Complete Supreme Court Yearly Digest Part-8

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19 Feb 2023 2:51 PM GMT

  • Complete Supreme Court Yearly Digest Part-8

    MMaintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007; Section 23 - Effecting transfer subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor – senior citizen is sine qua non for applicability of Section 23(1) - When it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in Section...

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    Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

    Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007; Section 23 - Effecting transfer subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor – senior citizen is sine qua non for applicability of Section 23(1) - When it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in Section 23(1) are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal. (Para 13-14) Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1011

    Marine Policy

    Marine Policy - Marine Insurance Act, 1963; Section 4 - A contract of marine insurance may, by its express terms, or by usage of trade, be extended so as to protect the assured against losses on inland waters or on any land risk which may be incidental to any sea voyage - warehouse risks, combined with voyage and other marine risks, are considered as part of marine insurance policies in India. (Para 19) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Levis Strauss (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : (2022) 6 SCC 1

    Marital Rape

    Marital Rape - Exception 2 to Section 375 of IPC - Exception 2 states that sexual intercourse by a man with his wife is not rape, unless she is below 15 years of age – Supreme Court leaves the constitutional validity of marital rape to be decided in appropriate proceedings but states that for the purpose of MTP Act, meaning of rape includes marital rape. (Para 74, 75, 115) X vs Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT Of Delhi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : AIR 2022 SC 4917

    Marital Rape - Rape includes ‘marital rape’ for the purpose of MTP Rules - Rule 3B(a) -Survivors of sexual assault or rape or incest shall be considered eligible for termination of pregnancy up to twenty-four weeks – Supreme Court holds that meaning of rape must be understood as including marital rape, solely for the purposes of the MTP Act – Woman need not seek recourse to formal legal proceedings to prove sexual assault, rape or incest. (Para 70, 75, 76) X vs Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT Of Delhi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : AIR 2022 SC 4917

    Media Trial

    Media Trial - All matters relating to the crime and whether a particular thing happens to be a conclusive piece of evidence must be dealt with by a Court of Law and not through a TV channel. If at all there was a voluntary statement, the matter would be dealt with by the Court of Law. The public platform is not a place for such debate or proof of what otherwise is the exclusive domain and function of Courts of law. Any such debate or discussion touching upon matters which are in the domain of Courts would amount to direct interference in administration of Criminal Justice. (Para 21) Venkatesh @ Chandra v. State of Karnataka, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 387

    Mediation

    Mediation - All States are mandated to set up the mediation cells - A direction is made for the e-filing system to be made operational. In Re: Inaction Of The Governments In Appointing President And Members/staff Of Districts And State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission And Inadequate Infrastructure Across India v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 371

    Mediation - Concerns regarding dearth of trained and skilled mediators and lack of infrastructure - Knowledge of the laws, which are the subject matter of the suits under the Act, is indispensable for a Mediator to effectively discharge his duties. His role is supreme and it is largely shaped by his own knowledge of the law that governs commercial cases - The effective participation of the bar which must be adequately remunerated for its service will assist in mediation evolving. The concerned High Court may also undertake periodic exercise to establish a panel of trained mediators in District and Taluka levels as per need. (Para 74) Patil AutomationPvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Private Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : AIR 2022 SC 3848 : (2022) 10 SCC 1

    Mediation - Mediation is an important, if not at times a better method of resolution of disputes. In Re: Inaction Of The Governments In Appointing President And Members/staff Of Districts And State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission And Inadequate Infrastructure Across India v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 371

    Mediation - Taking on record the comments made during the course of mediation or settlement proceedings impedes conciliation and impinges on the principle of confidentiality. (Para 3) Arjab Jena @ Arjab Kumar Jena v. Utsa Jena @ Pattnaik, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 21

    Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002

    Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 - Regulation 6.8 - Acceptance of freebies given by pharmaceutical companies is clearly an offence on part of the medical practitioner, punishable with varying consequences. (Para 18) Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : (2022) 7 SCC 98

    Medical Course

    Medical Course - Eligibility Requirement for Taking Admission in an Undergraduate Medical Course in a Foreign Medical Institution Regulations, 2002 - National Medical Commission is not bound to grant provisional registration to the student who has not completed the entire duration of the course from the Foreign Institute including the clinical training. (Para 15) National Medical Commission v. Pooja Thandu Naresh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : AIR 2022 SC 2956

    Medical Course - Screening Test Regulations, 2002 - Granting provisional registration to complete internship to a student who has not undergone clinical training would be compromising with the health of the citizens of any country and the health infrastructure at large - The decision of the National Medical Commission not to grant provisional registration cannot be said to be arbitrary - Qualifying in the Screening Regulations is no proof of the clinical experience, if any, gained by the students. (Para 16-21) National Medical Commission v. Pooja Thandu Naresh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : AIR 2022 SC 2956

    Medical Negligence

    Medical Negligence - A medical practitioner is not to be held liable simply because things went wrong from mischance or misadventure or through an error of judgment in choosing one reasonable course of treatment in preference to another - He/she would be liable only where his conduct fell below that of the standards of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field - Merely because he/she could not save the patient, that could not be considered to be a case of medical negligence. (Para 21-27) Dr. Chanda Rani Akhouri v. Dr. M.A. Methusethupathi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2022 (6) SCALE 546

    Medical Negligence - Appeal against NCDRC which dismissed appellant's complaint of medical negligence - Dismissed - Commission has not committed any manifest error in arriving to a conclusion that in post operative medical negligence or follow up care, there was no negligence being committed by the respondents which may be a foundation for entertaining the complaint filed by the appellants. Dr. Chanda Rani Akhouri v. Dr. M.A. Methusethupathi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2022 (6) SCALE 546

    Medical Negligence - Every death in an institutionalized environment of a hospital does not necessarily amount to medical negligence on a hypothetical assumption of lack of due medical care - It would not be possible for the Court to second-guess the medical judgment of the doctors on the line of medical treatment. Devarakonda Surya Sesha Mani v. Care Hospital, Institute of Medical Sciences, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 753

    Medical Negligence - In the proceedings for damages due to professional negligence, the question of intention does not arise. (Para 29) Harnek Singh v. Gurmit Singh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 511 : AIR 2022 SC 2643 : (2022) 7 SCC 685

    Medical Negligence - Opinion and findings of the MCI regarding the professional conduct of a doctor have great relevance while considering claim for compensation on the basis of medical negligence. (Para 35) Harnek Singh v. Gurmit Singh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 511 : AIR 2022 SC 2643 : (2022) 7 SCC 685

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 - All women are entitled to safe and legal abortions (Para 56) - There is no rationale in excluding unmarried women from the ambit of Rule 3B of MTP Rules which mentions the categories of women who can seek abortion of pregnancy in the term 20-24 weeks. (Para 121) X vs Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT Of Delhi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : AIR 2022 SC 4917

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 - Effect of 2021 amendment - Parliamentary intent to cover unmarried woman too-After 2021 amendment, the word "married woman" has been substituted with "any woman" and "husband" with "partner"-The Parliamentary intent, therefore, is clearly not to confine the beneficial provisions of the MTP Act only to a situation involving a matrimonial relationship. [Para 16 & 18] X v. Principal Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 621

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 - Gap in the law exists between MTP Act and MTP Rules -Evidently, there is a gap in the law : while Section 3 travels beyond conventional relationships based on marriage, Rule 3B of the MTP Rules does not envisage a situation involving unmarried women, but recognizes other categories of women such as divorcees, widows, minors, disabled and mentally ill women and survivors of sexual assault or rape. [Para 18] X v. Principal Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 621

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 - Supreme Court passes ad-interim order allowing unmarried woman to terminate pregnancy of 24-week term arising out of a consensual relationship - Prima facie observes the case is covered under Section 3(2)(b). X v. Principal Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 621

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 - There is no basis to deny unmarried women the right to medically terminate the pregnancy, when the same choice is available to other categories of women -Denying an unmarried woman the right to a safe abortion violates her personal autonomy and freedom-The distinction between a married and unmarried woman does not bear a nexus to the basic purpose and object which is sought to be achieved by Parliament which is conveyed specifically by the provisions of Explanation 1 to Section 3 of the Act. [Para 18, 20, 21] X v. Principal Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 621

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971; Section 3(2)(b) - Termination of a pregnancy till twenty-four weeks of women if it causes risk of injury to the mental health – unwanted pregnancy can be construed as injury to mental health. (Para 62, 63, 64) X vs Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT Of Delhi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : AIR 2022 SC 4917

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 - Rule 3B (categories of women who can seek abortion of pregnancy of 20-24 weeks) - A narrow interpretation of Rule 3B, limited only to married women, would render the provision discriminatory towards unmarried women and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Prohibiting unmarried or single pregnant women (whose pregnancies are between twenty and twenty-four weeks) from accessing abortion while allowing married women to access them during the same period would fall foul of the spirit guiding Article 140 - Purposive interpretation given to Rule 3B to include unmarried women whose pregnancy arise out of consensual relationship. (Para 121) X vs Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT Of Delhi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : AIR 2022 SC 4917

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003; Rule 3B(b) - Rule 3B(b) includes minors within the category of women who may terminate their pregnancy up to twenty-four weeks – the RMP need not disclose the identity and other personal details of the minor in the information provided under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act. (Para 81) X vs Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT Of Delhi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : AIR 2022 SC 4917

    Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003; Rule 3B(c) - Women going through a change of marital status during the ongoing pregnancy shall be considered eligible for termination of pregnancy – distinction between married and single women is not constitutionally sustainable – benefits in law extend equally to both single and married women. (Para 90, 92) X vs Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT Of Delhi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : AIR 2022 SC 4917

    Meerut Fire Tragedy (2006)

    Meerut Fire Tragedy (2006) - 40:60 Liability On State & Organizers To Compensate Victims - Allahabad High Court Chief Justice to nominate within two weeks a District Judge or Additional District Judge to work on a day to day basis for determining the compensation payable to the families of the victims of the fire that broke out during a consumer fair in Meerut in 2006 - Computation of compensation in accordance with the principles of just compensation as in the case of accident under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Sanjay Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : (2022) 7 SCC 203

    Mens Rea

    Mens Rea - Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence - A statute may exclude the element of mens rea, but it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England – and also accepted in India – to construe a statutory provision creating an offence in conformity with common law rather than against it, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded mens rea. The mere fact that the object of the statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil which by itself is not decisive of the question as to whether the element of a guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of an offence. Mens rea by necessary implication may be excluded from a statute only 33 where it is absolutely clear that implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated. (Para 14.10) Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : AIR 2022 SC 4558

    Mercy Petition

    Mercy Petition - Procedure governing petitions for mercy in death sentence cases provides the mercy petition must be filed within seven days of the disposal of the appeal or dismissal of special leave petition - The concerned instructionrequires suitable modification so as to enable the convicted accused to file mercy petition after exhaustion of remedies in Court of law. (Para 29) B.A. Umesh v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 907

    Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Act, 2006

    Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Act, 2006; Section 19 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34 - Pre-deposit of 75% of the awarded amount under section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is a mandatory requirement to challenge the award under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. (Para 4) Tirupati Steels v. Shubh Industrial Component, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2022 SC 1939 : (2022) 7 SCC 429

    Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; Section 18, 19 - MSMED Act does not empower the Facilitation Council to review its own decisions - i) that to begin with, the Facilitation Council should conduct conciliation; (ii) that upon failure of conciliation, the dispute is to be arbitrated either by the Facilitation council itself or by an institution to which it is referred; and (iii) that the decision arrived at thereto, constitutes an award. (Para 14-16) Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. Ajanta Press and Mechanical Works, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 769

    Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; Section 8(1) - MSMED Act is not applicable to transactions which took place even before the Act was enacted and that by taking recourse to Section 8(1) of the Act and filing a memorandum, a person cannot assume the legal status conferred under the Act to claim retrospectively - MSMED Act was not intended to provide a gateway for hopelessly time barred claims. (Para 12,17) Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. Ajanta Press and Mechanical Works, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 769

    Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; Section 17, 18 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 80 - No party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be precluded from making a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, though an independent arbitration agreement exists between the parties - Chapter-V of the MSMED Act, 2006 would override the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 - The Facilitation Council, which had initiated the Conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be entitled to act as an arbitrator despite the bar contained in Section 80 of the Arbitration Act - Such proceedings would be governed by the Arbitration Act, 1996 -The Facilitation Council / institute /centre acting as an arbitral tribunal would be competent to rule on its own jurisdiction as also the other issues. (Para 34) Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 : AIR 2022 SC 5545

    Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; Section 2(n) - A party who was not the 'supplier' as per the definition contained in Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, 2006 on the date of entering into contract cannot seek any benefit as the 'supplier' under the MSMED Act, 2006. If any registration is obtained subsequently the same would have an effect prospectively and would apply to the supply of goods and rendering services subsequent to the registration. (Para 34) Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 : AIR 2022 SC 5545

    Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

    Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 - Imposed a cost of Rupees one lakh on the Union Government for incorrectly mentioning the name of a coal mining company in the list of the illegal coal block allotments made in the "Coalgate" scam. BLA Industries Pvt Ltd v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 683 : AIR 2022 SC 3805

    Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 - Supreme Court lifts curbs on iron sale and export from mines in Karnataka - Relaxes the directions issued in 2011. Samaj Parivarthana Samudaya v. State of Karnataka, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2022 (9) SCALE 39

    Minimum Wages Act, 1948

    Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Section 10 - Only the clerical or arithmetical mistakes in any order fixing or revising minimum rates of wages can be corrected - An arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation; a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing. An error arising out of or occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to a careless or inadvertent mistake or omission unintentionally made. (Para 7.1-7.2) Gomantak Mazdoor Sangh v. State of Goa, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2022 (7) SCALE 789

    Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Section 3-5, 10 - Errata Notification dated 14.07.2016 issued by the State of Goa modifying/correcting its earlier notification dated 23/24.05.2016 by which it fixed the rates of minimum wages in various sectors - Wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the relevant provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 - The minimum wages were revised and determined even after consultation with the Minimum Wage Advisory Board as required under Section 5 of the Act, 1948. Therefore, once there was no mistake, the same could not have been corrected in exercise of powers under Section 10 of the Act, 1948. Gomantak Mazdoor Sangh v. State of Goa, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2022 (7) SCALE 789

    Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969

    Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969; Section 12B - Section 12B of MRTP Act empowers the Commission to grant compensation only when any loss or damage is caused to a consumer as a result of a monopolistic, restrictive or unfair trade practice. (Para 124) B.B. Patel v. DLF Universal Ltd; 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2022 SC 683 : (2022) 6 SCC 742

    Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969; Section 2(u) - Unfair Trade Practice - Five ingredients to constitute an offence of unfair trade practice: (1) There must be a trade practice (within the meaning of section 2(u) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act); (2) The trade practice must be employed for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or the provision of any services;(3) The trade practice should fall within the ambit of one or more of the categories enumerated in clauses (1) to (5) of Section 36A; (4) The trade practice should cause loss or injury to the consumers of goods or services; (5) The trade practice under clause (1) should involve making a “statement” orally or in writing or by visible representation. (Para 20) B.B. Patel v. DLF Universal Ltd; 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2022 SC 683 : (2022) 6 SCC 742

    Moral Policing

    Moral Policing - Supreme Court upholds dismissal of a CISF personnel who was found to have harassed a couple at night - Condemns moral policing by police. CISF v. Santosh Kumar Pandey, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1036

    Motor Accident

    Motor Accident Claims - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 168 - the Notification of Minimum Wages Act can be a guiding factor only in a case where there is no clue available to evaluate monthly income of the deceased. Where positive evidence has been led, no reliance on the Notification could be placed, particularly when it was nobody's case that the deceased was a labourer as presumed by the High Court. (Para 9) Gurpreet Kaur v. United India Insurance Company, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 821

    Motor Accident Claims - The owner of the vehicle is expected to verify the driving skills and not run to the licensing authority to verify the genuineness of the driving license before appointing a driver. Therefore, once the owner is satisfied that the driver is competent to drive the vehicle, it is not expected from the owner thereafter to verify the genuineness of the driving license issued to the drive. (Para 10) Rishi Pal Singh v. New India Assurance Co Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 646

    Motor Accident Compensation - Dependents entitled to compensation for loss of income even if businesses & properties of deceased were bequeathed to them. [Para 14,17 & 22] K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : AIR 2022 SC 4802

    Motor Accident Compensation - Documents such as income tax returns and audit reports are reliable evidence to determine the income of the deceased. [Para 14] K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : AIR 2022 SC 4802

    Motor Accident Compensation - Entire amount under 'Income from House Property and Agricultural Land' need not be deducted merely because properties have been bequeathed to dependents- compensation towards loss of managerial skills can be awarded. [Para 22] K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : AIR 2022 SC 4802

    Motor Accident Compensation - Mere fact that the Deceased's share of ownership in these businesses ventures was transferred to the Deceased's minor children just before his death or to the dependents after his death is not a sufficient justification to conclude that the benefits of these businesses continue to accrue to his dependents. [Para 17] K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : AIR 2022 SC 4802

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Enhanced the compensation payable to over Rupees 50 Lakhs in a motor accident case where appellant has been rendered paralysed for life after he met with an accident as a 5 year old boy in 2010 - The appellant is not able to move his both legs and had complete sensory loss in the legs, urinary incontinence and bowel constipation and bed sore. Master Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 330 : (2022) 7 SCC 738

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Even if the income of the claimant had increased after the accident, it would not be enough grounds to disable him from claiming compensation for future prospect as the rise in income may be attributed to multiple other factors - In cases of permanent disablement caused by a motor accident, the claimant is entitled to not just future loss of income, but also future prospects - Just compensation" must be interpreted in such a manner as to place the claimant in the same position as he was before the accident took place. (Para 18-20) Mohd Sabeer @ Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager UPSRTC, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Even in cases of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor-accident, the claimant can seek, apart from compensation for future loss of income, amounts for future prospects as well - Law regarding determination of compensation discussed - "Just compensation" should include all elements that would go to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the occurrence of the accident - Courts should be mindful that a serious injury not only permanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities but too often inflicts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim. (Para 29-32, 139) Sidram v. Divisional Manager United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 968

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Fixing of notional income - In the absence of a salary certificate, the minimum wages notification along with some amount of guesswork that is not completely detached from reality shall act as a yardstick to determine the income of the deceased - Referred to Chandra Alias Chanda Chandraram and Anr. v. Mukesh Kumar Yadav and Ors; (2022) 1 SCC 198 - High Court fixed the notional income of the Deceased driver as 10,000/- As per notification issued under Kerala Fair Wages Act, a 'driver' in Kerala earned a minimum of Rs. 15,600/- in 2015 - Thus Supreme Court fixed income of the Deceased notionally at Rs. 15,600/- per month. (Para 19-22) Manusha Sreekumar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd; 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 858 : AIR 2022 SC 5161

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - If the liability of the Insurance Company is decided and they are held not to be liable, ordinarily, there shall be no direction to "pay and recover" - In all cases such order of "pay and recover" would not arise when the Insurance Company is not liable but would, in the facts and circumstances, be considered by this Court to meet the ends of justice. Balu Krishna Chavan v. Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 932

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Income Tax Return is a statutory document on which reliance be placed, where available, for computation of annual income of deceased. (Para 9) Anjali v. Lokendra Rathod, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1012

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Multiplier of victims upto the age group of 15 years should be taken as '15' - When there is clear prohibition under Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 for engagement of children and the definition of "child" therein takes in children who have not completed their fourteenth year of age within its fold, there is certainly justification for selecting a lower multiplier of '15' in the case of victims belonging to the age group upto 15 years. (Para 10.1.4) Divya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 892

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Notional Income - It is not necessary to adduce any documentary evidence to prove the notional income of the victim and the Court can award the same even in the absence of any documentary evidence - The Court should ensure while choosing the method and fixing the notional income that the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. (Para 59) Sidram v. Divisional Manager United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 968

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Objective formula for calculating just compensation - Three factors that need to be established are: (a) age of the deceased; (b) income of the deceased; and (c) the number of dependents - The issues that are to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of dependency are: (i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income; (ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. (Para 17-18) Manusha Sreekumar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd; 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 858 : AIR 2022 SC 5161

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Pecuniary Expenses and Non- Pecuniary Loss - "Future Medical Expenses" and "Attendant Charges" would fall within the ambit of Pecuniary Expenses - "Pain and suffering" would be categorized as a non-pecuniary loss as it is incapable of being arithmetically calculated. Therefore, when compensation is to be awarded for pain and suffering, special circumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account including the victim's age, the unusual deprivation the victim has suffered, the effect thereof on his or her future life. (Para 67, 93) Sidram v. Divisional Manager United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 968

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Socio-economic background of the claimants must be considered while awarding compensation in cases of permanent disability - Persons from marginalized sections of the society already face severe discrimination due to a lack of social capital, and a new disability more often than not compounds to such discrimination. (Para 27-29) Mohd Sabeer @ Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager UPSRTC, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - Strict rules of evidence as applicable in a criminal trial, are not applicable in motor accident compensation cases - Disagreed with the view taken by the High Court while rejecting the salary certificate and pay slip of the deceased merely on the ground that the person issuing the two aforementioned documents was not examined before the Tribunal. Rajwati @ Rajjo v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1016

    Motor Accident Compensation Claims - The determination of damages in personal injury cases is not easy. The mental and physical loss cannot be computed in terms of money but there is no other way to compensate the victim except by payment of just compensation. (Para 12) Master Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 330 : (2022) 7 SCC 738

    Motor Accidents Compensation - Supreme Court grants relief to an advocate who had suffered 100% permanent disability due to an accident by enhancing the compensation awarded by the High Court from Rs 23,20,000/- to Rs 51,62,000/-. Abhimanyu Partap Singh v. Namita Sekhon, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : (2022) 8 SCC 489

