" protocols involving acclimatisation, telemetry collars for monitoring, and specialized prey transfer vehicles - The comprehensive draft guidelines on Animal Translocation prepared by the CEC must be examined and implemented by the MoEF&CC within six months, and shall be imparted statutory status. [Paras 3-11] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419

Wildlife Protection and Conservation — Translocation of Captive Animals — Ecological Carrying Capacity vs. Habitat Expansion – Held - The Supreme Court affirmed the translocation of surplus spotted deer (Axis axis) from A.N. Jha Deer Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, to the Mukundara Hills Tiger Reserve and Ramgarh Vishdhari Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan - Rejecting the petitioner's plea for expanding the existing precincts within Delhi , the Court observed that intra-park or inter-park relocation merely shifts, rather than resolves, fundamental management and ecological concerns like carrying capacity and population regulation - Wildlife species ought not to be confined to restrictive enclosures save in exceptional circumstances duly justified in law. New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms

Zamindari Abolition And Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.) - Sections 154 & 163 (Prior to omission) – Restriction on transfer by a Bhumidhar – Nature of transfer violating ceiling limits – Void or Voidable – A transfer of holding made by a bhumidhar in contravention of the ceiling limits prescribed under Section 154 is not void ipso facto or void ab initio under the unamended statutory regime - Section 163 merely exposes the transferee to the consequence of ejectment contingent upon a suit filed by the Gaon Sabha - Till such action is taken by the Gaon Sabha within the prescribed limitation period, the transferee continues to validly enjoy the property - any transfer violating Section 154 is not void but merely voidable at the instance of the Gaon Sabha to the extent of the excess over the prescribed limit. [Relied on Kripashanker vs. Director of Consolidation and Others, (1979) 4 SCC 199; Paras 23-34] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.) – Sections 166 & 167 (as amended by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982) – Prospective vs. Retrospective application – Accrued Rights – Amending Act which alters substantive rights or introduces a new disability/obligation in respect of transactions already accomplished is presumed to be prospective - The 1982 amendment expanding Sections 166 and 167 to declare all transfers in contravention of the Act as void with automatic vesting in the State introduced a substantive alteration in legal consequences - In the absence of an express or implied legislative intent, it cannot be applied retrospectively to invalidate a registered sale deed executed decades prior (in 1957) under the older regime where such transfer was merely voidable - Superimposing the amended framework retrospectively would create an irreconcilable statutory dichotomy and unsettling of vested rights. [Relied on Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1; State of Kerala vs. Philomina, (1976) 4 SCC 314; Paras 36-42] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 132 & Section 195 – Uttar Pradesh Land Records Manual – Paragraph Ka-155-Ka – Re-categorisation of Public Utility Land – Lack of Jurisdiction of Sub-Divisional Officer / Assistant Collector - The Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) / Assistant Collector lacks the statutory authority to alter the category of land from Category-6 (Public Utility / Communal Land) to Category-5 (Cultivable Land) under Paragraph Ka-155-Ka of the Manual - Clause (9) of Paragraph Ka-155-Ka merely prescribes the competent authority for making entries in the revenue records affecting the tenure rights and titles of already recorded khatedars (tenure holders) - It only contemplates a change in the classification or category of the khata (the tenure entry relating to the holder) and does not confer any jurisdiction to change the underlying physical or regulatory category of the land itself -The power to resume public utility land and change its classification rests solely with the State Government under Section 117(6) of the Abolition Act read with Section 77(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Code, 2006, subject to strict statutory safeguards - Subordinate revenue authorities cannot circumvent the express prohibition of Section 132 of the Abolition Act through the administrative expedient of changing revenue entries - What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly (Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum) - any agricultural pattas granted over public utility land on the basis of an unauthorized re-categorisation by an SDO are void ab initio. [Paras 28, 29, 30] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395

Public Utility and Communal Lands – Protection and Non-Diversion - Lands meant for public utility and community purposes (such as khalihan and pasture lands) constitute material assets of the community, essential for maintaining ecological balance and public welfare - Such lands must be zealously protected, cannot be legitimately converted for private benefits through administrative manipulations or processes, and consolidation proceedings cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent statutory protections afforded to communal resources. [Paras 31-36] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395