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - In case the claimant(s) or legal representative(s) of the deceased have filed separate claim petition(s) in the territorial jurisdiction of different High Courts, in the said situation, the first claim petition filed by the claimant(s)/legal representative(s) shall be maintained by the said Claims Tribunal and the subsequent claim petition(s) shall stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal where the first claim petition was filed and pending. It is made clear here that the claimant(s) are not required to apply before Supreme Court Court seeking transfer of other claim petition(s) though filed in the territorial jurisdiction of different High Courts. The Registrar Generals of the High Courts shall take appropriate steps and pass appropriate order in this regard in furtherance to the directions of this Court. Gohar Mohammed v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1040

    Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Motor Accident Compensation - the age of the deceased and not the age of the dependents in case of the death of a bachelor is to be the basis for multiplier. Giasi Ram v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 828

    Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Motor Accidents Claims Compensation - Mutliplier Method - Multiplier method has been recognized as most realistic and reasonable because it has been decided by looking at the age, inflation rate, uncertainty of life and other realistic needs - Not only for determination of future loss of earning but for attendant charges also the multiplier method should be followed. (Para 14) Abhimanyu Partap Singh v. Namita Sekhon, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : (2022) 8 SCC 489

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Motor Accident Claims- Does third party insurance cover pillion rider of a motor cycle? Supreme Court refers to larger bench. Mohana Krishnan S. v. K. Balasubramaniyam, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 726

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Motor Accident Compensation - Awarding compensation on the head of pain, shock and suffering - Factors to be considered - Prolonged hospitalization; the grievous injuries sustained; the operations underwent and the consequent pain, discomfort and suffering - There cannot be straight jacket formula. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it varies from person to person who has suffered due to the accident. (Para 8) Benson George v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 214 : AIR 2022 SC 1216

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Motor Accident Compensation - Awarding compensation on the head of Loss of amenities and happiness suffered by the claimant and his family members - Factors - The position of the claimant post­ accident and whether, he is in a position to enjoy life and/or happiness which he was enjoying prior to the accident. To what extent the claimant has lost the amenities in life and the happiness will depend on the facts of each case. (Para 8.1) Benson George v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 214 : AIR 2022 SC 1216

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Motor Accident Compensation - Claimant is in coma even after a period of eight long years and that he will have to be permanently bedridden during his entire life - The amount of compensation awarded under the head loss of amenities and happiness of Rs.1,00,000/­ only is unreasonable and meagre - Enhanced to Rs.10,00,000/ - The pain, suffering and trauma suffered by the claimant cannot be compensated in terms of the money. However, still it will be a solace to award suitable compensation under different heads including the pain, shock and suffering, loss of amenities and happiness of life - The amount of compensation under the head of pain, shock and suffering is enhanced to Rs.10,00,000/­ -. (Para 7, 8.1) Benson George v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 214 : AIR 2022 SC 1216

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Motor Accident Compensation - In the matter of compensation, the amount actually due and payable is to be awarded despite the claimants having sought for a lesser amount and the claim petition being valued at a lesser value. Mona Baghel v. Sajjan Singh Yadav, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 734

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Motor Accident Compensation - Method of determination of compensation applying two multipliers is clearly erroneous - The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. R. Valli v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : AIR 2022 SC 1096 : (2022) 5 SCC 107

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Motor Accident Compensation Claims - There is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation exceeding the amount so claimed. The Tribunal/Court ought to award 'just' compensation which is reasonable in the facts relying upon the evidence produced on record. Therefore, less valuation, if any, made in the Claim Petition would not be impediment to award just compensation exceeding the claimed amount. (Para 14) Meena Devi v. Nunu Chand Mahto @ Nemchand Mahto, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : AIR 2022 SC 5006

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 2(30) - U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997 - Section 2(h) - A financier who is in possession of the transport vehicle owing to non -payment of the loan amount is an "owner". (Para 8.3) Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2022 SC 1197 : (2022) 5 SCC 525

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 56, 59 and 83 - Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules,1989 - Rule 174(2)(c) - Rule 174 (2) (c) made by the State Government to enable replacement of the vehicle under a Transport permit, does not impinge upon the powers of the Central Government with respect to fixation of the age of the vehicle, or fitness of the vehicle conferred upon it under Sections 56 and 59 in Chapter IV. The scrutiny under Rule 174 is only to enable the Authority to ensure that the subsisting permit is not interrupted and at the same time public interest is not compromised by deviating from the permit. The Rule will have no bearing on the power of the Central Government and as such it would not be ultra vires the provisions of the Act. (Para 13.6) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 72 - Grant of a transport permit is an important function that the statutory authority under the Act would perform. (Para 18.1) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 83 - A scrutiny of the vehicle, stand alone, irrespective of its relation with the permit becomes an irrelevant consideration for the purpose of Section 83 - the scope of scrutiny is limited only to examining if the vehicle is of same nature as in the permit. (Para 13.2,13.3) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 83 - Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules,1989 - Rule 174(2)(c) - Rule 174(2)(c) [which enables road transport authority to reject an application for replacement if the proposed vehicle is older than the one covered under the existing permit] is valid - Rule 174 (2) (c) is neither ultra vires the Act, nor has overridden Section 83 - Kerala HC Judgment in Regional Transport Authority vs. Shaju [ILR 2017 (3) Ker. 720] set aside. (Para 1, 23, 24) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 83 - Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules,1989 - Rule 174(2)(c) - The purpose and object of mandating replacement by a vehicle of the same nature in Section 83 is only to ensure that the scrutiny and the conditions that were undertaken and imposed at the time of the grant continue even during the subsistence of the permit Rule 174 (2) (c) is intended to ensure that the conditions under which a transport permit is granted is not diluted when the vehicle covered by the permit is sought to be replaced by a new vehicle. (Para 15) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 83 - Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules,1989 - Rule 174(2)(c) - The vehicle which the Authority may not approve for replacement under section 83 on the ground that it is older than the vehicle covered under the permit, can be used as a transport vehicle within the State. There is no prohibition for such a usage as the said vehicle may continue to be fit and within the age limit prescribed by the Central Government. The rigour of Rule 174 (2) (c) is only in the context of a subsisting transport permit and not as a condition for transport vehicles as such. (Para 13.7) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 83 - Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules,1989 - Rule 174(2)(c) - Replacement of a vehicle during the subsistence and continuation of a transport permit is only an incident in the working of a transport permit. While addressing such an incident, the Authority cannot be oblivious of the history and background in which the permit is granted. (Para 21.2) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 83 - The expression "same nature" is confined only to, mean "a bus by bus, a mini -bus by mini -bus and not bus by a minibus…." is not a correct way to read the provision. There is no need to restrict the meaning of an expression same nature - The phrase, of the same nature seen in the context of provisions proximate to Sections 83, relating to duration and renewals of permits (Section 81), transfer of permits (Section 82) lend clarity to the meaning of the expression. Same nature must necessarily relate to the same nature of the vehicle in the permit. The question to be asked is the nature of the vehicle under the permit. What kind of a vehicle was that? How was that connected to the permit granted? Does the new vehicle serve the same purpose as the old vehicle was serving under the permit? (Para 21.3, 13.4) Regional Transport Authority v. Shaju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2022 (3) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The Madras High Court affirmed the findings recorded by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, in respect of multiplier of 3 upto the date of superannuation and thereafter multiplier of 8 keeping in view the dependency of life for 10 years. Allowing appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that the claimants are entitled to compensation of Rs. 24,33,064/ - with interest @ 9% from the date of filing of the claim application till realisation. R. Valli v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : AIR 2022 SC 1096 : (2022) 5 SCC 107

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Whether a person holding a driving licence in respect of “light motor vehicle”, could on the strength of that licence, be entitled to drive a “transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class” having unladen weight not exceeding 7500 kgs.? - Certain provisions were not noticed by the court in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2017) 14 SCC 663 - The controversy in question needs to be revisited - referred to larger bench of more than Three Judges. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance v Rambha Devi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 270 : 2022 (4) SCALE 554

    Motor Vehicles Act 1988; Section 149 - The General Insurance Council and all insurance companies are directed to issue appropriate directions to follow the mandate of Section 149 of the M.V. Amendment Act and the amended Rules. Gohar Mohammed v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1040

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 159 - Supreme Court issues a slew of directions for immediate registration of First Accident Report by the Police immediately after a motor vehicle accident -The Court directed the Police department of all states to develop a specialized unit and post trained police officers in every police station within three months for the effective implementation of the MV Amendment Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Gohar Mohammed v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1040

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 166 - If the daughters of the deceased have not been impleaded as claimants, it is immaterial as the amount of compensation payable by the tortfeasor will not get enhanced because of the daughters being party to the claim application. It is since the daughters are married, the mother has not impleaded, the daughters as the claimants. It is not really of any consequence. (Para 11) Janabai Dinkarrao Ghorpade v. ICICI Lambord Issurance Company Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : AIR 2022 SC 3731

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 166 - Rule of evidence to prove charges in a criminal trial cannot be used while deciding an application under Section 166 - It has to be decided on the basis of evidence led before it and not on the basis of evidence which should have been or could have been led in a criminal trial. (Para 10) Janabai Dinkarrao Ghorpade v. ICICI Lambord Issurance Company Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : AIR 2022 SC 3731

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 166 - The compensation under the head on account of loss of love and affection is not permissible but compensation on account of spousal consortium for wife and for the parental consortium for children is admissible. (Para 13) Janabai Dinkarrao Ghorpade v. ICICI Lambord Issurance Company Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : AIR 2022 SC 3731

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 168 - Concept of 'just compensation' which ought to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability - Although such determination can never be arithmetically exact or perfect, an endeavor should be made by the Court to award just and fair compensation irrespective of the amount claimed by the applicant/s. (Para 10) Anjali v. Lokendra Rathod, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1012

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 168 - Motor Accident Claims - compensation must be fair, reasonable and equitable. Further, the determination of quantum is a fact-dependent exercise which must be liberal and not parsimonious - Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 is a beneficial and welfare legislation that seeks to provide compensation as per the contemporaneous position of an individual which is essentially forward-looking. [Paras 11, 12] K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : AIR 2022 SC 4802

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 168 - Motor Accident Compensation Claims - While determining compensation under the Act, section 168 of the Act makes it imperative to grant compensation that appears to be just. The Act being a social welfare legislation operates through economic conception in the form of compensation, which renders way to corrective justice. Compensation acts as a fulcrum to bring equality between the wrongdoer and the victim, whenever the equality gets disturbed by the wrongdoer's harm to the victim. It also endeavors to make good the human suffering to the extent possible and to also save families which have lost their breadwinners from being pushed to vagrancy. Adequate compensation is considered to be fair and equitable compensation. Courts shoulder the responsibility of deciding adequate compensation on a case­to­case basis. However, it is imperative for the courts to grant such compensation which has nexus to the actual loss. (Para 16) Manusha Sreekumar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd; 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 858 : AIR 2022 SC 5161

    Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976

    Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976; Section 4(7), 4(8), 15 - Kerala Motor Transport Workers' Welfare Fund Act, 1985; Section 8A - Constitutional validity upheld -There is nothing wrong in State Legislature making it compulsory to pay outstanding welfare fund contribution first before accepting the vehicle tax which had become due and payable - These provisions are in no way in conflict with Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The real intent and purpose behind these provisions is to restate the mandate stated in the 1988 Act that the vehicle cannot be used on road without a valid permit and payment of vehicle tax up to date. (Para 40) All Kerala Distributors Association v. State of Kerala, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 639

    Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997 (U.P.) - Section 9 - The requirement under law is to first pay the tax in advance as provided under Section 9 and thereafter to use the vehicle - It is 'pay the tax and use' and not 'use and pay the tax'. (Para 9) Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2022 SC 1197 : (2022) 5 SCC 525

    Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997 (U.P.) - Sections 2(g), 2(h), 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 20A - A financier of a motor vehicle/transport vehicle in respect of which a hire -purchase or lease or hypothecation agreement has been entered, is liable to tax from the date of taking possession of the said vehicle under the said agreement. (Para 12) Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2022 SC 1197 : (2022) 5 SCC 525

    Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1997 (U.P.) - Sections 2(g), 2(h), 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 20A - If, after the payment of tax, the vehicle is not used for a month or more, then such an owner may apply for refund under Section 12 of the Act, 1997 and has to comply with all the requirements for seeking the refund as mentioned in Section 12, and 26 on fulfilling and/or complying with all the conditions mentioned in Section 12(1), he may get the refund to the extent provided in sub -section (1) of Section 12, as even under Section 12(1), the owner / operator shall not be entitled to the full refund but shall be entitled to the refund of an amount equal to one -third of the rate of quarterly tax or one twelfth of the yearly tax, as the case may be, payable in respect of such vehicle for each thirty days of such period for which such tax has been paid. However, only in a case, which falls under sub -section (2) of Section 12 and subject to surrender of the necessary documents as mentioned in sub -section (2) of Section 12, the liability to pay the tax shall not arise, otherwise the liability to pay the tax by such owner/operator shall continue. (Para 12) Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2022 SC 1197 : (2022) 5 SCC 525

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (Mumbai)

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (Mumbai); Section 154 - Capital Value Rules - Rule 20 of the Capital Value Rules of 2010 and 2015 empower the Commissioner to consider the capability of the open land of utilizing more than 1 floor space index (FSI) or any transfer of development right (TDR), would go well beyond the permissible scope delineated by the provisions of Section 154 of the MMC Act - Rule 20 of the Capital Value Rules of 2010 and the Capital Value Rules of 2015 would be ultra vires the provisions of sub­Sections (1A) and (1B) of Section 154 of the MMC Act - There being no empowerment to compute and/or levy property tax with retrospective effect by the statute itself, the rule making power, in any view of the matter, could not have created a liability pertaining to the period well before the Rules came into effect. (Para 38-39) Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Property Owners Association, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 927

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (Mumbai); Section 154 - Imposition of property tax on the capital value - For the purpose of determining capital value, only the present physical attributes and status of the land and building can be considered and not the future prospects of the land - Statutory provisions do not contemplate any likelihood of exploitation of capacity in future - The capital value of the land and building must be based on situation "in presenti" - In projects which are in progress, the value addition to the property would be ongoing feature. (Para 36-40) Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Property Owners Association, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 927

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Maharashtra)

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Maharashtra); Section 39A - Appointment of the Additional Municipal Commissioners - State Government created post and made appointment, but for Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation - Additional Municipal Commissioner to exercise power subject to the control of the Commissioner - Respondent no. 1 was an employee of the Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation. Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation v. Sanjay Gajanan Gharat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2022 SC 1618

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Maharashtra); Section 39A - Appointment of the Additional Municipal Commissioners - State Government created post and made appointment, but for Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation - Additional Municipal Commissioner to exercise power subject to the control of the Commissioner - Respondent no. 1 was an employee of the Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation. Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation v. Sanjay Gajanan Gharat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2022 SC 1618

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Maharashtra); Section 56 - Imposition of penalties on municipal officer and servants - the Commissioner was empowered to suspend any officer, whether appointed by the Corporation or any other competent authority - In case of 'post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of Assistant Commissioner', in terms of Section 56(1)(a) it is required to take prior approval from the Corporation - When a Transport Manager or officers appointed under Section 45 of the MMC Act is suspended by the Commissioner they are to inform the Corporation, which is to confirm suspension within a period of six months or else the suspension would come to an end - the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation will have the power to suspend or initiate departmental proceedings against an AMC, who is an officer superior in rank to the Assistant Commissioner. Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation v. Sanjay Gajanan Gharat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2022 SC 1618

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Maharashtra); Section 56 - Imposition of penalties on municipal officer and servants - the Commissioner was empowered to suspend any officer, whether appointed by the Corporation or any other competent authority - In case of 'post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of Assistant Commissioner', in terms of Section 56(1)(a) it is required to take prior approval from the Corporation - When a Transport Manager or officers appointed under Section 45 of the MMC Act is suspended by the Commissioner they are to inform the Corporation, which is to confirm suspension within a period of six months or else the suspension would come to an end - the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation will have the power to suspend or initiate departmental proceedings against an AMC, who is an officer superior in rank to the Assistant Commissioner. Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation v. Sanjay Gajanan Gharat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2022 SC 1618

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi)

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi); Sections 42(f), 390 391 - Until and unless the conditions as mentioned in Section 391 are satisfied and it is specifically found that any burning or burial ground has become offensive, or dangerous to the health of the persons residing at neighbourhood, the burning and burial ground can be ordered to be closed with the previous sanction of the Standing Committee - Subsequent settlement of residents in city/town by itself not a ground to shift cremetorium - It is the duty cast upon the Municipal Corporation to make provision for regulation of places for the disposal of dead and the provision of maintenance of said places is an obligatory function of Municipal Corporation. (Para 5-6) South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Federation of Residents Welfare Association Vasant Kunj, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : AIR 2022 SC 5409

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (Karnataka) - Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 - No legal or normative impediment for the State Election Commission to issue directions requiring disclosure of assets of the candidate, his/her spouse and dependent associates by way of affidavit - Purity of election at all levels, be it election to the Union Parliament or a State Legislature or a Municipal Corporation or a Panchayat is a matter of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable in the interest of all the States. A hypertechnical view of the omission to incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to condone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be against the spirit of the Constitution and public interest. (Para 70-74) S. Rukmini Madegowda v. State Election Commission, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : AIR 2022 SC 4347

    Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (Karnataka); Section 39 - The non-disclosure of assets would therefore, also amount to 'undue influence' and consequently to 'corrupt practices' under the KMC Act. (Para 62) S. Rukmini Madegowda v. State Election Commission, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : AIR 2022 SC 4347

    Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Maharashtra); Sections 6, 6A, 20(3) Proviso - Standing Committee stands dissolved along with the completion of the term of the Corporation -The proviso cannot be read to mean that notwithstanding the expiration of the duration of a Corporation and thereby, termination of the term of office of the Councillors, there could still be any Standing Committee in existence. (Para 13-15) Hemant Narayan Rasne v. Commissioner and Administrator of Pune Municipal Corporation, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 895

    Municipalities Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1998 (Chhattisgarh); Rule 7 - Municipal Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968 - A Shiksha Karmi cannot claim parity in pay-scale with that of Municipal teachers on the principle of equal pay for equal work - They are governed by the Shiksha Karmis Rules, 1998 under which they were appointed, are entitled to pay-scales under the Shiksha Karmis Rules, 1998 only. (Para 7) Dr. K.M. Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2022 (9) SCALE 30

    N

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Appeal against HC judgment upholding conviction of appellant under NDPS Act - Dismissed. Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 245

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - The physical nature of the material is not relevant for determining whether the contents of the sample analyzed were actually opium or not, and physical analysis is not prescribed under the provisions of the NDPS Act for testing the opium. Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 245

    Independent Witness

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Independent Witness - Independent witnesses turning hostile need not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused, when the mandatory procedure is followed and the other police witnesses speak in one voice - But if the Court has ­­ (i) to completely disregard the lack of corroboration of the testimony of police witnesses by independent witnesses; and (ii) to turn a Nelson's eye to the independent witnesses turning hostile, then the story of the prosecution should be very convincing and the testimony of the official witnesses notably trustworthy - If independent witnesses come up with a story which creates a gaping hole in the prosecution theory, about the very search and seizure, then the case of the prosecution should collapse like a pack of cards - Corroboration by independent witnesses is not always necessary. But once the prosecution comes up with a story that the search and seizure was conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and they also choose to examine them before Court, then the Court has to see whether the version of the independent witnesses who turned hostile is unbelievable and whether there is a possibility that they have become turncoats. (Para 18) Sanjeet Kumar Singh @ Munna Kumar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : AIR 2022 SC 4051

    Section 2(xvii) - “opium poppy”

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 2(xvii) - Once it is found that the seized material contain 'morphine' and 'meconic acid' it is sufficient to establish that the seized material comes within the definition of Section 2(xvii) of the NDPS Act (opium poppy). State of Himachal Pradesh v. Angejo Devi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 990

    Section 15 - Punishment for contravention in relation to poppy straw

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 15 - Once a Chemical Examiner establishes that the seized 'poppy straw' indicates a positive test for the contents of 'morphine' and 'meconic acid', it is sufficient to establish that it is covered by subclause (a) of Clause (xvii) of Section 2 of the 1985 Act and no further test would be necessary for establishing that the seized material is a part of 'papaver somniferum L'. In other words, once it is established that the seized 'poppy straw' tests positive for the contents of 'morphine' and 'meconic acid', no other test would be necessary for bringing home the guilt of the accused under the provisions of Section 15 of the 1985 Act. (Para 91) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nirmal Kaur @ Nimmo, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 866

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 15 - For bringing home the guilt of the accused, it will be necessary to establish that the seized material collected is any part of 'opium poppy' except the seeds. (Para 29) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nirmal Kaur @ Nimmo, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 866

    Section 20 - Punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 20 - Supreme Court sets aside conviction - gives benefit of doubt after noting gaps in the prosecution case - arrest memo, body search memo not proved - site plan wrongly prepared - no independent witnesses. Amar Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1002

    Section 21 - Punishment for contravention in relation to manufactured drugs and preparations

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 21 - The quantity of the neutral substance is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with the actual content of the weight of the offending drug while determining small and commercial quantities. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Karuna Shanker Puri, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 173

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 21 - The quantity of neutral substance(s) is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with actual content by weight of the offending drug, while determining the "small or commercial quantity" of the Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances. Intelligence Officer, Thiruvananthapuram v. K.K. Naushad, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 978

    Section 27A - Punishment for financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Sections 27A, 37 - When applicability of Section 27A NDPS Act is seriously questionable in this case and there being otherwise no recovery from the respondent and the quantity in question being also intermediate quantity, the rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act do not apply. (Para 16.4) State of West Bengal v. Rakesh Singh @ Rakesh Kumar Singh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 580

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Sections 27A, 37 - Appeal against Calcutta High Court order granted bail to a person accused under Sections 21(b)/29/27A of NDPS Act - Dismissed - No reason to consider interference in the order passed by the High Court granting bail to the respondent with specific conditions. State of West Bengal v. Rakesh Singh @ Rakesh Kumar Singh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 580

    Section 32B - Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher than the minimum punishment

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 32B - While imposing higher than the minimum punishment, such of the factors which are to be taken into consideration have been provided under Section 32B of the NDPS Act - The old age of the accused, who is a poor illiterate lady completely unaware of the consequences - Sentence reduced. Budhiyarin Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 667

    Section 37 - Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 - Appeal against High Court order that granted anticipatory bail on the ground that no recovery was effected from the accused and that they had been implicated only on the basis of the disclosure statement of the main accused - Allowed -The respondents may be able to take advantage of the decision in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1 , perhaps at the time of arguing the regular bail application or at the time of final hearing after conclusion of the trial. To grant anticipatory bail in a case of this nature is not really warranted. State of Haryana v. Samarth Kumar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 622

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 - The expression "reasonable grounds" used in Section 37(1)(b) under NDPS Act would mean credible, plausible grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence. (Para 14) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : AIR 2022 SC 3444

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 - Bail considerations - The length of the period of his custody or the fact that the charge-sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. (Para 17-18) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : AIR 2022 SC 3444

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 - Bail - The admissions made by the accused while in custody to the effect that he had illegally traded in narcotic drugs, will have to be kept aside - Confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act inadmissible in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. (Para 16) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : AIR 2022 SC 3444

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 - At the stage of examining an application for bail in the context of the Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not required to record a finding that the accused person is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not. The entire exercise that the Court is expected to undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences that he has been charged with and he is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act while on bail. (Para 15) Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : AIR 2022 SC 3444

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 - NCB's appeal against Delhi HC order granting bail to accused - Allowed - Even dehors the confessional statements, the other circumstantial evidence brought on record by the NCB ought to have dissuaded the High Court from exercising its discretion in favour of the accused - The observation made in the impugned order that since nothing was found from the possession of the respondent, he is not guilty of the offence for which he has been charged. Such an assumption would be premature at this stage - Set aside Bail order. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : AIR 2022 SC 3444

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Sections 37, 67 - Appeal against Bail granted to NDPS accused - Allowed - Validity and scope of statements under Section 67- Referred to Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1 - The rigour of law lay down in Tofan Singh was held to be applicable even at the stage of grant of bail - Referred to State by (NCB) Bengaluru v. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr. 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 69 - However, going by the circumstances on record, at this stage, the matter stands on a different footing - In the face of the mandate of Section 37 of the Act, the High Court could not and ought not to have released the accused on bail. Union of India (NCB) v. Khalil Uddin, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 878

    Section 50 - Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 - Personal search did not result in recovery of any contraband material but the non-compliance of requirement of affording an option to be searched before a Magistrate of a competent Gazetted Officer - Accused acquitted. (Para 9) Sanjeev v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : (2022) 6 SCC 294

    Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 50 - Whether the personal search is vitiated by violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the recovery made otherwise also would stand vitiated ? Cannot give such an extended view. Dayalu Kashyap v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 100

    Section 54 - Presumption from possession of illicit articles

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 54 - Section 54 of the Act raises a presumption and the burden shifts on the accused to explain as to how he came into possession of the contraband. But to raise the presumption under Section 54 of the Act, it must first be established that a recovery was made from the accused. (Para 33A) Sanjeet Kumar Singh @ Munna Kumar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : AIR 2022 SC 4051

    Section 67 - Power to call for information, etc.

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 67 - Confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act will remain inadmissible in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. (Para 10) State by (NCB) Bengaluru v. Pallulabid Ahmad, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 69 : 2022 (2) SCALE 14

    Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1988

    Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1988 - Detention - If there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. (Para 20) Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : AIR 2022 SC 4715

    Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 - Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1986; Section 37 - If detenue was ordered to be released on bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, then the same is suggestive that the Court concerned might not have found any prima facie case against him. (Para 23) Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : AIR 2022 SC 4715

    Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 - Supply of the illegible copy of documents which has been relied upon by the detaining authority indeed has deprived him in making an effective representation and denial thereof will hold the order of detention illegal and not in accordance with the procedure contemplated under law. (Para 21) State of Manipur v. Buyamayum Abdul Hanan @ Anand, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 862

    National Council for Teachers Education Regulations, 2014

    National Council for Teachers Education Regulations, 2014; Rule 7(5) - Recognition of B.Ed Colleges - State is well within its right to make suitable recommendations - When the State Government is required to provide detailed reasons against grant of recognition with necessary statistics, it includes the need and/or requirement. Therefore, the State Government was well within its right to recommend and/or opine that the State Government is not in favour of granting further recognition to the new B.Ed. colleges as against the need of annually 2500 teachers approximately 13000 students would be passing out every year, therefore, for the remaining students, there will be unemployment - The need of the new colleges looking to the requirement can be said to be a relevant consideration and a decision not to recommend further recognition to the new B.Ed. colleges on the need basis cannot be said to be arbitrary. (Para 8) State of Uttarakhand v. Nalanda College of Education, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 943 : AIR 2022 SC 5681

    National Food Security Act, 2013

    National Food Security Act, 2013 - There is a paradigm shift in addressing the problem of food security from the current welfare approach to a right based approach. The Act confers legal right on the eligible beneficiaries to get the essential commodities through fair price shops at a highly subsidized price. The Act also envisages reforms necessary for distribution of essential commodities to the ration card holders - The Act is a social welfare legislation and its provisions are mandatory. (Para 15-20) State of West Bengal v. Gitashree Dutta (Dey), 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 527

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - Appeal against NGT order that directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to not proceed with the proposal for establishment of new wood-based industries till an assessment of the actual availability of timber was done - Allowed - The Courts should not enter into an area that is the domain of the experts. FSI, an expert body, had arrived at its estimation based on the scientific method - NGT could not have sat in appeal over the opinion of the expert - While protecting the environment, the need for sustainable development has also to be taken into consideration and a proper balance between the two has to be struck - NGT has also failed to take into consideration the stand taken by the MOEFCC, which supported the stand of the State which had emphasized many advantages of granting new licenses to WBIs - While setting aside NGT orders, the following directions are issued (1) while granting permission for felling trees of the prohibited species, it should strictly ensure that the permission is granted only when the conditions specified in the Notification dated 7th January 2020 are satisfied. (2) The State Government shall also ensure that when such permissions are granted to the applicants, the applicants scrupulously follow the mandate in the said notification of planting 10 trees against 1 and maintaining them for five years. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uday Education and Welfare Trust, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 868

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - Establishment of NGT - The role of the NGT was not simply adjudicatory, but it also had the equally vital role which is preventive, ameliorative, or of the remedial category. (Para 6-10) Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : AIR 2022 SC 2713

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – NGT cannot refuse to hear a challenge to an Environmental Clearance under Section 16(h) of the NGT Act and delegate the process of adjudicating on compliance toan expert committee. (Para 16) Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust v. State of Gujarat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2022 (2) SCALE 826

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 and 15 - An expert committee may be able to assist the NGT, for instance, by carrying out a fact-finding exercise, but the adjudication has to be by the NGT. This is not a delegable function. Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust v. State of Gujarat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2022 (2) SCALE 826

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 and 15 - Section 15 empowers the NGT to award compensation to the victims of pollution and for environmental damage, to provide for restitution of property which has been damaged and for the restitution of the environment. The NGT cannot abdicate its jurisdiction by entrusting these core adjudicatory functions to administrative expert committees. Expert committees may be appointed to assist the NGT in the performance of its task and as an adjunct to its fact-finding role. But adjudication under the statute is entrusted to the NGT and cannot be delegated to administrative authorities. Adjudicatory functions assigned to courts and tribunals cannot be hived off to administrative committees. (Para 16) Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust v. State of Gujarat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2022 (2) SCALE 826

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 and 15 - Sections 14 and Section 15 entrust adjudicatory functions to the NGT. The NGT is a specialized body comprising of judicial and expert members. Judicial members bring to bear their experience in adjudicating cases. On the other hand, expert members bring into the decision-making process scientific knowledge on issues concerning the environment. (Para 15) Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust v. State of Gujarat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2022 (2) SCALE 826

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 and 15 - The NGT cannot abdicate its jurisdiction by entrusting these core adjudicatory functions to administrative expert committees. Expert committees may be appointed to assist the NGT in the performance of its task and as an adjunct to its fact-finding role. But adjudication under the statute is entrusted to the NGT and cannot be delegated to administrative authorities. (Para 16) Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust v. State of Gujarat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2022 (2) SCALE 826

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - When the credentials and bonafides of a litigant approaching the NGT are seriously raised, the same cannot be ignored Before a litigant is permitted to knock the doors of justice and seek orders which have far reaching effects of affecting the employment of thousands of persons, stopping investment in the State, prejudicing the interests of the farmers; the credentials and bonafides of the applicants must be tested. (Para 98-99) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uday Education and Welfare Trust, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 868

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 14 and 22 - NGT under Section 14 & 22 of the NGT Act does not oust the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 & 227 as the same is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. (Para 38(A), 12-15) Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : AIR 2022 SC 2713

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 22 - The remedy of direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 22 of the NGT Act is intra vires the Constitution of India - It cannot be seen as denial of access to justice to the litigants in the field of environmental law. (Para 38(B), 24-31) Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : AIR 2022 SC 2713

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 3 - Establishment of NGT - Constitutional validity upheld - Section 3 of the NGT Act is not a case of excessive delegation of power to the Central Government. (Para 38(C), 32-37) Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : AIR 2022 SC 2713

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 3, 4 - The seat of the NGT benches can be located as per Page 37 of 37 exigencies and it is not necessary to locate them in every State - Prayer for relocating the Bhopal NGT to Jabalpur is unmerited and is rejected. (Para 38(D), 16-23) Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : AIR 2022 SC 2713

    National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 4 - NGT (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011; Rule 3 - In view of the proviso to Section 4(4)(c) of the NGT Act 2010 which states that the number of expert members hearing the appeal or application shall be equal to the number of judicial members, mandating that there shall be at least one expert member on the Bench. Talli Gram Panchayat v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 614

    National Health Mission

    National Health Mission - Ayurvedic doctors will be entitled to be treated at par with Allopathic Medical Officers and Dental Medical Officers under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM/NHM) Scheme - Upheld Uttarakhand High Court judgment that under the NRHM/NHM Scheme, Ayurvedic Doctors will be entitled to parity in salary with Allopathic Medical Officers and Dental Medical Officers. State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Singh Chauhan, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 320

    National Highways Act, 1956

    National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3G(5) - While examining the award within the parameters permissible under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and while examining the determination of compensation as provided under Sections 26 and 28 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the concept of just compensation for the acquired land should be kept in view while taking note of the award considering the sufficiency of the reasons given in the award for the ultimate conclusion. (Para 24) National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju @ Cheluvaiah, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : 2022 (9) SCALE 823

    National Medical Commission

    National Medical Commission (Foreign Medical Graduate Licentiate) Regulations 2021; Regulations 4(a)(i), 4(a)(ii), 4(b) & 4(c) - National Medical Commission (Compulsory Rotating Medical Internship) Regulations, 2021; Schedule ­II 2(a) and 2(c)(i) - Constitutional validity upheld - NMC has the power to frame the Regulations - Regulations not arbitrary - Not necessary for the NMC and the Central Government to recognise foreign medical degrees of a lesser duration - The prescription of an internship for a minimum duration of 12 months in the same foreign medical institution cannot also be said to be a duplication of internships. Aravinth R.A. v. Secretary to Government of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 473

    National Security Act, 1980

    National Security Act, 1980 - Section 8 - The failure of the Central and the State governments to communicate the rejection of the representation in a time bound manner would vitiate the order of detention. (Para 10) Devesh Chourasia v. District Magistrate, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2022 (2) SCALE 330

    Natural Justice

    Natural Justice - It is well known that natural justice is the sworn enemy of unfairness - It is expected of the Courts to be cautious and afford a reasonable opportunity to parties, especially in commercial matters having a serious impact on the economy and employment of thousands of people. (Para 37) Future Coupons Pvt. Ltd. v. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : (2022) 6 SCC 121

    Natural Justice - Principles of - Quasi Judicial Authority - A quasi -judicial authority has a duty to disclose the material that has been relied upon at the stage of adjudication - An ipse dixit of the authority that it has not relied on certain material would not exempt it of its liability to disclose such material if it is relevant to and has a nexus to the action that is taken by the authority. In all reasonable probability, such material would have influenced the decision reached by the authority - The actual test is whether the material that is required to be disclosed is relevant for purpose of adjudication. If it is, then the principles of natural justice require its due disclosure. (Para 39) T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : AIR 2022 SC 1153 : (2022) 8 SCC 162

    Natural Justice - Principles of - Quasi Judicial Authority - The disclosure of material serves a three - fold purpose of decreasing the error in the verdict, protecting the fairness of the proceedings, and enhancing the transparency of the investigatory bodies and judicial institutions. (Para 51) T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : AIR 2022 SC 1153 : (2022) 8 SCC 162

    Natural Justice - The principles of natural justice is a part of the mandate of Article 14 itself - An exception to the principle would be a case where it is entirely futile to provide an opportunity. (Para 16) Jayashree v. Director Collegiate Education, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2022 (4) SCALE 267

    NEET

    NEET - Post Graduate Medical Courses - Admission - The schedule for admission to the post­graduate medical courses must be followed strictly leaving no discretion to any authority to permit admissions over the cut­off date under schedule for admission to post­graduate medical courses. (Para 20) Board of Governors of Medical Council of India v. Dr. Priyambada Sharma, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 855

    NEET - The validity of the OBC reservation in the AIQ seats in NEET-PG and NEET-UG is upheld - Operative directions issued - Counselling on the basis of NEET-PG 2021 and NEET- UG 2021 shall be conducted by giving effect to the reservation as provided by the notice dated 29 July 2021, including the 27 per cent reservation for the OBC category and 10 per cent reservation for EWS category in the AIQ seats - The criteria for the determination of the EWS notified by OM 2019 shall be used for identifying the EWS category for candidates who appeared for the NEET-PG 2021 and NEET-UG 2021 examinations. (Para 6, 7) Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : (2022) 4 SCC 95

    NEET Admissions - Court cannot issue a mandamus directing the respondent to conduct admissions through institutional preference. The decision of whether or not to provide institutional preference solely lies with the respondent-authority since it falls within the realm of policy. (Para 9) Hemant Kumar Verma v. Employee State Insurance Corporation, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 641

    NEET In-Service Quota - Junior Resident Doctors serving in Employee State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) run hospitals as part of their bond period cannot claim 50% in-service quota for Post Graduate courses at par with Insurance Medical Officers-There is a clear distinction in law between junior resident doctors and regularly recruited ESIC doctors. The in-service quota is, therefore, justifiably made available to the latter category. The petitioners cannot claim parity with regularly recruited insurance medical officers in seeking the benefit of the in-service quota. (Para 10) Hemant Kumar Verma v. Employee State Insurance Corporation, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 641

    NEET-PG - Plea to postpone NEET-PG 2022 scheduled for May 21 rejected - Postponement will create chaos and uncertainty and will impact patient care and will cause prejudice to over 2 lakh students who have prepared. Dr. R. Dinesh Kumar Reddy v. Medical Counselling Committee, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2022 SC 2306

    NEET-PG 2021 - The decision of the Union Government and the Medical Counselling Committee not to have Special Stray Round of counselling is in the interest of Medical Education and Public Health. There cannot be any compromise with the merits and/or quality of Medical Education, which may ultimately affect the Public Health. (Para 10.4) Astha Goel v. Medical Counselling Committee, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : AIR 2022 SC 2766

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

    Section 3 - Banker

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 3 - ‘Banker’ includes any person acting as a banker and any post office savings bank. In terms of this section, a post office savings bank is a banker under the NI Act. (Para 11) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Section 8 - “Holder”

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 8 - A holder means a person (i) entitled to possession of a promissory note, bill of exchange or a cheque, and (ii) entitled to sue the maker, acceptor or indorser of the instrument for the recovery of the amount due thereon in his name - The requirements of Section 8 are two -fold, and both requirements have to be satisfied. (Para 15) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 8 and 9 - An obligation has been imposed on the transferee of the promissory notes, to be deemed to be a ‘Holder in due course’, that the notes should have been acquired in good faith; after exercising reasonable care and caution about the holder’s title. (Para 11.2) Small Industries Development Bank of India v. Sibco Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : (2022) 3 SCC 56

    Section 10 - “Payment in due course”

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 10 - Definition of ‘payment in due course’ - Ascertainment of whether the act of payment is in good faith and without negligence is by examination of the circumstances in which payment is made. In other words, antecedent and present circumstances should not afford a reasonable ground for believing that the person to whom payment is made is not entitled to receive payment of the amount mentioned.9 While it would not be advisable or feasible to strait -jacket the circumstances, albeit value of the instrument, other facts that would raise doubts about the reliability and identity of the person entitled to receive payment and genuineness of the instrument in the payer’s mind are relevant considerations. (Para 17) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 10 - Definition of ‘payment in due course’ - The requirement in Section 10 that the payment should be in both good faith and without negligence is cumulative. Thus, mere good faith is not sufficient. (Para 17) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 10 - General Clauses Act, 1897 - Section 3(22) - Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act which defines ‘good faith’ as an act done honestly, whether done negligently or not, is not sufficient to hold that the payment made was ‘payment in due course’ under the NI Act. (Para 18) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Section 13 - “Negotiable instrument”

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 13 - Different principles apply for discharge from liability when the negotiable instrument is payable to bearer or has been indorsed in blank, in which case payment must be made in terms of Section 10, whereas when the negotiable instrument is payable to order, the maker, acceptor or endorser would be discharged from liability when payment is made to the ‘holder’ of the instrument. (Para 14) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 13 - Kisan Vikas Patra Rules, 1988 - Kisan Vikas Patras (KVPs) are negotiable instruments in terms of Section 13 of the NI Act - It cannot be said that the KVPs are simple bearer instruments payable to anyone who presents the same for encashment and discharge. (Para 12, 29) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Section 15 - Indorsement

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 15 and 16 - ‘Indorsement’, ‘indorsee’, ‘indorser’ and ‘indorsement in blank’ and ‘in full’ - Indorsement for the purpose of negotiation is made by the maker or holder of the negotiable instrument when he signs on the back or face of thereof, on a slip of paper annexed thereto or on a stamp paper for the purpose of negotiation. The person signing is called the indorser. If the instrument is signed by the indorser in his name only, it is an indorsement in blank. If the indorser also specifies the person to whom payment is to be made, the indorsement is said to be ‘in full’, and the person so specified is called the indorsee. (Para 12) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Section 78 - To whom payment should be made

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 8 and 78 - Payment made to a person in possession of the instrument, but not entitled to receive or recover the amount due thereon in his name, is not a valid discharge. (Para 15) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Section 118 - Presumptions as to negotiable instruments

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 118(a) - Presumption - Every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration. Frost International Ltd. v. Milan Developers & Builders, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : (2022) 8 SCC 633

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 118(a) - Presumption - Every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration. Frost International Ltd. v. Milan Developers & Builders, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : (2022) 8 SCC 633

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 118, 138, 139 - Once a cheque is issued and upon getting dishonoured a statutory notice is issued, it is for the accused to dislodge the legal presumption available under Sections 118 and 139 resply of the N.I. Act. Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh Chadha, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 879

    Section 131 - Non-liability of banker receiving payment of cheque

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 131 and 131A - The standard of care expected from a collecting banker does not require him to subject the cheque to a minute and microscopic examination, yet disregarding circumstances about the cheque, which on the face of it gives rise to suspicion, may amount to negligence on the part of the collecting banker. Further, the question of good faith and negligence is to be judged from the standpoint of the true owner towards whom the banker owes no contractual liability but statutory duty by these provisions - Allegations of negligence against the paying banker could provide no defence for the collecting banker who has not collected the amount in good faith and without negligence. (Para 20) Pradeep Kumar v. Post Master General, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : (2022) 6 SCC 351

    Section 138 - Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138 - Even when the Criminal Court refers the matter under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in order to make it executable, it will be treated as if it were a decree. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Noida) v. Yunus, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : AIR 2022 SC 847 : (2022) 9 SCC 516

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 138 - It is surprising that on the one hand, the bank managers have specifically deposed that no such bank account was opened and maintained in their bank while on the other hand the cheque drawn by the respondent in favour of the appellant, was returned with the remark "account frozen" in respect of the same cheque. The bank account has been mentioned on the cheque and the endorsement to the effect "Account Frozen" will presuppose that an account existed". Vikram Singh v. Shyoji Ram, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 223

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 and 142 - A.C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2014) 11 SCC 790 - The employment of the terms "specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney holder" and such assertion about knowledge should be "said explicitly" as stated in A.C. Narayanan (supra) cannot be understood to mean that the assertion should be in any particular manner, much less only in the manner understood by the accused in the case. All that is necessary is to demonstrate before the learned Magistrate that the complaint filed is in the name of the "payee" and if the person who is prosecuting the complaint is different from the payee, the authorisation therefor and that the contents of the complaint are within his knowledge. What can be treated as an explicit averment, cannot be put in a straitjacket but will have to be gathered from the circumstance and the manner in which it has been averred and conveyed, based on the facts of each case. The manner in which a complaint is drafted may vary from case to case and would also depend on the skills of the person drafting the same which by itself, cannot defeat a substantive right. However, what is necessary to be taken note of is as to whether the contents as available in the pleading would convey the meaning to the effect that the person who has filed the complaint, is stated to be authorized and claims to have knowledge of the same. In addition, the supporting documents which were available on the record by themselves demonstrate the fact that an authorized person, being a witness to the transaction and having knowledge of the case had instituted the complaint on behalf of the "payee" company and therefore, the requirement of Section 142 of N.I. Act was satisfied. (Para 17, 14) TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : AIR 2022 SC 1315 : (2022) 7 SCC 612

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 and 142 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Entertaining a petition under Section 482 to quash the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate would be unjustified when the issue of proper authorisation and knowledge can only be an issue for trial. (Para 17) TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : AIR 2022 SC 1315 : (2022) 7 SCC 612

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 and 142 - When a company is the payee of the cheque based on which a complaint is filed under Section 138 of N.I. Act, the complainant necessarily should be the Company which would be represented by an employee who is authorized. Prima­facie, in such a situation the indication in the complaint and the sworn statement (either orally or by affidavit) to the effect that the complainant (Company) is represented by an authorized person who has knowledge, would be sufficient - Such averment and prima facie material is sufficient for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance and issue process. If at all, there is any serious dispute with regard to the person prosecuting the complaint not being authorized or if it is to be demonstrated that the person who filed the complaint has no knowledge of the transaction and, as such that person could not have instituted and prosecuted the complaint, it would be open for the accused to dispute the position and establish the same during the course of the trial. (Para 17) TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : AIR 2022 SC 1315 : (2022) 7 SCC 612

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 is not maintainable, the complainant cannot be permitted to present the very same complaint at any later stage. His remedy is only to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the court of sufficient cause. (Para 5-9) Gajanand Burange v. Laxmi Chand Goyal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 682

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Expeditious disposal of cases - Establishment of pilot courts presided over by retired judges in 5 districts of 5 states with the highest pendency (namely, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh) directed - Guidelines covering the pilot study issued. In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : AIR 2022 SC 2481

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - For the commission of an offence under Section 138, the cheque that is dishonoured must represent a legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity or presentation - If the drawer of the cheque pays a part or whole of the sum between the period when the cheque is drawn and when it is encashed upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque - When a part or whole of the sum represented on the cheque is paid by the drawer of the cheque, it must be endorsed on the cheque as prescribed in Section 56 of the Act. The cheque endorsed with the payment made may be used to negotiate the balance, if any. If the cheque that is endorsed is dishonoured when it is sought to be encashed upon maturity, then the offence under Section 138 will stand attracted. (Para 30) Dashratbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : AIR 2022 SC 4961

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Supreme Court imposes Rs 5 lakhs cost on convict who agreed to settle the dispute only after 10 years of litigation - Court cites wastage of precious judicial time and tyranny of justice caused to complainant. Santhosh J. v. V. Narasimha Murthy, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 874

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Though a post- dated cheque might be drawn to represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of its drawing, for the offence to be attracted, the cheque must represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment. If there has been a material change in the circumstance such that the sum in the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of maturity or encashment, then the offence under Section 138 is not made out. (Para 16) Dashratbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : AIR 2022 SC 4961

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138, 141 - The object of notice before the filing of the complaint is not just to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission to make his stance clear so far as his liability under Section 138 of the NI Act is concerned - It is essential for the person to whom statutory notice is issued under Section 138 of the NI Act to give an appropriate reply. The person concerned is expected to clarify his or her stance. If the person concerned has some unimpeachable and incontrovertible material to establish that he or she has no role to play in the affairs of the company/firm, then such material should be highlighted in the reply to the notice as a foundation. (Para 44) S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : AIR 2022 SC 4883

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138, 141 - Vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners 'qua' the firm. This would make them liable to face the prosecution but it does not lead to automatic conviction - On the other elements of an offence under Section 138 being satisfied, the burden is on the Board of Directors or the officers in charge of the affairs of the company/partners of a firm to show that they were not liable to be convicted. (Para 47) S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : AIR 2022 SC 4883

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138, 56 - When a part- payment of the debt is made after the cheque was drawn but before the cheque is encashed, such payment must be endorsed on the cheque under Section 56 of the Act. The cheque cannot be presented for encashment without recording the part payment. If the unendorsed cheque is dishonoured on presentation, the offence under Section 138 would not be attracted since the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment. (Para 29) Dashratbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : AIR 2022 SC 4961

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138, 139 - A drawer handing over a cheque signed by him is liable unless it is proved by adducing evidence at the trial that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability. The evidence of a hand-writing expert on whether the accused had filled in the details in the cheque would be immaterial to determining the purpose for which the cheque was handed over. Therefore, no purpose is served by allowing the application for adducing the evidence of the hand-writing expert - The presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-writing expert. Even if the details in the cheque have not been filled up by drawer but by another person, this is not relevant to the defense whether cheque was issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. (Para 4, 17) Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Prabodh Kumar Tewar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 714

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138, 139 - Appeal against concurrent conviction in a cheque bounce case - Partly allowed - Upheld the conviction - Directed that sentence of imprisonment of one year vacated - Accused appellant sentenced to fine of Rs.5,000/- which he will deposit within a period of one month in the Trial Court. Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : (2022) 6 SCC 735

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138, 139 - At the time, when the complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity - However, the accused has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is acceptable which he can do by producing independent materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and producing documents, by pointing to the materials produced by the complainant himself, or through the cross examination of the witnesses of the complainant. (Para 9) Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : (2022) 6 SCC 735

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138, 139 - Theory of 'probable defence' - The accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof - All which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances that exist - It becomes the duty of the Courts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and then come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the accused has shown that the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason that the accused has established a probable defence. (Para 7, 9) Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : (2022) 6 SCC 735

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138, 141 - For maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of NI Act, arraigning of the company as an accused is imperative and non-impleadment of the company would be fatal for the complaint. (Para 19-21) Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 971

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138, 141, 142 - Whether the amendment in the complaint and the impleadment of an additional accused subsequent to filing of the complaint is pemissible? The argument that an additional accused can be impleaded subsequent to the filing of the complaint merits no consideration, once the limitation prescribed for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 142 of NI Act has expired. More particularly, in view of the fact that neither any effort was made by the petitioner at any stage of the proceedings to arraign the company as an accused nor any such circumstances or reason has been pointed out to enable the Court to exercise the power conferred by proviso to Section 142, to condone the delay for not making the complaint within the prescribed period of limitation. (Para 22-23) Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 971

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138,141 - Whether it is necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of, or responsible for the conduct of the business of the company - the liability arises on account of conduct, act or omission on the part of a person and not merely on account of holding an office or a position in a company. Therefore, in order to bring a case within Section 141 of the Act the complaint must disclose the necessary facts which make a person liable. (Para 26-31) Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 971

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Whether on similar set of allegations of fact the accused can be tried for an offence under NI Act which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior conviction or acquittal and, the bar of Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. would attract for such trial? - Referred to larger bench. J. Vedhasingh v. R.M. Govindan, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : AIR 2022 SC 3772

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; Section 138 - The judgment in M/s Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. M/s Bhiwani Denim Apparels Ltd.: (2001) 7 SCC 401 does not deal with a claim for blanket exemption from personal appearance - Observations therein essentially co-relate with the facts of the said case - In appropriate cases the Magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel - Such discretion needs to be exercised only in rare instances and there ought to be good reasons for dispensing with the presence. Mahesh Kumar Kejriwal v. Bhanuj Jindal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 394

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; Section 138 - SLP against Punjab & Haryana HC judgment which refused petitioner's claim of blanket exemption from personal experience in case under Section 138 NI Act -Dismissed - It is difficult to appreciate that in the case of the present nature, the petitioners seek to avoid appearance even once in terms of the order of the learned Sessions Judge. Mahesh Kumar Kejriwal v. Bhanuj Jindal, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 394

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Transfer Petition filed by a woman-accused seeking transfer of cheque bounce complaint - A complaint under Section 138 cannot be transferred as per the convenience of the accused - Being a woman and senior citizen, she can always seek exemption from personal appearance - Directed Trial Judge to favourable consider application if made by the petitioner for grant of exemption - The Trial Judge shall compel the petitioner to appear only when her presence is absolutely mandatory for the conduct of the trial. S. Nalini Jayanthi v. M. Ramasubba Reddy, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 880

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138,139 - The Court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility particularly because of the legal presumption - In a situation where the accused moves Court for quashing even before trial has commenced, the Court's approach should be careful enough to not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which supports the complaint - Quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence. (Para 16, 11, 13) Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2022 (6) SCALE 794

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138, 141 - The laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions, resulting in enactment of Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act has to be borne in mind - A complaint should also not be read with a pedantically hyper technical approach to deny relief under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to those impleaded as accused, who do not have any criminal liability in respect of the offence alleged in the complaint. (Para 39) Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : AIR 2022 SC 3548 : (2022) 10 SCC 152

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138,141 - High Court should not interfere under Section 482 of the Code at the instance of an accused unless it comes across some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that the Director/partner of a firm could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques - If any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald averment is made in the complaint and that he/she is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he/she must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling incontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his/her contention. He/she must make out a case that making him/her stand the trial would be an abuse of process of Court. (Para 47) S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : AIR 2022 SC 4883

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138,139 - Whether the cheque in question had been issued for a time barred debt or not, itself prima facie, is a matter of evidence and could not have been adjudicated in an application filed by the accused under Section 482 of the CrPC. Yogesh Jain v. Sumesh Chadha, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 879

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 and 141 - Moratorium - Liability of natural persons like a Director of the Company - The moratorium provisions contained in Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 would apply only to the corporate debtor and that the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 of the Act would continue to be statutorily liable under the provisions of the Act. Narinder Garg v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2022 (7) SCALE 162

    Section 139 - Presumption in favour of holder

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 139 - Presumption under Section 139 includes a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. However, the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is rebuttable and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. Jain P. Jose v. Santhosh, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 979

    Section 141 - Offences by companies

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 141 - Impleadment of all Directors of an Accused Company on the basis of a statement that they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, without anything more, does not fulfil the requirements of Section 141 of the NI Act - Specific averments have to be made in the pleadings to substantiate the said statement in the complaint, that such Director was in charge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the Company or the Company - It would be a travesty of justice to drag Directors, who may not even be connected with the issuance of a cheque or dishonour thereof, such as Director (Personnel), Director (Human Resources Development) etc. into criminal proceedings under the NI Act, only because of their designation. (Para 42-46) Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : AIR 2022 SC 3548 : (2022) 10 SCC 152

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 141 - The burden is on the prosecution to show that the person prosecuted was in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. (Para 7) Dilip Hariramani v. Bank of Baroda, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : AIR 2022 SC 2258

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 141 - Vicarious liability in the criminal law in terms of Section 141 of the NI Act cannot be fastened because of the civil liability - Vicarious liability arises only when the company or firm commits the offence as the primary offender - Unless the company or firm has committed the offence as a principal accused, the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) or (2) would not be liable and convicted as vicariously liable. (Para 11-14) Dilip Hariramani v. Bank of Baroda, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : AIR 2022 SC 2258

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 141 - When the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director of a company, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company - Prefix "Managing" to the word "Director" makes it clear that the Director was in charge of and responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company - A Director or an Officer of the company who signed the cheque renders himself liable in case of dishonour. (Para 30, 37) Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : AIR 2022 SC 3548 : (2022) 10 SCC 152

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 141(1) Proviso - The onus to satisfy the requirements and take benefit of the proviso is on the accused. Still, it does not displace or extricate the initial onus and burden on the prosecution to first establish the requirements of sub-section (1) to Section 141 of the NI Act. (Para 7) Dilip Hariramani v. Bank of Baroda, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : AIR 2022 SC 2258

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 141(2) - The onus under Section 141(2) of the NI Act is on the prosecution and not on the person being prosecuted - Sub-section (2) to Section 141 of the NI Act does not state that the persons enumerated, can be prosecuted and punished merely because of their status or position as a director, manager, secretary or any other officer, unless the offence in question was committed with their consent or connivance or is attributable to any neglect on their part. (Para 8) Dilip Hariramani v. Bank of Baroda, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : AIR 2022 SC 2258

    Section 143A - Power to direct interim compensation

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 143A - Failure of accused to pay interim compensation - The amount can be recovered as if it were a fine - The provision nowhere contemplates that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be fastened with any other disability including denial of right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant. (Para 12-14) Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : AIR 2022 SC 3592 : (2022) 9 SCC 23

    Newspaper Reports

    Newspaper Reports - Courts cannot take judicial notice of facts stated in a news item published in a newspaper. A statement of fact contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore, inadmissible in evidence, unless proved by the maker of the statement appearing in court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported. (Para 70) Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 439 : 2022 (7) SCALE 256

    O

    One Time Settlement Scheme - The borrower as a matter of right cannot claim that though it has not made the payment as per the sanctioned OTS Scheme still it be granted further extension as a matter of right - Bank mutually can agree to extend the time which is permissible under Section 62 of the 18 Indian Contract Act. State Bank of India v. Arvindra Electronics Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : AIR 2022 SC 5517

    Orders - Conditional Order - CAT while setting aside disciplinary proceedings directed the disciplinary authority to complete the fresh proceedings within two months - The fresh proceedings was not completed within this stipulated time and an order was passed by the authority later - CAT rejected employee's challenge against this order - Allowing writ petition filed by employee, the High Court held that Disciplinary Authority had no jurisdiction or authority to complete the proceedings beyond the period prescribed by the Tribunal - Allowing appeal, Supreme Court observed: While treating the proceedings as having abated and as nullity, the High Court has ignored the fundamental principles that fixing of such time period was only a matter of procedure with an expectation of conclusion of the proceedings in an expeditious manner. This period of two months had not acquired any such mandatory statutory character so as to nullify the entire of the disciplinary proceedings with its expiry. Union of India v. Sharvan Kumar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 595

    Orders - Conditional Order - When a conditional order is passed by the Court/Tribunal to do a particular act or thing within a particular period but the order does not provide anything as to the consequence of default, the Court/Tribunal fixing the time for doing a particular thing obviously retains the power to enlarge such time. As a corollary, even the Appellate Court/Tribunal or any higher forum would also be having the power to enlarge such time, if so required. In any case, it cannot be said that the proceedings would come to an end immediately after the expiry of the time fixed. (Para 9.2) Union of India v. Sharvan Kumar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 595

    Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999 - U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 - UP Entry Tax Act, 2007 - Inclusion of industrial townships within the definition of the local area - Constitutional Validity upheld - The object of the levy, i.e., entry tax, is the regulation of entry of goods in a regular area for consumption, i.e., manufacture, use or sale. There is no dispute that entry of goods into an industrial area or estate is for their use for manufacturing or for processing or for the purposes of their delivery as their ultimate point of destination, i.e. for the purpose of their "consumption, use or sale" within that area. It could even be that the goods enter within the industrial area or estate, as the ultimate point of destination for their use. In any case, the levy would be attracted because the incidence is the entry into the local area. (Para 48) OCL India Ltd. v. State of Orissa, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 911 : AIR 2022 SC 5609

    Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Register) Rules, 1970 (U.P.) - Family register does not only contain date of birth but also keeps the records of any additions in the family, though the evidentiary value needs to be examined in each case - It is a question of fact as to how much evidentiary value is to be attached to the family register, but to say that it is entirely not relevant would not be the correct enunciation of law. The register is being maintained in accordance with the rules framed under a statute. (Para 35 -36) Manoj @ Monu @ Vishal Chaudhary v. State of Haryana, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2022 SC 1060 : (2022) 6 SCC 187

    Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (Kerala); Section 102(1)(ca) - The failure to make a true disclosure in Form 2A, regarding the past conviction, will certainly come within the meaning of the word 'fake', mentioned in Section 102 (1)(ca) - A person having criminal antecedents, poses himself to be one without any such antecedent, when he fails to make a true disclosure. In law, he passes off or comes out as a person without any criminal antecedent. (Para 33) Ravi Namboothiri v. K.A. Baiju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 933

    Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (Kerala); Section 52(1A) - The words "involvement in a criminal case at the time of filing of the nomination" would only mean (i) cases where a criminal complaint is pending investigation/trial; (ii) cases where the conviction and/or sentence is current at the time of filing of the nomination; and (iii) cases where the conviction is the subject matter of any appeal or revision pending at the time of the nomination. (Para 37) Ravi Namboothiri v. K.A. Baiju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 933

    Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (Kerala); Section 52(1A) and 102(1) - Police Act, 1960 (Kerala); Sections 38 and 52 - The failure of the elected candidate to disclose (in nomination form) his conviction for an offence under the Kerala Police Act for holding a dharna in front of the Panchayat office, cannot be taken as a ground for declaring an election void. (Para 46) Ravi Namboothiri v. K.A. Baiju, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 933

    Partition - It is not always necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for partition to seek the cancellation of the alienations- Alienees as well as the cosharer are still entitled to sustain the alienation to the extent of the share of the co­sharer. It may also be open to the alienee, in the final decree proceedings, to seek the allotment of the transferred property, to the share of the transferor, so that equities are worked out in a fair manner. (Para 15) Umadevi Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : AIR 2022 SC 1640 : (2022) 7 SCC 90

    Partition - It is not always necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for partition to seek the cancellation of the alienations- Alienees as well as the cosharer are still entitled to sustain the alienation to the extent of the share of the co­sharer. It may also be open to the alienee, in the final decree proceedings, to seek the allotment of the transferred property, to the share of the transferor, so that equities are worked out in a fair manner. (Para 15) Umadevi Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : AIR 2022 SC 1640 : (2022) 7 SCC 90

    Partition - it is not the law that a co -owner cannot acquire his own independent or separate properties. (Para 29) B.R. Patil v. Tulsa Y. Sawkar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 165 : 2022 (4) SCALE 122

    Partition - Ouster - The possession of a co -owner however long it may be, hardly by itself, will constitute ouster. In the case of a co -owner, it is presumed that he possesses the property on behalf of the entire body of co -owners. Even non -participation of rent and profits by itself need not amount to ouster. The proof of the ingredients of adverse possession are undoubtedly indispensable even in a plea of ouster. However, there is the additional requirement in the case of ouster that the elements of adverse possession must be shown to have been made known to the co -owner. This is apparently for the reason that the possession of a co -owner is treated as possession of other co -owners. While it may be true that it may not be necessary to actually drive out the co -owner from the property - Mere continuance in the possession of a co -owner does not suffice to set up a plea of ouster. The possession of the co -owner will also be referable to lawful title. (Para 24) B.R. Patil v. Tulsa Y. Sawkar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 165 : 2022 (4) SCALE 122

    Partition - Properties not in the possession of co -sharers/coparceners being omitted cannot result in a suit for the partition of the properties which are in their possession being rejected. (Para 11) B.R. Patil v. Tulsa Y. Sawkar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 165 : 2022 (4) SCALE 122

    Partition - The law looks with disfavor upon properties being partitioned partially. The principle that there cannot be a partial partition is not an absolute one. It admits of exceptions. (Para 10) B.R. Patil v. Tulsa Y. Sawkar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 165 : 2022 (4) SCALE 122

    Partition Suit - In a suit for partition, the position of the plaintiff and the defendant can be interchangeable. Each party adopts the same position with the other parties - So long as the suit is pending, a defendant can ask the Court to transpose him as a plaintiff and a plaintiff can ask for being transposed as a defendant. (Para 12) Azgar Barid v. Mazambi @ Pyaremabi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : AIR 2022 SC 1304 : (2022) 5 SCC 334

    Partition Suit - Plaintiff is not disentitled to relief in the second appeal merely on the ground that they have not challenged the judgment and decree of the trial court which denied their claims before the First Appellate Court. Azgar Barid v. Mazambi @ Pyaremabi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : AIR 2022 SC 1304 : (2022) 5 SCC 334

    Partnership Act, 1932 - Section 30(5) - Sub -Section (5) of Section 30 shall not be applicable to a minor partner who was not a partner at the time of his attaining the majority and, thereafter, he shall not be liable for any past dues of the partnership firm when he was a partner being a minor. (Para 6) State of Kerala v. Laxmi Vasanth, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 166

    Partnership Act, 1932 - Section 30(5) - Sub -Section (5) of Section 30 shall be applicable only in a case where a minor was inducted as a partner and thereafter at the time of attaining the majority he continued as a partner in that case such a partner who has been continued is required to give six months' notice as provided under sub -Section (5) of Section 30. If such a person who has been continued as a partner at the time of attaining the majority does not give six months notice as per sub -Section (5) of Section 30, in that case, he is deemed to have been and/or he shall be continued or treated to have been continued as a partner and the consequences and the liability as per sub -Section (7) of Section 30 shall follow. (Para 6) State of Kerala v. Laxmi Vasanth, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 166

    Partnership Act, 1932 - To attract the bar of Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932, the contract in question must be the one entered into by firm with the third-party defendant and must also be the one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of its business dealings; and that Section 69(2) of the Act of 1932 is not a bar to a suit filed by an unregistered firm, if the same is for enforcement of a statutory right or a common law right. (Para 15) Shiv Developers v. Aksharay Developers, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 104 : AIR 2022 SC 772

    Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Anganwadi centres - Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009; Section 11 - The activity of running a preschool for the children in the age group of 3 to 6 years is purely an educational activity. The job of teaching is done by AWWs and AWHs. The State Government is running pre-schools in Anganwadi centres in accordance with Section 11 of the RTE Act. (Para 30) Maniben Maganbhai Bhariya v. District Development Officer Dahod, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : AIR 2022 SC 2119

    Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - The 1972 Act will apply to Anganwadi centres and in turn to Anganwadi workers (AWW) and Anganwadi helpers. (Para 31) Maniben Maganbhai Bhariya v. District Development Officer Dahod, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : AIR 2022 SC 2119

    Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; Section 2(s) - 'Wages' - Ad hoc payment made pursuant to the interim orders passed by Court does not form part of "wages" within the meaning of the expression under Section 2(s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 for the purpose of calculating gratuity. (Para 17-22) Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Rajesh Chandra Shrivastava, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : AIR 2022 SC 1707

    Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; Section 3(1)(b) - Anganwadi centres are establishments contemplated by clause (b) of sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the 1972 Act - ‘Establishments’ contemplated by clause (b) can be establishments within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in a State in relation to establishments. (Para 24) Maniben Maganbhai Bhariya v. District Development Officer Dahod, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : AIR 2022 SC 2119

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